Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Plurality, Privacy, Timeline

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Plurality, Privacy, Timeline / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI, an opinion with respect to Part V-E, in which JUSTICE STEVENS joins, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV; V-B, and V-D.

I

Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade , 410 U. S. 113 (1973), that definition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae , the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe. See Brief for Respondents 104-117; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8.

At issue in these cases are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203-3220 (1990). Relevant portions of the Act are set forth in the Appendix. Infra , at 902. The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed. § 3205. For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of her parents, but provides for a judicial bypass option if the minor does not wish to or cannot obtain a parent’s consent. § 3206. Another provision of

Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Timeline

Grutter v. Bollinger

Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Timeline / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to decide whether the use of race as a factor in student admissions by the University of Michigan Law School (Law School) is unlawful.

I

A

The Law School ranks among the Nation’s top law schools. It receives more than 3,500 applications each year for a class of around 350 students. Seeking to “admit a group of students who individually and collectively are among the most capable,” the Law School looks for individuals with “substantial promise for success in law school” and “a strong likelihood of succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the well-being of others.” App. 110. More broadly, the Law School seeks “a mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each other.” Ibid. In 1992, the dean of the Law School charged a faculty committee with crafting a written admissions policy to implement these goals. In particular, the Law School sought to ensure that its efforts to achieve student body diversity complied with this Court’s most recent ruling on the use of race in university admissions. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). Upon the unanimous adoption of the committee’s report by the Law School faculty, it became the Law School’s official admissions policy.

The hallmark of that policy is its focus on academic ability coupled with a flexible assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, Majority, William Rehnquist

Georgia v. Ashcroft

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we decide whether Georgia’s State Senate redistricting plan should have been precleared under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as renumbered and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Section 5 requires that before a covered jurisdiction’s new voting “standard, prac tice, or procedure” goes into effect, it must be precleared by either the Attorney General of the United States or a federal court to ensure that the change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. Whether a voting procedure change should be precleared depends on whether the change “would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). We therefore must decide whether Georgia’s State Senate redistricting plan is retrogressive as compared to its previous, benchmark districting plan.

I A

Over the past decade, the propriety of Georgia’s state and congressional districts has been the subject of repeated litigation. In 1991, the Georgia General Assembly began the process of redistricting after the 1990 census. Because Georgia is a covered jurisdiction under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 905 (1995), Georgia submitted its revised State Senate plan to the United States

Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Rose v. Lundy

Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-C.

In this case, we consider whether the exhaustion rule in 28 U.S.C. §§ 224(b), (c) requires a federal district court to dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus containing any claims that have not been exhausted in the state courts. Because a rule requiring exhaustion of all claims furthers the purposes underlying the habeas statute, we hold that a district court must dismiss such “mixed petitions,” leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court.

I

Following a jury trial, respondent Noah Lundy was convicted on charges of rape and crime against nature, and sentenced to the Tennessee State Penitentiary. [ Footnote 1 ] After the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review, the respondent filed an unsuccessful petition for postconviction relief in the Knox County Criminal Court.

The respondent subsequently filed a petition in Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging four grounds for relief: (1) that he had been denied the right to confrontation because the trial court limited the defense counsel’s questioning of the victim; (2) that he had been denied the right to a fair trial because the prosecuting attorney stated that the respondent had a violent

Concurrence, Due Process

Smith v. Phillips

Concurrence, Due Process / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

I concur in the Court’s opinion, but write separately to express my view that the opinion does not foreclose the use of “implied bias” in appropriate circumstances.

I

Determining whether a juror is biased or has prejudged a case is difficult, partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it. The problem may be compounded when a charge of bias arises from juror misconduct, and not simply from attempts of third parties to influence a juror.

Nevertheless, I believe that, in most instances, a postconviction hearing will be adequate to determine whether a juror is biased. A hearing permits counsel to probe the juror’s memory, his reasons for acting as he did, and his understanding of the consequences of his actions. A hearing also permits the trial judge to observe the juror’s demeanor under cross-examination, and to evaluate his answers in light of the particular circumstances of the case.

I am concerned, however, that, in certain instances, a hearing may be inadequate for uncovering a juror’s biases, leaving serious question whether the trial court had subjected the defendant to manifestly unjust procedures resulting in a miscarriage of justice. While each case must turn on its own facts, there are some extreme situations that would justify a finding of implied bias. Some examples might include a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

Boag v. MacDougall

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

I join in the per curiam, but write separately to emphasize two points. First, nothing in the Court’s opinion prevents the District Court on remand from dismissing this suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) if it finds grounds to believe that the complaint is “malicious or frivolous.” This Court only requires the District Court to articulate briefly its reasons for dismissal in order to facilitate appellate review. Second, I find merit in JUSTICE REHNQUIST’s comments that this Court is not equipped to correct every perceived error coming from the lower federal courts. The effectiveness of this Court rests in part on its practice of deciding cases of broad significance and of declining to expend limited judicial resources on cases, such as the present one, whose significance is limited to the parties. In exercising our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, we should not be influenced solely by the merits of the petitioner’s case.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Bradshaw v. Stumpf

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns respondent John David Stumpf ’s conviction and death sentence for the murder of Mary Jane Stout. In adjudicating Stumpf ’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted him relief on two grounds: that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and that his conviction and sentence could not stand because the State, in a later trial of Stumpf ’s accomplice, pursued a theory of the case inconsistent with the theory it had advanced in Stumpf ’s case. We granted certiorari to review both holdings. 543 U. S. ___ (2005).

I
On May 14, 1984, Stumpf and two other men, Clyde Daniel Wesley and Norman Leroy Edmonds, were traveling in Edmonds’ car along Interstate 70 through Guernsey County, Ohio. Needing money for gas, the men stopped the car along the highway. While Edmonds waited in the car, Stumpf and Wesley walked to the home of Norman and Mary Jane Stout, about 100 yards away. Stumpf and Wesley, each concealing a gun, talked their way into the home by telling the Stouts they needed to use the phone. Their real object, however, was robbery: Once inside, Stumpf held the Stouts at gunpoint, while Wesley ransacked the house. When Mr. Stout moved toward Stumpf, Stumpf shot him twice in the head, causing Mr. Stout to black out. After he regained consciousness, Mr. Stout heard two male voices coming from another room, and then four gunshots—the shots that killed his wife. Edmonds was arrested shortly afterward, and his statements led the police to issue arrest warrants for Stumpf and Wesley. Stumpf, who surrendered to the police, at first denied any knowledge of the crimes. After he was told that Mr. Stout had survived, however, Stumpf admitted to participating in the robbery and to shooting Mr. Stumpf. But he claimed not to have shot Mrs. Stout, and he has maintained that position ever since.

The proceedings against Stumpf occurred while Wesley, who had been arrested in Texas, was still resisting extradition to Ohio. Stumpf was indicted for aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and two counts of grand theft. With respect to the aggravated murder charge, the indictment listed four statutory “specifications”—three of them aggravating circumstances making Stumpf eligible for the death penalty. See App. 117–118; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03 (Anderson 1982).* The case was assigned to a three-judge panel in the Court of Common Pleas.

Rather than proceed to trial, however, Stumpf and the State worked out a plea agreement: Stumpf would plead guilty to aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder, and the State would drop most of the other charges; with respect to the aggravated murder charge, Stumpf would plead guilty to one of the three capital specifications, with the State dropping the other two. The plea was accepted after a colloquy with the presiding judge, and after a hearing in which the panel satisfied itself as to the factual basis for the plea.

Because the capital specification to which Stumpf pleaded guilty left him eligible for the death penalty, a contested penalty hearing was held before the same three-judge panel. Stumpf ’s mitigation case was based in part on his difficult childhood, limited education, dependable work history, youth, and lack of prior serious offenses. Stumpf ’s principal argument, however, was that he had participated in the plot only at the urging and under the influence of Wesley, that it was Wesley who had fired the fatal shots at Mrs. Stout, and that Stumpf ’s assertedly minor role in the murder counseled against the death sentence. See §2929.04(B)(6) (directing the sentencer to consider as a potential mitigating circumstance, “[i]f the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender, the degree of the offender’s participation in the offense”). The State, on the other hand, argued that Stumpf had indeed shot Mrs. Stout. Still, while the prosecutor claimed Stumpf ’s allegedly primary role in the shooting as a special reason to reject Stumpf ’s mitigation argument, the prosecutor also noted that Ohio law did not restrict the death penalty to those who commit murder by their own hands—an accomplice to murder could also receive the death penalty, so long as he acted with the specific intent to cause death. As a result, the State argued, Stumpf deserved death even if he had not personally shot Mrs. Stout, because the circumstances of the robbery provided a basis from which to infer Stumpf ’s intent to cause death. The three-judge panel, agreeing with the State’s first contention, specifically found that Stumpf “was the principal offender” in the aggravated murder of Mrs. Stout. App. 196. Determining that the aggravating factors in Stumpf ’s case outweighed any mitigating factors, the panel sentenced Stumpf to death.

Afterward, Wesley was successfully extradited to Ohio to stand trial. His case was tried to a jury, before the same judge who had presided over the panel overseeing Stumpf ’s proceedings, and with the same prosecutor. This time, however, the prosecutor had new evidence: James Eastman, Wesley’s cellmate after his extradition, testified that Wesley had admitted to firing the shots that killed Mrs. Stout. The prosecutor introduced Eastman’s testimony in Wesley’s trial, and in his closing argument he argued for Wesley’s credibility and lack of motive to lie. The prosecutor claimed that Eastman’s testimony, combined with certain circumstantial evidence and with the implausibility of Wesley’s own account of events, proved that Wesley was the principal offender in Mrs. Stout’s murder—and that Wesley therefore deserved to be put to death. One way Wesley countered this argument was by noting that the prosecutor had taken a contrary position in Stumpf ’s trial, and that Stumpf had already been sentenced to death for the crime. Wesley also took the stand in his own defense, and testified that Stumpf had shot Mrs. Stout. In the end, the jury sentenced Wesley to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 20 years.

After the Wesley trial, Stumpf, whose direct appeal was still pending in the Ohio Court of Appeals, returned to the Court of Common Pleas with a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate his death sentence. Stumpf argued that Eastman’s testimony, and the prosecution’s endorsement of that testimony in Wesley’s trial, cast doubt upon Stumpf ’s conviction and sentence. The State (represented again by the same prosecutor who had tried both Wesley’s case and Stumpf ’s original case) disagreed. According to the prosecutor, the court’s first task was to decide whether the Eastman testimony was sufficient to alter the court’s prior determination that Stumpf had been the shooter. Id., at 210. Contrary to the argument he had presented in the Wesley trial, however, the prosecutor now noted that Eastman’s testimony was belied by certain other evidence (ballistics evidence and Wesley’s testimony in his own defense) confirming Stumpf to have been the primary shooter. In the alternative, the State noted as it had before that an aider-and-abettor theory might allow the death sentence to be imposed against Stumpf even if he had not shot Mrs. Stout.

Although one judge speculated during oral argument that the court’s earlier conclusion about Stumpf ’s principal role in the killing “may very well have had an effect upon” the prior sentencing determination, ibid., the Court of Common Pleas denied Stumpf ’s motion in a brief summary order without explanation. That order was appealed together with the original judgment in Stumpf ’s case, and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St. 3d 95, 512 N. E. 2d 598 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1079 (1988).

After a subsequent request for state postconviction relief was denied by the state courts, Stumpf filed this federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in November 1995. The District Court denied Stumpf relief, but granted permission to appeal on four claims, including the two at issue here. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that habeas relief was warranted on “either or both” of “two alternative grounds.” Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F. 3d 594, 596 (2004). First, the court determined that Stumpf ’s guilty plea was invalid because it had not been entered knowingly and intelligently. More precisely, the court concluded that Stumpf had pleaded guilty to aggravated murder without understanding that specific intent to cause death was a necessary element of the charge under Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2903.01(B) and (D). Noting that Stumpf had all along denied shooting Mrs. Stout, and considering those denials inconsistent with an informed choice to plead guilty to aggravated murder, the Court of Appeals concluded that Stumpf must have entered his plea out of ignorance. Second, the court concluded that “Stumpf ’s due process rights were violated by the state’s deliberate action in securing convictions of both Stumpf and Wesley for the same crime, using inconsistent theories.” 367 F. 3d, at 596. This violation, the court held, required setting aside “both Stumpf ’s plea and his sentence.” Id., at 616. One member of the panel dissented.

II
Because Stumpf filed his habeas petition before enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we review his claims under the standards of the pre-AEDPA habeas statute. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320 (1997). Moreover, because petitioner has not argued that Stumpf ’s habeas claims were barred as requiring announcement of a new rule, we do not apply the rule of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), to this case. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U. S. 222, 229 (1994); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389, 397, n. 8 (1993).

A
The Court of Appeals concluded that Stumpf ’s plea of guilty to aggravated murder was invalid because he was not aware of the specific intent element of the charge—a determination we find unsupportable.

Stumpf ’s guilty plea would indeed be invalid if he had not been aware of the nature of the charges against him, including the elements of the aggravated murder charge to which he pleaded guilty. A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970). Where a defendant pleads guilty to a crime without having been informed of the crime’s elements, this standard is not met and the plea is invalid. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637 (1976).

But the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Stumpf had not been properly informed before pleading guilty. In Stumpf ’s plea hearing, his attorneys represented on the record that they had explained to their client the elements of the aggravated murder charge; Stumpf himself then confirmed that this representation was true. See App. 135, 137–138. While the court taking a defendant’s plea is responsible for ensuring “a record adequate for any review that may be later sought,” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 244 (1969), we have never held that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. Cf. Henderson, supra, at 647 (granting relief to a defendant unaware of the elements of his crime, but distinguishing that case from others where “the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused”). Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.

Seeking to counter this natural inference, Stumpf argues, in essence, that his choice to plead guilty to the aggravated murder charge was so inconsistent with his denial of having shot the victim that he could only have pleaded guilty out of ignorance of the charge’s specific intent requirement. But Stumpf ’s asserted inconsistency is illusory. The aggravated murder charge’s intent element did not require any showing that Stumpf had himself shot Mrs. Stout. Rather, Ohio law considers aiders and abettors equally in violation of the aggravated murder statute, so long as the aiding and abetting is done with the specific intent to cause death. See In re Washington, 81 Ohio St. 3d 337, 691 N. E. 2d 285 (1998); State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St. 2d 155, 165, 400 N. E. 2d 375, 382 (1980). As a result, Stumpf ’s steadfast assertion that he had not shot Mrs. Stout would not necessarily have precluded him from admitting his specific intent under the statute.

That is particularly so given the other evidence in this case. Stumpf and Wesley had gone to the Stouts’ home together, carrying guns and intending to commit armed robbery. Stumpf, by his own admission, shot Mr. Stout in the head at close range. Taken together, these facts could show that Wesley and Stumpf had together agreed to kill both of the Stouts in order to leave no witnesses to the crime. And that, in turn, could make both men guilty of aggravated murder regardless of who actually killed Mrs. Stout. See ibid., at 165, 400 N. E. 2d, at 382.

Stumpf also points to aspects of the plea hearing transcript which he says show that both he and his attorneys were confused about the relevance and timing of defenses Stumpf and his attorneys had planned to make. First, at one point during the hearing, the presiding judge stated that by pleading guilty Stumpf would waive his trial rights and his right to testify in his own behalf. Stumpf ’s attorney answered that Stumpf “was going to respond but we have informed him that there is, after the plea, a hearing or trial relative to the underlying facts so that he is of the belief that there will be a presentation of evidence.” App. 140. The presiding judge responded that “[o]f course in the sentencing portion of this trial you do have those rights to speak in your own behalf [and] to present evidence and testimony on your own behalf.” Ibid. A few moments later, there was another exchange along similar lines, after the judge asked Stumpf whether he was “in fact guilty of” the aggravated murder charge and its capital specification:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: … Your Honor, the defendant has asked me to explain his answer. His answer is yes. He will recite that with obviously his understanding of his right to present evidence at a later time relative to his conduct, but he’ll respond to that.

“JUDGE HENDERSON: At no time am I implying that the defendant will not have the right to present evidence in [the] mitigation hearing …. And I’m going to ask that the defendant, himself, respond to the question that I asked with that understanding that he has the right to present evidence in mitigation. I’m going to ask the defendant if he is in fact guilty of the charge set forth in Count one, including specification one … ?

“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.” Id., at 142.

Reviewing this exchange, the Court of Appeals concluded that Stumpf “obviously … was reiterating his desire to challenge the [S]tate’s account of his actions”—that is, to show that he did not intend to kill Mrs. Stout. 367 F. 3d, at 607. But the desire to contest the State’s version of events would not necessarily entail the desire to contest the aggravated murder charge or any of its elements. Rather, Stumpf ’s desire to put on evidence “relative to the underlying facts” and “relative to his conduct” could equally have meant that Stumpf was eager to make his mitigation case—an interpretation bolstered by the attorney’s and Stumpf ’s approving answers after the presiding judge confirmed that the defense could put on evidence “in mitigation” and in “the sentencing” phase. While Stumpf ’s mitigation case was premised on the argument that Stumpf had not shot Mrs. Stout, that was fully consistent with his plea of guilty to aggravated murder. See supra, at 7–8.

Finally, Stumpf, like the Court of Appeals, relies on the perception that he obtained a bad bargain by his plea—that the State’s dropping several non-murder charges and two of the three capital murder specifications was a bad tradeoff for Stumpf ’s guilty plea. But a plea’s validity may not be collaterally attacked merely because the defendant made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. See Brady, 397 U. S., at 757; Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 504, 508 (1984). Rather, the shortcomings of the deal Stumpf obtained cast doubt on the validity of his plea only if they show either that he made the unfavorable plea on the constitutionally defective advice of counsel, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258, 267 (1973), or that he could not have understood the terms of the bargain he and Ohio agreed to. Though Stumpf did bring an independent claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim is not before us in this case. And in evaluating the validity of Stumpf ’s plea, we are reluctant to accord much weight to his post hoc reevaluation of the wisdom of the bargain. Stumpf pleaded guilty knowing that the State had copious evidence against him, including the testimony of Mr. Stout; the plea eliminated two of the three capital specifications the State could rely on in seeking the death penalty; and the plea allowed Stumpf to assert his acceptance of responsibility as an argument in mitigation. Under these circumstances, the plea may well have been a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent reaction to a litigation situation that was difficult, to say the least. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Stumpf was uninformed about the nature of the charge he pleaded guilty to, and we reverse that portion of the judgment below.

B
The Court of Appeals was also wrong to hold that prosecutorial inconsistencies between the Stumpf and Wesley cases required voiding Stumpf ’s guilty plea. Stumpf ’s assertions of inconsistency relate entirely to the prosecutor’s arguments about which of the two men, Wesley or Stumpf, shot Mrs. Stout. For the reasons given above, see supra, at 7–8, the precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial to Stumpf ’s conviction for aggravated murder. Moreover, Stumpf has never provided an explanation of how the prosecution’s postplea use of inconsistent arguments could have affected the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of his plea.

The prosecutor’s use of allegedly inconsistent theories may have a more direct effect on Stumpf ’s sentence, however, for it is at least arguable that the sentencing panel’s conclusion about Stumpf ’s principal role in the offense was material to its sentencing determination. The opinion below leaves some ambiguity as to the overlap between how the lower court resolved Stumpf ’s due process challenge to his conviction, and how it resolved Stumpf ’s challenge to his sentence. It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals would have concluded that Stumpf was entitled to resentencing had the court not also considered the conviction invalid. Likewise, the parties’ briefing to this Court, and the question on which we granted certiorari, largely focused on the lower court’s determination about Stumpf ’s conviction. See, e.g., Pet. for Cert. ii (requesting review of Stumpf ’s conviction, not sentence); Reply Brief for Petitioner 3 (challenge to Court of Appeals’ decision is focused on issue of conviction); Brief for Respondent 15, n. 3 (“arguments regarding Stumpf ’s death sentence are not before this Court”). In these circumstances, it would be premature for this Court to resolve the merits of Stumpf ’s sentencing claim, and we therefore express no opinion on whether the prosecutor’s actions amounted to a due process violation, or whether any such violation would have been prejudicial. The Court of Appeals should have the opportunity to consider, in the first instance, the question of how Eastman’s testimony and the prosecutor’s conduct in the Stumpf and Wesley cases relate to Stumpf ’s death sentence in particular. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the judgment below relating to Stumpf ’s prosecutorial inconsistency claim, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Notes
* Unless otherwise noted, all citations to Ohio statutes refer to the versions of those statutes in effect in 1984, at the time of the crime and trial.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, John Roberts, Judicial Power, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Lockhart v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, John Roberts, Judicial Power, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether the United States may offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that has been outstanding for over 10 years.

I
A
Petitioner James Lockhart failed to repay federally reinsured student loans that he had incurred between 1984 and 1989 under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program. These loans were eventually reassigned to the Department of Education, which certified the debt to the Department of the Treasury through the Treasury Offset Program. In 2002, the Government began withholding a portion of petitioner’s Social Security payments to offset his debt, some of which was more than 10 years delinquent.

Petitioner sued in Federal District Court, alleging that under the Debt Collection Act’s 10-year statute of limitations, the offset was time barred. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 376 F. 3d 1027 (2004). We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. ___ (2005), to resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, see Lee v. Paige, 376 F. 3d 1179 (CA8 2004), and now affirm.

B
The Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended, provides that, after pursuing the debt collection channels set out in 31 U. S. C. §3711(a), an agency head can collect an outstanding debt “by administrative offset.” §3716(a). The availability of offsets against Social Security benefits is limited, as the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, makes Social Security benefits, in general, not “subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.” 42 U. S. C. §407(a). The Social Security Act purports to protect this anti-attachment rule with an express-reference provision: “No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.” §407(b).

Moreover, the Debt Collection Act’s offset provisions generally do not authorize the collection of claims which, like petitioner’s debts at issue here, are over 10 years old. 31 U. S. C. §3716(e)(1). In 1991, however, the Higher Education Technical Amendments, 105 Stat. 123, sweepingly eliminated time limitations as to certain loans: “Notwithstanding any other provision of statute… no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed, a judgment may be enforced, or an offset, garnishment, or other action initiated or taken,” 20 U. S. C. §1091a(a)(2), for the repayment of various student loans, including the loans at issue here, §1091a(a)(2)(D).

The Higher Education Technical Amendments, by their terms, did not make Social Security benefits subject to offset; these were still protected by the Social Security Act’s anti-attachment rule. Only in 1996 did the Debt Collection Improvement Act—in amending and recodifying the Debt Collection Act—provide that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (including [§407] … ),” with a limited exception not relevant here, “all payment due an individual under … the Social Security Act … shall be subject to offset under this section.” 31 U. S. C. §3716(c)(3)(A)(i).

II
The Government does not contend that the “notwithstanding” clauses in both the Higher Education Technical Amendments and the Debt Collection Improvement Act trump the Social Security Act’s express-reference provision. Cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302, 310 (1955) (“Exemptions from the terms of the … Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement … that modifications must be express[.] But … [u]nless we are to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the … Act, we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the … provisions of that Act” (citation omitted)); Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U. S. 452, 465 (1908).

We need not decide the effect of express-reference provisions such as §407(b) to resolve this case. Because the Debt Collection Improvement Act clearly makes Social Security benefits subject to offset, it provides exactly the sort of express reference that the Social Security Act says is necessary to supersede the anti-attachment provision.

It is clear that the Higher Education Technical Amendments remove the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar offsetting petitioner’s Social Security benefits to pay off his student loan debt. Petitioner argues that Congress could not have intended in 1991 to repeal the Debt Collection Act’s statute of limitations as to offsets against Social Security benefits—since debt collection by Social Security offset was not authorized until five years later. Therefore, petitioner continues, the Higher Education Technical Amendments’ abrogation of time limits in 1991 only applies to then-valid means of debt collection. We disagree. “The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.” Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U. S. 151, 158 (1991).

Petitioner points out that the Higher Education Technical Amendments, unlike the Debt Collection Improvement Act, do not explicitly mention §407. But §407(b) only requires an express reference to authorize attachment in the first place—which the Debt Collection Improvement Act has already provided.

III
Nor does the Debt Collection Improvement Act’s 1996 recodification of the Debt Collection Act help petitioner. The Debt Collection Improvement Act, in addition to adding offset authority against Social Security benefits, retained the Debt Collection Act’s general 10-year bar on offset authority. But the mere retention of this previously enacted time bar does not make the time bar apply in all contexts—a result that would extend far beyond Social Security benefits, since it would imply that the Higher Education Technical Amendments’ abrogation of time limits was now a dead letter as to any kind of administrative offset. Rather, the Higher Education Technical Amendments retain their effect as a limited exception to the Debt Collection Act time bar in the student loan context.

Finally, we decline to read any meaning into the failed 2004 effort to amend the Debt Collection Act to explicitly authorize offset of debts over 10 years old. See H. R. 5025, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., §642 (Sept. 8, 2004); S. 2806, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., §642 (Sept. 15, 2004). “[F]ailed legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.’ ” United States v. Craft, 535 U. S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990)). In any event, it is unclear what meaning we could read into this effort even if we were inclined to do so, as the failed amendment—which was not limited to offsets against Social Security benefits—would have had a different effect than the interpretation we advance today.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

It is so ordered.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Due Process, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Due Process, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule or test finds its way into our case law through simple repetition of a phrase—however fortuitously coined. A quarter century ago, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), the Court declared that government regulation of private property “effects a taking if [such regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ….” Id., at 260. Through reiteration in a half dozen or so decisions since Agins, this language has been ensconced in our Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. See Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 704 (1999) (citing cases).

In the case before us, the lower courts applied Agins ’ “substantially advances” formula to strike down a Hawaii statute that limits the rent that oil companies may charge to dealers who lease service stations owned by the companies. The lower courts held that the rent cap effects an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it does not substantially advance Hawaii’s asserted interest in controlling retail gasoline prices. This case requires us to decide whether the “substantially advances” formula announced in Agins is an appropriate test for determining whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking. We conclude that it is not.

I
The State of Hawaii, whose territory comprises an archipelago of 132 islands clustered in the midst of the Pacific Ocean, is located over 1,600 miles from the U. S. mainland and ranks among the least populous of the 50 States. Because of Hawaii’s small size and geographic isolation, its wholesale market for oil products is highly concentrated. When this lawsuit began in 1997, only two refineries and six gasoline wholesalers were doing business in the State. As of that time, respondent Chevron U. S. A. Inc. was the largest refiner and marketer of gasoline in Hawaii: It controlled 60 percent of the market for gasoline produced or refined in-state and 30 percent of the wholesale market on the State’s most populous island, Oahu.

Gasoline is sold at retail in Hawaii from about 300 different service stations. About half of these stations are leased from oil companies by independent lessee-dealers, another 75 or so are owned and operated by “open” dealers, and the remainder are owned and operated by the oil companies. Chevron sells most of its product through 64 independent lessee-dealer stations. In a typical lessee-dealer arrangement, Chevron buys or leases land from a third party, builds a service station, and then leases the station to a dealer on a turnkey basis. Chevron charges the lessee-dealer a monthly rent, defined as a percentage of the dealer’s margin on retail sales of gasoline and other goods. In addition, Chevron requires the lessee-dealer to enter into a supply contract, under which the dealer agrees to purchase from Chevron whatever is necessary to satisfy demand at the station for Chevron’s product. Chevron unilaterally sets the wholesale price of its product.

The Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257 in June 1997, apparently in response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on retail gasoline prices. See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws no. 257, §1. The statute seeks to protect independent dealers by imposing certain restrictions on the ownership and leasing of service stations by oil companies. It prohibits oil companies from converting existing lessee-dealer stations to company-operated stations and from locating new company-operated stations in close proximity to existing dealer-operated stations. Haw. Rev. Stat. §§486H–10.4(a), (b) (1998 Cum. Supp.). More importantly for present purposes, Act 257 limits the amount of rent that an oil company may charge a lessee-dealer to 15 percent of the dealer’s gross profits from gasoline sales plus 15 percent of gross sales of products other than gasoline. §486H–10.4(c).

Thirty days after Act 257’s enactment, Chevron sued the Governor and Attorney General of Hawaii in their official capacities (collectively Hawaii) in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, raising several federal constitutional challenges to the statute. As pertinent here, Chevron claimed that the statute’s rent cap provision, on its face, effected a taking of Chevron’s property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Chevron sought a declaration to this effect as well as an injunction against the application of the rent cap to its stations. Chevron swiftly moved for summary judgment on its takings claim, arguing that the rent cap does not substantially advance any legitimate government interest. Hawaii filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on all of Chevron’s claims.

To facilitate resolution of the summary judgment motions, the parties jointly stipulated to certain relevant facts. They agreed that Act 257 reduces by about $207,000 per year the aggregate rent that Chevron would otherwise charge on 11 of its 64 lessee-dealer stations. On the other hand, the statute allows Chevron to collect more rent than it would otherwise charge at its remaining 53 lessee-dealer stations, such that Chevron could increase its overall rental income from all 64 stations by nearly $1.1 million per year. The parties further stipulated that, over the past 20 years, Chevron has not fully recovered the costs of maintaining lessee-dealer stations in any State through rent alone. Rather, the company recoups its expenses through a combination of rent and product sales. Finally, the joint stipulation states that Chevron has earned in the past, and anticipates that it will continue to earn under Act 257, a return on its investment in lessee-dealer stations in Hawaii that satisfies any constitutional standard.

The District Court granted summary judgment to Chevron, holding that “Act 257 fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest, and as such, effects an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (1998). The District Court accepted Hawaii’s argument that the rent cap was intended to prevent concentration of the retail gasoline market—and, more importantly, resultant high prices for consumers—by maintaining the viability of independent lessee-dealers. Id., at 1009–1010. The court concluded that the statute would not substantially advance this interest, however, because it would not actually reduce lessee-dealers’ costs or retail prices. It found that the rent cap would allow incumbent lessee-dealers, upon transferring occupancy rights to a new lessee, to charge the incoming lessee a premium reflecting the value of the rent reduction. Accordingly, the District Court reasoned, the incoming lessee’s overall expenses would be the same as in the absence of the rent cap, so there would be no savings to pass along to consumers. Id., at 1010–1012. Nor would incumbent lessees benefit from the rent cap, the court found, because the oil company lessors would unilaterally raise wholesale fuel prices in order to offset the reduction in their rental income. Id., at 1012–1014.

On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court had applied the correct legal standard to Chevron’s takings claim. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F. 3d 1030, 1033–1037 (2000). The Court of Appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment, however, on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the Act would benefit consumers. Id., at 1037–1042. Judge William Fletcher concurred in the judgment, maintaining that the “reasonableness” standard applicable to “ordinary rent and price control laws” should instead govern Chevron’s claim. Id., at 1048.

On remand, the District Court entered judgment for Chevron after a 1-day bench trial in which Chevron and Hawaii called competing expert witnesses (both economists) to testify. 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (2002). Finding Chevron’s expert witness to be “more persuasive” than the State’s expert, the District Court once again concluded that oil companies would raise wholesale gasoline prices to offset any rent reduction required by Act 257, and that the result would be an increase in retail gasoline prices. Id., at 1187–1189. Even if the rent cap did reduce lessee-dealers’ costs, the court found, they would not pass on any savings to consumers. Id., at 1189. The court went on to reiterate its determination that Act 257 would enable incumbent lessee-dealers to sell their leaseholds at a premium, such that incoming lessees would not obtain any of the benefits of the rent cap. Id., at 1189–1190. And while it acknowledged that the rent cap could preclude oil companies from constructively evicting dealers through excessive rents, the court found no evidence that Chevron or any other oil company would attempt to charge such rents in the absence of the cap. Id., at 1191. Finally, the court concluded that Act 257 would in fact decrease the number of lessee-dealer stations because the rent cap would discourage oil companies from building such stations. Id., at 1191–1192. Based on these findings, the District Court held that “Act 257 effect[ed] an unconstitutional regulatory taking given its failure to substantially advance any legitimate state interest.” Id., at 1193.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that its decision in the prior appeal barred Hawaii from challenging the application of the “substantially advances” test to Chevron’s takings claim or from arguing for a more deferential standard of review. 363 F. 3d 846, 849–855 (2004). The panel majority went on to reject Hawaii’s challenge to the application of the standard to the facts of the case. Id., at 855–858. Judge Fletcher dissented, renewing his contention that Act 257 should not be reviewed under the “substantially advances” standard. Id., at 859–861. We granted certiorari, 543 U. S. ___ (2004), and now reverse.

II
A
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897), provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” As its text makes plain, the Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 314 (1987). In other words, it “is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” Id., at 315 (emphasis in original). While scholars have offered various justifications for this regime, we have emphasized its role in “bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 325 (1893).

The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property. See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114 (1951) (Government’s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal miners effected a taking); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 (1945) (Government’s occupation of private warehouse effected a taking). Indeed, until the Court’s watershed decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), “it was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, or the functional equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession.’ ” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citations omitted and emphasis added; brackets in original); see also id., at 1028, n. 15 (“[E]arly constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all”).

Beginning with Mahon, however, the Court recognized that government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster—and that such “regulatory takings” may be compensable under the Fifth Amendment. In Justice Holmes’ storied but cryptic formulation, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” 260 U. S., at 415. The rub, of course, has been—and remains—how to discern how far is “too far.” In answering that question, we must remain cognizant that “government regulation—by definition—involves the adjustment of rights for the public good,” Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65 (1979), and that “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,” Mahon, supra, at 413.

Our precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property—however minor—it must provide just compensation. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 (1982) (state law requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install cable facilities in apartment buildings effected a taking). A second categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of “ all economically beneficial us[e]” of her property. Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1019 (emphasis in original). We held in Lucas that the government must pay just compensation for such “total regulatory takings,” except to the extent that “background principles of nuisance and property law” independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property. Id., at 1026–1032.

Outside these two relatively narrow categories (and the special context of land-use exactions discussed below, see infra, at 16–18), regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). The Court in Penn Central acknowledged that it had hitherto been “unable to develop any ‘set formula’ ” for evaluating regulatory takings claims, but identified “several factors that have particular significance.” Id., at 124. Primary among those factors are “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.” Ibid. In addition, the “character of the governmental action”—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through “some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good”—may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred. Ibid. The Penn Central factors—though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions—have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 617–618 (2001); id., at 632–634 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central ) share a common touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights. The Court has held that physical takings require compensation because of the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others from entering and using her property—perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825, 831–832 (1987); Loretto, supra, at 433; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 176 (1979). In the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of a property’s value is the determinative factor. See Lucas, supra, at 1017 (positing that “total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation”). And the Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.

B
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, a case involving a facial takings challenge to certain municipal zoning ordinances, the Court declared that “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928), or denies an owner economically viable use of his land, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 138, n. 36 (1978).” 447 U. S., at 260. Because this statement is phrased in the disjunctive, Agins ’ “substantially advances” language has been read to announce a stand-alone regulatory takings test that is wholly independent of Penn Central or any other test. Indeed, the lower courts in this case struck down Hawaii’s rent control statute as an “unconstitutional regulatory taking,” 198 F. Supp. 2d, at 1193, based solely upon a finding that it does not substantially advance the State’s asserted interest in controlling retail gasoline prices. See supra, at 6–7. Although a number of our takings precedents have recited the “substantially advances” formula minted in Agins, this is our first opportunity to consider its validity as a freestanding takings test. We conclude that this formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.

There is no question that the “substantially advances” formula was derived from due process, not takings, precedents. In support of this new language, Agins cited Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, a 1928 case in which the plaintiff claimed that a city zoning ordinance “deprived him of his property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment,” id., at 185. Agins then went on to discuss Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926), a historic decision holding that a municipal zoning ordinance would survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” Id., at 395 (emphasis added); see also Nectow, supra, at 188 (quoting the same “substantial relation” language from Euclid ).

When viewed in historical context, the Court’s reliance on Nectow and Euclid is understandable. Agins was the Court’s first case involving a challenge to zoning regulations in many decades, so it was natural to turn to these seminal zoning precedents for guidance. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Agins v. City of Tiburon, O. T. 1979, No. 602, pp. 12–13 (arguing that Euclid “set out the principles applicable to a determination of the facial validity of a zoning ordinance attacked as a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment”). Moreover, Agins ’ apparent commingling of due process and takings inquiries had some precedent in the Court’s then-recent decision in Penn Central. See 438 U. S., at 127 (stating in dicta that “[i]t is … implicit in Goldblatt [v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962),] that a use restriction on real property may constitute a ‘taking’ if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, see Nectow v. Cambridge, supra ”). But see Goldblatt, supra, at 594–595 (quoting “ ‘reasonably necessary’ ” language from Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137 (1894), a due process case, and applying a deferential “ ‘reasonableness’ ” standard to determine whether a challenged regulation was a “valid exercise of the … police power” under the Due Process Clause). Finally, when Agins was decided, there had been some history of referring to deprivations of property without due process of law as “takings,” see, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 740 (1970), and the Court had yet to clarify whether “regulatory takings” claims were properly cognizable under the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause, see Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Jefferson City, 473 U. S. 172, 197–199 (1985).

Although Agins ’ reliance on due process precedents is understandable, the language the Court selected was regrettably imprecise. The “substantially advances” formula suggests a means-ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose. An inquiry of this nature has some logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 846 (1998) (stating that the Due Process Clause is intended, in part, to protect the individual against “the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective”). But such a test is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been “taken” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.

In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed above, the “substantially advances” inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners. In consequence, this test does not help to identify those regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private property; it is tethered neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the Clause.

Chevron appeals to the general principle that the Takings Clause is meant “ ‘to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’ ” Brief for Respondent 17–21 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U. S., at 49). But that appeal is clearly misplaced, for the reasons just indicated. A test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allocated cannot tell us when justice might require that the burden be spread among taxpayers through the payment of compensation. The owner of a property subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an ineffective regulation. It would make little sense to say that the second owner has suffered a taking while the first has not. Likewise, an ineffective regulation may not significantly burden property rights at all, and it may distribute any burden broadly and evenly among property owners. The notion that such a regulation nevertheless “takes” private property for public use merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is untenable.

Instead of addressing a challenged regulation’s effect on private property, the “substantially advances” inquiry probes the regulation’s underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose. The Clause expressly requires compensation where government takes private property “ for public use.” It does not bar government from interfering with property rights, but rather requires compensation “in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U. S., at 315 (emphasis added). Conversely, if a government action is found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet the “public use” requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action.

Chevron’s challenge to the Hawaii statute in this case illustrates the flaws in the “substantially advances” theory. To begin with, it is unclear how significantly Hawaii’s rent cap actually burdens Chevron’s property rights. The parties stipulated below that the cap would reduce Chevron’s aggregate rental income on 11 of its 64 lessee-dealer stations by about $207,000 per year, but that Chevron nevertheless expects to receive a return on its investment in these stations that satisfies any constitutional standard. See supra, at 4. Moreover, Chevron asserted below, and the District Court found, that Chevron would recoup any reductions in its rental income by raising wholesale gasoline prices. See supra, at 5. In short, Chevron has not clearly argued—let alone established—that it has been singled out to bear any particularly severe regulatory burden. Rather, the gravamen of Chevron’s claim is simply that Hawaii’s rent cap will not actually serve the State’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers against high gasoline prices. Whatever the merits of that claim, it does not sound under the Takings Clause. Chevron plainly does not seek compensation for a taking of its property for a legitimate public use, but rather an injunction against the enforcement of a regulation that it alleges to be fundamentally arbitrary and irrational.

Finally, the “substantially advances” formula is not only doctrinally untenable as a takings test—its application as such would also present serious practical difficulties. The Agins formula can be read to demand heightened means-ends review of virtually any regulation of private property. If so interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and federal regulations—a task for which courts are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower—and might often require—courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.

Although the instant case is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg, it foreshadows the hazards of placing courts in this role. To resolve Chevron’s takings claim, the District Court was required to choose between the views of two opposing economists as to whether Hawaii’s rent control statute would help to prevent concentration and supracompetitive prices in the State’s retail gasoline market. Finding one expert to be “more persuasive” than the other, the court concluded that the Hawaii Legislature’s chosen regulatory strategy would not actually achieve its objectives. See 198 F. Supp. 2d, at 1187–1193. Along the way, the court determined that the State was not entitled to enact a prophylactic rent cap without actual evidence that oil companies had charged, or would charge, excessive rents. See id., at 1191 . Based on these findings, the District Court enjoined further enforcement of Act 257’s rent cap provision against Chevron. We find the proceedings below remarkable, to say the least, given that we have long eschewed such heightened scrutiny when addressing substantive due process challenges to government regulation. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 124–125 (1978); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730–732 (1963). The reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the need for, and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well established, and we think they are no less applicable here.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the “substantially advances” formula announced in Agins is not a valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation. Since Chevron argued only a “substantially advances” theory in support of its takings claim, it was not entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

III
We emphasize that our holding today—that the “substantially advances” formula is not a valid takings test—does not require us to disturb any of our prior holdings. To be sure, we applied a “substantially advances” inquiry in Agins itself, see 447 U. S., at 261–262 (finding that the challenged zoning ordinances “substantially advance[d] legitimate governmental goals”), and arguably also in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 485–492 (1987) (quoting “ ‘substantially advance[s]’ ” language and then finding that the challenged statute was intended to further a substantial public interest). But in no case have we found a compensable taking based on such an inquiry. Indeed, in most of the cases reciting the “substantially advances” formula, the Court has merely assumed its validity when referring to it in dicta. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 334 (2002); Del Monte Dunes, 526 U. S., at 704; Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1016; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 534 (1992); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121, 126 (1985).

It might be argued that this formula played a role in our decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994). See Brief for Respondent 21–23. But while the Court drew upon the language of Agins in these cases, it did not apply the “substantially advances” test that is the subject of today’s decision. Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a condition of obtaining a development permit. See Dolan, supra, at 379–380 (permit to expand a store and parking lot conditioned on the dedication of a portion of the relevant property for a “greenway,” including a bike/pedestrian path); Nollan, supra, at 828 (permit to build a larger residence on beachfront property conditioned on dedication of an easement allowing the public to traverse a strip of the property between the owner’s seawall and the mean high-tide line).

In each case, the Court began with the premise that, had the government simply appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per se physical taking. Dolan, supra, at 384; Nollan, supra, at 831–832. The question was whether the government could, without paying the compensation that would otherwise be required upon effecting such a taking, demand the easement as a condition for granting a development permit the government was entitled to deny. The Court in Nolan answered in the affirmative, provided that the exaction would substantially advance the same government interest that would furnish a valid ground for denial of the permit. 483 U. S., at 834–837. The Court further refined this requirement in Dolan, holding that an adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private property must also be “ ‘rough[ly] proportiona[l]’ … both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” 512 U. S., at 391; see also Del Monte Dunes, supra, at 702 (emphasizing that we have not extended this standard “beyond the special context of [such] exactions”).

Although Nollan and Dolan quoted Agins ’ language, see Dolan, supra, at 385; Nollan, supra, at 834, the rule those decisions established is entirely distinct from the “substantially advances” test we address today. Whereas the “substantially advances” inquiry before us now is unconcerned with the degree or type of burden a regulation places upon property, Nollan and Dolan both involved dedications of property so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se physical takings. In neither case did the Court question whether the exaction would substantially advance some legitimate state interest. See Dolan, supra, at 387–388; Nollan, supra, at 841. Rather, the issue was whether the exactions substantially advanced the same interests that land-use authorities asserted would allow them to deny the permit altogether. As the Court explained in Dolan, these cases involve a special application of the “doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ ” which provides that “the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no relationship to the property.” 512 U. S., at 385. That is worlds apart from a rule that says a regulation affecting property constitutes a taking on its face solely because it does not substantially advance a legitimate government interest. In short, Nollan and Dolan cannot be characterized as applying the “substantially advances” test we address today, and our decision should not be read to disturb these precedents.

***

Twenty-five years ago, the Court posited that a regulation of private property “effects a taking if [it] does not substantially advance [a] legitimate state interes[t].” Agins, supra, at 260. The lower courts in this case took that statement to its logical conclusion, and in so doing, revealed its imprecision. Today we correct course. We hold that the “substantially advances” formula is not a valid takings test, and indeed conclude that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence. In so doing, we reaffirm that a plaintiff seeking to challenge a government regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property may proceed under one of the other theories discussed above—by alleging a “physical” taking, a Lucas -type “total regulatory taking,” a Penn Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan. Because Chevron argued only a “substantially advances” theory in support of its takings claim, it was not entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner South Florida Water Management District operates a pumping facility that transfers water from a canal into a reservoir a short distance away. Respondents Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades brought a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act contending that the pumping facility is required to obtain a discharge permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment to respondents. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit rested their holdings on the predicate determination that the canal and reservoir are two distinct water bodies. For the reasons explained below, we vacate and remand for further development of the factual record as to the accuracy of that determination.
I
A
The Central and South Florida Flood Control Project (Project) consists of a vast array of levees, canals, pumps, and water impoundment areas in the land between south Florida’s coastal hills and the Everglades. Historically, that land was itself part of the Everglades, and its surface and groundwater flowed south in a uniform and unchanneled sheet. Starting in the early 1900’s, however, the State began to build canals to drain the wetlands and make them suitable for cultivation. These canals proved to be a source of trouble; they lowered the water table, allowing salt water to intrude upon coastal wells, and they proved incapable of controlling flooding. Congress established the Project in 1948 to address these problems. It gave the United States Army Corps of Engineers the task of constructing a comprehensive network of levees, water storage areas, pumps, and canal improvements that would serve several simultaneous purposes, including flood protection, water conservation, and drainage. These improvements fundamentally altered the hydrology of the Everglades, changing the natural sheet flow of ground and surface water. The local sponsor and day-to-day operator of the Project is the South Florida Water Management District (District).
Five discrete elements of the Project are at issue in this case. One is a canal called “C–11.” C–11 collects groundwater and rainwater from a 104 square–mile area in south central Broward County. App. 110. The area drained by C–11 includes urban, agricultural, and residential development, and is home to 136,000 people. At the western terminus of C–11 is the second Project element at issue here: a large pump station known as “S–9.” When the water level in C–11 rises above a set level, S–9 begins operating and pumps water out of the canal. The water does not travel far. Sixty feet away, the pump station empties the water into a large undeveloped wetland area called “WCA–3,” the third element of the Project we consider here. WCA–3 is the largest of several “water conservation areas” that are remnants of the original South Florida Everglades. The District impounds water in these areas to conserve fresh water that might otherwise flow directly to the ocean, and to preserve wetlands habitat. Id., at 112.
Using pump stations like S–9, the District maintains the water table in WCA–3 at a level significantly higher than that in the developed lands drained by the C–11 canal to the east. Absent human intervention, that water would simply flow back east, where it would rejoin the waters of the canal and flood the populated areas of the C–11 basin. That return flow is prevented, or, more accurately, slowed, by levees that hold back the surface waters of WCA–3. Two of those levees, L–33 and L–37, are the final two elements of the Project at issue here. The combined effect of L–33 and L–37, C–11, and S–9 is artificially to separate the C–11 basin from WCA–3; left to nature, the two areas would be a single wetland covered in an undifferentiated body of surface and ground water flowing slowly southward.
B
As the above description illustrates, the Project has wrought large-scale hydrologic and environmental change in South Florida, some deliberate and some accidental. Its most obvious environmental impact has been the conversion of what were once wetlands into areas suitable for human use. But the Project also has affected those areas that remain wetland ecosystems.
Rain on the western side of the L–33 and L–37 levees falls into the wetland ecosystem of WCA–3. Rain on the eastern side of the levees, on the other hand, falls on agricultural, urban, and residential land. Before it enters the C–11 canal, whether directly as surface runoff or indirectly as groundwater, that rainwater absorbs contaminants produced by human activities. The water in C–11 therefore differs chemically from that in WCA–3. Of particular interest here, C–11 water contains elevated levels of phosphorous, which is found in fertilizers used by farmers in the C–11 basin. When water from C–11 is pumped across the levees, the phosphorous it contains alters the balance of WCA–3’s ecosystem (which is naturally low in phosphorous) and stimulates the growth of algae and plants foreign to the Everglades ecosystem.
The phosphorous-related impacts of the Project are well known and have received a great deal of attention from state and federal authorities for more than 20 years. A number of initiatives are currently under way to reduce these impacts and thereby restore the ecological integrity of the Everglades. Respondents Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades (hereinafter simply Tribe), impatient with the pace of this progress, brought this Clean Water Act suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. They sought, among other things, to enjoin the operation of S–9 and, in turn, the conveyance of water from C–11 into WCA–3.
C
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (Act) in 1972. Its stated objective was “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. §1251. To serve those ends, the Act prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by any person” unless done in compliance with some provision of the Act. §1311(a). The provision relevant to this case, §1342, establishes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, or “NPDES.” Generally speaking, the NPDES requires dischargers to obtain permits that place limits on the type and quantity of pollutants that can be released into the Nation’s waters. The Act defines the phrase “ ‘discharge of a pollutant’ ” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” §1362(12). A “ ‘point source,’ ” in turn, is defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,” such as a pipe, ditch, channel, or tunnel, “from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” §1362(14).
According to the Tribe, the District cannot operate S–9 without an NPDES permit because the pump station moves phosphorous-laden water from C–11 into WCA–3. The District does not dispute that phosphorous is a pollutant, or that C–11 and WCA–3 are “navigable waters” within the meaning of the Act. The question, it contends, is whether the operation of the S–9 pump constitutes the “discharge of [a] pollutant” within the meaning of the Act.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether S–9 requires an NPDES permit. The District Court granted the Tribe’s motion, reasoning as follows:
“In this case an addition of pollutants exists because undisputedly water containing pollutants is being discharged through S–9 from C–11 waters into the Everglades, both of which are separate bodies of United States water with… different quality levels. They are two separate bodies of water because the transfer of water or its contents from C–11 into the Everglades would not occur naturally.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a–29a.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It reasoned first that “in determining whether pollutants are added to navigable waters for purposes of the [Act], the receiving body of water is the relevant body of navigable water.” 280 F. 3d 1364, 1368 (CA11 2002). After concluding that pollutants were indeed being added to WCA–3, the court then asked whether that addition of pollutants was from a “point source,” so as to trigger the NPDES permitting requirement. To answer that question, it explained:
“[F]or an addition of pollutants to be from a point source, the relevant inquiry is whether—but for the point source—the pollutants would have been added to the receiving body of water. We, therefore, conclude that an addition from a point source occurs if a point source is the cause in fact of the release of pollutants into navigable waters.
“When a point source changes the natural flow of a body of water which contains pollutants and causes that water to flow into another distinct body of navigable water into which it would not have otherwise flowed, that point source is the cause-in-fact of the discharge of pollutants.” Ibid. (footnote omitted).
Because it believed that the water in the C–11 canal would not flow into WCA–3 without the operation of the S–9 pump station, the Court of Appeals concluded that S–9 was the cause-in-fact of the addition of pollutants to WCA–3. It accordingly affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, and held that the S–9 pump station requires an NPDES permit. We granted certiorari. 539 U. S. 957 (2003).
II
The District and the Federal Government, as amicus, advance three separate arguments, any of which would, if accepted, lead to the conclusion that the S–9 pump station does not require a point source discharge permit under the NPDES program. Two of these arguments involve the application of disputed contentions of law to agreed-upon facts, while the third involves the application of agreed-upon law to disputed facts. For reasons explained below, we decline at this time to resolve all of the parties’ legal disagreements, and instead remand for further proceedings regarding their factual dispute.
A
In its opening brief on the merits, the District argued that the NPDES program applies to a point source “only when a pollutant originates from the point source,” and not when pollutants originating elsewhere merely pass through the point source. Brief for Petitioner 20. This argument mirrors the question presented in the District’s petition for certiorari: “Whether the pumping of water by a state water management agency that adds nothing to the water being pumped constitutes an ‘addition’ of a pollutant ‘from’ a point source triggering the need for a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit under the Clean Water Act.” Pet. for Cert. i. Although the Government rejects the District’s legal position, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21, it and the Tribe agree with the factual proposition that S–9 does not itself add any pollutants to the water it conveys into WCA–3.
This initial argument is untenable, and even the District appears to have abandoned it in its reply brief. Reply Brief for Petitioner 2. A point source is, by definition, a “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance.” §1362(14) (emphasis added). That definition makes plain that a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollutant to “navigable waters,” which are, in turn, defined as “the waters of the United States.” §1362(7). Tellingly, the examples of “point sources” listed by the Act include pipes, ditches, tunnels, and conduits, objects that do not themselves generate pollutants but merely transport them. §1362(14). In addition, one of the Act’s primary goals was to impose NPDES permitting requirements on municipal wastewater treatment plants. See, e.g., §1311(b)(1)(B) (establishing a compliance schedule for publicly owned treatment works). But under the District’s interpretation of the Act, the NPDES program would not cover such plants, because they treat and discharge pollutants added to water by others. We therefore reject the District’s proposed reading of the definition of “ ‘discharge of a pollutant’ ” contained in §1362(12). That definition includes within its reach point sources that do not themselves generate pollutants.
B
Having answered the precise question on which we granted certiorari, we turn to a second argument, advanced primarily by the Government as amicus curiae in merits briefing and at oral argument. For purposes of determining whether there has been “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” ibid., the Government contends that all the water bodies that fall within the Act’s definition of “ ‘navigable waters’ ” (that is, all “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” §1362(7)) should be viewed unitarily for purposes of NPDES permitting requirements. Because the Act requires NPDES permits only when there is an addition of a pollutant “to navigable waters,” the Government’s approach would lead to the conclusion that such permits are not required when water from one navigable water body is discharged, unaltered, into another navigable water body. That would be true even if one water body were polluted and the other pristine, and the two would not otherwise mix. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. New York, 273 F. 3d 481, 492 (CA2 2001); Dubois v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 102 F. 3d 1273 (CA1 1996). Under this “unitary waters” approach, the S–9 pump station would not need an NPDES permit.
1
The “unitary waters” argument focuses on the Act’s definition of a pollutant discharge as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” §1362(12). The Government contends that the absence of the word “any” prior to the phrase “navigable waters” in §1362(12) signals Congress’ understanding that NPDES permits would not be required for pollution caused by the engineered transfer of one “navigable water” into another. It argues that Congress intended that such pollution instead would be addressed through local nonpoint source pollution programs. Section 1314(f)(2(F), which concerns nonpoint sources, directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to give States information on the evaluation and control of “pollution resulting from… changes in the movement, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters or ground waters, including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.”
We note, however, that §1314(f)(2)(F) does not explicitly exempt nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES program if they also fall within the “point source” definition. And several NPDES provisions might be read to suggest a view contrary to the unitary waters approach. For example, under the Act, a State may set individualized ambient water quality standards by taking into consideration “the designated uses of the navigable waters involved.” 33 U. S. C. §1313(c)(2)(A). Those water quality standards, in turn, directly affect local NPDES permits; if standard permit conditions fail to achieve the water quality goals for a given water body, the State must determine the total pollutant load that the water body can sustain and then allocate that load among the permit-holders who discharge to the water body. §1313(d). This approach suggests that the Act protects individual water bodies as well as the “waters of the United States” as a whole.
The Government also suggests that we adopt the “unitary waters” approach out of deference to a longstanding EPA view that the process of “transporting, impounding, and releasing navigable waters” cannot constitute an “ ‘addition’ ” of pollutants to “ ‘the waters of the United States.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16. But the Government does not identify any administrative documents in which EPA has espoused that position. Indeed, an amicus brief filed by several former EPA officials argues that the agency once reached the opposite conclusion. See Brief for Former Administrator Carol M. Browner et al. as Amici Curiae 17 (citing In re Riverside Irrigation Dist., 1975 WL 23864 (Off. Gen. Couns., June 27, 1975) (irrigation ditches that discharge to navigable waters require NPDES permits even if they themselves qualify as navigable waters)). The “unitary waters” approach could also conflict with current NPDES regulations. For example, 40 CFR §122.45(g)(4) (2003) allows an industrial water user to obtain “intake credit” for pollutants present in water that it withdraws from navigable waters. When the permit holder discharges the water after use, it does not have to remove pollutants that were in the water before it was withdrawn. There is a caveat, however: EPA extends such credit “only if the discharger demonstrates that the intake water is drawn from the same body of water into which the discharge is made.” The NPDES program thus appears to address the movement of pollutants among water bodies, at least at times.
Finally, the Government and numerous amici warn that affirming the Court of Appeals in this case would have significant practical consequences. If we read the Clean Water Act to require an NPDES permit for every engineered diversion of one navigable water into another, thousands of new permits might have to be issued, particularly by western States, whose water supply networks often rely on engineered transfers among various natural water bodies. See Brief for Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae 2–4. Many of those diversions might also require expensive treatment to meet water quality criteria. It may be that construing the NPDES program to cover such transfers would therefore raise the costs of water distribution prohibitively, and violate Congress’ specific instruction that “the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired” by the Act. §1251(g). On the other hand, it may be that such permitting authority is necessary to protect water quality, and that the States or EPA could control regulatory costs by issuing general permits to point sources associated with water distribution programs. See 40 CFR §§122.28, 123.25 (2003).* Indeed, that is the position of the one State that has interpreted the Act to cover interbasin water transfers. See Brief for Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection as Amicus Curiae 11–18.
2
Because WCA–3 and C–11 are both “navigable waters,” adopting the “unitary waters” approach would lead to the conclusion that the District may operate S–9 without an NPDES permit. But despite its relevance here, neither the District nor the Government raised the unitary waters approach before the Court of Appeals or in their briefs respecting the petition for certiorari. (The District adopted the position as its own in its reply brief on the merits.) Indeed, we are not aware of any reported case that examines the unitary waters argument in precisely the form that the Government now presents it. As a result, we decline to resolve it here. Because we find it necessary to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to a third argument presented by the District, the unitary waters argument will be open to the parties on remand.
C
In the courts below, as here, the District contended that the C–11 canal and WCA–3 impoundment area are not distinct water bodies at all, but instead are two hydrologically indistinguishable parts of a single water body. The Government agrees with the District on this point, claiming that because the C–11 canal and WCA–3 “share a unique, intimately related, hydrological association,” they “can appropriately be viewed, for purposes of Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, as parts of a single body of water.” Brief for United States in Opposition 13. The Tribe does not dispute that if C–11 and WCA–3 are simply two parts of the same water body, pumping water from one into the other cannot constitute an “addition” of pollutants. As the Second Circuit put it in Trout Unlimited, “[i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has not ‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot.” 273 F. 3d, at 492. What the Tribe disputes is the accuracy of the District’s factual premise; according to the Tribe, C–11 and WCA–3 are two pots of soup, not one.
The record does contain information supporting the District’s view of the facts. Although C–11 and WCA–3 are divided from one another by the L–33 and L–37 levees, that line appears to be an uncertain one. Because Everglades soil is extremely porous, water flows easily between ground and surface waters, so much so that “[g]round and surface waters are essentially the same thing.” App. 111, 117. C–11 and WCA–3, of course, share a common underlying aquifer. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. Moreover, the L–33 and L–37 levees continually leak, allowing water to escape from WCA–3. This means not only that any boundary between C–11 and WCA–3 is indistinct, but also that there is some significant mingling of the two waters; the record reveals that even without use of the S–9 pump station, water travels as both seepage and groundwater flow between the water conservation area and the C–11 basin. App. 172, see also id., at 37 (describing flow between C–11 and WCA–3 as “cyclical”).
The parties also disagree about how the relationship between S–9 and WCA–3 should be assessed. At oral argument, counsel for the Tribe focused on the differing “biological or ecosystem characteristics” of the respective waters, Tr. of Oral Arg. 43; see also Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida 6–7; Brief for Respondent Friends of the Everglades 18–22, while counsel for the District emphasizes the close hydrological connections between the two. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 47. Despite these disputes, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Tribe. It applied a test that neither party defends; it determined that C–11 and WCA–3 are distinct “because the transfer of water or its contents from C–11 into the Everglades would not occur naturally.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit endorsed this test. 280 F. 3d, at 1368.
We do not decide here whether the District Court’s test is adequate for determining whether C–11 and WCA–3 are distinct. Instead, we hold only that the District Court applied its test prematurely. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 (1986). The record before us leads us to believe that some factual issues remain unresolved. The District Court certainly was correct to characterize the flow through the S–9 pump station as a non-natural one, propelled as it is by diesel-fired motors against the pull of gravity. And it also appears true that if S–9 were shut down, the water in the C–11 canal might for a brief time flow east, rather than west, as it now does. But the effects of shutting down the pump might extend beyond that. The limited record before us suggests that if S–9 were shut down, the area drained by C–11 would flood quite quickly. See 280 F. 3d, at 1366 (“Without the operation of the S–9 pump station, the populated western portion of Broward County would flood within days”). That flooding might mean that C–11 would no longer be a “distinct body of navigable water,” id., at 1368, but part of a larger water body extending over WCA–3 and the C–11 basin. It also might call into question the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that S–9 is the cause in fact of phosphorous addition to WCA–3. Nothing in the record suggests that the District Court considered these issues when it granted summary judgment. Indeed, in ordering later emergency relief from its own injunction against the operation of the S–9 pump station, the court admitted that it had not previously understood that shutting down S–9 would “literally ope[n] the flood gates.” Id., at 1371.
We find that further development of the record is necessary to resolve the dispute over the validity of the distinction between C–11 and WCA–3. After reviewing the full record, it is possible that the District Court will conclude that C–11 and WCA–3 are not meaningfully distinct water bodies. If it does so, then the S–9 pump station will not need an NPDES permit. In addition, the Government’s broader “unitary waters” argument is open to the District on remand. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Notes
*An applicant for an individual NPDES permit must provide information about, among other things, the point source itself, the nature of the pollutants to be discharged, and any water treatment system that will be used. General permits greatly reduce that administrative burden by authorizing discharges from a category of point sources within a specified geographic area. Once EPA or a state agency issues such a permit, covered entities, in some cases, need take no further action to achieve compliance with the NPDES besides adhering to the permit conditions. See 40 CFR §122.28(b)(2)(v) (2003).