Opinions

O’CONNOR, Supreme Court Justice (Ret.):

Appellant Jason McGuire fired a single shot from a handgun in the general direction of an airborne police helicopter. Believing he meant to hit the helicopter, a jury convicted McGuire of attempting to “set[ ] fire to, damage[ ], destroy[ ], disable[ ], or wreck[ ] an[ ] aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1). The judge determined that this was a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which imposes a mandatory consecutive sentence on anyone who uses or possesses a firearm in connection with such a crime. McGuire challenges both the jury’s verdict and the judge’s determination. We affirm.

I.

Because McGuire challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the facts are in dispute. Roughly speaking, however, they are as follows:

Inebriated and distraught because of losing his girlfriend and his job, McGuire took his father’s loaded.38–caliber revolver from an unlocked safe and out into the driveway of his home. He called several friends on his cell phone, attempting to vent his distress, but could not find a ready ear. He was contemplating suicide, he says, but he could not bring himself to it. Instead, he fired off several rounds: one into a tree near the driveway, and several down the empty street. Neighbors called the police. McGuire, meanwhile, went back inside. See Dkt. No. 152 at 19–24.

When he came out again, the police had responded.

O’CONNOR, Supreme Court Justice (Ret.):

Claiming to be the holder in due course of a commercial loan on which Appellant Michael McCranie had defaulted, Appellee DZ Bank brought an enforcement suit in federal district court. McCranie defended the suit on the grounds that DZ Bank was not in fact a holder of the loan because of a problem in the chain of title, and that even if it was, it had obtained the loan subject to certain valid defenses that prevented enforcement. The District Court granted summary judgment to DZ Bank. Because we find that the facts surrounding the loan’s chain of title were in material dispute, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Although our ultimate point is that there are some key facts in dispute, many of them are uncontested. In October 2000, McCranie entered into an agreement with Brooke Corporation, an insurance franchising company, to buy a local franchise in Florida. McCranie borrowed money from a Brooke affiliate called Brooke Credit to finance the sale, and agreed in return to write policies exclusively through Brooke, paying off the loan over time with his commissions. See Dkt. No. 63–1 at 1–4; Dkt. No. 54–1 at 2. The original note, as well as a supplemental note executed in 2002, were both made payable only to Brooke Credit or its successors and assigns. See Dkt. No. 63–1 at 27; Dkt. No. 54–1 at 6.

Trouble arose in August 2008, when McCranie became aware of serious allegations of wrongdoing at Brooke. According to McCranie,

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.):

Defendant Charles Lee Gillenwater, II, was charged with two counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications and one count of transmitting threatening communications by United States mail. After determining that Gillenwater was not competent to stand trial, the district court authorized the government to medicate Gillenwater involuntarily to render him competent to face the charges against him. While recognizing the important interests at stake for both the government and Gillenwater, we conclude that the district court did not err in authorizing Gillenwater’s involuntary medication.

I

Gillenwater once worked on the renovation of the Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. Gillenwater believes that he and thousands of others were exposed to asbestos during that renovation. He also believes that the government allowed the exposure to occur and helped the hotel cover it up. And Gillenwater believes that government and hotel officials came after him when he tried to reveal the exposure and cover up.

In November 2011, Gillenwater was charged with two counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and one count of transmitting threatening communications by United States mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c).

In the proceedings that followed, the government claimed that Gillenwater made graphic and disturbing threats against a number of government officials and employees and showed