Supreme Court Opinions

Concurrence, Privacy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Vacco v. Quill

Concurrence, Privacy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.* t

Death will be different for each of us. For many, the last days will be spent in physical pain and perhaps the despair that accompanies physical deterioration and a loss of control of basic bodily and mental functions. Some will seek medication to alleviate that pain and other symptoms.

The Court frames the issue in Washington v. Glucksberg as whether the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects a “right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,” ante, at 723, and concludes that our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices do not support the existence of such a right. I join the Court’s opinions because I agree that there is no generalized right to “commit suicide.” But respondents urge us to address the narrower question whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death. I see no need to reach that question in the context of the facial challenges to the New York and Washington laws at issue here. See ibid. (“The Washington statute at issue in this case prohibits ‘aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide,’… and, thus, the question before us is whether the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so”). The parties and amici agree that in these States a patient who

Concurrence, Privacy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Washington v. Glucksberg

Concurrence, Privacy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.* t

Death will be different for each of us. For many, the last days will be spent in physical pain and perhaps the despair that accompanies physical deterioration and a loss of control of basic bodily and mental functions. Some will seek medication to alleviate that pain and other symptoms.

The Court frames the issue in Washington v. Glucksberg as whether the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects a “right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so,” ante, at 723, and concludes that our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices do not support the existence of such a right. I join the Court’s opinions because I agree that there is no generalized right to “commit suicide.” But respondents urge us to address the narrower question whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death. I see no need to reach that question in the context of the facial challenges to the New York and Washington laws at issue here. See ibid. (“The Washington statute at issue in this case prohibits ‘aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide,’… and, thus, the question before us is whether the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so”). The parties and amici agree that in these States a patient who

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Board of Comm’rs Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.†
This case requires us to decide whether, and to what extent, the First Amendment protects independent contractors from the termination of at-will government contracts in retaliation for their exercise of the freedom of speech.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Robin L. Dahlbert, Marjorie Heins, and Steven R. Shapiro; and for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., Anthony C. Epstein, Julie M. Carpenter, Nory Miller, Roger K. Evans, Dara Klassel, and Eve W Paul.
† THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins all but Part II-B-1 of this opinion.
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Under state law, Wabaunsee County, Kansas (County), is obliged to provide for the disposal of solid waste generated within its borders. In 1981, and, after renegotiation, in 1985, the County contracted with respondent U mbehr for him to be the exclusive hauler of trash for cities in the County at a rate specified in the contract. Each city was free to reject or, on 90 days’ notice, to opt out of, the contract. By its terms, the contract between U mbehr and the County was automatically renewed annually unless either party terminated it by giving notice at least 60 days before the end of the year or a renegotiation was instituted on 90 days’ notice. Pursuant to the contract, U mbehr hauled trash for six of the County’s seven cities from 1985 to 1991 on an exclusive and uninterrupted basis.
During the

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist

Lewis v. United States

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a defendant who is prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses has a constitutional right to a jury trial where the aggregate prison term authorized for the offenses exceeds six months. We are also asked to decide whether a defendant who would otherwise have a constitutional right to a jury trial may be denied that right because the presiding judge has made a pretrial commitment that the aggregate sentence imposed will not exceed six months.
We conclude that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, and its scope does not change where a defendant faces a potential aggregate prison term in excess of six months for petty offenses charged. Because we decide that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses, we do not reach the second question.
* David A. Reiser, John Vanderstar, and Jeffrey B. Coopersmith filed a brief for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Christopher Warnock filed a brief for the Jury Trial Group as amicus curiae.
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Petitioner Ray Lewis was a mail handler for the United States Postal Service. One day, postal inspectors saw him open several pieces of mail and pocket the contents. The next day, the inspectors routed “test”

David Souter, Dissent, Due Process, John Paul Stevens, Stephen Breyer

Montana v. Egelhoff

David Souter, Dissent, Due Process, John Paul Stevens, Stephen Breyer / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JusTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

The Montana Supreme Court unanimously held that Mont.

Code Ann. § 45-2-203 (1995) violates due process. I agree. Our cases establish that due process sets an outer limit on the restrictions that may be placed on a defendant’s ability to raise an effective defense to the State’s accusations. Here, to impede the defendant’s ability to throw doubt on the State’s case, Montana has removed from the jury’s consideration a category of evidence relevant to determination of mental state where that mental state is an essential element of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because this disallowance eliminates evidence with which the defense might negate an essential element, the State’s burden to prove its case is made correspondingly easier. The justification for this disallowance is the State’s desire to increase the likelihood of conviction of a certain class of defendants who might otherwise be able to prove that they did not satisfy a requisite element of the offense. In my view, the statute’s effect on the criminal proceeding violates due process.

