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Justice O’Connor’s Pragmatic View of Coerced Self-Incrimination

January 1, 1991

ITEM DETAILS

Type: Law review article
Author: George C. Thomas III
Source: Women's Rts. L. Rep.
Citation: 13 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 117 (1991)
Date is approximate: Yes
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Justice O’Connor’s Pragmatic View Of Coerced Self-Incrimination

by

GEORGE C. THOMAS III

Almost no one acknowledges it, but the Self incrimination Clause is empty of meaning. By that I mean that the clause generates no under standing of how it should operate beyond the very narrow understanding derived from its historical origins (and thus from outside the language of the clause itself). The Self-incrimination Clause can not generate meaning because its central con cept-

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