Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
Filters
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.
Today the Court holds that claims of political gerrymandering lodged by members of one of the political parties that make up our two-party system are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our precedents compels us to take this step, and there is every reason not to do so. I would hold that the partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political question that the judiciary should leave to the legislative branch, as the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended. Accordingly, I would reverse the District Court’s judgment on the grounds that appellees’ claim is nonjusticiable.
There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government. The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the continued vitality of our two-party system, which permits both stability and measured change. The opportunity to control the drawing of electoral boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part of politics in the United States, and one that plays no small role in fostering active participation in the political parties at every level. Thus, the legislative business of apportionment is fundamentally
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.
In this case, we are called upon to construe § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. Amended § 2 is intended to codify the “results” test employed in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the “intent” test propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). S.Rep. No. 97-417, pp. 27-28 (1982) (hereinafter S.Rep.). Whereas Bolden required members of a racial minority who alleged impairment of their voting strength to prove that the challenged electoral system was created or maintained with a discriminatory purpose and led to discriminatory results, under the results test, “plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose.” S.Rep. at 28. At the same time, however, § 2 unequivocally disclaims the creation of a right to proportional representation. This disclaimer was essential to the compromise that resulted in passage of the amendment. See id. at 193-194 (additional views of Sen. Dole).
In construing this compromise legislation, we must make every effort to be faithful to the balance Congress struck. This is not an easy task. We know that Congress intended to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2, but we also know that Congress did not intend to create a right to proportional representa
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the recovery available to a defrauded tax shelter investor, entitled under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 or § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to rescind the fraudulent transaction or obtain rescissory damages, must be reduced by any tax benefits the investor has received from the tax shelter investment.
I
In 1973, petitioners purchased interests in Alotel Associates (Associates), a limited partnership organized by respondent B. J. Loftsgaarden to build and operate a motel in Rochester, Minnesota. Loftsgaarden was the president and sole shareholder of respondent Alotel, Inc. (Alotel), which, together with Loftsgaarden, was to be a general partner in the venture.
Loftsgaarden marketed this $3.5 million project as a “tax shelter,” which would result in ” significantly greater returns for persons in relatively high income tax brackets.'” Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 173 (CA8 1982) ( Austin I ). As a partnership, Associates would not be taxed as an entity. Rather, its taxable income and losses would pass through to the limited partners, who would then be entitled to claim their individual shares of the partnership’s deductible losses to the extent of their adjusted basis in their partnership interests. 26 U.S.C. § 704(d). Especially attractive from the high-income investor’s perspective was the fact that,
in a real estate investment such as the one contemplated
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize that the Court’s holding is a narrow one. The Court holds that the relief provided in a consent decree need not conform to the limits on court-ordered relief imposed by § 706(g), whatever those limits may be. Rather, the validity of race-conscious relief provided in a consent decree is to be assessed for consistency with the provisions of § 703, such as § 703(a) and § 703(d), which were at issue in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), and, in the case of a public employer, for consistency with the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court explains, nonminority employees therefore remain free to challenge the race-conscious measures contemplated by a proposed consent decree as violative of their rights under § 703 or the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if nonminority employees do not object to the consent decree, a court should not approve a consent decree that, on its face, provides for racially preferential treatment that would clearly violate § 703 or the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the Court refrains from deciding
what showing [an] employer would be required to make concerning prior discrimination on its part against minorities in order to defeat a challenge by nonminority employees based on § 703.
Ante at 478 U. S. 517, n. 8.
It is clear, then, that the Court’s opinion does not hold or otherwise suggest that there is no “necessary predicate for race-conscious practices… favoring
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts II-A, III, and VI of the Court’s opinion. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on statutory grounds insofar as the membership “goal” and the Fund order are concerned, and I would not reach petitioners’ constitutional claims. I agree with JUSTICE WHITE, however, that the membership “goal” in this case operates as a rigid racial quota that cannot feasibly be met through good faith efforts by Local 28. In my view, § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j), and § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), read together, preclude courts from ordering racial quotas such as this. I therefore dissent from the Court’s judgment insofar as it affirms the use of these mandatory quotas.
In Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984), the Court interpreted § 706(g) as embodying a policy against court-ordered remedies under Title VII that award racial preferences in employment to individuals who have not been subjected to unlawful discrimination. See id. at 467 U. S. 579 -583. The dissenting opinion in Stotts urged precisely the position advanced by JUSTICE BRENNAN’s plurality opinion today -that any such policy extends only to awarding make-whole relief to particular nonvictims of discrimination, and does not bar class-wide racial preferences in certain cases. Id. at 467 U. S. 612 -614 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). The Court unquestionably rejected that view in Stotts. Although technically dicta, the discussion of § 706(g)
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA or Act), 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., empowers the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) to entertain state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings and, if so, whether that grant of authority violates Article III of the Constitution.
I
The CEA broadly prohibits fraudulent and manipulative conduct in connection with commodity futures transactions. In 1974, Congress “overhaul[ed]” the Act in order to institute a more “comprehensive regulatory structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex.” H.R.Rep. No. 93-975, p. 1 (1974). See Pub.L. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389. Congress also determined that the broad regulatory powers of the CEA were most appropriately vested in an agency which would be relatively immune from the “political winds that sweep Washington.” H.R.Rep. No. 93-975, at 44, 70. It therefore created an independent agency, the CFTC, and entrusted to it sweeping authority to implement the CEA.
Among the duties assigned to the CFTC was the administration of a reparations procedure through which disgruntled customers of professional commodity brokers could seek redress for the brokers’ violations of the Act or CFTC regulations. Thus, § 14 of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 ed.), [ Footnote 1 ] provides that any person injured by such violations may apply to the Commission for an order directing the offender to pay reparations
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring.
I agree that the Court of Appeals erred in applying a First Amendment standard of review where, as here, the government is regulating neither speech nor an incidental, nonexpressive effect of speech. Any other conclusion would lead to the absurd result that any government action that had some conceivable speech-inhibiting consequences, such as the arrest of a newscaster for a traffic violation, would require analysis under the First Amendment. If, however, a city were to use a nuisance statute as a pretext for closing down a bookstore because it sold indecent books or because of the perceived secondary effects of having a purveyor of such books in the neighborhood, the case would clearly implicate First Amendment concerns and require analysis under the appropriate First Amendment standard of review. Because there is no suggestion in the record or opinion below of such pretextual use of the New York nuisance provision in this case, I concur in the Court’s opinion and judgment.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, Circuit Justice.
Applicant requests that I issue a stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three. The California Court of Appeal judgment granted Phillip William Feiock’s petition for habeas corpus, holding that the United States Constitution requires that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil contempt proceeding that Mr. Feiock was able to comply with a previous court order. The Orange County Superior Court had ordered Mr. Feiock to make child support payments, and after Mr. Feiock failed to comply with this court order, he was held in civil contempt. He was sentenced to a 25-day suspended sentence, placed on probation, and ordered to begin making his child support payments or prepare himself for incarceration. At the civil contempt hearing, the trial court applied Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 1209.5 (West 1982), which provides that proof that a court of competent jurisdiction had issued a child support order which was filed and served on a parent, together with proof of noncompliance, constitutes prima facie evidence of a contempt of court.
On petition of Mr. Feiock, the California Court of Appeal granted a writ of habeas corpus and annulled the judgment of contempt. In re Feiock, 180 Cal. App. 3d 649, 225 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986). The court held that § 1209.5 was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a court may award attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §1988, in a separate federal action not to enforce any of the civil rights laws listed in §1988, but solely to recover attorney’s fees.
I
In 1957, the Durham City Council advised the North Carolina State Highway Commission of the need for a major east-west expressway in the city. North Carolina Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, Final Environmental Impact Statement No. FHWA-NC-EIS-72 13-F, Historical Resume 15 (1982). Over the years, parts of this highway were completed. In 1976, petitioner North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) resumed planning an extension of the east-west highway. The proposed extension was to run through the Crest Street community, an established, predominantly black neighborhood in Durham. The extension would have displaced the community park and church and many of the residents of the neighborhood. Respondents, Residents of Crest Street Community and the Save Our Church and Community Committee, two unincorporated associations, retained the North Central Legal Assistance Program to represent them in regard to the proposed highway extension. Despite respondents’ opposition to the extension plans, petitioners issued a revised draft Environmental Impact Statement that continued to propose that the extension run through
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, II, III-B, and III-C, and I concur in the Court’s judgment that § 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (Act), 2 U.S.C. § 441b, is unconstitutional as applied to the conduct of appellee Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), at issue in this case. I write separately, however, because I am concerned that the Court’s discussion of the Act’s disclosure requirements may be read as moving away from the teaching of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); see ante at 479 U. S. 254 -255. In Buckley, the Court was concerned not only with the chilling effect of reporting and disclosure requirements on an organization’s contributors, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 66 -68, but also with the potential burden of disclosure requirements on a group’s own speech. Id. at 424 U. S. 74 -82. The Buckley Court concluded that disclosure of a group’s independent campaign expenditures serves the important governmental interest of “shed[ding] the light of publicity” on campaign financing, thereby helping voters to evaluate the constituencies of those who seek federal office. Id. at 424 U. S. 81. As a result, the burden of disclosing independent expenditures generally is “a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic processes of our federal election system to public view.” Id. at 424 U. S. 82.
In my view, the significant burden on MCFL in this case comes not from
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.
Immediately after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, this Court recognized that the broad language of § 2 of the Amendment conferred plenary power on the States to regulate the liquor trade within their boundaries. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 (1939); Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939); State Board of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 (1936). As JUSTICE STEVENS recently observed, however, the Court has, over the years, so “completely distorted the Twenty-first Amendment” that “[i]t now has a barely discernible effect in Commerce Clause cases.” Newport v. Iacobucci, ante, at 479 U. S. 98 (dissenting). Because I believe that the Twenty-first Amendment clearly authorized the State of New York to regulate the liquor trade within its borders free of federal interference, I dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion, and would affirm the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.
I
In Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324 (1964), this Court took a first step toward eviscerating the authority of States to regulate the commerce of liquor. The Court held that the State of New York could not regulate the importation of liquor into that State when the liquor was sold in duty-free shops at the Kennedy Airport. The basis for this decision was the fact that the United States Customs Service
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
As the Court’s opinion acknowledges, there must be a deprivation “of a right’ secured by a federal statute” before 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action. Ante at 479 U. S. 423. Petitioners’ claim of a federally enforceable “right” raises three distinct questions. The first question is whether the Brooke Amendment to the Public Housing Act of 1937, Pub.L. 91-152, § 213, 83 Stat. 389 (1969), itself has created an enforceable right to utilities. The second is whether, in the absence of any indication of congressional intent to create a right to utilities, administrative regulations can create such a right. The third is whether, assuming administrative regulations alone could create a right enforceable in a § 1983 action, the regulations at issue in this case have established standards capable of judicial interpretation and application.
Whether a federal statute confers substantive rights is not an issue unique to § 1983 actions. In implied right of action cases, the Court also has asked, since Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 422 U. S. 78 (1975), whether “the statute create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.” In determining whether a statute creates enforceable rights, the “key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature.” Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 453 U. S. 13 (1981). We have looked first to the statutory
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12), does not prohibit a State from disqualifying unemployment compensation claimants who leave their jobs because of pregnancy, when the State imposes the same disqualification on all claimants who leave their jobs for a reason not causally connected to their work or their employer. 688 S.W.2d 344 (1985). We granted certiorari, 475 U. S. 1118 (1986), because the court’s decision conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1150 (1983), on a question of practical significance in the administration of state unemployment compensation laws.
I
In August, 1980, after having been employed by the J. C. Penney Company for approximately three years, petitioner requested a leave of absence on account of her pregnancy. Pursuant to its established policy, the J. C. Penney Company granted petitioner a “leave without guarantee of reinstatement,” meaning that petitioner would be rehired only if a position was available when petitioner was ready to return to work. Petitioner’s child was born on November 5, 1980. On December 1, 1980, when petitioner notified J. C. Penney that she wished to return to work, she was told that there were no positions open.
Petitioner then filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The claim was denied by the Division of Employment
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
This case squarely presents the tension that has long existed between the two central principles of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 428 U. S. 189 (1976), JUSTICES Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS concluded that,
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.
In capital sentencing, therefore, discretion must be ” controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce nondiscriminatory application.'” Id. at 428 U. S. 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)). See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 428 U. S. 253 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.) (State must provide “specific and detailed guidance” to the sentencing body). On the other hand, this Court has also held that a sentencing body must be able to consider any relevant mitigating evidence regarding the defendant’s character or background, and the circumstances of the particular offense. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
The issue in this case is whether an instruction designed to satisfy the principle that capital sentencing decisions must not be made on mere whim, but instead on clear and objective standards,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we consider whether the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax, S.D.Codified Laws, ch. 10-29 (1982), violates the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C.App. § 1513(d). We conclude that, because the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax is an “in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes,” 49 U.S.C.App. § 1513(d)(3), the tax does not violate § 1513(d).
I
The federal provision at issue is part of a series of congressional actions dedicated to improving the Nation’s air transportation system. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U. S. 7, 464 U. S. 8 -10 (1983). In 1970, following findings that
substantial expansion and improvement of the airport and airway system is [ sic ] required to meet the demands of interstate commerce, the postal service, and the national defense,
H. R. Conf Rep. No. 91-1074, p. 29 (1970), Congress required the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a plan for the development of public airports, and authorized the Secretary to make grants to States and localities for airport development. Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219. Congress also established an Airport and Airway Trust Fund, maintained by federal aviation taxes, to finance airport development projects. § 208, 84 Stat. 250. Soon afterward, Congress acted to limit state taxation of air transportation. Concluding that state passenger
Justice O’CONNOR, delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I and II-B, concluding that the state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over petitioner would be unreasonable and unfair, in violation of the Due Process Clause. Pp.480 U. S. 113-116.
(a) The burden imposed on petitioner by the exercise of state court jurisdiction would be severe, since petitioner would be required not only to traverse the distance between Japan and California, but also to submit its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign judicial system. Such unique burdens should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of extending personal jurisdiction over national borders. Pp. 480 U. S. 113 -114.
(b) The interests of Cheng Shin and the forum State in the exercise of jurisdiction over petitioner would be slight, and would be insufficient to justify the heavy burdens placed on petitioner. The only surviving question is whether a Japanese corporation should indemnify a Taiwanese corporation on the bases of a sale made in Taiwan and a shipment of goods from Japan to Taiwan. The facts do not demonstrate that it would be more convenient for Cheng Shin to litigate its claim in California, rather than in Taiwan or Japan, while California’s interests are diminished by Cheng Shin’s lack of a California residence and by the fact that the dispute is primarily about indemnity, rather than the safety of consumers. While the possibility of being sued in California might create an additional deterrent
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 476 U. S. 273 (1986), we concluded that the level of Fourteenth Amendment
scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.
Thus, in evaluating the constitutionality of the District Court order in this case under the Fourteenth Amendment, we must undertake a two-part inquiry. First, we must decide whether the order is “supported by a compelling [governmental] purpose.” Ibid. Second, we must scrutinize the order to ensure that “the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are narrowly tailored.” Ibid.
One cannot read the record in this case without concluding that the Alabama Department of Public Safety had undertaken a course of action that amounted to “pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct.” Ante at 480 U. S. 167. Because the Federal Government has a compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination by the Department, the District Court unquestionably had the authority to fashion a remedy designed to end the Department’s egregious history of discrimination. In doing so, however, the District Court was obligated to fashion a remedy that was narrowly tailored to accomplish this purpose. The plurality today purports to apply strict scrutiny, and concludes that the order in this case was
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve whether a city can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for providing inadequate police training, and, if so, what standard should govern the imposition of such liability. 475 U.S. 1064 (1986). In my view, the question is properly before the Court, and I would decide it on the merits.
I
On the evening of September 28, 1981, the Springfield Police Department received a telephone call reporting that someone had called an apartment’s occupants and threatened to come after them with a knife. Later calls reported that an individual identified as Clinton Thurston had broken the apartment door and assaulted a woman staying at the apartment. When officers arrived at the scene, they discovered that Thurston had abducted the woman and driven away in his car. A short while later, Thurston’s vehicle was spotted by an officer driving an unmarked police car. When Thurston stopped at an intersection, the officer walked up to Thurston’s vehicle and identified himself as a police officer, but Thurston drove away.
The officer gave chase, and soon was joined by other members of the Springfield Police Department. Two officers set up a roadblock to stop Thurston, but he drove past the obstacle without stopping. As he did so, one of the officers fired at the tires of Thurston’s vehicle; later a nick was found in the left rear wheel. At a second roadblock,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong question. The Court asks whether the police must have probable cause before either seizing an object in plain view or conducting a full-blown search of that object, and concludes that they must. I agree. In my view, however, this case presents a different question: whether police must have probable cause before conducting a cursory inspection of an item in plain view. Because I conclude that such an inspection is reasonable if the police are aware of facts or circumstances that justify a reasonable suspicion that the item is evidence of a crime, I would reverse the judgment of the Arizona Court of Appeals, and therefore dissent.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), Justice Stewart summarized three requirements that the plurality thought must be satisfied for a plain view search or seizure. First, the police must lawfully make an initial intrusion or otherwise be in a position from which they can view a particular area. Second, the officer must discover incriminating evidence “inadvertently.” Third, it must be “immediately apparent” to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. As another plurality observed in Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 460 U. S. 737 (1983), these three requirements have never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court, but
as the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
The Court today extends the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), in order to provide a grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation during which the State is permitted to violate constitutional requirements with impunity. Leon’s rationale does not support this extension of its rule, and the Court is unable to give any independent reason in defense of this departure from established precedent. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Court, ante at 480 U. S. 348, accurately summarizes Leon’s holding:
In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was ultimately found to be defective. The Court also accurately summarizes the reasoning supporting this conclusion as based upon three factors: the historic purpose of the exclusionary rule, the absence of evidence suggesting that judicial officers are inclined to ignore Fourth Amendment limitations, and the absence of any basis for believing that the exclusionary rule significantly deters Fourth Amendment violations by judicial officers in the search warrant context. Ibid. In my view, application of Leon’s stated rationales leads to a contrary result in this
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join in Parts I, II, III-A, IV, and V of the Court’s opinion. More particularly, I join the Court in disapproving the Court of Appeals’ broad holding that a criminal defendant’s promise not to sue local governments and officials for constitutional violations arising out of his arrest and prosecution, given in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to dismiss pending criminal charges, is void as against public policy under all circumstances. I agree with the Court that a case-by-case approach appropriately balances the important interests on both sides of the question of the enforceability of these agreements, and that, on the facts of this particular case, Bernard Rumery’s covenant not to sue is enforceable. I write separately, however, in order to set out the factors that lead me to conclude that this covenant should be enforced, and to emphasize that it is the burden of those relying upon such covenants to establish that the agreement is neither involuntary nor the product of an abuse of the criminal process.
As the Court shows, ante at 480 U. S. 395 -396, 480 U. S. 398, there are substantial policy reasons for permitting release-dismissal bargains to be struck in appropriate cases. Certainly some § 1983 litigation is meritless, and the inconvenience and distraction of public officials caused by such suits is not inconsiderable. Moreover, particular release-dismissal agreements may serve bona fide criminal
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Forest Service regulations, federal land use statutes and regulations, or the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), preempt the California Coastal Commission’s imposition of a permit requirement on operation of an unpatented mining claim in a national forest.
I
Granite Rock Company is a privately owned firm that mines chemical and pharmaceutical grade white limestone. Under the Mining Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 91, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq., a private citizen may enter federal lands to explore for mineral deposits. If a person locates a valuable mineral deposit on federal land, and perfects the claim by properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements, the claimant “shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations,” 30 U.S.C. § 26, although the United States retains title to the land. The holder of a perfected mining claim may secure a patent to the land by complying with the requirements of the Mining Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, see 43 CFR § 3861.1 et seq. (1986), and, upon issuance of the patent, legal title to the land passes to the patent holder. Granite Rock holds unpatented mining claims on federally owned lands on and around Mount Pico Blanco in the Big Sur region of Los Padres National Forest.
From 1959 to
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), this Court held that § 703(d) of Title VII does not prohibit voluntary affirmative action efforts if the employer sought to remedy a “manifest… imbalanc[e] in traditionally segregated job categories.” Id. at 443 U. S. 197. As JUSTICE SCALIA illuminates with excruciating clarity, § 703 has been interpreted by Weber and succeeding cases to permit what its language read literally would prohibit. Post at 480 U. S. 669 -671; see also ante at 480 U. S. 642 -643 (STEVENS, J., concurring). Section 703(d) prohibits employment discrimination “against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (emphasis added). The Weber Court, however, concluded that voluntary affirmative action was permissible in some circumstances because a prohibition of every type of affirmative action would ” bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute.'” 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 202 (quoting United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 345 U. S. 295, 345 U. S. 315 (1953)). This purpose, according to the Court, was to open employment opportunities for blacks in occupations that had been traditionally closed to them.
None of the parties in this case have suggested that we overrule Weber, and that question was not raised, briefed, or argued in this Court or in the courts below. If the Court is faithful to its normal prudential restraints
JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE POWELL join.
This suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 presents two issues concerning the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees. First, we must determine whether the respondent, a public employee, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets at his place of work. Second, we must address the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard for a search conducted by a public employer in areas in which a public employee is found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
I
Dr. Magno Ortega, a physician and psychiatrist, held the position of Chief of Professional Education at Napa State Hospital (Hospital) for 17 years, until his dismissal from that position in 1981. As Chief of Professional Education, Dr. Ortega had primary responsibility for training young physicians in psychiatric residency programs.
In July, 1981, Hospital officials, including Dr. Dennis O’Connor, the Executive Director of the Hospital, became concerned about possible improprieties in Dr. Ortega’s management of the residency program. In particular, the Hospital officials were concerned with Dr. Ortega’s acquisition of an Apple II computer for use in the residency program. The officials thought that Dr. Ortega may have misled Dr. O’Connor into believing that the computer had been donated, when in fact the computer had been financed by the possibly coerced
Justice O’CONNOR, Circuit Justice.
Applicants request that I issue a stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The underlying dispute in this case involves the division of responsibility for regulation of collective bargaining between airlines and their employees under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The Act defines three classes of labor disputes and establishes a different dispute resolution procedure for each. “Minor” disputes involve the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. Minor disputes are subject to arbitration by a System Board of Adjustment. 45 U.S.C. 184. While courts lack authority to interpret the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, a court may compel arbitration of a minor dispute before the authorized System Board.
“Major” disputes involve the formation of collective-bargaining agreements, and the resolution of such disputes is governed by § 6 of the Act, 45 U.S.C. 156, 181.
“Representation” disputes involve defining the bargaining unit and determining the employee representative for collective bargaining. Under § 2, Ninth, of the Act, the National Mediation Board has exclusive jurisdiction over representation disputes. 45 U.S.C. 152, 181.
Applicants, Western Airlines and Delta Air Lines, entered into an agreement and plan of merger on September 9, 1986. The merger