Supreme Court Opinions

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Majority, William Rehnquist

Smith v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide today whether the exchange of a gun for narcotics constitutes “use” of a firearm “during and in relation to… [a] drug trafficking crime” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). We hold that it does.

I

Petitioner John Angus Smith and his companion went from Tennessee to Florida to buy cocaine; they hoped to resell it at a profit. While in Florida, they met petitioner’s acquaintance, Deborah Hoag. Hoag agreed to, and in fact did, purchase cocaine for petitioner. She then accompanied petitioner and his friend to her motel room, where they were joined by a drug dealer. While Hoag listened, petitioner and the dealer discussed petitioner’s MAC-l0 firearm, which had been modified to operate as an automatic. The MAC-l0 apparently is a favorite among criminals. It is small and compact, lightweight, and can be equipped with a silencer. Most important of all, it can be devastating: A fully automatic MAC-l0 can fire more than 1,000 rounds per minute. The dealer expressed his interest in becoming the owner of a MAC-l0, and petitioner promised that he would discuss selling the gun if his arrangement with another potential buyer fell through.

Unfortunately for petitioner, Hoag had contacts not only with narcotics traffickers but also with law enforcement officials. In fact, she was a confidential informant. Consistent with her post, she informed the Broward County Sheriff’s Office of petitioner’s activities. The Sheriff’s

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we consider the definition of a discriminatorily “abusive work environment” (also known as a “hostile work

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, John A. Powell, and Lois C. Waldman; for Feminists for Free Expression by Cathy E. Crosson; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Elaine R. Jones and Eric Schnapper; for the National Conference of Women’s Bar Associations et al. by Edith Barnett; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Margaret A. Harris, Katherine L. Butler, and William J. Smith; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Deborah A. Ellis, Sarah E. Burns, Richard F. Ziegler, and Shari Siegel; for the Southern States Police Benevolent Association et al. by J. Michael McGuinness; and for the Women’s Legal Defense Fund et al. by Carolyn F. Corwin, Judith L. Lichtman, Donna R. Lenhoff, and Susan Deller Ross.

Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Ann Elizabeth Reesman filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Psychological Association by Dort S. Bigg; and for the Employment Law Center et al. by Patricia A. Shiu. OCTOBER TERM, 1993 Syllabus HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 92-1168. Argued October

David Souter, First Amendment, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Waters v. Churchill

David Souter, First Amendment, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join.

In Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983), we set forth a test for determining whether speech by a government employee may, consistently with the First Amendment, serve as a basis for disciplining or discharging that employee. In this case, we decide whether the Connick test should be applied to what the government employer thought was said, or to what the trier of fact ultimately determines to have been said.

I

This case arises out of a conversation that respondent Cheryl Churchill had on January 16, 1987, with Melanie Perkins-Graham. Both Churchill and Perkins-Graham were nurses working at McDonough District Hospital; Churchill was in the obstetrics department, and Perkins-Graham was considering transferring to that department. The conversation took place at work during a dinner break. Petitioners heard about it and fired Churchill, allegedly because of it. There is, however, a dispute about what Churchill actually said, and therefore about whether petitioners were constitutionally permitted to fire Churchill for her statements.

* Richard Ruda and Glen D. Nager filed a brief for the International City/County Management Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Nurses Association by Ronald C. Jessamy; for the National Education Association et al.

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, a city and a local utility district, want to build a hydroelectric project on the Dosewallips River in Washington State. We must decide whether respondent state environmental agency (hereinafter respondent) properly conditioned a permit for the project on the maintenance of specific minimum stream flows to protect salmon and steelhead runs.

General of New York, and Kathleen Liston Morrison, Assistant Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Robert A. Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Roland A. Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Pamela Fanning Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney General of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Jeremiah W Nixon, Attorney General of

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist

Davis v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), we held that law enforcement officers must immediately cease questioning a suspect who has clearly asserted his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. In this case we decide how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to counsel that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning.

I

Pool brought trouble-not to River City, but to the Charleston Naval Base. Petitioner, a member of the United States Navy, spent the evening of October 2, 1988, shooting pool at a club on the base. Another sailor, Keith Shackleton, lost a game and a $30 wager to petitioner, but Shackleton refused to pay. After the club closed, Shackleton was beaten to death with a pool cue on a loading dock behind the commissary. The body was found early the next morning.

The investigation by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) gradually focused on petitioner. Investigative agents determined that petitioner was at the club that evening, and that he was absent without authorization from his duty station the next morning. The agents also learned that only privately owned pool cues could be removed from the club premises, and that petitioner owned two cues-one of which had a bloodstain on it. The agents were told by various people that petitioner either had admitted committing the crime or had recounted details that clearly indicated

Antonin Scalia, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Williamson v. United States

Antonin Scalia, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-C.

In this case we clarify the scope of the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(3).

I

A deputy sheriff stopped the rental car driven by Reginald Harris for weaving on the highway. Harris consented to a search of the car, which revealed 19 kilograms of cocaine in two suitcases in the trunk. Harris was promptly arrested.

Shortly after Harris’ arrest, Special Agent Donald Walton of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) interviewed him by telephone. During that conversation, Harris said that he got the cocaine from an unidentified Cuban in Fort Lauderdale; that the cocaine belonged to petitioner Williamson; and that it was to be delivered that night to a particular dumpster. Williamson was also connected to Harris by physical evidence: The luggage bore the initials of Williamson’s sister, Williamson was listed as an additional driver on the car rental agreement, and an envelope addressed to Williamson and a receipt with Williamson’s girlfriend’s address were found in the glove compartment.

Several hours later, Agent Walton spoke to Harris in person. During that interview, Harris said he had rented the car a few days earlier and had driven it to Fort Lauderdale to meet Williamson. According to Harris, he had gotten the cocaine from a Cuban who was Williamson’s acquaintance, and the Cuban had put the cocaine in the car with a note telling Harris how to deliver

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Victor v. Nebraska

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.* The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense. In re Winship,397 U. S. 358(1970). Although this standard is an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication. In these cases, we consider the constitutionality of two attempts to define “reasonable doubt.”

*JUSTICES BLACKMUN and SOUTER join only Part II of this opinion.

JUSTICE GINSBURG joins only Parts II, III-B, and IV.

I

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Cf. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 440-441 (1887). Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 320, n. 14 (1979), the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. Cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U. S. 478, 485-486 (1978). Rather, “taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.” Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 140 (1954).

In only one case have we held that a definition of reasonable doubt violated the Due Process Clause. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990) (per curiam). There, the jurors were told:

“‘[A

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.,prohibits certain employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their disabilities. See § 12112(a). Petitioners challenge the dismissal of their ADA action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed. In reaching that result, we hold that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment, including, in this instance, eyeglasses and contact lenses. In addition, we hold that petitioners failed to allege properly that respondent “regarded” them as having a disability within the meaning of the ADA.

I

Petitioners’ amended complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we accept the allegations contained in their complaint as true for purposes of this case. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 327 (1991).

Petitioners are twin sisters, both of whom have severe myopia. Each petitioner’s uncorrected visual acuity is 20/ 200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye, but “[w]ith the use of corrective lenses, each… has vision that is 20/20 or better.” App. 23. Consequently, without corrective lenses, each “effectively cannot see to conduct

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Kolstad v. American Dental Assn

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), 105 Stat. 1071, punitive damages are available in claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000eet seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.Punitive damages are limited, however, to cases in which the em

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey L. Needle and Mark S. Mandell; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Janice Goodman, Paula A. Brantner, and Peter S. Rukin; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; for the National Retail Federation by Robert P. Joy; for the Society for Human Resource Management by D. Gregory Valenza and Roger S. Kaplan; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Michael J. Connolly, David A. Lawrence, Clifford J. Scharman, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Timothy B. Dyk, Daniel H. Bromberg, John B. Kennedy, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by James M. Finberg, Daniel F.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Roe v. Flores-Ortega

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we must decide the proper framework for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal without respondent’s consent.

I

The State of California charged respondent, Lucio FloresOrtega, with one count of murder, two counts of assault, and a personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement allegation. In October 1993, respondent appeared in Superior Court with his court-appointed public defender, Nancy Kops, and a Spanish language interpreter, and pleaded guilty to seconddegree murder. The plea was entered pursuant to a California rule permitting a defendant both to deny committing a crime and to admit that there is sufficient evidence to convict him. See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P. 2d 409 (1970). In exchange for the guilty plea, the state prosecutor moved to strike the allegation of personal use of a deadly weapon and to dismiss both assault charges. On November 10, 1993,

* Kent S. Scheidegger and Christine M. Murphy filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.

Lawrence S. Lustberg, Kevin McNulty, and Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. respondent was sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison. After pronouncing sentence, the trial judge informed respondent, “You may file an appeal within 60 days from today’s date