Supreme Court Opinions

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist

Duncan v. Walker

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides:

“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” This case presents the question whether a federal habeas corpus petition is an “application for State postconviction or other collateral review” within the meaning of this provision.

I

In 1992, several judgments of conviction for robbery were entered against respondent Sherman Walker in the

Leon Friedman and Joshua L. Dratel filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

Kent S. Scheidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. New York state courts. The last of these convictions came in June 1992, when respondent pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree in the New York Supreme Court, Queens County. Respondent was sentenced to 7 to 14 years in prison on this conviction.

Respondent unsuccessfully pursued a number of state remedies in connection with his convictions. It is unnecessary to describe all of these proceedings herein. Respondent’s last conviction was affirmed on June 12, 1995. Respondent was later denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Respondent also sought a writ of error coram nobis, which the

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist

Daniels v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court in part, concluding that petitioner, having failed to pursue remedies that were otherwise available to him to challenge his prior convictions while he was in custody on those convictions, may not now use a § 2255 motion directed at his federal sentence to collaterally attack those convictions. Pp. 378-383, 384.

(a) In Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485,490-497, this Court held that with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant has no right under the ACCA or the Constitution to collaterally attack prior convictions at his federal sentencing proceeding. The considerations supporting that conclusion-ease of administration and the interest in promoting the finality of judgmentsare also present in the § 2255 context. A district court evaluating a § 2255 motion is as unlikely as a district court engaged in sentencing to have the documents necessary to evaluate claims arising from longpast proceedings in a different jurisdiction. Moreover, States retain a strong interest in preserving convictions they have obtained, as they impose a wide range of disabilities on those who have been convicted, even after their release. Pp. 378-380. (b) Although defendants may challenge their convictions for constitutional infirmity, it does not necessarily follow that a § 2255 motion is an appropriate vehicle for determining whether a conviction later used to enhance a federal sentence was unconstituti

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, Due Process, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Seling v. Young

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, Due Process, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Washington State’s Community Protection Act of 1990 authorizes the civil commitment of “sexually violent predators,” persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.010et seq.(1992). Respondent, Andre Brigham Young, is confined as a sexually violent predator at the Special Commitment Center (Center), for which petitioner is the superintendent. After respondent’s challenges to his commitment in state court proved largely unsuccessful, he instituted a habeas action under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, seeking release from confinement. The Washington Supreme Court had already held that the Act is civil,In re Young,122 Wash. 2d 1, 857 P. 2d 989 (1993) (en bane), and this Court held a similar commitment scheme for sexually violent predators in Kansas to be civil on its face,Kansasv.Hendricks,521 U. S. 346(1997). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit nevertheless concluded that respondent could challenge the statute as being punitive “as applied” to him in violation of the

eral, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:

Bill Pryor of Alabama, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,

Majority, Privacy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Troxel v. Granville

Majority, Privacy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JusTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join.

Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington permits “[a]ny person” to petition a superior court for visitation rights “at any time,” and authorizes that court to grant such visitation rights whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child.” Petitioners Jenifer and Gary Troxel petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their grandchildren, Isabelle and Natalie Troxel. Respondent Tommie Granville, the mother of Isabelle and Natalie, opposed the petition. The case ultimately reached the Washington Supreme Court, which held that § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.

I

Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel shared a relationship that ended in June 1991. The two never married, but they had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad’s parents, and thus the paternal grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie. After Tommie and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought his daughters to his parents’ home for weekend visitation. Brad committed suicide in May 1993. Although the Troxels at first continued to see Isabelle and Natalie on a regular basis after their son’s death, Tommie Granville in

and Education Fund et al. by Patricia M. Logue, Ruth E. Harlow, and Beatrice Dohrn; for

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the kind and amount of evidence necessary to sustain a jury’s verdict that an employer unlawfully discriminated on the basis of age. Specifically, we must resolve whether a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff’s case consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. We must also decide whether the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the particular circumstances presented here.

I

In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years old and had spent 40 years in the employ of respondent, Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers. 197 F.3d 688, 690 (CA5 1999). Petitioner worked in a department known as the “Hinge Room,” where he supervised the “regular line.” Ibid. Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, supervised the Hinge Room’s “special line,” and Russell Caldwell, the manager of the Hinge Room and age 45, supervised both petitioner and Oswalt. Ibid. Petitioner’s responsibilities included recording the attendance and hours of those under his supervision, and reviewing a weekly report that listed the hours worked by each employee. 3 Record 38-40.

