Supreme Court Opinions

Concurrence, Privacy

Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dept. of Health

Concurrence, Privacy / By

Justice O’CONNOR, concurring.

I agree that a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions, see ante at 497 U. S. 278 -279, and that the refusal of artificially delivered food and water is encompassed within that liberty interest. See ante at 497 U. S. 279. I write separately to clarify why I believe this to be so.

As the Court notes, the liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions involving the State’s invasions into the body. See ante at 497 U. S. 278 -279. Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 342 U. S. 172 (1952) (“Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents… is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities”); Union Pacific R. C.o. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 141 U. S. 251 (1891). Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has echoed this same concern. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 384 U. S. 772 (1966) (“The integrity of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our society”); Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753, 470 U. S. 759 (1985) (“A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence… implicates expectations

Concurrence, Economic Activity

Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal. Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal

Concurrence, Economic Activity / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

I join all of the Court’s opinion, except for the statement that petitioner cannot “rel[y] on ERISA’s original limitation of contingent liability to 30% of net worth.” Ante, at 646. The Court’s reasoning is generally consistent with my own views about retroactive withdrawal liability, which I explained in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U. S. 211, 228-236 (1986) (concurring opinion), and which I need not restate at length here. In essence, my position is that the “imposition of this type of retroactive liability on employers, to be constitutional, must rest on some basis in the employer’s conduct that would make it rational to treat the employees’ expectations of benefits under the plan as the employer’s responsibility.” Id., at 229.

The Court does not hold otherwise. Rather, it reasons that, although “the withdrawal liability assessed against Concrete Pipe may amount to more… than the share of the Plan’s liability strictly attributable to employment of covered workers at Concrete Pipe,” this possibility “was exactly what Concrete Pipe accepted when it joined the Plan.” Ante, at 638. I agree that a withdrawing employer can be held responsible for its statutory “share” of unfunded vested benefits if the employer should have anticipated the prospect of withdrawal liability when it joined the plan. In such a case, the “basis in the employer’s conduct that would make it rational to treat the employees’ expectations of benefits

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Privacy, William Rehnquist

Department of Justice v. Landano

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Privacy, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Exemption 7(D) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (FOIA), exempts from disclosure agency records “compiled for law enforcement purposes… by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation” if release of those records “could reasonably be expected to disclose” the identity of, or information provided by, a “confidential source.” § 552(b)(7)(D). This case concerns the evidentiary showing that the Government must make to establish that a source is “confidential” within the meaning of Exemption 7(D). We are asked to decide whether the Government is entitled to a presumption that all sources supplying information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or Bureau) in the course of a criminal investigation are confidential sources.

I

Respondent Vincent Landano was convicted in New Jersey state court for murdering Newark, New Jersey, police officer John Snow in the course of a robbery. The crime received considerable media attention. Evidence at trial showed that the robbery had been orchestrated by Victor Forni and a motorcycle gang known as “the Breed.” There was testimony that Landano, though not a Breed member, had been recruited for the job. Landano always has maintained that he did not participate in the robbery and that Forni, not he, killed Officer Snow. He contends that the prosecution withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83

Civil Rights, Concurrence, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Davis v. Bandemer

Civil Rights, Concurrence, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.

Today the Court holds that claims of political gerrymandering lodged by members of one of the political parties that make up our two-party system are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our precedents compels us to take this step, and there is every reason not to do so. I would hold that the partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political question that the judiciary should leave to the legislative branch, as the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended. Accordingly, I would reverse the District Court’s judgment on the grounds that appellees’ claim is nonjusticiable.

There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government. The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and federal, depends to no small extent on the continued vitality of our two-party system, which permits both stability and measured change. The opportunity to control the drawing of electoral boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part of politics in the United States, and one that plays no small role in fostering active participation in the political parties at every level. Thus, the legislative business of apportionment is fundamentally

Concurrence, First Amendment

Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos

Concurrence, First Amendment / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

Although I agree with the judgment of the Court, I write separately to note that this action once again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court’s use of the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 612 -613 (1971). See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 472 U. S. 67 (1985) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 465 U. S. 687 (1984) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring). As a result of this problematic analysis, while the holding of the opinion for the Court extends only to nonprofit organizations, its reasoning fails to acknowledge that the amended § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, raises different questions as it is applied to profit and nonprofit organizations.

In Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, I noted a tension in the Court’s use of the Lemon test to evaluate an Establishment Clause challenge to government efforts to accommodate the free exercise of religion:

On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting religious observers from generally applicable government obligations. By definition, such legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an ‘accommodation’ of free exercise

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium Inc. v. FCC

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree that § 10(a) is constitutional and that § 10(b) is unconstitutional, and I join Parts I, II, III, and V, and the judgment in part. I am not persuaded, however, that the asserted “important differences” between §§ 10(a) and 10(c), ante, at 760, are sufficient to justify striking down § 10(c). I find the features shared by § 10(a), which covers leased access channels, and § 10(c), which covers public access channels, to be more significant than the differences. For that reason, I would find that § 10(c) also withstands constitutional scrutiny.

Both §§ 10(a) and 10(c) serve an important governmental interest: the well-established compelling interest of protecting children from exposure to indecent material. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 639-640 (1968). Cable television, like broadcast television, is a medium that is uniquely accessible to children, see ante, at 744-745, and, of course, children have equally easy access to public access channels as to leased access channels. By permitting a cable operator to prevent transmission of patently offensive sexrelated programming, §§ 10(a) and 10(c) further the interest of protecting children.

Furthermore, both provisions are permissive. Neither presents an outright ban on a category of speech, such as we struck down in Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, supra. Sections 10(a) and

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Judicial Power, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Judicial Power, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents three issues related to the application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: whether a district court may impose Rule 11 sanctions on a plaintiff who has voluntarily dismissed his complaint pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; what constitutes the appropriate standard of appellate review of a district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions; and whether Rule 11 authorizes awards of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal of a Rule 11 sanction. *

I

In 1983, Danik, Inc., owned and operated a number of discount men’s clothing stores in the Washington, D.C., area. In June, 1983, Intercontinental Apparel, a subsidiary of respondent Hartmarx Corp., brought a breach-of-contract action against Danik in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Danik, represented by the law firm of Cooter & Gell (petitioner), responded to the suit by filing a counterclaim against Intercontinental, alleging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13 et seq. In March, 1984, the District Court granted summary judgment for Intercontinental in its suit against Danik, and, in February, 1985, a jury returned a verdict for Intercontinental on Danik’s counterclaim. Both judgments were affirmed on appeal. Danik, Inc. v. Intercontinental Apparel, Inc., 245 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 759 F.2d 959 (1985) (judgment order); Intercontinental Apparel, Inc. v. Danik,

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Economic Activity, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Director Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Economic Activity, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In adjudicating benefits claims under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 83 Stat. 792, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., the Department of Labor applies what it calls the “true doubt” rule. This rule essentially shifts the burden of persuasion to the party opposing the benefits claim-when the evidence is evenly balanced, the benefits claimant wins. This litigation presents the question whether the rule is consistent with § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof.” 5 U. S. C. § 556(d).

I

We review two separate decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In one, Andrew Ondecko applied for disability benefits under the BLBA after working as a coal miner for 31 years. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Ondecko had pneumoconiosis (or black lung disease), that he was totally disabled by the disease, and that the disease resulted from coal mine employment. In resolving the first two issues, the ALJ relied on the true doubt rule. In resolving the third, she relied on the rebuttable presumption that a miner with pneumoconiosis who worked in the mines for at least 10 years developed the disease be

tBriefs of amici curiae urging affirmance

Dissent, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Dixson v. United States

Dissent, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. The rule of lenity demands that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”Rewis v. United States,401 U. S. 808,401 U. S. 812 opinion cannot carry the weight the Court places on it, and there is good reason to reject the Court’s interpretation of the statute.(1971). The Court concludes that congressional intent to include persons like petitioners within the coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 201 is clear enough to make the rule of lenity inapplicable. The statutory language admits of the Court’s reading, and the case for that reading would be strong, though perhaps not persuasive, if § 201 were a civil statute. I differ with the Court in that I find the evidence of congressional intent too weak to meet the higher standard for resolving facial ambiguity against a defendant when interpreting a criminal statute. In my view, the evidence of intent offered by the Court’s
I
The language of § 201 and of its predecessors, as the Court’s opinion points out, is intentionally broad. But that fact merely creates the interpretive problem -it does not resolve it. Congress intended to carry forward the pre-1962 bribery statute when it enacted § 201, and it understood the coverage of the bribery law to be broad. See ante at 465 U. S. 491 -493, 465 U. S. 494 -495. Moreover, the purpose of the statute was undoubtedly to proscribe bribery of all those who

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist

Dodd v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

Title 28 U. S. C. §2255 establishes a “1-year period of limitation” within which a federal prisoner may file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under that section. That period runs from “the latest” of a number of events, which are enumerated in subparagraphs (1) through (4) of ¶6 of that section. This case involves subparagraph (3), which provides that the limitation period begins to run on “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” We must decide whether the date from which the limitation period begins to run under ¶6(3) is the date on which this Court “initially recognized” the right asserted in an applicant’s §2255 motion, or whether, instead, it is the date on which the right is “made retroactiv[e].”

I
Petitioner Michael Donald Dodd was indicted on June 25, 1993, for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841 and 846, conspiring to possess with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of §841(a)(1), conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of §841(a)(1), and 16 counts of using and possessing a passport obtained by false statement in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1546(a). He was convicted of all counts except the cocaine charge, and was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on May 7, 1997. 111 F. 3d 867 (per curiam). Because Dodd did not file a petition for certiorari, his conviction became final on August 6, 1997. See Clay v. United States, 537 U. S. 522, 525 (2003).

On April 4, 2001, more than three years after his conviction became final, Dodd filed a pro se motion under 28 U. S. C. §2255 seeking to set aside his conviction for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, based on our decision in Richardson v. United States, 526 U. S. 813 (1999). Richardson held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that together constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. Id., at 815. Dodd argued, among other things, that he was entitled to relief because his jury had not been instructed that they had to agree unanimously on each predicate violation. App. 9. The District Court dismissed Dodd’s §2255 motion as time barred. Id., at 11–15. Because Richardson had been decided more than one year before Dodd filed his motion, the court held that the motion was untimely; it also rejected Dodd’s request for equitable tolling. App. 13–15.

Dodd appealed, arguing that the limitation period in §2255, ¶6(3), did not begin to run until April 19, 2002, when the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Ross v. United States, 289 F. 3d 677, that the right recognized in Richardson applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Eleventh Circuit held that the limitation period began to run on “the date the Supreme Court initially recognizes the right”—the date Richardson was decided—and accordingly affirmed the dismissal of Dodd’s motion as time barred. 365 F. 3d 1273, 1283 (2004).

We granted certiorari, 543 U. S. __ (2004), to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over when the limitation period in ¶6(3) begins to run. Compare, e.g., 365 F. 3d, at 1283 (case below) (period runs from date of Supreme Court decision initially recognizing right asserted); and United States v. Lopez, 248 F. 3d 427, 432–433 (CA5 2001) (same), with Pryor v. United States, 278 F. 3d 612, 616 (CA6 2002) (period does not begin to run until right has been held retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review); and United States v. Valdez, 195 F. 3d 544, 547–548 (CA9 1999) (same).

II
Section 2255, ¶6, provides:

“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

“(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

“(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

“(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

“(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”

In most cases, the operative date from which the limitation period is measured will be the one identified in ¶6(1): “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” Ibid. ; see also Clay, supra, at 524. But later filings are permitted where subparagraphs (2)–(4) apply. This case involves ¶6(3), which gives §2255 applicants one year from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Dodd contends that under subparagraph (3), the limitation period runs from the date on which the right asserted was made retroactively applicable. The United States, on the other hand, argues that it runs from the date on which this Court initially recognized the right asserted.

We believe that the text of ¶6(3) settles this dispute. It unequivocally identifies one, and only one, date from which the 1-year limitation period is measured: “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” We “must presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1992). What Congress has said in ¶6(3) is clear: an applicant has one year from the date on which the right he asserts was initially recognized by this Court.

Dodd urges us to adopt a different interpretation. He contends that the second clause in ¶6(3) affects the applicable date under that provision. He reads ¶6(3) as containing “three distinct prerequisites” that “must be satisfied before the limitation period begins.” Brief for Petitioner 8. Those three prerequisites are: (1) the right asserted by the applicant “was initially recognized” by this Court; (2) this Court “newly recognized” the right; and (3) a court must have “made” the right “retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Id., at 13–14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit did not hold the right recognized in Richardson v. United States, 526 U. S. 813 (1999), retroactively applicable until April 19, 2002, when it decided Ross, 289 F. 3d 677, Dodd contends that he had until April 19, 2003—one year from the date when all three prerequisites were satisfied—to file his §2255 motion.

Dodd’s interpretation does not square with the only natural reading of the text. Paragraph 6(3) identifies one date and one date only as the date from which the 1-year limitation period runs: “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” Dodd’s reliance on the second clause to identify the operative date is misplaced. That clause—“if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”—imposes a condition on the applicability of this subsection. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1124 (1993) (the definition of “if ” is “in the event that” or “on condition that”). It therefore limits ¶6(3)’s application to cases in which applicants are seeking to assert rights “newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” §2255, ¶6(3). That means that ¶6(3)’s date—“the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court”—does not apply at all if the conditions in the second clause—the right “has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”—have not been satisfied. As long as the conditions in the second clause are satisfied so that ¶6(3) applies in the first place, that clause has no impact whatsoever on the date from which the 1-year limitation period in ¶6(3) begins to run. Thus, if this Court decides a case recognizing a new right, a federal prisoner seeking to assert that right will have one year from this Court’s decision within which to file his §2255 motion. He may take advantage of the date in the first clause of ¶6(3) only if the conditions in the second clause are met.

We recognize that the statute of limitations in ¶6(3) makes it difficult for applicants filing second or successive §2255 motions to obtain relief. The limitation period in ¶6(3) applies to “all motions” under §2255, initial motions as well as second or successive ones. Section 2255, ¶8(2), narrowly restricts an applicant’s ability to file a second or successive motion. An applicant may file a second or successive motion only in limited circumstances, such as where he seeks to take advantage of “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” §2255, ¶8(2). Dodd points out that this Court rarely decides that a new rule is retroactively applicable within one year of initially recognizing that right. Thus, because of the interplay between ¶¶8(2) and 6(3), an applicant who files a second or successive motion seeking to take advantage of a new rule of constitutional law will be time barred except in the rare case in which this Court announces a new rule of constitutional law and makes it retroactive within one year.

Although we recognize the potential for harsh results in some cases, we are not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted. “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 663, n. 5 (2001) (“[E]ven if we disagreed with the legislative decision to establish stringent procedural requirements for retroactive application of new rules, we do not have license to question the decision on policy grounds”). The disposition required by the text here, though strict, is not absurd. It is for Congress, not this Court, to amend the statute if it believes that the interplay of ¶¶8(2) and 6(3) of §2255 unduly restricts federal prisoners’ ability to file second or successive motions.

Justice Stevens would hold, contrary to the plain text, that the limitation period in ¶6(3) begins to run when the right asserted is made retroactive, see post, at 9–10 (dissenting opinion), because he assumes that “the most natural reading of the statutory text would make it possible for the limitations period to expire before the cause of action accrues,” post, at 1. Justice Stevens analogizes this case to Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, ex rel. Wilson, post, p. __, see post, at 1 (dissenting opinion), but Graham Count y is distinguishable. The text of the statute at issue in Graham County is ambiguous, justifying the Court’s partial reliance on “the ‘standard rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’ ” See Graham County, post, at 5–8, and n. 2. Here, there is no such ambiguity; ¶6(3) clearly specifies the date on which the limitation period begins to run.

III
Dodd’s §2255 motion sought to benefit from our holding in Richardson, supra, which was decided on June 1, 1999. Thus, he had one year from that date within which to file his motion. Because he did not file his motion until April 4, 2001, the motion was untimely. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

It is so ordered.