Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
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JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, ante p. 481 U. S. 41, the Court held that state common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., are preempted by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a). The question presented by this litigation is whether these state common law claims are not only preempted by ERISA, but also displaced by ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), [ Footnote 1 ] to the extent that complaints filed in state courts purporting to plead such state common law causes of action are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
I
General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in Michigan, has set up an employee benefit plan subject to the provisions of ERISA for its salaried employees. The plan pays benefits to salaried employees disabled by sickness or accident, and is insured by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan).
General Motors employed Michigan resident Arthur Taylor as a salaried employee from 1959-1980. In 1961, Taylor was involved in a job-related automobile accident, and sustained a back injury. Taylor filed a workers’ compensation claim for this injury, and he eventually returned to work. In May, 1980, while embroiled in a divorce
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., preempts state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan.
I
In March, 1975, in Gulfport, Mississippi, respondent Everate W. Dedeaux injured his back in an accident related to his employment for Entex, Inc. (Entex). Entex had at this time a long-term disability employee benefit plan established by purchasing a group insurance policy from petitioner, Pilot Life Insurance Co. (Pilot Life). Entex collected and matched its employees’ contributions to the plan and forwarded those funds to Pilot Life; the employer also provided forms to its employees for processing disability claims, and forwarded completed forms to Pilot Life. Pilot Life bore the responsibility of determining who would receive disability benefits. Although Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following the 1975 accident, Pilot Life terminated his benefits after two years. During the following three years, Dedeaux’s benefits were reinstated and terminated by Pilot Life several times.
In 1980, Dedeaux instituted a diversity action against Pilot Life in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Dedeaux’s complaint contained three counts: “Tortious Breach of Contract”; “Breach of Fiduciary
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the petitioners’ participation in the events leading up to and following the murder of four members of a family makes the sentences of death imposed by the Arizona courts constitutionally permissible, although neither petitioner specifically intended to kill the victims and neither inflicted the fatal gunshot wounds. We hold that the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard in making the findings required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), and, therefore, vacate the judgments below and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I
Gary Tison was sentenced to life imprisonment as the result of a prison escape during the course of which he had killed a guard. After he had been in prison a number of years, Gary Tison’s wife, their three sons Donald, Ricky, and Raymond, Gary’s brother Joseph, and other relatives made plans to help Gary Tison escape again. See State v. Dorothy Tison, Cr. No. 108352 (Super.Ct.Maricopa County 1981). The Tison family assembled a large arsenal of weapons for this purpose. Plans for escape were discussed with Gary Tison, who insisted that his cellmate, Randy Greenawalt, also a convicted murderer, be included in the prison break. The following facts are largely evidenced by petitioners’ detailed confessions given as part of a plea bargain according to the terms of which the State agreed not to seek the death sentence.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
Section 446(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that taxable income
shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.
The Code specifically recognizes the use of “an accrual method,” 26 U.S.C. § 446(c)(2), under which a taxpayer is permitted to deduct an expense in the year in which it is “incurred,” regardless of when it is actually paid. § 162(a). Under the “all events” test, long applied by this Court and the Internal Revenue Service, an expense may be accrued and deducted when all the events that determine the fact of liability have occurred, and the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Treas.Reg. § 1.461-1, 26 CFR § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1986). Because the Court today applies a rigid version of the “all events” test that retreats from our most recent application of that test, and unnecessarily drives a greater wedge between tax and financial accounting methods, I respectfully dissent.
This case calls for the Court to revisit the issue addressed only last Term in United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U. S. 593 (1986). At issue in Hughes Properties was whether a casino operator utilizing the accrual method of accounting could deduct amounts guaranteed for payment on “progressive” slot machines, but not yet won by a playing patron. A progressive slot machine
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the original version of the “escheat” provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub.L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected a “taking” of appellees’ decedents’ property without just compensation.
I
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic ways in order to “speed the Indians’ assimilation into American society,” Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 465 U. S. 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, Congress adopted a specific statute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. Under the Act, each male Sioux head of household took 320 acres of land, and most other individuals 160 acres. 25 Stat. 890. In order to protect the allottees from the improvident disposition of their lands to white settlers, the Sioux
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that Mr. Rose may be compelled to use his veterans’ disability benefits to discharge his child support obligation. I would rest this conclusion, however, on a ground that the Court disdains -the distinction between familial support obligations and other debts. The Court apparently views Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46 (1981), as an insuperable obstacle to acknowledging that this distinction makes the difference here. I disagree: while stare decisis concerns may counsel against overruling Ridgway’s interpretation of the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act, I see no reason whatsoever to extend Ridgway’s equation of business debts with family support obligations absent the clearest congressional direction to do so. Read in light of this Nation’s common law heritage, the language of this statute, like that in Ridgway, incorporates, rather than rejects, this distinction.
The anti-attachment provision of 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) says:
Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and such payment made to, or on account of, a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of regulations promulgated by the Missouri Division of Corrections relating to inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying a strict scrutiny analysis, concluded that the regulations violate respondents’ constitutional rights. We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules. Applying that standard, we uphold the validity of the correspondence regulation, but we conclude that the marriage restriction cannot be sustained.
I
Respondents brought this class action for injunctive relief and damages in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The regulations challenged in the complaint were in effect at all prisons within the jurisdiction of the Missouri Division of Corrections. This litigation focused, however, on practices at the Renz Correctional Institution (Renz), located in Cedar City, Missouri. The Renz prison population includes both male and female prisoners of varying security levels. Most of the female prisoners at Renz are classified as medium or maximum security inmates, while most of the male prisoners are classified as minimum security offenders. Renz is used on occasion to provide protective custody for inmates from other prisons in the Missouri system. The facility originally was built as a minimum
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring.
The Court is, I believe, entirely correct to find that the “step two” regulation is not facially inconsistent with the Social Security Act’s definition of disability. Title 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1982 ed. and Supp. III) provides:
[A]n individual… shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.
Step two, on its face, requires only that the claimant show that he or she suffers from
an impairment or combination of impairments… [that] significantly limit[s]… physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
20 CFR § 404.1521(a) (1986). “Basic work activities,” the regulation says, include
walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling[,]… seeing, hearing, and speaking,… [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions[,]… [u]se of judgment[,]… [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work situations[,]… [d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.
§404.1521(b)(1)-(6). I do not see how a claimant unable to show a significant limitation in any of these areas can possibly meet the statutory definition of disability. For the reasons
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether title to the bed of Utah Lake passed to the State of Utah under the equal footing doctrine upon Utah’s admission to the Union in 1896.
I
A
The equal footing doctrine is deeply rooted in history, and the proper application of the doctrine requires an understanding of its origins. Under English common law, the English Crown held sovereign title to all lands underlying navigable waters. Because title to such land was important to the sovereign’s ability to control navigation, fishing, and other commercial activity on rivers and lakes, ownership of this land was considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.
Title to such land was therefore vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 152 U. S. 11 -14 (1894). When the 13 Colonies became independent from Great Britain, they claimed title to the lands under navigable waters within their boundaries as the sovereign successors to the English Crown. Id. at 152 U. S. 15. Because all subsequently admitted States enter the Union on an “equal footing” with the original 13 States, they too hold title to the land under navigable waters within their boundaries upon entry into the Union. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845).
In Pollard’s Lessee, this Court announced the principle that the United States held the lands under navigable waters in the Territories “in trust” for the future States
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents two questions regarding the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements between brokerage firms and their customers. the first is whether a claim brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), must be sent to arbitration in accordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement. The second is whether a claim brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S. C. § 1961 et seq., must be arbitrated in accordance with the terms of such an agreement.
I
Between 1980 and 1982, respondents Eugene and Julia McMahon, individually and as trustees for various pension and profit-sharing plans, were customers of petitioner Shearson/American Express Inc. (Shearson), a brokerage firm registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission). Two customer agreements signed by Julia McMahon provided for arbitration of any controversy relating to the accounts the McMahons maintained with Shearson. The arbitration provision provided in relevant part as follows:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the time petitioner committed the crime for which he was convicted, Florida’s sentencing guidelines would have resulted in a presumptive sentence of 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 years’ imprisonment. At the time petitioner was sentenced, the revised guidelines called for a presumptive sentence of 5 1/2 to 7 years in prison. The trial court applied the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, and imposed a 7-year sentence. The question presented is whether application of these amended guidelines in petitioner’s case is unconstitutional by virtue of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
I
In 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted legislation replacing Florida’s system of indeterminate sentencing with a sentencing guidelines scheme intended “to eliminate unwarranted variation in the sentencing process.” Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.701(b) (1983). See 1983 Fla. Laws, ch. 83-216. Under the sentencing statute, a guidelines commission was responsible for “the initial development of a statewide system of sentencing guidelines.” Fla.Stat. § 921.001(1) (1983). Once the commission had made its recommendation, the Supreme Court of Florida was to develop a final system of guidelines. These guidelines were to become effective for crimes committed on or after October 1, 1983. Fla.Stat. § 921.001(4)(a) (1983).
The sentencing statute authorized the guidelines commission to “meet annually or at the call of the chairman to review sentencing practices and recommend
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
Relying on semantics and ignoring altogether the sweeping discretion granted to the Board of Pardons by Montana law, the Court today concludes that respondents had a legitimate expectation of parole sufficient to give rise to an interest protected by procedural due process. Because I conclude that the discretion accorded the Board of Pardons belies any reasonable claim of entitlement to parole, I respectfully dissent.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), this Court observed that, to have a protected interest, one
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
Id. at 408 U. S. 577. Applying these principles, the Roth Court found that a teacher had no property interest in a renewal of his 1-year contract despite the fact that most teachers hired on a year-to-year basis by the university were rehired. Id. at 408 U. S. 578, n. 16. The Court concluded that the teacher had no legitimate entitlement to continued employment because the discretion of the university officials to renew or not renew such a contract was subject to no “cause” limitations.
The Roth decision teaches that a mere expectation of a benefit -even if that expectation is supported by consistent government practice -is not sufficient to create an interest protected by procedural due
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case are the limits imposed by federal law upon state court habeas corpus proceedings challenging an extradition warrant.
I
Richard and Judith Smolin were divorced in California in 1978. Sole custody of their two children, Jennifer and Jamie, was awarded to Judith Smolin, subject to reasonable visitation rights for Richard. Until November, 1979, all the parties remained in San Bernardino County, California, and Richard apparently paid his child support and exercised his visitation rights without serious incident. In August, 1979, however, Judith married James Pope, and in November, Mr. Pope’s work required that the family relocate to Oregon. When the Popes moved without informing Richard, the battle over the custody of the minor children began in earnest.
It is unnecessary to recite in detail all that ensued. Richard alleged, and the California courts later found, that the Popes deliberately attempted to defeat Richard’s visitation rights and to preclude him from forming a meaningful relationship with his children in the course of their succeeding relocations from Oregon to Texas to Louisiana. On February 13, 1981, the Popes obtained a decree from a Texas court granting full faith and credit to the original California order awarding sole custody to Judith. Richard was served, but did not appear in the Texas proceeding. Before the Texas decree was issued, however, Richard sought and obtained in California
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue presented in this case is whether a resolution banning all “First Amendment activities” at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) violates the First Amendment.
I
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners (Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides, in pertinent part:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity; * * * *” BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effective date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or entity seeks to engage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy of the Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to the uses permitted within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that, if any individual or entity engages in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litigation against such individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commissioners….
App. 4a-5a.
Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc., is a nonprofit religious
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.
The Court today holds that § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (Act), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., requires the arbitration of appellee’s claim for wages despite clear state policy to the contrary. This Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1 (1984), that the Act applies to state court as well as federal court proceedings. Because I continue to believe that this holding was
unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and, in light of the [Act’s] antecedents and the intervening contraction of federal power, inexplicable,
id. at 465 U. S. 36 (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting), I respectfully dissent.
Even if I were not to adhere to my position that the Act is inapplicable to state court proceedings, however, I would still dissent. We have held that Congress can limit or preclude a waiver of a judicial forum, and that Congress’ intent to do so will be deduced from a statute’s text or legislative history, or “from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.” Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, ante at 482 U. S. 227. As JUSTICE STEVENS has observed, the Court has not explained why state legislatures should not also be able to limit or preclude waiver of a judicial forum:
We should not refuse to exercise independent judgment concerning the conditions under which an arbitration agreement, generally enforceable under the Act, can be held invalid as contrary to public policy simply because the source of
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in No. 85-1626 and dissenting in No. 85-2010.
In light of the Court’s decision to apply a uniform characterization for limitations purposes to actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, I agree that the most appropriate choice is each State’s limitations period for personal injury suits. But see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 471 U. S. 280 -287 (1985) (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting). Although I doubt whether the Court’s decision should be given general retroactive effect, I agree that the Court should adhere to its policy of applying the rule it announces to the parties before the Court. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 388 U. S. 301 (1967). I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court in No. 85-1626. I join Parts I through IV of JUSTICE POWELL’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, as to No. 85-2010.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners William Conover and Anthony Tanner were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and of committing mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. 772 F.2d 765 (1985). Petitioners argue that the District Court erred in refusing to admit juror testimony at a postverdict hearing on juror intoxication during the trial; and that the conspiracy count of the indictment failed to charge a crime against the United States. We affirm in part and remand.
I
Conover was the procurement manager at Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Seminole), a Florida corporation owned and operated by 11 rural electric distribution cooperatives. Seminole generates and transmits electrical energy to the cooperatives.
In 1979, Seminole borrowed over $1.1 billion from the Federal Financing Bank in order to construct a coal-fired power plant near Palatka, Florida. The loan was guaranteed by the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), a credit agency of the United States Department of Agriculture that assists rural electric organizations by providing loans, guaranteeing loans from other sources, and approving other security arrangements that allow the borrower to obtain financing. REA, A Brief History of the Rural Electrification and Telephone Programs (1985). The loan agreement between Seminole and the REA provided
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in these consolidated cases is the appropriate statute of limitations for civil enforcement actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982 ed. and Supp. III).
Petitioner Crown Life Insurance Company (Crown Life) is a Canadian corporation engaged in the business of selling life, health, and casualty insurance policies. Respondent Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. (Malley-Duff), was an agent of Crown Life for a territory in the Pittsburgh area. Crown Life terminated Malley-Duff’s agency on February 13, 1978, after Malley-Duff failed to satisfy a production quota. This case is the second of two actions brought by Malley-Duff following that termination.
In April, 1978, Malley-Duff filed its first suit ( Malley-Duff I ) against the petitioners in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and a state law claim for tortious interference with contract. See 734 F.2d 133 (CA3 1984). Before the antitrust action was brought to trial, however, on March 20, 1981, Malley-Duff brought this action ( Malley-Duff II ) in the same court, alleging causes of action under RICO, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and state civil conspiracy law. Initially, Malley-Duff II was consolidated with Malley-Duff I, but the two cases were severed before trial. Only the RICO claim of Malley-Duff II is at issue before this Court.
The
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion holding that, “[i]n light of the facially discriminatory nature of the multiple activities exemption,” ante at 483 U. S. 244, see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 451 U. S. 756 -757 (1981), the Washington taxpayers need not prove actual discriminatory impact “by an examination of the tax burdens imposed by other States.” Ante at 483 U. S. 247. I do not read the Court’s decision as extending the “internal consistency” test described in Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 467 U. S. 644 -645 (1984), to taxes that are not facially discriminatory, contra, post at 483 U. S. 257 -258 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), nor would I agree with such a result in these cases. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, post p. 483 U. S. 298 (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting).
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.
The Court today upholds the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1982 ed., Supp. III), as a valid exercise of the spending power conferred by Article I, § 8. But § 158 is not a condition on spending reasonably related to the expenditure of federal funds, and cannot be justified on that ground. Rather, it is an attempt to regulate the sale of liquor, an attempt that lies outside Congress’ power to regulate commerce because it falls within the ambit of § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.
My disagreement with the Court is relatively narrow on the spending power issue: it is a disagreement about the application of a principle, rather than a disagreement on the principle itself. I agree with the Court that Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds to further “the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.” Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 435 U. S. 461 (1978); see Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U. S. 127, 330 U. S. 143 -144 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937). I also subscribe to the established proposition that the reach of the spending power “is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.” United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 297 U. S. 66 (1936). Finally, I agree that there are four separate types of limitations on the spending power: the expenditure must be for the general welfare, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, II-A, II-C, and III of the Court’s opinion. Because the Court ultimately resolves this case under the Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3182, I do not find Part II-B, and its statements concerning the Extradition Clause of the Constitution, necessary to the decision of this case. Accordingly, I do not subscribe to that part of the Court’s opinion. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 472 U. S. 854 (1985); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 461 U. S. 361, n. 10 (1983); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 297 U. S. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
In finding Pennsylvania’s “flat” highway use taxes unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, the Court today directly overrules the holdings of at least three cases: Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U. S. 542 (1950); Aero Mayflower Transit Corp. v. Board of Railroad Comm’rs, 332 U. S. 495 (1947); and Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, 295 U. S. 285 (1935). These cases were apparently cited with approval as recently as Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 435 U. S. 463 -464 (1978), and Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707, 405 U. S. 715 -717 (1972). In Massachusetts, the opinion states:
[W]e turn to consider the Commonwealth’s argument that § 4491 should not be treated as a user fee, because the amount of the tax is a flat annual fee, and hence is not directly related to the degree of use of the airways. This argument has been confronted and rejected in analogous contexts. Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U. S. 542 (1950) is illustrative…. Noting that the tax ‘should be judged by its result, not its formula, and must stand unless proven to be unreasonable in amount for the privilege granted,’ id. at 339 U. S. 545, the Court rejected the carrier’s argument: Complete fairness would require that a state tax formula vary with every factor affecting appropriate compensationfor road use. These factors,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
Although I agree with the judgment of the Court, I write separately to note that this action once again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court’s use of the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 612 -613 (1971). See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 472 U. S. 67 (1985) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 465 U. S. 687 (1984) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring). As a result of this problematic analysis, while the holding of the opinion for the Court extends only to nonprofit organizations, its reasoning fails to acknowledge that the amended § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, raises different questions as it is applied to profit and nonprofit organizations.
In Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, I noted a tension in the Court’s use of the Lemon test to evaluate an Establishment Clause challenge to government efforts to accommodate the free exercise of religion:
On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting religious observers from generally applicable government obligations. By definition, such legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an ‘accommodation’ of free exercise
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s construction of § 110 of the Amateur Sports Act, 92 Stat. 3048, 36 U.S.C. § 380, and with its holding that the statute is “within constitutional bounds.” Ante at 483 U. S. 535. Therefore, I join Parts I through III of the Court’s opinion. But largely for the reasons explained by JUSTICE BRENNAN in 483 U. S. I believe the United States Olympic Committee and the United States are joint participants in the challenged activity, and as such are subject to the equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ finding of no Government action and remand the case for determination of petitioners’ claim of discriminatory enforcement.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
I believe that the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should be affirmed for the reasons set forth by JUSTICE REHNQUIST in dissent in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 455 U. S. 770 -791 (1982).
Both theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of family and family-property arrangements.
United States v. Yazell, 382 U. S. 341, 382 U. S. 352 (1966). Particularly in light of that special solicitude, I cannot find that the flexible concept of due process, Santosky v. Kramer, supra, at 455 U. S. 774 -776 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), bars Pennsylvania from providing that the litigants to a civil paternity suit are to bear the risk of factual error in roughly equal fashion. I do not find it necessary to this conclusion to rely upon the fact that the majority of American jurisdictions apply the same rule as Pennsylvania does. Cf. ante at 483 U. S. 577 -578. Nor do I agree that the differences between termination and paternity proceedings are substantial enough to justify the different conclusion reached in Santosky. Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s judgment, but not its opinion.