Supreme Court Opinions

Antonin Scalia, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Unions, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. PERB

Antonin Scalia, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Unions, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a state university’s delivery of unstamped letters from a labor union to university employees violates the Private Express Statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1699, 39 U.S.C. §§ 601-606. These statutes establish the postal monopoly, and generally prohibit the private carriage of letters over postal routes without the payment of postage to the United States Postal Service.

I

Appellant Regents govern a large state-owned university with over 100,000 employees. The university (hereafter referred to as appellant) operates an internal mail system to facilitate the delivery of mail to the various sites on its campuses. Appellant’s employees collect mail originating on the campuses from many mail depositories and take it to a central location for sorting. The mail is separated into three groups: (1) mail already bearing United States postage; (2) unstamped internal university mail; and (3) other unstamped mail. Group (1) is delivered to the Postal Service without further handling by appellant. Group (2) is monitored to ensure that it includes only official university mail. Group (3) is examined for any letters addressed to university destinations that come within an exception to the Private Express Statutes and can therefore be delivered by the appellant without postage. Appellant affixes United States postage to the remainder of mail in group (3) and delivers it to the Postal Service, then charges

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Reich v. Collins

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In a long line of cases, this Court has established that due process requires a “clear and certain” remedy for taxes collected in violation of federal law. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O’Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 285 (1912) (Holmes, J.). A State has the flexibility to provide that remedy before the disputed taxes are paid (predeprivation), after they are paid (postdeprivation), or both. But what it may not do, and what Georgia did here, is hold out what plainly appears to be a “clear and certain” postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the disputed taxes have been paid, that no such remedyexists.

I

For many years, numerous States, including Georgia, exempted from state personal income tax retirement benefits paid by the State, but not retirement benefits paid by the Federal Government (or any other employer). In March 1989, this Court held that such a tax scheme violates the constitutional intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, which dates back to McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), and has been generally codified at 4 U. S. C. § 111. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803 (1989).

In the aftermath of Davis, most of these States, Georgia included, repealed their special tax exemptions for state retirees, but few offered federal retirees any refunds for the unconstitutional taxes they had paid in the years before Davis was decided. Not surprisingly, a great deal of litigation ensued in

David Souter, Dissent, Judicial Power, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc

David Souter, Dissent, Judicial Power, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

The Court today holds that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA or Act), 29 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), clearly precludes the Secretary of Labor from adopting a rule requiring an employer to give an em ployee notice that leave is FMLA qualifying before the leave may be counted against the employer’s 12-week obligation. Because I believe the Secretary is justified in requiring such individualized notice and because I think that nothing in the Act constrains the Secretary’s ability to secure compliance with that requirement by refusing to count the leave against the employer’s statutory obligation, I respectfully dissent.

I

I begin with the question the Court set aside, see ante, at 88, whether the Secretary was justified in requiring individualized notice at all. The FMLA gives the Secretary the notice and comment rulemaking authority to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out” the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 2654 (1994 ed.). In light of this explicit congressional delegation of rulemaking authority, we must uphold the Secretary’s regulations unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984).

The Secretary has reasonably determined that individualized notice is necessary to implement the FMLA’s provisions. According to

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell

Puerto Rico v. Branstad

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I, II-A, II-C, and III of the Court’s opinion. Because the Court ultimately resolves this case under the Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182, I do not find Part II-B, and its statements concerning the Extradition Clause of the Constitution, necessary to the decision of this case. Accordingly, I do not subscribe to that part of the Court’s opinion. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 472 U. S. 854 (1985); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 461 U. S. 361, n. 10 (1983); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

Clarence Thomas, Concurrence, Economic Activity

Public Lands Council v. Babbitt

Clarence Thomas, Concurrence, Economic Activity / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to make the following observations concerning the Court’s decision. First, in Part II-A, the Court holds that the Secretary did not exceed his authority under the Taylor Grazing Act by promulgating the new “grazing preference” and “permitted use” rules. I agree with that holding but would place special emphasis on the Court’s third reason for rejecting petitioners’ facial challenge to the regulations. Petitioners have not shown how the new regulations themselves-rather than specific actions the Secretary might take pursuant to those regulations-violate the Taylor Grazing Act’s requirement that “grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged… be adequately safeguarded.” 43 U. S. C. § 315b. It is of particular importance, as the Court notes, ante, at 743, that the Secretary has assured us that the new regulations do not in actual practice “alter the active use/suspended use formula in grazing permits” and that” ‘present suspended use would continue to be recognized and have a priority for additional grazing use within the allotment.'” Brief for Respondents 22 (quoting Bureau of Land Management, Rangeland Reform ’94: Final Environmental Impact Statement 144 (1994)). For these reasons, petitioners’ facial challenge to the regulations must fail. Should a permit holder find, however, that the Secretary’s specific application of the new regulations deviates from the above

Civil Rights, Concurrence

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins

Civil Rights, Concurrence / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the plurality that, on the facts presented in this case, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision concerning Ann Hopkins’ candidacy absent consideration of her gender. I further agree that this burden shift is properly part of the liability phase of the litigation. I thus concur in the judgment of the Court. My disagreement stems from the plurality’s conclusions concerning the substantive requirement of causation under the statute and its broad statements regarding the applicability of the allocation of the burden of proof applied in this case. The evidentiary rule the Court adopts today should be viewed as a supplement to the careful framework established by our unanimous decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), for use in cases such as this one where the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. I write separately to explain why I believe such a departure from the McDonnell Douglas standard is justified in the circumstances presented by this and like cases, and to express my views as to when and how the strong medicine of requiring the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of causation should be administered.

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Title

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Concurrence, Due Process

Preseault v. ICC

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Concurrence, Due Process / By

Justice O’CONNOR, with whom Justice SCALIA and Justice KENNEDY join, concurring.

Petitioners assert that the Interstate Commerce Commission’s (ICC) actions prevent them from enjoying property rights secured by Vermont law, and thereby have effected a compensable taking. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that, no matter what Vermont law might provide, the ICC’s actions forestalled petitioners from possessing the asserted reversionary interest, and thus that no takings claim could arise. Today the Court affirms the Second Circuit’s judgment on quite different grounds. I join the Court’s opinion, but write separately to express my view that state law determines what property interest petitioners possess, and that traditional takings doctrine will determine whether the Government must compensate petitioners for the burden imposed on any property interest they possess.

As the Court acknowledges, ante at 494 U. S. 8 -9, 494 U. S. 15 -16, state law creates and defines the scope of the reversionary or other real property interests affected by the ICC’s actions pursuant to Section 208 of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). In determining whether a taking has occurred,

we are mindful of the basic axiom that ‘[p]roperty interests… are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’

Ruckelshaus

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

Pliler v. Ford

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

Justice O’Connor, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion because it is limited to the narrow question whether the notifications crafted by the Ninth Circuit must be given.
The propriety of the stay-and-abeyance procedure generally is not addressed. The District Court did not employ that procedure, nor did the Ninth Circuit hold that it must be applied in every case. There is, therefore, no need for us to pass on it in this case, and the Court properly avoids doing so. I note, however, that the procedure is not an idiosyncratic one; as Justice Breyer describes, post, at 3 (dissenting opinion), seven of the eight Circuits to consider it have approved stay-and-abeyance as an appropriate exercise of a district court’s equitable powers.
For the reasons given by the majority, ante, at 6–7, it is not incumbent upon a district court to establish whether the statute of limitations has already run before explaining the options available to a habeas petitioner who has filed a mixed petition. Nevertheless, if the petitioner is affirmatively misled, either by the court or by the State, equitable tolling might well be appropriate. This is a question for the Ninth Circuit to consider on remand. See ante, at 8.

Byron White, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, Privacy, William Rehnquist

Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft

Byron White, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, Privacy, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

For reasons stated in my dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, ante p. 462 U. S. 416, I believe that the second trimester hospitalization requirement imposed by § 188.025 does not impose an undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Assuming, arguendo, that the requirement was an undue burden, it would nevertheless “reasonably relat[e] to the preservation and protection of maternal health.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 410 U. S. 163 (1973). I therefore dissent from the Court’s judgment that the requirement is unconstitutional.

I agree that the second physician requirement contained in § 188.030.3 is constitutional because the State possesses a compelling interest in protecting and preserving fetal life, but I believe that this state interest is extant throughout pregnancy. I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.

I agree that the pathology report requirement imposed by § 188.047 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Because I do not believe that the validity of this requirement is contingent in any way on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is imposed, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

Assuming, arguendo, that the State cannot impose a parental veto on the decision of a minor to undergo an abortion, I agree that the parental consent provision

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Dissent, Economic Activity

Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Dissent, Economic Activity / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

Today the Court replaces the straightforward analysis commended by the language of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) with a balancing test. Because the Court’s approach is inconsistent with the Rule’s plain language and unduly complicates the task of courts called upon to apply it, I respectfully dissent.

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Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) provides that, if a party moves for permission to act after having missed a deadline, the court “may at any time in its discretion… permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” This language establishes two requirements that must be met before untimely action will be permitted. First, no relief is available unless the failure to comply with the deadline “was the result of excusable neglect.” Bkrtcy. Rule 9006(b)(1). Second, the court may withhold relief if it believes forbearance inappropriate; the statute does not re quire the court to forgive every omission caused by excusable neglect, but states that the court “may” grant relief “in its discretion.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus, the court must at the threshold determine its authority to allow untimely action by asking whether the failure to meet the deadline resulted from excusable neglect; if the answer is yes, then the court should consider the equities and decide whether to excuse the error.

Instead of following the plain meaning of the Rule and examining