In the summer of 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the director of manufacturing and the husband of company president Sandra Sanderson,

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Federalism, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Norfolk Southern Railway. Co. v. Shanklin

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Federalism, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an action for damages against a railroad due to its alleged failure to maintain adequate warning devices at a grade crossing in western Tennessee. After her husband was killed in a crossing accident, respondent brought suit against petitioner, the operator of the train involved in the collision. Respondent claimed that the warning signs posted at the crossing, which had been installed using federal funds, were insufficient to warn motorists of the danger posed by passing trains. The specific issue we must decide is whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 971, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20101et seq.,in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration’s regulation addressing the adequacy of warning devices installed with federal funds, pre-empts state tort actions such as respondent’s. We hold that it does.

I A

In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) “to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.” 49 U. S. C. § 20101. The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation the authority to “prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety,” § 20103(a), and directs the Secretary to “maintain a coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem,” § 20134(a). The FRSA also contains an express pre-emption provision, which states:

Laws, regulations,

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, First Amendment, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Erie v. Pap’s A. M

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, First Amendment, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that the case is not moot. A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.County of Los Angelesv.Davis,440 U. S. 625Syllabus, 631. Simply closing Kandyland is not sufficient to moot the case because Pap’s is still incorporated under Pennsylvania

law, and could again decide to operate a nude dancing establishment in Erie. Moreover, Pap’s failed, despite its obligation to the Court, to mention the potential mootness issue in its brief in opposition, which was filed after Kandyland was closed and the property sold. See Board of License Comm’rs of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U. S. 238, 240. In any event, this is not a run of the mill voluntary cessation case. Here it is the plaintiff who, having prevailed below, seeks to have the case declared moot. And it is the defendant city that seeks to invoke the federal judicial power to obtain this Court’s review of the decision. Cf. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 617-618. The city has an ongoing injury because it is barred from enforcing the ordinance’s public nudity provisions. If the ordinance is found constitutional, then Erie can enforce it, and the availability of such relief is sufficient to prevent the case from being moot. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13. And Pap’s still has a concrete stake in the case’s outcome because,

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Federalism, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Federalism, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621et seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III), makes it unlawful for an employer, including a State, “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual… because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). In these cases, three sets of plaintiffs filed suit under the Act, seeking money damages for their state employers’ alleged discrimination on the basis of age. In each case, the state employer moved to dismiss the suit on the basis of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court in one case granted the motion to dismiss, while in each of the remaining cases the District Court denied the motion. Appeals in the three cases were consolidated before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. In these cases, we are asked to consider whether the ADEA contains a clear

Foley, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitor, and Matthew J. Lampke, Assistant Solicitor, Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Kolstad v. American Dental Assn

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), 105 Stat. 1071, punitive damages are available in claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000eet seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.Punitive damages are limited, however, to cases in which the em

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey L. Needle and Mark S. Mandell; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Janice Goodman, Paula A. Brantner, and Peter S. Rukin; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; for the National Retail Federation by Robert P. Joy; for the Society for Human Resource Management by D. Gregory Valenza and Roger S. Kaplan; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Michael J. Connolly, David A. Lawrence, Clifford J. Scharman, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Timothy B. Dyk, Daniel H. Bromberg, John B. Kennedy, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by James M. Finberg, Daniel F.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.,prohibits certain employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their disabilities. See § 12112(a). Petitioners challenge the dismissal of their ADA action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed. In reaching that result, we hold that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment, including, in this instance, eyeglasses and contact lenses. In addition, we hold that petitioners failed to allege properly that respondent “regarded” them as having a disability within the meaning of the ADA.

I

Petitioners’ amended complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we accept the allegations contained in their complaint as true for purposes of this case. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 327 (1991).

Petitioners are twin sisters, both of whom have severe myopia. Each petitioner’s uncorrected visual acuity is 20/ 200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye, but “[w]ith the use of corrective lenses, each… has vision that is 20/20 or better.” App. 23. Consequently, without corrective lenses, each “effectively cannot see to conduct