Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
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JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
A prisoner under a death sentence remains a living person and consequently has an interest in his life. The question this case raises is the issue of what process is constitutionally necessary to protect that interest in the context of Ohio’s clemency procedures. It is clear that “once society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore established its right to punish, the demands of due process are reduced accordingly.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 429 (1986) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part). I do not, however, agree with the suggestion in the principal opinion that, because clemency is committed to the discretion of the executive, the Due Process Clause provides no constitutional safeguards. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S reasoning rests on our decisions in Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458 (1981), and Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Com plex, 442 U. S. 1 (1979). In those cases, the Court found that an inmate seeking commutation of a life sentence or discre tionary parole had no protected liberty interest in release from lawful confinement. When a person has been fairly convicted and sentenced, his liberty interest, in being free from such confinement, has been extinguished. But it is incorrect, as JUSTICE STEVENS’ dissent notes, to say that a prisoner
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This action, involving the adjudication of various claims to a historic shipwreck, requires us to address the interaction between the Eleventh Amendment and thein remadmiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Respondent Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR), located the ship, known as the S. S.Brother Jonathan,in California’s territorial waters. When DSR turned to the federal courts for resolution of its claims to the vessel, California contended that the Eleventh Amendment precluded a federal court from considering DSR’s claims in light of the State’s asserted rights to theBrother Jonathanunder federal and state law. We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the jurisdiction
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Florida et al. by Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, and Eric J. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Calvin E. Holloway, Sr., of Guam, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, William H. Sorrell of Vermont,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, concurring in the judgment.
This Court has long applied a presumption against thirdparty standing as a prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Federal courts, we have held, “must hesitate before resolving a controversy, even one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 113 (1976); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975). Contrary to this prudential rule, the principal opinion recognizes that petitioner has standing to raise an equal protection challenge to 8 U. S. C. § 1409. The statute, however, accords differential treatment to fathers and mothers, not to sons and daughters. Thus, O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment
although petitioner is clearly injured by the fact that she has been denied citizenship, the discriminatory impact of the provision falls on petitioner’s father, Charlie Miller, who is no longer a party to this suit. Consequently, I do not believe that we should consider petitioner’s gender discrimination claim.
The principal opinion recognizes that petitioner’s claim turns on “the proposition that her citizen father should have the same right to transmit citizenship as would a citizen mother” and resolves to “evaluate the alleged discrimination against [petitioner’s father] as well as its impact on [petitioner].” Ante, at 433. But even when “the very same allegedly
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is when a school district may be held liable in damages in an implied right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1681et seq.(Title IX), for the sexual harassment of a student by one of the district’s teachers. We conclude that damages may not be recovered in those circumstances unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct.
I
In the spring of 1991, when petitioner Alida Star Gebser was an eighth-grade student at a middle school in respondent Lago Vista Independent School District (Lago Vista), she joined a high school book discussion group led by Frank Waldrop, a teacher at Lago Vista’s high school. Lago Vista received federal funds at all pertinent times. During the book discussion sessions, Waldrop often made sexually suggestive comments to the students. Gebser entered high school in the fall and was assigned to classes taught by Waldrop in both semesters. Waldrop continued to make inappropriate
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Education Association by Michael D. Simpson and Laurence Gold; and for the National Women’s Law Center et al. by Jacqueline R. Denning, Nancy L. Perkins, and Marcia D. Greenberger.
Briefs of amici curiae urging
JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JusTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join.
In this case, the Court considers a challenge under the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Constitution to the Coal
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for AlliedSignal Inc. et al. by Donald B. Ayer, Jonathan C. Rose, James E. Gauch, and Gregory G. Katsas; for Davon, Inc., by John W Fischer II; for Pardee & Curtin Lumber Co. et al. by Arthur Newbold, Ethan D. Fogel, and Andrew S. Miller; for Unity Real Estate Co. et al. by Robert H. Bork, David J. Laurent, Patrick M. McSweeney, William B. Ellis, and John L. Marshall; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Timothy S. Bishop, Daniel
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Association, Inc., by Clifford M. Sloan and Paul L. Joffe; for California Cities and Counties et al. by John R. Calhoun, John D. Echeverria, James K. Hahn, Anthony Saul Alperin, Samuel L. Jackson, Joan R. Gallo, George Rios, Louise H. Renne, Gary T. Ragghianti, and S. Shane Stark; for Cedar Coal Co. et al. by David M. Cohen; for Freeman United Coal Mining Co. by Kathryn S. Matkov; for Ohio Valley Coal Co. et al. by John G. Roberts, Jr.; and for the United Mine Workers of America by Grant Crandall.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Midwest Motor Express, Inc., by Hervey H. Aitken, Jr., and Roy A. Sheetz; and for Pittston Co. by A. E. Dick
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that respondent’s claim of disability should be evaluated on an individualized basis and that she has not proved that her asymptomatic HIV status substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. In my view, the act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part of the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the representative major life activities of all persons-“caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working”-listed in regulations relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR § 41.31(b)(2) (1997). Based on that conclusion, there is no need to address whether other aspects of intimate or family relationships not raised in this case could constitute major life activities; nor is there reason to consider whether HIV status would impose a substantiallimitation on one’s ability to reproduce if reproduction were a major life activity.
I join in Part II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which concludes that the Court of Appeals failed to properly determine whether respondent’s condition posed a direct threat. Accordingly, I agree that a remand is necessary on that issue.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
Although the attorney-client privilege ordinarily will survive the death of the client, I do not agree with the Court that it inevitably precludes disclosure of a deceased client’s communications in criminal proceedings. In my view, a criminal defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence or a compelling law enforcement need for information may, where the testimony is not available from other sources, override a client’s posthumous interest in confidentiality.
We have long recognized that “[t]he fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are to rest upon reason-is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.” Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 381 (1933). In light of the heavy burden that they place on the search for truth, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708-710 (1974), “[e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper circumstances,” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 175 (1979). Consequently, we construe the scope of privileges narrowly. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U. S. 1, 19 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); see also University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U. S. 182, 189 (1990). We are reluctant to recognize a privilege or read an existing one expansively unless to do so will serve a “public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.t The National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, as amended in 1990, 104 Stat. 1963, requires the Chairperson of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to ensure that “artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.” 20 U. S. C. § 954(d)(1). In this case, we review the Court of Ap
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay A. Sekulow, Colby M. May, James M. Henderson, Sr., and John P. Tuskey; for Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver and Frederick H. Nelson; and for the National Family Legal Foundation by Len L. Munsil.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of University Professors et al. by John Joshua Wheeler, Jonathan R. Alger, and Jeffrey P. Cunard; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State by Steven K. Green, Julie A. Segal, and Edward Tabash; for the Family Research Institute of Wisconsin by Daniel Kelly; for the New School for Social Research et al. by Floyd Abrams, Burt Neuborne, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Jonathan Sherman, Elai Katz, and Deborah Goldberg; for the Rockefeller Foundation by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.; for Twenty-Six Arts, Broadcast, Library, Museum and Publishing Amici Curiae by James F. Fitzpatrick,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause, which we have found applicable in the capital sentencing context, seeBullingtonv.Missouri,451 U. S. 430(1981), extends to noncapital sentencing proceedings. We hold that it does not, and accordingly affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court.
I
Petitioner was charged under California law with one count of using a minor to sell marijuana, Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11361(a) (West 1991), one count of sale or transportation of marijuana, § 11360(a), and one count of possession of marijuana for sale, § 11359. In the information, the State also notified petitioner that it would seek to prove two sentence enhancement allegations: that petitioner had previously been convicted of assault and that he had served a prison term for that offense, see Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 245(a)(1), 667(e)(1), and 667.5 (West Supp. 1998).
Under California’s “three-strikes” law, a defendant convicted of a felony who has two qualifying prior convictions for “serious felonies” receives a minimum sentence of 25 years to life; when the instant conviction was preceded by one serious felony offense, the court doubles a defendant’s term of imprisonment. §§ 667(d)(1) and (e)(1)-(2). An assault conviction qualifies as a serious felony if the defendant either inflicted great bodily injury on another person or per
W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mike Fisher
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 452, as added, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3), permits unions and employers to negotiate an agreement that requires union “membership” as a condition of employment for all employees. We have interpreted a proviso to this language to mean that the only “membership” that a union can require is the payment of fees and dues,NLRBv.General Motors Corp.,373 U. S. 734, 742 (1963), and we have held that § 8(a)(3) allows unions to collect and expend funds over the objection of nonmembers only to the extent they are used for collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment activities,Communications Workersv.Beck,487 U. S. 735, 745, 762-763 (1988). In this case, we must determine whether a union breaches its duty of fair representation when it negotiates a union security clause that tracks the language of § 8(a)(3) without explaining, in the agreement, this Court’s interpretation of that language. We conclude that it does not.
We are also asked to review the Court of Appeals’ decision that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide a claim that a union breached the duty of fair representation by negotiating a clause that was inconsistent with the statute. We conclude that because this challenge to the union security clause was based purely on an alleged inconsistency with the statute, the Court of Appeals correctly held that
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
Petition circulation undoubtedly has a significant political speech component. When an initiative petition circulator approaches a person and asks that person to sign the petition, the circulator is engaging in “interactive communication concerning political change.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U. S. 414, 422 (1988). It was the imposition of a direct and substantial burden on this one-on-one communication that concerned us in Meyer v. Grant. To address this concern, we held in that case that regulations directly burdening the one-on-one, communicative aspect of petition circulation are subject to strict scrutiny. Id., at 420.
Not all circulation-related regulations target this aspect of petition circulation, however. Some regulations govern the electoral process by directing the manner in which an initiative proposal qualifies for placement on the ballot. These latter regulations may indirectly burden speech but are a step removed from the communicative aspect of petitioning and are necessary to maintain an orderly electoral process. Accordingly, these regulations should be subject to a less exacting standard of review.
In this respect, regulating petition circulation is similar to regulating candidate elections. Regulations that govern a candidate election invariably burden to some degree one’s right to vote and one’s right to associate for political purposes. Such restrictions
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act or Voting Rights Act), 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973et seq.,des
* Deborah J. La Fetra filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. ignated States and political subdivisions are required to obtain federal preclearance before giving effect to changes in their voting laws. See § 1973c. Here, the State of California (California or State), which is not subject to the Act’s preclearance requirements, has passed legislation altering the scheme for electing judges in Monterey County, California (Monterey County or County), a “covered” jurisdiction required to preclear its voting changes. In this appeal, we review the conclusion of a three-judge District Court that Monterey County need not seek approval of these changes before giving them effect. The District Court reasoned, specifically, that California is not subject to the preclearance requirement and that Monterey County merely implemented a California law without exercising any independent discretion. We hold that the Act’s preclearance requirements apply to measures mandated by a noncovered State to the extent that these measures will effect a voting change in a covered county. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the District Court.
I
The instant appeal marks the second occasion on which this Court has addressed issues arising in the course of litigation over the method for electing
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-B.
The Census Bureau (Bureau) has announced a plan to use two forms of statistical sampling in the 2000 Decennial Census to address a chronic and apparently growing problem of “undercounting” certain identifiable groups of individuals. Two sets of plaintiffs filed separate suits challenging the legality and constitutionality of the Bureau’s plan. Convened as three-judge courts, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and the District Court for the District of Columbia each held that the Bureau’s plan for the 2000 census violates the Census Act, 13 U. s. C. § 1 et seq., and both courts permanently enjoined the Bureau’s planned use of statistical sampling to determine the population for purposes of congressional apportionment. 19 F. Supp. 2d 543 (ED Va. 1998); 11 F. Supp. 2d 76 (DC 1998). We noted probable jurisdiction in both cases, 524 U. S. 978 (1998); 525 u. S. 924 (1998), and consolidated the cases for oral argument, 525
rien; for Jerome Gray et al. by Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, and Edward Still.
Donald Dinan filed a brief for the District of Columbia State Democratic Committee urging reversal in No. 98-564.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 98-404 were filed for the State of Wisconsin et al. by James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Peter C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Mike Fisher, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Calvin R.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JusTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write separately to express my views about the meaning of prejudice in this context. When, as here, a district court fails to advise a defendant of his right to appeal, there are two ways in which this error could be said not to have prejudiced the defendant. First, a defendant might not be prejudiced by the error because he already knew about his right to appeal. That is the case here, and the Court properly concludes that under these circumstances, the defendant has not shown that he is entitled to collateral relief.
Second, a defendant might not be prejudiced by the district court’s failure to advise him of his right to appeal because he had no meritorious grounds for appeal in any event. In my opinion, there is no reason why a defendant should have to demonstrate that he had meritorious grounds for an appeal when he is attempting to show that he was harmed by the district court’s error. To require defendants to specify the grounds for their appeal and show that they have some merit would impose a heavy burden on defendants who are often proceeding pro se in an initial 28 U. S. C. § 2255 motion. If the district judge had fulfilled his obligation to advise the defendant of his right to appeal, and the defendant had wanted to appeal, he would have had a lawyer to identify and develop his arguments on appeal. The defendant should not be
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, and with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join as to Part I, dissenting.
The Court today ignores the plain meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Federal Labor Statute or Statute) and erroneously concludes that when an agency responds to a judicial decision by abandoning its own interpretation of a statute and adopting that of the judicial forum this Court should defer to the agency’s revised position, rather than evaluate whether the revised interpretation renders, in fact, the most plausible reading of the statute. I respectfully dissent.
I
The Federal Labor Statute plainly does not impose a general duty on agencies to bargain midterm. See Social Security Administration v. FLRA, 956 F.2d 1280, 1281 (CA4 1992). Whether the language of a statute is plain or ambiguous is determined “by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997).
Here, the language of the Federal Labor Statute, as well as the specific and broader contexts in which that language is used, demonstrates that the Statute is unambiguous. The Federal Labor Statute specifies a few instances where midterm bargaining is required, see 5 U. S. C. § 7106(b), but it contains no provision that expressly or implicitly imposes a general duty on agencies to bargain during the term of a collective
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and I agree that the State’s failure to properly raise its challenge to our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence supports a decision not to pass on the merits of this claim. Ante this page. I further note, however, that the State does nothing that would persuade me to reconsider or abandon our well-established body of negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1837, the United States entered into a Treaty with several Bands of Chippewa Indians. Under the terms of this Treaty, the Indians ceded land in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota to the United States, and the United States guar
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Richard M. Frank and Jan S. Stevens, Assistant Attorneys General, and Joel S. Jacobs, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Brent D. Boger and Robin L. Rivett.
Carter G. Phillips, Virginia A. Seitz, and John Bell filed a brief for the National Congress of American Indians et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Douglas Y. Freeman filed a brief for the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance as amicus curiae. anteed to the Indians certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. We must decide whether the Chippewa Indians retain these usufructuary rights today. The State of Minnesota argues that the Indians lost these rights through an Executive Order in 1850, an 1855 Treaty, and the admission of Minnesota into the Union in 1858. After
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner brought suit against the Monroe County Board of Education and other defendants, alleging that her fifthgrade daughter had been the victim of sexual harassment by another student in her class. Among petitioner’s claims was a claim for monetary and injunctive relief under Title IX of
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Sara L. Mandelbaum and Steven R. Shapiro; for the National Education Association et al. by Judith L. Lichtman and Donna R. Lenhoff; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Martha F. Davis, Julie Goldscheid, Yolanda S. Wu, David S. Ettinger, and Mary-Christine Sungaila; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National School Boards Association et al. by Lisa A. Brown, Jennifer Jacobs, and Julie Underwood; and for Students for Individual Liberty et al. by James A. Moody.
Richard P. Ward and Anita K. Blair filed a brief for the Independent Women’s Forum as amicus curiae. the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. The District Court dismissed petitioner’s Title IX claim on the ground that “student-on-student,” or peer, harassment provides no ground for a private cause of action under the statute. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. We consider
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court. 28 U. s. C. §§ 2254(b)(1), (c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III). In this case, we are asked to decide whether a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for
* Edward M. Chikofsky and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. We conclude that he must.
I
In 1977, respondent Darren Boerckel was tried in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Illinois, for the rape, burglary, and aggravated battery of an 87-year-old woman. The central evidence against him at trial was his written confession to the crimes, a confession admitted over Boerckel’s objection. The jury convicted Boerckel on all three charges, and he was sentenced to serve 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment on the rape charge, and shorter terms on the other two charges, with all sentences to be served concurrently.
Boerckel appealed his convictions to the Appellate Court of Illinois, raising several issues. He argued, among other things, that his confession should have been suppressed because the confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest, because the confession was coerced, and because he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance, Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992) (gang loitering ordinance or ordinance) is unconstitutionally vague. A penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited” or fails to establish guidelines to prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” of the law. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357 (1983). Of these, “the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is… the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”’ Id., at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 574-575 (1974)). I share JUSTICE THOMAS’ concern about the consequences of gang violence, and I agree that some degree of police discretion is necessary to allow the police “to perform their peacekeeping responsibilities satisfactorily.” Post, at 109 (dissenting opinion). A criminal law, however, must not permit policemen, prosecutors, and juries to conduct “‘a standardless sweep… to pursue their personal predilections.”’ Kolender v. Lawson, supra, at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, supra, at 575).
The ordinance at issue provides:”Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. * Section 803(d)(3) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA or Act), 110 Stat. 1321-72, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(d)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. III), t places limits on the fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits. We are asked to decide how this section applies to cases that were pending when the PLRA became effective on April 26, 1996. We conclude that § 803(d)(3) limits attorney’s fees with respect to post judgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA’s effective date but it does not so limit fees for post judgment monitoring performed before the effective date.
I
The fee disputes before us arose out of two class action lawsuits challenging the conditions of confinement in the Michigan prison system. The first case, which we will call Glover, began in 1977 when a now-certified class of female prisoners filed suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Glover plaintiffs alleged that the defendant prison officials had violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them access to vocational and educational opportunities that were available to male prisoners. They also claimed that the defendants had denied them their right of access to the courts. After a bench trial, the District Court found “[s]ignificant discrimination against the female prison population”
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.,prohibits certain employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their disabilities. See § 12112(a). Petitioners challenge the dismissal of their ADA action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed. In reaching that result, we hold that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment, including, in this instance, eyeglasses and contact lenses. In addition, we hold that petitioners failed to allege properly that respondent “regarded” them as having a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
I
Petitioners’ amended complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we accept the allegations contained in their complaint as true for purposes of this case. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 327 (1991).
Petitioners are twin sisters, both of whom have severe myopia. Each petitioner’s uncorrected visual acuity is 20/ 200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye, but “[w]ith the use of corrective lenses, each… has vision that is 20/20 or better.” App. 23. Consequently, without corrective lenses, each “effectively cannot see to conduct
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), 105 Stat. 1071, punitive damages are available in claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000eet seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.Punitive damages are limited, however, to cases in which the em
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey L. Needle and Mark S. Mandell; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Janice Goodman, Paula A. Brantner, and Peter S. Rukin; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; for the National Retail Federation by Robert P. Joy; for the Society for Human Resource Management by D. Gregory Valenza and Roger S. Kaplan; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Michael J. Connolly, David A. Lawrence, Clifford J. Scharman, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Timothy B. Dyk, Daniel H. Bromberg, John B. Kennedy, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by James M. Finberg, Daniel F.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), dismissed petitioner Vaughn L. Murphy from his job as a UPS mechanic because of his high blood pressure. Petitioner filed suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.,in Federal District Court. The District Court granted summary judgment to respondent, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly considered petitioner in his medicated state when it held that petitioner’s impairment does
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Massachusetts et al. by Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Catherine C. Ziehl, Assistant Attorney General, Darrell V. McGraw, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Mary C. Buchmelter, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Bill Lockyer of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, and Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico; for the American Diabetes Association by Michael A. Greene; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Gary Phelan and Paul A. Brantner; and for Senator Harkin et al. by Arlene B. Mayerson.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Trucking
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621et seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III), makes it unlawful for an employer, including a State, “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual… because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). In these cases, three sets of plaintiffs filed suit under the Act, seeking money damages for their state employers’ alleged discrimination on the basis of age. In each case, the state employer moved to dismiss the suit on the basis of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court in one case granted the motion to dismiss, while in each of the remaining cases the District Court denied the motion. Appeals in the three cases were consolidated before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. In these cases, we are asked to consider whether the ADEA contains a clear
Foley, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitor, and Matthew J. Lampke, Assistant Solicitor, Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla