JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that, on the facts presented in this case, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision concerning Ann Hopkins' candidacy absent consideration of her gender. I further agree that this burden shift is properly part of the liability phase of the litigation. I thus concur in the judgment of the Court. My disagreement stems from the plurality's conclusions concerning the substantive requirement of causation under the statute and its broad statements regarding the applicability of the allocation of the burden of proof applied in this case. The evidentiary rule the Court adopts today should be viewed as a supplement to the careful framework established by our unanimous decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), for use in cases such as this one where the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. I write separately to explain why I believe such a departure from the McDonnell Douglas standard is justified in the circumstances presented by this and like cases, and to express my views as to when and how the strong medicine of requiring the employer to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of causation should be administered.
I
Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer… to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). The legislative history of Title VII bears out what its plain language suggests: a substantive violation of the statute only occurs when consideration of an illegitimate criterion is the "but-for" cause of an adverse employment action. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress was attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in the employment setting, not mere discriminatory thoughts. Critics of the bill that became Title VII labeled it a "thought control bill," and argued that it created a "punishable crime that does not require an illegal external act as a basis for judgment." 100 Cong.Rec. 7254 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). Senator Case, whose views the plurality finds so persuasive elsewhere, responded:
The man must do or fail to do something in regard to employment. There must be some specific external act, more than a mental act. Only if he does the act because of the grounds stated in the bill would there be any legal consequences.
Ibid. Thus, I disagree with the plurality's dictum that the words "because of" do not mean "but-for" causation; manifestly they do. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 478 U. S. 499 (1986) (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("[T]he general policy under Title VII is to limit relief for racial discrimination in employment practices to actual victims of the discrimination"). We should not, and need not, deviate from that policy today. The question for decision in this case is what allocation of the burden of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms with the intent of Congress and the purposes behind Title VII.
The evidence of congressional intent as to which party should bear the burden of proof on the issue of causation is considerably less clear. No doubt, as a general matter, Congress assumed that the plaintiff in a Title VII action would bear the burden of proof on the elements critical to his or her case. As the dissent points out, post at 287, n. 3, the interpretative memorandum submitted by sponsors of Title VII indicates that "the plaintiff, as in any civil case, would have the burden of proving that discrimination had occurred." 110 Cong.Rec. 7214 (1964) (emphasis added). But in the area of tort liability, from whence the dissent's "but-for" standard of causation is derived, see post at 282, the law has long recognized that, in certain "civil cases," leaving the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to prove "but-for" causation would be both unfair and destructive of the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care. Thus, in multiple causation cases, where a breach of duty has been established, the common law of torts has long shifted the burden of proof to multiple defendants to prove that their negligent actions were not the "but-for" cause of the plaintiff's injury. See e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 84-87, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1948). The same rule has been applied where the effect of a defendant's tortious conduct combines with a force of unknown or innocent origin to produce the harm to the plaintiff. See Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 616, 211 N.W. 913, 915 (1927) ("Granting that the union of that fire [caused by defendant's negligence] with another of natural origin, or with another of much greater proportions, is available as a defense, the burden is on the defendant to show that… the fire set by him was not the proximate cause of the damage"). See also 2 J. Wigmore, Select Cases on the Law of Torts, § 153, p. 865 (1912) ("When two or more persons by their acts are possibly the sole cause of a harm, or when two or more acts of the same person are possibly the sole cause, and the plaintiff has introduced evidence that one of the two persons, or one of the same person's two acts, is culpable, then the defendant has the burden of proving that the other person, or his other act, was the sole cause of the harm").
While requiring that the plaintiff in a tort suit or a Title VII action prove that the defendant's "breach of duty" was the "but-for" cause of an injury does not generally hamper effective enforcement of the policies behind those causes of action,
at other times, the [but-for] test demands the impossible. It challenges the imagination of the trier to probe into a purely fanciful and unknowable state of affairs. He is invited to make an estimate concerning facts that concededly never existed. The very uncertainty as to what might have happened opens the door wide for conjecture. But when conjecture is demanded it can be given a direction that is consistent with the policy considerations that underlie the controversy.
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan.L.Rev. 60, 67 (1956).
Like the common law of torts, the statutory employment "tort" created by Title VII has two basic purposes. The first is to deter conduct which has been identified as contrary to public policy and harmful to society as a whole. As we have noted in the past, the award of backpay to a Title VII plaintiff provides
the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges
of discrimination in employment. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 422 U. S. 417 -418 (1975) (citation omitted). The second goal of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." Id. at 422 U. S. 418.
Both these goals are reflected in the elements of a disparate treatment action. There is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender or race in making employment decisions an evil in itself. As Senator Clark put it, "[t]he bill simply eliminates consideration of color [or other forbidden criteria] from the decision to hire or promote." 110 Cong.Rec. 7218 (1964). See also id. at 13088 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("What the bill does… is simply to make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment"). Reliance on such factors is exactly what the threat of Title VII liability was meant to deter. While the main concern of the statute was with employment opportunity, Congress was certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated by a process which treats one as an inferior by reason of one's race or sex. This Court's decisions under the Equal Protection Clause have long recognized that, whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms both society and the individual. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989). At the same time, Congress clearly conditioned legal liability on a determination that the consideration of an illegitimate factor caused a tangible employment injury of some kind.
Where an individual disparate treatment plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision, the deterrent purpose of the statute has clearly been triggered. More importantly, as an evidentiary matter, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that, absent further explanation, the employer's discriminatory motivation "caused" the employment decision. The employer has not yet been shown to be a violator, but neither is it entitled to the same presumption of good faith concerning its employment decisions which is accorded employers facing only circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Both the policies behind the statute and the evidentiary principles developed in the analogous area of causation in the law of torts suggest that, at this point, the employer may be required to convince the factfinder that, despite the smoke, there is no fire.
We have given recognition to these principles in our cases which have discussed the "remedial phase" of class action disparate treatment cases. Once the class has established that discrimination against a protected group was essentially the employer's "standard practice," there has been harm to the group, and injunctive relief is appropriate. But, as to the individual members of the class, the liability phase of the litigation is not complete. See Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1004 (CA3 1984) ("It is misleading to speak of the additional proof required by an individual class member for relief as being a part of the damage phase; that evidence is actually an element of the liability portion of the case") (footnote omitted). Because the class has already demonstrated that, as a rule, illegitimate factors were considered in the employer's decisions, the burden shifts to the employer "to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for legitimate reasons." Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 431 U. S. 362 (1977). See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 424 U. S. 772 (1976).
The individual members of a class action disparate treatment case stand in much the same position as Ann Hopkins here. There has been a strong showing that the employer has done exactly what Title VII forbids, but the connection between the employer's illegitimate motivation and any injury to the individual plaintiff is unclear. At this point, calling upon the employer to show that despite consideration of illegitimate factors the individual plaintiff would not have been hired or promoted in any event hardly seems "unfair" or contrary to the substantive command of the statute. In fact, an individual plaintiff who has shown that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in the decision in her case has proved more than the class member in a Teamsters -type action. The latter receives the benefit of a burden-shift to the defendant based on the likelihood that an illegitimate criterion was a factor in the individual employment decision.
There is a tension between the Franks and Teamsters line of decisions and the individual disparate treatment cases cited by the dissent. See post at 490 U. S. 286 -289. Logically, under the dissent's view, each member of a disparate treatment class action would have to show "but-for" causation as to his or her individual employment decision, since it is not an element of the pattern or practice proof of the entire class and it is statutorily mandated that the plaintiff bear the burden of proof on this issue throughout the litigation. While the Court has properly drawn a distinction between the elements of a class action claim and an individual disparate treatment claim, see Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 467 U. S. 873 -878 (1984), and I do not suggest the wholesale transposition of rules from one setting to the other, our decisions in Teamsters and Franks do indicate a recognition that presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion based on evidentiary probabilities and the policies behind the statute are not alien to our Title VII jurisprudence.
Moreover, placing the burden on the defendant in this case to prove that the same decision would have been justified by legitimate reasons is consistent with our interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Like a disparate treatment plaintiff, one who asserts that governmental action violates the Equal Protection Clause must show that he or she is "the victim of intentional discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 256. Compare post at 490 U. S. 286, 490 U. S. 289 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 426 U. S. 240 (1976). In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 (1972), we dealt with a criminal defendant's allegation that members of his race had been invidiously excluded from the grand jury which indicted him, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In addition to the statistical evidence presented by petitioner in that case, we noted that the State's "selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral." Id. at 405 U. S. 630. Once the consideration of race in the decisional process had been established, we held that
the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.
Id. at 405 U. S. 632.
We adhered to similar principles in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977), a case which, like this one, presented the problems of motivation and causation in the context of a multimember decisionmaking body authorized to consider a wide range of factors in arriving at its decisions. In Arlington Heights, a group of minority plaintiffs claimed that a municipal governing body's refusal to rezone a plot of land to allow for the construction of low-income integrated housing was racially motivated. On the issue of causation, we indicated that the plaintiff was not required
to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one. In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justified.
Id. at 429 U. S. 265 -266 (citation omitted).
If the strong presumption of regularity and rationality of legislative decisionmaking must give way in the face of evidence that race has played a significant part in a legislative decision, I simply cannot believe that Congress intended Title VII to accord more deference to a private employer in the face of evidence that its decisional process has been substantially infected by discrimination. Indeed, where a public employee brings a "disparate treatment" claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause, the employee is entitled to the favorable evidentiary framework of Arlington Heights. See, e.g., Hervey v. Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1233-1234 (CA8 1986) (applying Arlington Heights to public employee's claim of sex discrimination in promotion decision); Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Education, 684 F.2d 769, 773-774 (CA11 1982) (applying Arlington Heights to public employees' claims of race discrimination in discharge case). Under the dissent's reading of Title VII, Congress' extension of the coverage of the statute to public employers in 1972 has placed these employees under a less favorable evidentiary regime. In my view, nothing in the language, history, or purpose of Title VII prohibits adoption of an evidentiary rule which places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns would have justified an adverse employment action where the plaintiff has convinced the factfinder that a forbidden factor played a substantial role in the employment decision. Even the dissenting judge below "[had] no quarrel with [the] principle" that
a party with one permissible motive and one unlawful one may prevail only by affirmatively proving that it would have acted as it did even if the forbidden motive were absent.
263 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 341, 825 F.2d 458, 478 (1987) (Williams, J. dissenting).
II
The dissent's summary of our individual disparate treatment cases to date is fair and accurate, and amply demonstrates that the rule we adopt today is at least a change in direction from some of our prior precedents. See post at 490 U. S. 286 -289. We have indeed emphasized in the past that, in an individual disparate treatment action, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout the litigation. Nor have we confined the word "pretext" to the narrow definition which the plurality attempts to pin on it today. See ante at 490 U. S. 244 -247. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine clearly contemplated that a disparate treatment plaintiff could show that the employer's proffered explanation for an event was not "the true reason," either because it never motivated the employer in its employment decisions or because it did not do so in a particular case. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine assumed that the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion as to both these attacks, and we clearly depart from that framework today. Such a departure requires justification, and its outlines should be carefully drawn.
First, McDonnell Douglas itself dealt with a situation where the plaintiff presented no direct evidence that the employer had relied on a forbidden factor under Title VII in making an employment decision. The prima facie case established there was not difficult to prove, and was based only on the statistical probability that, when a number of potential causes for an employment decision are eliminated, an inference arises that an illegitimate factor was, in fact, the motivation behind the decision. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 431 U. S. 358, n. 44 ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimination"). In the face of this inferential proof, the employer's burden was deemed to be only one of production; the employer must articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 438 U. S. 577 (1978). The plaintiff must then be given an
opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were, in fact, a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 805. Our decision in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), also involved the "narrow question" whether, after a plaintiff had carried the "not onerous" burden of establishing the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the burden of persuasion should be shifted to the employer to prove that a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action existed. 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 250. As the discussion of Teamsters and Arlington Heights indicates, I do not think that the employer is entitled to the same presumption of good faith where there is direct evidence that it has placed substantial reliance on factors whose consideration is forbidden by Title VII.
The only individual disparate treatment case cited by the dissent which involved the kind of direct evidence of discriminatory animus with which we are confronted here is United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 460 U. S. 713 -714, n. 2 (1983). The question presented to the Court in that case involved only a challenge to the elements of the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, see Pet. for Cert. in United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, O.T. 1981, No. 81-1044, and the question we confront today was neither briefed nor argued to the Court. As should be apparent, the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by. That the employer's burden in rebutting such an inferential case of discrimination is only one of production does not mean that the scales should be weighted in the same manner where there is direct evidence of intentional discrimination. Indeed, in one Age Discrimination in Employment Act case, the Court seemed to indicate that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 469 U. S. 121 (1985). See also East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 431 U. S. 403 -404, n. 9 (1977).
Second, the facts of this case, and a growing number like it decided by the Courts of Appeals, convince me that the evidentiary standard I propose is necessary to make real the promise of McDonnell Douglas that,
[i]n the implementation of [employment] decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no… discrimination, subtle or otherwise.
411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 801. In this case, the District Court found that a number of the evaluations of Ann Hopkins submitted by partners in the firm overtly referred to her failure to conform to certain gender stereotypes as a factor militating against her election to the partnership. 618 F.Supp. 1109, 1116-1117 (DC 1985). The District Court further found that these evaluations were given "great weight" by the decisionmakers at Price Waterhouse. Id. at 1118. In addition, the District Court found that the partner responsible for informing Hopkins of the factors which caused her candidacy to be placed on hold indicated that her "professional" problems would be solved if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id. at 1117 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals characterized it, Ann Hopkins proved that Price Waterhouse
permitt[ed] stereotypical attitudes towards women to play a significant, though unquantifiable, role in its decision not to invite her to become a partner.
263 U.S.App.D.C. at 324, 825 F.2d at 461.
At this point, Ann Hopkins had taken her proof as far as it could go. She had proved discriminatory input into the decisional process, and had proved that participants in the process considered her failure to conform to the stereotypes credited by a number of the decisionmakers had been a substantial factor in the decision. It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the room where partnership decisions were being made. As the partners filed in to consider her candidacy, she heard several of them make sexist remarks in discussing her suitability for partnership. As the decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by one of those privy to the decisionmaking process that her gender was a major reason for the rejection of her partnership bid. If, as we noted in Teamsters,
[p]resumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's superior access to the proof,
431 U.S. at 431 U. S. 359, n. 45, one would be hard-pressed to think of a situation where it would be more appropriate to require the defendant to show that its decision would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns.
Moreover, there is mounting evidence in the decisions of the lower courts that respondent here is not alone in her inability to pinpoint discrimination as the precise cause of her injury, despite having shown that it played a significant role in the decisional process. Many of these courts, which deal with the evidentiary issues in Title VII cases on a regular basis, have concluded that placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant in a situation where uncertainty as to causation has been created by its consideration of an illegitimate criterion makes sense as a rule of evidence, and furthers the substantive command of Title VII. See, e.g., Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1556 (CA11 1983) (Tjoflat, J.) ("It would be illogical, indeed ironic, to hold a Title VII plaintiff presenting direct evidence of a defendant's intent to discriminate to a more stringent burden of proof, or to allow a defendant to meet that direct proof by merely articulating, but not proving, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action"). Particularly in the context of the professional world, where decisions are often made by collegial bodies on the basis of largely subjective criteria, requiring the plaintiff to prove that any one factor was the definitive cause of the decisionmakers' action may be tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such decisions. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark University, 817 F.2d 931, 935-937 (CA1 1987) (where plaintiff produced "strong evidence" that sexist attitudes infected faculty tenure decision, burden properly shifted to defendant to show that it would have reached the same decision absent discrimination); Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F.2d 558, 563 (CA11 1985) (direct evidence of discriminatory animus in decision to discharge college professor shifted burden of persuasion to defendant).
Finally, I am convinced that a rule shifting the burden to the defendant where the plaintiff has shown that an illegitimate criterion was a "substantial factor" in the employment decision will not conflict with other congressional policies embodied in Title VII. Title VII expressly provides that an employer need not give preferential treatment to employees or applicants of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in order to maintain a workforce in balance with the general population. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j). The interpretive memorandum, whose authoritative force is noted by the plurality, see ante at 490 U. S. 243, n. 8, specifically provides:
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his workforce. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire or refuse to hire on the basis of race.
110 Cong.Rec. 7213 (1964).
Last Term, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977 (1988), the Court unanimously concluded that the disparate impact analysis first enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), should be extended to subjective or discretionary selection processes. At the same time, a plurality of the Court indicated concern that the focus on bare statistics in the disparate impact setting could force employers to adopt "inappropriate prophylactic measures" in violation of § 2000e-2(j). The plurality went on to emphasize that, in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may not simply point to a statistical disparity in the employer's workforce. Instead, the plaintiff must identify a particular employment practice and
must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group.
487 U.S. at 487 U. S. 994. The plurality indicated that
the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times.
Id. at 487 U. S. 997.
I believe there are significant differences between shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer in a case resting purely on statistical proof, as in the disparate impact setting, and shifting the burden of persuasion in a case like this one, where an employee has demonstrated by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in a particular employment decision. First, the explicit consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in making employment decisions "was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 431 U. S. 335, n. 15. While the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and the statistical showing of imbalance involved in a disparate impact case may both be indicators of discrimination or its "functional equivalent," they are not, in and of themselves, the evils Congress sought to eradicate from the employment setting. Second, shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer in a situation like this one creates no incentive to preferential treatment in violation of § 2000e(2)(j). To avoid bearing the burden of justifying its decision, the employer need not seek racial or sexual balance in its workforce; rather, all it need do is avoid substantial reliance on forbidden criteria in making its employment decisions.
While the danger of forcing employers to engage in unwarranted preferential treatment is thus less dramatic in this setting than in the situation the Court faced in Watson, it is far from wholly illusory. Based on its misreading of the words "because of " in the statute, see ante at 490 U. S. 240 -242, the plurality appears to conclude that, if a decisional process is "tainted" by awareness of sex or race in any way, the employer has violated the statute, and Title VII thus commands that the burden shift to the employer to justify its decision. Ante at 490 U. S. 250 -252. The plurality thus effectively reads the causation requirement out of the statute and then replaces it with an "affirmative defense." Ante at 490 U. S. 244 -247.
In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision. As the Court of Appeals noted below:
While most circuits have not confronted the question squarely, the consensus among those that hav