Supreme Court Opinions

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc. v. Director Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 33 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 933, gives the “person entitled to compensation” two avenues of recovery: Such a person may seek to recover damages from the third parties ultimately at fault for any injuries and still recover compensation under the Act from the covered worker’s employer as long as the worker’s employer gives its approval before the person settles with any of the third party tortfeasors. The question we decide today is whether an injured worker’s spouse, who may be eligible to receive death benefits under the Act after the worker dies, is a “person entitled to compensation” when the spouse enters into a settlement agreement with a third party before the worker’s death. We also consider whether the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) is a proper respondent in proceedings before the courts of appeals.

I

Jefferson Yates worked for Ingalls as a shipfitter at its Pascagoula shipyards in Mississippi between 1953 and 1967 and was exposed to asbestos in his workplace during this time. In March 1981, Mr. Yates was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis, chronic bronchitis, and possible malignancy in his lungs. Less than a month later, he filed a claim for disability benefits under § 8 of the LHWCA, 33 U. S. C. § 908, asserting that his present condition resulted from his expo

*Briefs of amici curiae

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Today we clarify the relationship between § 2 and § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973, 1973c. Specifically, we decide two questions: (i) whether preclearance must be denied under § 5 whenever a covered jurisdiction’s new voting “standard, practice, or procedure” violates § 2; and (ii) whether evidence that a new “standard, practice, or procedure” has a dilutive impact is always irrelevant to the inquiry whether the covered jurisdiction acted with “the purpose… of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” under § 5. We answer both in the negative.

I

Appellee Bossier Parish School Board (Board) is a jurisdiction subject to the preclearance requirements of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, and must therefore obtain the approval of either the United States Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before implementing any changes to a voting “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.” The Board has 12 members who are elected from single-member districts by majority vote to serve 4-year terms. When the 1990 census revealed wide population disparities among its districts, see App. to Juris. Statement 93a (Stipulations of Fact and Law, 82), the Board decided to redraw the districts to equalize the population distribution.

During this process, the Board considered two

Antonin Scalia, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Williamson v. United States

Antonin Scalia, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-C.

In this case we clarify the scope of the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3).

I

A deputy sheriff stopped the rental car driven by Reginald Harris for weaving on the highway. Harris consented to a search of the car, which revealed 19 kilograms of cocaine in two suitcases in the trunk. Harris was promptly arrested.

Shortly after Harris’ arrest, Special Agent Donald Walton of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) interviewed him by telephone. During that conversation, Harris said that he got the cocaine from an unidentified Cuban in Fort Lauderdale; that the cocaine belonged to petitioner Williamson; and that it was to be delivered that night to a particular dumpster. Williamson was also connected to Harris by physical evidence: The luggage bore the initials of Williamson’s sister, Williamson was listed as an additional driver on the car rental agreement, and an envelope addressed to Williamson and a receipt with Williamson’s girlfriend’s address were found in the glove compartment.

Several hours later, Agent Walton spoke to Harris in person. During that interview, Harris said he had rented the car a few days earlier and had driven it to Fort Lauderdale to meet Williamson. According to Harris, he had gotten the cocaine from a Cuban who was Williamson’s acquaintance, and the Cuban had put the cocaine in the car with a note telling Harris how to deliver

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist

Davis v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), we held that law enforcement officers must immediately cease questioning a suspect who has clearly asserted his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. In this case we decide how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to counsel that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning.

I

Pool brought trouble-not to River City, but to the Charleston Naval Base. Petitioner, a member of the United States Navy, spent the evening of October 2, 1988, shooting pool at a club on the base. Another sailor, Keith Shackleton, lost a game and a $30 wager to petitioner, but Shackleton refused to pay. After the club closed, Shackleton was beaten to death with a pool cue on a loading dock behind the commissary. The body was found early the next morning.

The investigation by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) gradually focused on petitioner. Investigative agents determined that petitioner was at the club that evening, and that he was absent without authorization from his duty station the next morning. The agents also learned that only privately owned pool cues could be removed from the club premises, and that petitioner owned two cues-one of which had a bloodstain on it. The agents were told by various people that petitioner either had admitted committing the crime or had recounted details that clearly indicated

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, a city and a local utility district, want to build a hydroelectric project on the Dosewallips River in Washington State. We must decide whether respondent state environmental agency (hereinafter respondent) properly conditioned a permit for the project on the maintenance of specific minimum stream flows to protect salmon and steelhead runs.

General of New York, and Kathleen Liston Morrison, Assistant Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Robert A. Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Roland A. Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Pamela Fanning Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Jeremiah W Nixon, Attorney General of

David Souter, First Amendment, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Waters v. Churchill

David Souter, First Amendment, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join.

In Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983), we set forth a test for determining whether speech by a government employee may, consistently with the First Amendment, serve as a basis for disciplining or discharging that employee. In this case, we decide whether the Connick test should be applied to what the government employer thought was said, or to what the trier of fact ultimately determines to have been said.

I

This case arises out of a conversation that respondent Cheryl Churchill had on January 16, 1987, with Melanie Perkins-Graham. Both Churchill and Perkins-Graham were nurses working at McDonough District Hospital; Churchill was in the obstetrics department, and Perkins-Graham was considering transferring to that department. The conversation took place at work during a dinner break. Petitioners heard about it and fired Churchill, allegedly because of it. There is, however, a dispute about what Churchill actually said, and therefore about whether petitioners were constitutionally permitted to fire Churchill for her statements.

* Richard Ruda and Glen D. Nager filed a brief for the International City/County Management Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Nurses Association by Ronald C. Jessamy; for the National Education Association et al.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Victor v. Nebraska

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.* The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense. In re Winship,397 U. S. 358(1970). Although this standard is an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication. In these cases, we consider the constitutionality of two attempts to define “reasonable doubt.”

*JUSTICES BLACKMUN and SOUTER join only Part II of this opinion.

JUSTICE GINSBURG joins only Parts II, III-B, and IV.

I

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Cf. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 440-441 (1887). Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 320, n. 14 (1979), the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. Cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 485-486 (1978). Rather, “taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 140 (1954).

In only one case have we held that a definition of reasonable doubt violated the Due Process Clause. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). There, the jurors were told:

“‘[A

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we consider the definition of a discriminatorily “abusive work environment” (also known as a “hostile work

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, and Lois C. Waldman; for Feminists for Free Expression by Cathy E. Crosson; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Elaine R. Jones and Eric Schnapper; for the National Conference of Women’s Bar Associations et al. by Edith Barnett; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Margaret A. Harris, Katherine L. Butler, and William J. Smith; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Deborah A. Ellis, Sarah E. Burns, Richard F. Ziegler, and Shari Siegel; for the Southern States Police Benevolent Association et al. by J. Michael McGuinness; and for the Women’s Legal Defense Fund et al. by Carolyn F. Corwin, Judith L. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, and Susan Deller Ross.

Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Ann Elizabeth Reesman filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Psychological Association by Dort S. Bigg; and for the Employment Law Center et al. by Patricia A. Shiu. OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Syllabus HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 92-1168. Argued October

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Majority, William Rehnquist

Smith v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide today whether the exchange of a gun for narcotics constitutes “use” of a firearm “during and in relation to… [a] drug trafficking crime” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). We hold that it does.

I

Petitioner John Angus Smith and his companion went from Tennessee to Florida to buy cocaine; they hoped to resell it at a profit. While in Florida, they met petitioner’s acquaintance, Deborah Hoag. Hoag agreed to, and in fact did, purchase cocaine for petitioner. She then accompanied petitioner and his friend to her motel room, where they were joined by a drug dealer. While Hoag listened, petitioner and the dealer discussed petitioner’s MAC-l0 firearm, which had been modified to operate as an automatic. The MAC-l0 apparently is a favorite among criminals. It is small and compact, lightweight, and can be equipped with a silencer. Most important of all, it can be devastating: A fully automatic MAC-l0 can fire more than 1,000 rounds per minute. The dealer expressed his interest in becoming the owner of a MAC-l0, and petitioner promised that he would discuss selling the gun if his arrangement with another potential buyer fell through.

Unfortunately for petitioner, Hoag had contacts not only with narcotics traffickers but also with law enforcement officials. In fact, she was a confidential informant. Consistent with her post, she informed the Broward County Sheriff’s Office of petitioner’s activities. The Sheriff’s

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist

United States v. Olano

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations was a “plain error” that the Court of Appeals was authorized to correct under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).

I

Each of the respondents, Guy W. Olano, Jr., and Raymond M. Gray, served on the board of directors of a savings and loan association. In 1986, the two were indicted in the Western District of Washington on multiple federal charges for their participation in an elaborate loan “kickback” scheme. Their joint jury trial with five other codefendants commenced in March 1987. All of the parties agreed that 14 jurors would be selected to hear the case, and that the 2 alternates would be identified before deliberations began.

On May 26, shortly before the end of the 3-month trial, the District Court suggested to the defendants that the two alternate jurors, soon to be identified, might be allowed to attend deliberations along with the regular jurors:”… I’d just like you to think about it, you have a day, let me know, it’s just a suggestion and you can-if there is even one person who doesn’t like it we won’t do it, but it is a suggestion that other courts have followed in long cases where jurors have sat through a lot of testimony, and that is to let the alternates go in but not participate, but just to sit in on deliberations.”I t’s strictly a matter of courtesy and I know many judges have done it with no objections