And a Child Shall Lead Them: Justice O’Connor, the Principle of Religious Liberty and Its Practical Application

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And a Child Shall Lead Them:* Justice O’Connor, The Principle of Religious Liberty and Its Practical Application

Benjamin D. Federt

Introduction

In the more than forty years since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Everson v. Board of Education,1 lawyers, scholars, lay men, and judges have struggled to find a consistent, logical method for interpreting and applying the terse language of the religion clauses of the first amendment.2 Most of the attention (and controversy) has focused on the first of these, known as the establishment clause. After closely examining the cases, opin ions, and articles in this area, only one proposition may be confi-

This title stems from a comment made by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496 (1985), in reference to her status then as the Court’s junior member.

t Associated with the firm of Shearman & Sterling in New York. B.A., 1981, Boston

University; J.D., 1985, Boston University. The views contained herein, for better and worse, are solely those of the author. I wish to thank Lawrence Sager, Neil Devins, and Robert Feder for their helpful suggestions and comments along the way. Josephine Fra gale provided all secretarial assistance. I wish to express special thanks to Archibald Cox, for his time and invaluable comments on an earlier version of this article. Finally, I must note my deep gratitude to Ira C. Lupu for both his strong support and his insightful critical analyses.

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