Supreme Court Opinions

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Roe v. Flores-Ortega

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we must decide the proper framework for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal without respondent’s consent.

I

The State of California charged respondent, Lucio FloresOrtega, with one count of murder, two counts of assault, and a personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement allegation. In October 1993, respondent appeared in Superior Court with his court-appointed public defender, Nancy Kops, and a Spanish language interpreter, and pleaded guilty to seconddegree murder. The plea was entered pursuant to a California rule permitting a defendant both to deny committing a crime and to admit that there is sufficient evidence to convict him. See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P. 2d 409 (1970). In exchange for the guilty plea, the state prosecutor moved to strike the allegation of personal use of a deadly weapon and to dismiss both assault charges. On November 10, 1993,

* Kent S. Scheidegger and Christine M. Murphy filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.

Lawrence S. Lustberg, Kevin McNulty, and Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. respondent was sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison. After pronouncing sentence, the trial judge informed respondent, “You may file an appeal within 60 days from today’s date

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Federalism, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Federalism, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621et seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III), makes it unlawful for an employer, including a State, “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual… because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). In these cases, three sets of plaintiffs filed suit under the Act, seeking money damages for their state employers’ alleged discrimination on the basis of age. In each case, the state employer moved to dismiss the suit on the basis of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court in one case granted the motion to dismiss, while in each of the remaining cases the District Court denied the motion. Appeals in the three cases were consolidated before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. In these cases, we are asked to consider whether the ADEA contains a clear

Foley, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitor, and Matthew J. Lampke, Assistant Solicitor, Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, First Amendment, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Erie v. Pap’s A. M

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, First Amendment, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that the case is not moot. A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.County of Los Angelesv.Davis,440 U. S. 625Syllabus, 631. Simply closing Kandyland is not sufficient to moot the case because Pap’s is still incorporated under Pennsylvania

law, and could again decide to operate a nude dancing establishment in Erie. Moreover, Pap’s failed, despite its obligation to the Court, to mention the potential mootness issue in its brief in opposition, which was filed after Kandyland was closed and the property sold. See Board of License Comm’rs of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U. S. 238, 240. In any event, this is not a run of the mill voluntary cessation case. Here it is the plaintiff who, having prevailed below, seeks to have the case declared moot. And it is the defendant city that seeks to invoke the federal judicial power to obtain this Court’s review of the decision. Cf. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 617-618. The city has an ongoing injury because it is barred from enforcing the ordinance’s public nudity provisions. If the ordinance is found constitutional, then Erie can enforce it, and the availability of such relief is sufficient to prevent the case from being moot. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13. And Pap’s still has a concrete stake in the case’s outcome because,

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Federalism, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Norfolk Southern Railway. Co. v. Shanklin

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Federalism, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an action for damages against a railroad due to its alleged failure to maintain adequate warning devices at a grade crossing in western Tennessee. After her husband was killed in a crossing accident, respondent brought suit against petitioner, the operator of the train involved in the collision. Respondent claimed that the warning signs posted at the crossing, which had been installed using federal funds, were insufficient to warn motorists of the danger posed by passing trains. The specific issue we must decide is whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 971, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20101et seq.,in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration’s regulation addressing the adequacy of warning devices installed with federal funds, pre-empts state tort actions such as respondent’s. We hold that it does.

I A

In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) “to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.” 49 U. S. C. § 20101. The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation the authority to “prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety,” § 20103(a), and directs the Secretary to “maintain a coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem,” § 20134(a). The FRSA also contains an express pre-emption provision, which states:

Laws, regulations,

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the kind and amount of evidence necessary to sustain a jury’s verdict that an employer unlawfully discriminated on the basis of age. Specifically, we must resolve whether a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff’s case consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. We must also decide whether the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the particular circumstances presented here.

I

In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years old and had spent 40 years in the employ of respondent, Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers. 197 F.3d 688, 690 (CA5 1999). Petitioner worked in a department known as the “Hinge Room,” where he supervised the “regular line.” Ibid. Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, supervised the Hinge Room’s “special line,” and Russell Caldwell, the manager of the Hinge Room and age 45, supervised both petitioner and Oswalt. Ibid. Petitioner’s responsibilities included recording the attendance and hours of those under his supervision, and reviewing a weekly report that listed the hours worked by each employee. 3 Record 38-40.

In the summer of 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the director of manufacturing and the husband of company president Sandra Sanderson,

Majority, Privacy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Troxel v. Granville

Majority, Privacy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JusTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join.

Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington permits “[a]ny person” to petition a superior court for visitation rights “at any time,” and authorizes that court to grant such visitation rights whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child.” Petitioners Jenifer and Gary Troxel petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their grandchildren, Isabelle and Natalie Troxel. Respondent Tommie Granville, the mother of Isabelle and Natalie, opposed the petition. The case ultimately reached the Washington Supreme Court, which held that § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.

I

Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel shared a relationship that ended in June 1991. The two never married, but they had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad’s parents, and thus the paternal grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie. After Tommie and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought his daughters to his parents’ home for weekend visitation. Brad committed suicide in May 1993. Although the Troxels at first continued to see Isabelle and Natalie on a regular basis after their son’s death, Tommie Granville in

and Education Fund et al. by Patricia M. Logue, Ruth E. Harlow, and Beatrice Dohrn; for

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist

Daniels v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court in part, concluding that petitioner, having failed to pursue remedies that were otherwise available to him to challenge his prior convictions while he was in custody on those convictions, may not now use a § 2255 motion directed at his federal sentence to collaterally attack those convictions. Pp. 378-383, 384.

(a) In Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485,490-497, this Court held that with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant has no right under the ACCA or the Constitution to collaterally attack prior convictions at his federal sentencing proceeding. The considerations supporting that conclusion-ease of administration and the interest in promoting the finality of judgmentsare also present in the § 2255 context. A district court evaluating a § 2255 motion is as unlikely as a district court engaged in sentencing to have the documents necessary to evaluate claims arising from longpast proceedings in a different jurisdiction. Moreover, States retain a strong interest in preserving convictions they have obtained, as they impose a wide range of disabilities on those who have been convicted, even after their release. Pp. 378-380. (b) Although defendants may challenge their convictions for constitutional infirmity, it does not necessarily follow that a § 2255 motion is an appropriate vehicle for determining whether a conviction later used to enhance a federal sentence was unconstituti

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Plurality, Privacy, Timeline

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Plurality, Privacy, Timeline / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE SOUTER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI, an opinion with respect to Part V-E, in which JUSTICE STEVENS joins, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV; V-B, and V-D.

I

Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade , 410 U. S. 113 (1973), that definition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae , the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe. See Brief for Respondents 104-117; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8.

At issue in these cases are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203-3220 (1990). Relevant portions of the Act are set forth in the Appendix. Infra , at 902. The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed. § 3205. For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of her parents, but provides for a judicial bypass option if the minor does not wish to or cannot obtain a parent’s consent. § 3206. Another provision of

Civil Rights, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

Toll v. Moreno

Civil Rights, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the Court’s opinion insofar as it holds that the State may not charge out-of-state tuition to nonimmigrant aliens who, under federal law, are exempt from both state and federal taxes, and who are domiciled in the State. Imposition of out-of-state tuition on such aliens conflicts with federal law exempting them from state taxes, since, after all, the University admits that it seeks to charge the higher tuition in order to recover costs that state income taxes normally would cover.

I cannot join the remainder of the Court’s opinion, however, for it wholly fails to address the criticisms leveled in JUSTICE REHNQUIST’s dissenting opinion. As JUSTICE REHNQUIST makes clear, the class of G-4 aliens is not homogenous: some G-4 aliens are exempt under federal law from state taxes, while other G-4 aliens are not. Moreover, the legislative history of § 4(b) of the International Organizations Immunities Act, later reenacted as § 893 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 893, from which many G-4 aliens derive their federal tax immunity, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to exempt such aliens from state taxes, choosing instead to leave the matter to the state and local authorities. Thus, I disagree with the Court when it states that the “State may not recoup indirectly from respondents’ parents the taxes that the Federal Government has expressly barred the State from collecting,” ante at 458 U. S.

Civil Rights, Concurrence, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, William Brennan

Mills v. Habluetzel

Civil Rights, Concurrence, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BRENNAN, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, and with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins as to Part I, concurring.

Today, this Court holds that a Texas statute prescribing a one-year statute of limitation for paternity suits violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although I agree with the Court’s analysis and result, I write separately because I fear that the opinion may be misinterpreted as approving the 4-year statute of limitation now used in Texas. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 13.01 (Supp.1982).

I

As the Court notes, the response of the Texas Legislature to our opinion in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973), was “less than generous.” Ante at 456 U. S. 94. The one-year statute of limitation for paternity suits, enacted following our decision in Gomez, severely restricted the opportunity for illegitimate children to obtain financial support from their natural fathers, an opportunity not denied legitimate children. Although the need for proof of paternity distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate children in their claims for child support, the State’s asserted justification is neither sufficiently weighty nor substantially related to the limitation to uphold the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The appellee has set forth a number of “state interests” to justify the one-year statute of limitation, but the Court accepts only one of these as permissible -the interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or