Supreme Court Opinions

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit a State from imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the distribution of religious materials by a religious organization.

I

California’s Sales and Use Tax Law requires retailers to pay a sales tax “[f]or the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail.” Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. § 6051 (West 1987). A “sale” includes any transfer of title or possession of tangible personal property for consideration. Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. § 6006(a) (West Supp.1989).

The use tax, as a complement to the sales tax, reaches out-of-state purchases by residents of the State. It is “imposed on the storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer,” § 6201, at the same rate as the sales tax (6 percent). Although the use tax is imposed on the purchaser, § 6202, it is generally collected by the retailer at the time the sale is made. §§ 6202-6206. Neither the State Constitution nor the State Sales and Use Tax Law exempts religious organizations from the sales and use tax, apart from a limited exemption for the serving of meals by religious organizations, § 6363.5.

During the tax period in question (1974 to 1981), appellant Jimmy Swaggart Ministries was a religious organization incorporated as a Louisiana nonprofit corporation and recognized as such by the Internal Revenue

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Dissent

Swidler & Berlin v. United States

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

Although the attorney-client privilege ordinarily will survive the death of the client, I do not agree with the Court that it inevitably precludes disclosure of a deceased client’s communications in criminal proceedings. In my view, a criminal defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence or a compelling law enforcement need for information may, where the testimony is not available from other sources, override a client’s posthumous interest in confidentiality.

We have long recognized that “[t]he fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are to rest upon reason-is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.” Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 381 (1933). In light of the heavy burden that they place on the search for truth, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708-710 (1974), “[e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper circumstances,” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 175 (1979). Consequently, we construe the scope of privileges narrowly. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U. S. 1, 19 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); see also University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U. S. 182, 189 (1990). We are reluctant to recognize a privilege or read an existing one expansively unless to do so will serve a “public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means

Anthony Kennedy, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Tennard v. Dretke

Anthony Kennedy, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), we held that the Texas capital sentencing scheme provided a constitutionally inadequate vehicle for jurors to consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse the petitioner had presented. The petitioner in this case argues that the same scheme was inadequate for jurors to give effect to his evidence of low intelligence. The Texas courts rejected his claim, and a Federal District Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that ‘reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,’ Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), and therefore hold that a certificate of appealability should have issued.

I

Petitioner Robert Tennard was convicted by a jury of capital murder in October 1986. The evidence presented at trial indicated that Tennard and two accomplices killed two of his neighbors and robbed their house. Tennard himself stabbed one of the victims to death, and one of the accomplices killed the other victim with a hatchet.

During the penalty phase of the trial, defense counsel called only one witness’Tennard’s parole officer’who testified that Tennard’s Department of Corrections record from a prior incarceration indicated that he had an IQ of 67. App. 28’29. He testified that the IQ test would have been administered as a matter of course. Ibid.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Attorneys, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Texas St. Teach. Ass’n v. Garland ISD

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Attorneys, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We must decide today the proper standard for determining whether a party has “prevailed” in an action brought under certain civil rights statutes such that the party is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This is an issue which has divided the Courts of Appeals both before and after our decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983). The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits require that a party succeed on the “central issue” in the litigation and achieve the “primary relief sought” to be eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988. See, e.g., Simien v. San Antonio, 809 F.2d 255, 258 (CA5 1987); Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1149 (CA11 1985) (en banc). Most of the other Federal Courts of Appeals have applied a less demanding standard, requiring only that a party succeed on a significant issue and receive some of the relief sought in the lawsuit to qualify for a fee award. See, e.g., Gingras v. Lloyd, 740 F.2d 210, 212 (CA2 1984); Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99, 102 (CA7 1985); Fast v. School Dist. of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1032-1033 (CA8 1984) (en banc); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F.2d 1124, 1125 (CA9 1983); Nephew v. Aurora, 766 F.2d 1464, 1466 (CA10 1985). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the “central issue” test, and concluded that petitioners here were

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

Thompson v. Oklahoma

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

The plurality and dissent agree on two fundamental propositions: that there is some age below which a juvenile’s crimes can never be constitutionally punished by death, and that our precedents require us to locate this age in light of the ” evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'” See ante at 487 U. S. 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 356 U. S. 101 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.)); ante at 487 U. S. 827 -829; post at 487 U. S. 864 -865, 487 U. S. 872. See also e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 481 U. S. 300 (1987). I accept both principles. The disagreements between the plurality and the dissent rest on their different evaluations of the evidence available to us about the relevant social consensus. Although I believe that a national consensus forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed before the age of 16 very likely does exist, I am reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of constitutional law without better evidence than we now possess. Because I conclude that the sentence in this case can and should be set aside on narrower grounds than those adopted by the plurality, and because the grounds on which I rest should allow us to face the more general question when better evidence is available, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.

I

Both the plurality and the dissent look initially to the decisions of American legislatures for signs of a national

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist

Tanner v. United States

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners William Conover and Anthony Tanner were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and of committing mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. 772 F.2d 765 (1985). Petitioners argue that the District Court erred in refusing to admit juror testimony at a postverdict hearing on juror intoxication during the trial; and that the conspiracy count of the indictment failed to charge a crime against the United States. We affirm in part and remand.

I

Conover was the procurement manager at Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Seminole), a Florida corporation owned and operated by 11 rural electric distribution cooperatives. Seminole generates and transmits electrical energy to the cooperatives.

In 1979, Seminole borrowed over $1.1 billion from the Federal Financing Bank in order to construct a coal-fired power plant near Palatka, Florida. The loan was guaranteed by the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), a credit agency of the United States Department of Agriculture that assists rural electric organizations by providing loans, guaranteeing loans from other sources, and approving other security arrangements that allow the borrower to obtain financing. REA, A Brief History of the Rural Electrification and Telephone Programs (1985). The loan agreement between Seminole and the REA provided

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Unions, William Rehnquist

TWA v. Flight Attendants

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Unions, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide today whether, at the end of a strike, an employer is required by the Railway Labor Act (RLA or Act), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., to displace employees who worked during the strike in order to reinstate striking employees with greater seniority.

I

In March, 1984, Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), and the Independent Federation of Flight Attendants (IFFA or Union) began negotiations pursuant to § 6 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 156, on a new collective bargaining agreement to replace their prior agreement due to expire on July 31, 1984. The existing collective bargaining agreement created a complex system of bidding, the general effect of which was to insure that those flight attendants with the greatest seniority would have the best opportunity to obtain their preferred job assignments, flight schedules, and bases of operation as vacancies appeared, and to insure that senior flight attendants would be least affected by the periodic furloughs endemic to the airline industry. Thus, for example, should a job vacancy appear at the highly desirable Los Angeles or San Francisco bases of operation or “domiciles,” the most senior qualified flight attendant who bid on such a vacancy would be entitled to it. Conversely, should a reduction in force eliminate a position in the Los Angeles domicile, the furloughed flight attendant could opt to displace the most junior attendant of equal rank in the entire system

Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

TWA v. Franklin Mint Corp

Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented in this litigation is whether an air carrier’s declared liability limit of $9.07 per pound of cargo is inconsistent with the “Warsaw Convention” [ Footnote 1 ] (Convention), an international air carriage treaty that the United States has ratified. As a threshold matter we must determine whether the 1978 repeal of legislation setting an “official” price of gold in the United States renders the Convention’s gold-based liability limit unenforceable in this country. We conclude that the 1978 legislation was not intended to affect the enforceability of the Convention in the United States, and that a $9.07-per-pound liability limit is not inconsistent with the Convention.

I

In 1974, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) informed international air carriers doing business in the United States that the minimum acceptable carrier liability limit for lost cargo would thenceforth be $9.07 per pound. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), has complied with the CAB order since that time. On March 23, 1979, Franklin Mint Corp. (Franklin Mint) delivered four packages of numismatic materials with a total weight of 714 pounds to TWA for transportation from Philadelphia to London. Franklin Mint made no special declaration of value at the time of delivery. [ Footnote 2 ] The packages were subsequently lost. Franklin Mint brought suit in United States District Court to recover damages in the amount of $250,000. The parties stipulated

Concurrence, Economic Activity

Tyler Pipe v. Wash. Dept. of Rev

Concurrence, Economic Activity / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion holding that, “[i]n light of the facially discriminatory nature of the multiple activities exemption,” ante at 483 U. S. 244, see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 451 U. S. 756 -757 (1981), the Washington taxpayers need not prove actual discriminatory impact “by an examination of the tax burdens imposed by other States.” Ante at 483 U. S. 247. I do not read the Court’s decision as extending the “internal consistency” test described in Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 467 U. S. 644 -645 (1984), to taxes that are not facially discriminatory, contra, post at 483 U. S. 257 -258 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), nor would I agree with such a result in these cases. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, post p. 483 U. S. 298 (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting).