Opinions

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Justice O’CONNOR wrote the opinion, in which Judge KING and Judge DAVIS joined.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice:

Geraldine Lauture appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to her employer, St. Agnes Hospital, on her race- and national origin-based claims for discrimination, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. She also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to St. Agnes on her state law claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I

Appellant Geraldine Lauture, who is black and was born in Haiti of Haitian parents, was employed by St. Agnes Hospital as a Medical Laboratory Technician. Lauture holds an associate degree in Medical Laboratory Technology and a Certificate of Achievement for completing training in chemistry, hematology, and microbiology. From July 2004 until December 2005, Lauture worked the evening shift in the Microbiology Lab without any direct supervision. In December 2005, Lauture was allowed to switch to the day shift so that she could spend time with her children. On the day shift, Lauture was supervised by Jane Weiger and Margaret Kinch, the Microbiology Lab’s co-Lead Technologists, who had permitted Lauture’s move from the evening shift. Weiger and Kinch

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Justice O’CONNOR wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER and Judge KEENAN joined.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice:

Charles Edward Wernert II, the Appellee, filed suit against Fluvanna County Police Department Deputy Joshua Greene,1 alleging that Greene used excessive force against him. Appellant Greene invoked a defense of qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment.

I

On the evening of May 4, 2007, Fluvanna County Police Department Deputy Joshua Greene was on patrol with auxiliary Deputy Francis Ferki. The deputies heard over their radio first that an individual had jumped onto an ambulance on Kents Store Road and then that a man had committed an assault at a residence on the same road. The man who committed the assault was described as being approximately six feet tall, wearing a white tee shirt and blue jeans, and carrying one or two suitcases. Near the location of the assault, the deputies saw Appellee Wernert, who matched the description they had received.

When Wernert saw the deputies, he started walking away, carrying a bag. The deputies stopped him and asked for identification, which Wernert provided. Wernert, who appeared to be intoxicated, explained that he was on parole in Pennsylvania and therefore was not supposed to leave that state. The radio dispatcher confirmed

O’CONNOR, Supreme Court Justice (Ret.):

This case asks us to evaluate the constitutionality of certain aspects of New York’s handgun licensing regime. As we explain, we believe we should not reach that question before certifying a predicate question of state law to the New York Court of Appeals.

I

Appellant Alfred Osterweil applied for a handgun license in May 2008. Following the directions of New York Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a), he applied for a license “in the city or county… where [he] resides.”1 At that time, his house in Summit, New York—part of Schoharie County—was still his primary residence and domicile. While his application was pending, however, Osterweil moved his primary residence to Louisiana, keeping his home in Summit as a part-time vacation residence. He then sent a letter to the Schoharie licensing authorities inquiring whether this move made him ineligible for a license. A46. Shortly thereafter, in July 2008, Osterweil sent another letter suggesting that if his change of domicile foiled his license application, a constitutional problem would result. A52–A53. This second letter came after the United States Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms, and that the core of this right is the right to self-defense in the home.

Osterweil’s application was eventually forwarded to appellee George Bartlett, a judge of the county court

O’CONNOR, Supreme Court Justice (Ret.):

Appellant Jason McGuire fired a single shot from a handgun in the general direction of an airborne police helicopter. Believing he meant to hit the helicopter, a jury convicted McGuire of attempting to “set[ ] fire to, damage[ ], destroy[ ], disable[ ], or wreck[ ] an[ ] aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1). The judge determined that this was a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which imposes a mandatory consecutive sentence on anyone who uses or possesses a firearm in connection with such a crime. McGuire challenges both the jury’s verdict and the judge’s determination. We affirm.

I.

Because McGuire challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the facts are in dispute. Roughly speaking, however, they are as follows:

Inebriated and distraught because of losing his girlfriend and his job, McGuire took his father’s loaded.38–caliber revolver from an unlocked safe and out into the driveway of his home. He called several friends on his cell phone, attempting to vent his distress, but could not find a ready ear. He was contemplating suicide, he says, but he could not bring himself to it. Instead, he fired off several rounds: one into a tree near the driveway, and several down the empty street. Neighbors called the police. McGuire, meanwhile, went back inside. See Dkt. No. 152 at 19–24.

When he came out again, the police had responded.

O’CONNOR, Supreme Court Justice (Ret.):

Claiming to be the holder in due course of a commercial loan on which Appellant Michael McCranie had defaulted, Appellee DZ Bank brought an enforcement suit in federal district court. McCranie defended the suit on the grounds that DZ Bank was not in fact a holder of the loan because of a problem in the chain of title, and that even if it was, it had obtained the loan subject to certain valid defenses that prevented enforcement. The District Court granted summary judgment to DZ Bank. Because we find that the facts surrounding the loan’s chain of title were in material dispute, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Although our ultimate point is that there are some key facts in dispute, many of them are uncontested. In October 2000, McCranie entered into an agreement with Brooke Corporation, an insurance franchising company, to buy a local franchise in Florida. McCranie borrowed money from a Brooke affiliate called Brooke Credit to finance the sale, and agreed in return to write policies exclusively through Brooke, paying off the loan over time with his commissions. See Dkt. No. 63–1 at 1–4; Dkt. No. 54–1 at 2. The original note, as well as a supplemental note executed in 2002, were both made payable only to Brooke Credit or its successors and assigns. See Dkt. No. 63–1 at 27; Dkt. No. 54–1 at 6.

Trouble arose in August 2008, when McCranie became aware of serious allegations of wrongdoing at Brooke. According to McCranie,

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.):

Defendant Charles Lee Gillenwater, II, was charged with two counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications and one count of transmitting threatening communications by United States mail. After determining that Gillenwater was not competent to stand trial, the district court authorized the government to medicate Gillenwater involuntarily to render him competent to face the charges against him. While recognizing the important interests at stake for both the government and Gillenwater, we conclude that the district court did not err in authorizing Gillenwater’s involuntary medication.

I

Gillenwater once worked on the renovation of the Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. Gillenwater believes that he and thousands of others were exposed to asbestos during that renovation. He also believes that the government allowed the exposure to occur and helped the hotel cover it up. And Gillenwater believes that government and hotel officials came after him when he tried to reveal the exposure and cover up.

In November 2011, Gillenwater was charged with two counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and one count of transmitting threatening communications by United States mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c).

In the proceedings that followed, the government claimed that Gillenwater made graphic and disturbing threats against a number of government officials and employees and showed