Supreme Court Opinions

Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

McKaskle v. Wiggins

Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), this Court recognized a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense. The Court also held that a trial court may appoint “standby counsel” to assist the pro se defendant in his defense. Today we must decide what role standby counsel who is present at trial over the defendant’s objection may play consistent with the protection of the defendant’s Faretta rights.

I

Carl Edwin Wiggins was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as a recidivist. His conviction was set aside because of a defective indictment. When Wiggins was retried, he was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Standby counsel were appointed to assist Wiggins at both trials. Wiggins now challenges counsel’s participation in his second trial.

Prior to the first trial, a hearing was held on Wiggins’ motion to proceed pro se. The court granted the motion, Record 4a, but simultaneously appointed two attorneys to act as standby counsel. Wiggins initially objected to their presence. Id. at 11a. Shortly thereafter, however, counsel asked Wiggins how they should conduct themselves at trial, and Wiggins expressly requested that they bring appropriate objections directly to the attention of the court, without first consulting him. Id. at 37a. After the trial, newly appointed counsel discovered that the original indictment was defective, and a new trial was granted.

On April

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

McKune v. Lile

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

The Court today is divided on the question of what standard to apply when evaluating compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting. I write separately because, although I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is broader than the “atypical and significant hardship” standard we have adopted for evaluating due process claims in prisons, see post, at 58-60 (dissenting opinion) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976)), I do not believe that the alterations in respondent’s prison conditions as a result of his failure to participate in the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) were so great as to constitute compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. I therefore agree with the plurality that the decision below should be reversed.

The text of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person’s refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. Not all pressure necessarily “compel[s]” incriminating statements.

For instance, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 455 (1966), we found that an environment of police custodial interrogation was coercive enough to require prophylactic warnings only after observing that such an environment exerts a “heavy toll on individual liberty.” But we have not required Miranda warnings

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Federalism, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, William Rehnquist

Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Federalism, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Section 360k(a), the pre-emption provision of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), provides that no State may establish or continue in effect “any requirement” “which is different from, or in addition to,” any requirement applicable under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) to the device. As the Court points out, because Congress has expressly provided a pre-emption provision, “we need not go beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the MDA to pre-empt” state law. Ante, at 484. We agree, then, on the task before us: to interpret Congress’ intent by reading the statute in accordance with its terms. This, however, the Court has failed to do.

The cases require us to determine whether the Lohrs’ state common-law claims survive pre-emption under § 360k. I conclude that state common-law damages actions do impose “requirements” and are therefore pre-empted where such requirements would differ from those imposed by the FDCA. The plurality acknowledges that a common-law action might impose a “requirement,” but suggests that such a pre-emption would be “rare indeed.” Ante, at 502. To reach that determination, the opinion-without explicitly relying on Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations and without offering any sound basis for why deference would be warranted-imports the FDA regulations interpreting

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Meghrig v. KFC Western Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider whether § 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U. S. C. § 6972, authorizes a private cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the environment. We conclude that it does not.

I

Respondent KFC Western, Inc. (KFC), owns and operates a “Kentucky Fried Chicken” restaurant on a parcel of property in Los Angeles. In 1988, KFC discovered during the course of a construction project that the property was contaminated with petroleum. The County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services ordered KFC to attend to the problem, and KFC spent $211,000 removing and disposing of the oil-tainted soil.

Three years later, KFC brought this suit under the citizen suit provision of RCRA, 90 Stat. 2825, as amended, 42

Massachusetts, and William L. Pardee, John Beling, and Karen McGuire, Assistant Attorneys General, Jeremiah W Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, and James Layton, Joseph P. Bindbeutel, and Douglas E. Nelson, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General of their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Calvin E. Holloway of Guam, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Carla Stolla of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana,

Dissent, Due Process, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist

Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams

Dissent, Due Process, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior decisions and holds that, before the State conducts any proceeding that will affect the legally protected property interests of any party, the State must provide notice to that party by means certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party’s identity and location are “reasonably ascertainable.” Ante at 462 U. S. 800. Applying this novel and unjustified principle to the present case, the Court decides that the mortgagee involved deserved more than the notice by publication and posting that were provided. I dissent because the Court’s approach is unwarranted both as a general rule and as the rule of this case.

I

In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 339 U. S. 314 (1950), the Court established that

[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.

We emphasized that notice is constitutionally adequate when “the practicalities and peculiarities of the case… are reasonably met,” id. at 339 U. S. 314 -315. See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 352 U. S. 115 (1956); Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U. S. 208, 371 U. S. 211 -212 (1962); Greene v. Lindsey, 456

Dissent, Economic Activity, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

Dissent, Economic Activity, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

This case presents a simple question: is it legitimate for a State to use its taxing power to promote a domestic insurance industry and to encourage capital investment within its borders? In a holding that can only be characterized as astonishing, the Court determines that these purposes are illegitimate. This holding is unsupported by precedent and subtly distorts the constitutional balance, threatening the freedom of both state and federal legislative bodies to fashion appropriate classifications in economic legislation. Because I disagree with both the Court’s method of analysis and its conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

I

Alabama’s legislature has chosen to impose a higher tax on out-of-state insurance companies and insurance companies incorporated in Alabama that do not maintain their principal place of business or invest assets within the State. Ala.Code § 27-4-4 et seq. (1975). This tax seeks to promote both a domestic insurance industry and capital investment in Alabama. App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, joined by many other out-of-state insurers, alleges that this discrimination violates its rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that a State shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Appellants rely on the Equal Protection Clause because,

Byron White, Civil Rights, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Timeline, William Brennan

Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan

Byron White, Civil Rights, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Timeline, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the narrow issue of whether a state statute that excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported professional nursing school violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

The facts are not in dispute. In 1884, the Mississippi Legislature created the Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White Girls of the State of Mississippi, now the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States. 1884 Miss.Gen.Laws, Ch. 30, § 6. The school, known today as Mississippi University for Women (MUW), has from its inception limited its enrollment to women. [ Footnote 1 ]

In 1971, MUW established a School of Nursing, initially offering a 2-year associate degree. Three years later, the school instituted a 4-year baccalaureate program in nursing, and today also offers a graduate program. The School of Nursing has its own faculty and administrative officers, and establishes its own criteria for admission. [ Footnote 2 ]

Respondent, Joe Hogan, is a registered nurse but does not hold a baccalaureate degree in nursing. Since 1974, he has worked as a nursing supervisor in a medical center in Columbus, the city in which MUW is located. In 1979, Hogan applied for admission to the MUW School of Nursing’s baccalaureate program. [ Footnote 3 ] Although he was otherwise qualified, he was denied admission to the School of Nursing solely because of his sex. School officials

Concurrence, First Amendment, Stephen Breyer, Timeline

Mitchell v. Helms

Concurrence, First Amendment, Stephen Breyer, Timeline / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring in the judgment.

In 1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 79 Stat. 27 (1965 Act). Under Title I, Congress provided monetary grants to States to address the needs of educationally deprived children of low-income families. Under Title II, Congress provided further monetary grants to States for the acquisition of library resources, textbooks, and other instructional materials for use by children and teachers in public and private elementary and secondary schools. Since 1965, Congress has reauthorized the Title I and Title II programs several times. Three Terms ago, we held in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203 (1997), that Title I, as applied in New York City, did not violate the Establishment Clause. I believe that Agostini likewise controls the constitutional inquiry respecting Title II presented here, and requires the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment that the program is unconstitutional as applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. To the extent our decisions in Meek v. Pit tenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977), are inconsistent with the Court’s judgment today, I agree that those decisions should be overruled. I therefore concur in the judgment.

I

I write separately because, in my view, the plurality announces a rule of unprecedented breadth for the evaluation of Establishment Clause challenges to government school aid programs. Reduced to its essentials

Economic Activity, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, William Rehnquist

Monessen v. Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan

Economic Activity, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

For the reasons given by the Court, I agree that prejudgment interest was impermissibly awarded in this FELA case. Accordingly, I join Parts I and II of its opinion. Because the trial court erroneously gave conclusive effect to a state rule requiring the use of a “total offset” method of calculating present value, I also agree that we must reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upholding that decision. I do not agree, however, that juries must in all circumstances be left free to choose among the total offset rule and alternative methods of accounting for anticipated future inflation.

The majority correctly notes that damages awards in state court FELA cases must be based on an approximation of present value, and that the jury must be instructed accordingly. Ante at 486 U. S. 339 -340.

Although… [it is] clear that no single method for determining present value is mandated by federal law, and that the method of calculating present value should take into account inflation and other sources of wage increases as well as the rate of interest, it is equally clear that an utter failure to instruct the jury that present value is the proper measure of a damages award is error.

St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U. S. 409, 470 U. S. 412 (1985). The reason for this rule is plain: because of the time value of money and the practice of awarding damages in

Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Monge v. California

Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause, which we have found applicable in the capital sentencing context, seeBullingtonv.Missouri,451 U. S. 430(1981), extends to noncapital sentencing proceedings. We hold that it does not, and accordingly affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court.

I

Petitioner was charged under California law with one count of using a minor to sell marijuana, Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11361(a) (West 1991), one count of sale or transportation of marijuana, § 11360(a), and one count of possession of marijuana for sale, § 11359. In the information, the State also notified petitioner that it would seek to prove two sentence enhancement allegations: that petitioner had previously been convicted of assault and that he had served a prison term for that offense, see Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 245(a)(1), 667(e)(1), and 667.5 (West Supp. 1998).

Under California’s “three-strikes” law, a defendant convicted of a felony who has two qualifying prior convictions for “serious felonies” receives a minimum sentence of 25 years to life; when the instant conviction was preceded by one serious felony offense, the court doubles a defendant’s term of imprisonment. §§ 667(d)(1) and (e)(1)-(2). An assault conviction qualifies as a serious felony if the defendant either inflicted great bodily injury on another person or per

W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mike Fisher