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This Court’s cases establish that limitations placed on the accused’s ability to present a fair and complete defense can, in some circumstances, be severe enough to violate due process. “The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Judicial Power, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

United States v. Hays

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Judicial Power, Majority, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. We held inShawv.Reno,509 U. S. 630(1993), that a plaintiff may state a claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that a State “adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race,

tBriefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the Congressional Black Caucus by A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., and Pamela S. Karlan; for the National Bar Association et al. by Koteles Alexander and Brian J. Murphy; and for Bernadine St. Cyr et al. by Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, Charles Stephen Ralston, Jacqueline A. Berrien, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, J. Gerald Hebert, and Robert B. McDuff

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Anthony T. Caso and Deborah J. La Fetra; for the South Carolina Senate et al. by Mark A. Packman and Benjamin E. Griffith; and for Ruth O. Shaw et al. by Robinson O. Everett and Clifford Dougherty.

William H. Mellor III filed a brief for the Institute for Justice as amicus curiae. and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.” Id., at 658. Appellees Ray Hays, Edward Adams, Susan Shaw Singleton, and Gary Stokley claim that the State of Louisiana’s congressiona

Anthony Kennedy, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Witte v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.t The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits successive prosecution or multiple punishment for “the same offence.” This case, which involves application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, asks us to consider whether a court violates that proscription by convicting and sentencing a defendant for a crime when the conduct underlying that offense has been considered in determining the defendant’s sentence for a previous conviction.

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In June 1990, petitioner Steven Kurt Witte and several co-conspirators, including Dennis Mason and Tom Pokorny, arranged with Roger Norman, an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, to import large amounts of marijuana from Mexico and cocaine from Guatemala. Norman had the task offiying the contraband into the United States, with Witte providing the ground transportation for the drugs once they had been brought into the country. The following month, the Mexican marijuana source advised the conspiracy participants that cocaine might be added to the

*Peter Goldberger and Scott A. Srebnick filed a brief for the National Association of Legal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging reversal. tTHE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join all but Part III of this opinion, and JUSTICE STEVENS joins only Part III. first shipment if there was room on the plane or if an insufficient quantity of marijuana was available. Norman was informed

Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Dissent, Federal Taxation

Commissioner v. Schleier

Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Dissent, Federal Taxation / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, and with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins with respect to Part II, dissenting.

Age discrimination inflicts a personal injury. Even under the principles set forth in United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229 (1992), the damages received from a claim of such discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) are received “on account of” that personal injury and therefore excludable from taxable income under 26 U. S. C. § 104(a)(2). Unless the Court reads § 104(a)(2) to permit exclusion only of damages received for tangible injuries (i. e., physical and mental injuries)-a reading rejected by eight Members of the Court in Burke and contradicted by an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute it administers-the inescapable conclusion is that ADEA damages awards, are excludable.

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It is not disputed that the damages received by respondents constitute gross income under 26 U. S. C. § 61(a) unless excluded elsewhere; the question is whether such damages fall within § 104(a)(2), which excludes from taxable income “the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness…. ” What constitutes “damages received on account of personal injuries” is not obvious from the text or history of the statute, and since 1960 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations have defined the phrase with reference to traditional tort

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, Ruth Bader Ginsburg / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, and with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins as to Parts I and III, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

There are only so many channels that any cable system can carry. If there are fewer channels than programmers who want to use the system, some programmers will have to be dropped. In the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, Congress made a choice: By reserving a little over one-third of the channels on a cable system for broadcasters, it ensured that in most cases it will be a cable programmer who is dropped and a broadcaster who is retained. The question presented in this case is whether this choice comports with the commands of the First Amendment.

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The 1992 Cable Act implicates the First Amendment rights of two classes of speakers. First, it tells cable operators which programmers they must carry, and keeps cable operators from carrying others that they might prefer. Though cable operators do not actually originate most of the programming they show, the Court correctly holds that they are, for First Amendment purposes, speakers. Ante, at 636. Selecting which speech to retransmit is, as we know from the example of publishing houses, movie theaters, bookstores, and Reader’s Digest, no less communication than is creating the speech in the first place.

Second, the Act deprives a certain class of video programmers-those

Byron White, David Souter, Dissent, Economic Activity

TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp

Byron White, David Souter, Dissent, Economic Activity / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, and with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins as to Parts II-B-2, II-C, III, and IV, dissenting.

In Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Has lip, 499 U. S. 1 (1991), this Court held out the promise that punitive damages awards would receive sufficient constitutional scrutiny to restore fairness in what is rapidly becoming an arbitrary and oppressive system. Today the Court’s judgment renders Haslip’s promise a false one. The procedures that converted this commercial dispute into a $10 million punitive verdict were wholly inadequate. Rather than producing a judgment founded on verifiable criteria, they produced a monstrous award-526 times actual damages and over 20 times greater than any punitive award in West Virginia history. Worse, the State Supreme Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s challenge with only cursory analysis, observing that petitioner, rather than being “really stupid,” had been “really mean.” 187 W. Va. 457, 474-475, 419 S. E. 2d 870, 887-889 (1992). The court similarly refused to consider the possibility of remittitur because petitioner “and its agents and servants failed to conduct themselves as gentlemen.” Id., at 462, 419 S. E. 2d, at 875. In my view, due process does not tolerate such cavalier standards when so much is at stake. Because I believe that neither this award’s size nor the procedures that produced it are consistent with the principles this Court articulated in Haslip, I respectfully dissent.

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Our system of