Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
Filters
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.
Immediately after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, this Court recognized that the broad language of § 2 of the Amendment conferred plenary power on the States to regulate the liquor trade within their boundaries. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 (1939); Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939); State Board of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U. S. 59 (1936). As JUSTICE STEVENS recently observed, however, the Court has, over the years, so “completely distorted the Twenty-first Amendment” that “[i]t now has a barely discernible effect in Commerce Clause cases.” Newport v. Iacobucci, ante, at 479 U. S. 98 (dissenting). Because I believe that the Twenty-first Amendment clearly authorized the State of New York to regulate the liquor trade within its borders free of federal interference, I dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion, and would affirm the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.
I
In Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324 (1964), this Court took a first step toward eviscerating the authority of States to regulate the commerce of liquor. The Court held that the State of New York could not regulate the importation of liquor into that State when the liquor was sold in duty-free shops at the Kennedy Airport. The basis for this decision was the fact that the United States Customs Service
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
As the Court’s opinion acknowledges, there must be a deprivation “of a right’ secured by a federal statute” before 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action. Ante at 479 U. S. 423. Petitioners’ claim of a federally enforceable “right” raises three distinct questions. The first question is whether the Brooke Amendment to the Public Housing Act of 1937, Pub.L. 91-152, § 213, 83 Stat. 389 (1969), itself has created an enforceable right to utilities. The second is whether, in the absence of any indication of congressional intent to create a right to utilities, administrative regulations can create such a right. The third is whether, assuming administrative regulations alone could create a right enforceable in a § 1983 action, the regulations at issue in this case have established standards capable of judicial interpretation and application.
Whether a federal statute confers substantive rights is not an issue unique to § 1983 actions. In implied right of action cases, the Court also has asked, since Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 422 U. S. 78 (1975), whether “the statute create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.” In determining whether a statute creates enforceable rights, the “key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature.” Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 453 U. S. 13 (1981). We have looked first to the statutory
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12), does not prohibit a State from disqualifying unemployment compensation claimants who leave their jobs because of pregnancy, when the State imposes the same disqualification on all claimants who leave their jobs for a reason not causally connected to their work or their employer. 688 S.W.2d 344 (1985). We granted certiorari, 475 U. S. 1118 (1986), because the court’s decision conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1150 (1983), on a question of practical significance in the administration of state unemployment compensation laws.
I
In August, 1980, after having been employed by the J. C. Penney Company for approximately three years, petitioner requested a leave of absence on account of her pregnancy. Pursuant to its established policy, the J. C. Penney Company granted petitioner a “leave without guarantee of reinstatement,” meaning that petitioner would be rehired only if a position was available when petitioner was ready to return to work. Petitioner’s child was born on November 5, 1980. On December 1, 1980, when petitioner notified J. C. Penney that she wished to return to work, she was told that there were no positions open.
Petitioner then filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The claim was denied by the Division of Employment
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
This case squarely presents the tension that has long existed between the two central principles of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 428 U. S. 189 (1976), JUSTICES Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS concluded that,
where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.
In capital sentencing, therefore, discretion must be ” controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce nondiscriminatory application.'” Id. at 428 U. S. 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)). See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 428 U. S. 253 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.) (State must provide “specific and detailed guidance” to the sentencing body). On the other hand, this Court has also held that a sentencing body must be able to consider any relevant mitigating evidence regarding the defendant’s character or background, and the circumstances of the particular offense. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
The issue in this case is whether an instruction designed to satisfy the principle that capital sentencing decisions must not be made on mere whim, but instead on clear and objective standards,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we consider whether the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax, S.D.Codified Laws, ch. 10-29 (1982), violates the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C.App. § 1513(d). We conclude that, because the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax is an “in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes,” 49 U.S.C.App. § 1513(d)(3), the tax does not violate § 1513(d).
I
The federal provision at issue is part of a series of congressional actions dedicated to improving the Nation’s air transportation system. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U. S. 7, 464 U. S. 8 -10 (1983). In 1970, following findings that
substantial expansion and improvement of the airport and airway system is [ sic ] required to meet the demands of interstate commerce, the postal service, and the national defense,
H. R. Conf Rep. No. 91-1074, p. 29 (1970), Congress required the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a plan for the development of public airports, and authorized the Secretary to make grants to States and localities for airport development. Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219. Congress also established an Airport and Airway Trust Fund, maintained by federal aviation taxes, to finance airport development projects. § 208, 84 Stat. 250. Soon afterward, Congress acted to limit state taxation of air transportation. Concluding that state passenger
Justice O’CONNOR, delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I and II-B, concluding that the state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over petitioner would be unreasonable and unfair, in violation of the Due Process Clause. Pp.480 U. S. 113-116.
(a) The burden imposed on petitioner by the exercise of state court jurisdiction would be severe, since petitioner would be required not only to traverse the distance between Japan and California, but also to submit its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign judicial system. Such unique burdens should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of extending personal jurisdiction over national borders. Pp. 480 U. S. 113 -114.
(b) The interests of Cheng Shin and the forum State in the exercise of jurisdiction over petitioner would be slight, and would be insufficient to justify the heavy burdens placed on petitioner. The only surviving question is whether a Japanese corporation should indemnify a Taiwanese corporation on the bases of a sale made in Taiwan and a shipment of goods from Japan to Taiwan. The facts do not demonstrate that it would be more convenient for Cheng Shin to litigate its claim in California, rather than in Taiwan or Japan, while California’s interests are diminished by Cheng Shin’s lack of a California residence and by the fact that the dispute is primarily about indemnity, rather than the safety of consumers. While the possibility of being sued in California might create an additional deterrent
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 476 U. S. 273 (1986), we concluded that the level of Fourteenth Amendment
scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.
Thus, in evaluating the constitutionality of the District Court order in this case under the Fourteenth Amendment, we must undertake a two-part inquiry. First, we must decide whether the order is “supported by a compelling [governmental] purpose.” Ibid. Second, we must scrutinize the order to ensure that “the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are narrowly tailored.” Ibid.
One cannot read the record in this case without concluding that the Alabama Department of Public Safety had undertaken a course of action that amounted to “pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct.” Ante at 480 U. S. 167. Because the Federal Government has a compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination by the Department, the District Court unquestionably had the authority to fashion a remedy designed to end the Department’s egregious history of discrimination. In doing so, however, the District Court was obligated to fashion a remedy that was narrowly tailored to accomplish this purpose. The plurality today purports to apply strict scrutiny, and concludes that the order in this case was
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve whether a city can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for providing inadequate police training, and, if so, what standard should govern the imposition of such liability. 475 U.S. 1064 (1986). In my view, the question is properly before the Court, and I would decide it on the merits.
I
On the evening of September 28, 1981, the Springfield Police Department received a telephone call reporting that someone had called an apartment’s occupants and threatened to come after them with a knife. Later calls reported that an individual identified as Clinton Thurston had broken the apartment door and assaulted a woman staying at the apartment. When officers arrived at the scene, they discovered that Thurston had abducted the woman and driven away in his car. A short while later, Thurston’s vehicle was spotted by an officer driving an unmarked police car. When Thurston stopped at an intersection, the officer walked up to Thurston’s vehicle and identified himself as a police officer, but Thurston drove away.
The officer gave chase, and soon was joined by other members of the Springfield Police Department. Two officers set up a roadblock to stop Thurston, but he drove past the obstacle without stopping. As he did so, one of the officers fired at the tires of Thurston’s vehicle; later a nick was found in the left rear wheel. At a second roadblock,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong question. The Court asks whether the police must have probable cause before either seizing an object in plain view or conducting a full-blown search of that object, and concludes that they must. I agree. In my view, however, this case presents a different question: whether police must have probable cause before conducting a cursory inspection of an item in plain view. Because I conclude that such an inspection is reasonable if the police are aware of facts or circumstances that justify a reasonable suspicion that the item is evidence of a crime, I would reverse the judgment of the Arizona Court of Appeals, and therefore dissent.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), Justice Stewart summarized three requirements that the plurality thought must be satisfied for a plain view search or seizure. First, the police must lawfully make an initial intrusion or otherwise be in a position from which they can view a particular area. Second, the officer must discover incriminating evidence “inadvertently.” Third, it must be “immediately apparent” to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. As another plurality observed in Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 460 U. S. 737 (1983), these three requirements have never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court, but
as the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
The Court today extends the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), in order to provide a grace period for unconstitutional search and seizure legislation during which the State is permitted to violate constitutional requirements with impunity. Leon’s rationale does not support this extension of its rule, and the Court is unable to give any independent reason in defense of this departure from established precedent. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Court, ante at 480 U. S. 348, accurately summarizes Leon’s holding:
In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was ultimately found to be defective. The Court also accurately summarizes the reasoning supporting this conclusion as based upon three factors: the historic purpose of the exclusionary rule, the absence of evidence suggesting that judicial officers are inclined to ignore Fourth Amendment limitations, and the absence of any basis for believing that the exclusionary rule significantly deters Fourth Amendment violations by judicial officers in the search warrant context. Ibid. In my view, application of Leon’s stated rationales leads to a contrary result in this
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join in Parts I, II, III-A, IV, and V of the Court’s opinion. More particularly, I join the Court in disapproving the Court of Appeals’ broad holding that a criminal defendant’s promise not to sue local governments and officials for constitutional violations arising out of his arrest and prosecution, given in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to dismiss pending criminal charges, is void as against public policy under all circumstances. I agree with the Court that a case-by-case approach appropriately balances the important interests on both sides of the question of the enforceability of these agreements, and that, on the facts of this particular case, Bernard Rumery’s covenant not to sue is enforceable. I write separately, however, in order to set out the factors that lead me to conclude that this covenant should be enforced, and to emphasize that it is the burden of those relying upon such covenants to establish that the agreement is neither involuntary nor the product of an abuse of the criminal process.
As the Court shows, ante at 480 U. S. 395 -396, 480 U. S. 398, there are substantial policy reasons for permitting release-dismissal bargains to be struck in appropriate cases. Certainly some § 1983 litigation is meritless, and the inconvenience and distraction of public officials caused by such suits is not inconsiderable. Moreover, particular release-dismissal agreements may serve bona fide criminal
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Forest Service regulations, federal land use statutes and regulations, or the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), preempt the California Coastal Commission’s imposition of a permit requirement on operation of an unpatented mining claim in a national forest.
I
Granite Rock Company is a privately owned firm that mines chemical and pharmaceutical grade white limestone. Under the Mining Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 91, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq., a private citizen may enter federal lands to explore for mineral deposits. If a person locates a valuable mineral deposit on federal land, and perfects the claim by properly staking it and complying with other statutory requirements, the claimant “shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations,” 30 U.S.C. § 26, although the United States retains title to the land. The holder of a perfected mining claim may secure a patent to the land by complying with the requirements of the Mining Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, see 43 CFR § 3861.1 et seq. (1986), and, upon issuance of the patent, legal title to the land passes to the patent holder. Granite Rock holds unpatented mining claims on federally owned lands on and around Mount Pico Blanco in the Big Sur region of Los Padres National Forest.
From 1959 to
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), this Court held that § 703(d) of Title VII does not prohibit voluntary affirmative action efforts if the employer sought to remedy a “manifest… imbalanc[e] in traditionally segregated job categories.” Id. at 443 U. S. 197. As JUSTICE SCALIA illuminates with excruciating clarity, § 703 has been interpreted by Weber and succeeding cases to permit what its language read literally would prohibit. Post at 480 U. S. 669 -671; see also ante at 480 U. S. 642 -643 (STEVENS, J., concurring). Section 703(d) prohibits employment discrimination “against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (emphasis added). The Weber Court, however, concluded that voluntary affirmative action was permissible in some circumstances because a prohibition of every type of affirmative action would ” bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute.'” 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 202 (quoting United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 345 U. S. 295, 345 U. S. 315 (1953)). This purpose, according to the Court, was to open employment opportunities for blacks in occupations that had been traditionally closed to them.
None of the parties in this case have suggested that we overrule Weber, and that question was not raised, briefed, or argued in this Court or in the courts below. If the Court is faithful to its normal prudential restraints
JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE POWELL join.
This suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 presents two issues concerning the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees. First, we must determine whether the respondent, a public employee, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets at his place of work. Second, we must address the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard for a search conducted by a public employer in areas in which a public employee is found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
I
Dr. Magno Ortega, a physician and psychiatrist, held the position of Chief of Professional Education at Napa State Hospital (Hospital) for 17 years, until his dismissal from that position in 1981. As Chief of Professional Education, Dr. Ortega had primary responsibility for training young physicians in psychiatric residency programs.
In July, 1981, Hospital officials, including Dr. Dennis O’Connor, the Executive Director of the Hospital, became concerned about possible improprieties in Dr. Ortega’s management of the residency program. In particular, the Hospital officials were concerned with Dr. Ortega’s acquisition of an Apple II computer for use in the residency program. The officials thought that Dr. Ortega may have misled Dr. O’Connor into believing that the computer had been donated, when in fact the computer had been financed by the possibly coerced
Justice O’CONNOR, Circuit Justice.
Applicants request that I issue a stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The underlying dispute in this case involves the division of responsibility for regulation of collective bargaining between airlines and their employees under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The Act defines three classes of labor disputes and establishes a different dispute resolution procedure for each. “Minor” disputes involve the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. Minor disputes are subject to arbitration by a System Board of Adjustment. 45 U.S.C. 184. While courts lack authority to interpret the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, a court may compel arbitration of a minor dispute before the authorized System Board.
“Major” disputes involve the formation of collective-bargaining agreements, and the resolution of such disputes is governed by § 6 of the Act, 45 U.S.C. 156, 181.
“Representation” disputes involve defining the bargaining unit and determining the employee representative for collective bargaining. Under § 2, Ninth, of the Act, the National Mediation Board has exclusive jurisdiction over representation disputes. 45 U.S.C. 152, 181.
Applicants, Western Airlines and Delta Air Lines, entered into an agreement and plan of merger on September 9, 1986. The merger
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., preempts state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan.
I
In March, 1975, in Gulfport, Mississippi, respondent Everate W. Dedeaux injured his back in an accident related to his employment for Entex, Inc. (Entex). Entex had at this time a long-term disability employee benefit plan established by purchasing a group insurance policy from petitioner, Pilot Life Insurance Co. (Pilot Life). Entex collected and matched its employees’ contributions to the plan and forwarded those funds to Pilot Life; the employer also provided forms to its employees for processing disability claims, and forwarded completed forms to Pilot Life. Pilot Life bore the responsibility of determining who would receive disability benefits. Although Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following the 1975 accident, Pilot Life terminated his benefits after two years. During the following three years, Dedeaux’s benefits were reinstated and terminated by Pilot Life several times.
In 1980, Dedeaux instituted a diversity action against Pilot Life in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Dedeaux’s complaint contained three counts: “Tortious Breach of Contract”; “Breach of Fiduciary
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, ante p. 481 U. S. 41, the Court held that state common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., are preempted by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a). The question presented by this litigation is whether these state common law claims are not only preempted by ERISA, but also displaced by ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), [ Footnote 1 ] to the extent that complaints filed in state courts purporting to plead such state common law causes of action are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
I
General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in Michigan, has set up an employee benefit plan subject to the provisions of ERISA for its salaried employees. The plan pays benefits to salaried employees disabled by sickness or accident, and is insured by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan).
General Motors employed Michigan resident Arthur Taylor as a salaried employee from 1959-1980. In 1961, Taylor was involved in a job-related automobile accident, and sustained a back injury. Taylor filed a workers’ compensation claim for this injury, and he eventually returned to work. In May, 1980, while embroiled in a divorce
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the petitioners’ participation in the events leading up to and following the murder of four members of a family makes the sentences of death imposed by the Arizona courts constitutionally permissible, although neither petitioner specifically intended to kill the victims and neither inflicted the fatal gunshot wounds. We hold that the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard in making the findings required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), and, therefore, vacate the judgments below and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I
Gary Tison was sentenced to life imprisonment as the result of a prison escape during the course of which he had killed a guard. After he had been in prison a number of years, Gary Tison’s wife, their three sons Donald, Ricky, and Raymond, Gary’s brother Joseph, and other relatives made plans to help Gary Tison escape again. See State v. Dorothy Tison, Cr. No. 108352 (Super.Ct.Maricopa County 1981). The Tison family assembled a large arsenal of weapons for this purpose. Plans for escape were discussed with Gary Tison, who insisted that his cellmate, Randy Greenawalt, also a convicted murderer, be included in the prison break. The following facts are largely evidenced by petitioners’ detailed confessions given as part of a plea bargain according to the terms of which the State agreed not to seek the death sentence.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
Section 446(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that taxable income
shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.
The Code specifically recognizes the use of “an accrual method,” 26 U.S.C. § 446(c)(2), under which a taxpayer is permitted to deduct an expense in the year in which it is “incurred,” regardless of when it is actually paid. § 162(a). Under the “all events” test, long applied by this Court and the Internal Revenue Service, an expense may be accrued and deducted when all the events that determine the fact of liability have occurred, and the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Treas.Reg. § 1.461-1, 26 CFR § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1986). Because the Court today applies a rigid version of the “all events” test that retreats from our most recent application of that test, and unnecessarily drives a greater wedge between tax and financial accounting methods, I respectfully dissent.
This case calls for the Court to revisit the issue addressed only last Term in United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U. S. 593 (1986). At issue in Hughes Properties was whether a casino operator utilizing the accrual method of accounting could deduct amounts guaranteed for payment on “progressive” slot machines, but not yet won by a playing patron. A progressive slot machine
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that Mr. Rose may be compelled to use his veterans’ disability benefits to discharge his child support obligation. I would rest this conclusion, however, on a ground that the Court disdains -the distinction between familial support obligations and other debts. The Court apparently views Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46 (1981), as an insuperable obstacle to acknowledging that this distinction makes the difference here. I disagree: while stare decisis concerns may counsel against overruling Ridgway’s interpretation of the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act, I see no reason whatsoever to extend Ridgway’s equation of business debts with family support obligations absent the clearest congressional direction to do so. Read in light of this Nation’s common law heritage, the language of this statute, like that in Ridgway, incorporates, rather than rejects, this distinction.
The anti-attachment provision of 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) says:
Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized by law, and such payment made to, or on account of, a beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the original version of the “escheat” provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub.L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected a “taking” of appellees’ decedents’ property without just compensation.
I
Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic ways in order to “speed the Indians’ assimilation into American society,” Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 465 U. S. 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, Congress adopted a specific statute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. Under the Act, each male Sioux head of household took 320 acres of land, and most other individuals 160 acres. 25 Stat. 890. In order to protect the allottees from the improvident disposition of their lands to white settlers, the Sioux
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of regulations promulgated by the Missouri Division of Corrections relating to inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying a strict scrutiny analysis, concluded that the regulations violate respondents’ constitutional rights. We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules. Applying that standard, we uphold the validity of the correspondence regulation, but we conclude that the marriage restriction cannot be sustained.
I
Respondents brought this class action for injunctive relief and damages in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The regulations challenged in the complaint were in effect at all prisons within the jurisdiction of the Missouri Division of Corrections. This litigation focused, however, on practices at the Renz Correctional Institution (Renz), located in Cedar City, Missouri. The Renz prison population includes both male and female prisoners of varying security levels. Most of the female prisoners at Renz are classified as medium or maximum security inmates, while most of the male prisoners are classified as minimum security offenders. Renz is used on occasion to provide protective custody for inmates from other prisons in the Missouri system. The facility originally was built as a minimum
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether title to the bed of Utah Lake passed to the State of Utah under the equal footing doctrine upon Utah’s admission to the Union in 1896.
I
A
The equal footing doctrine is deeply rooted in history, and the proper application of the doctrine requires an understanding of its origins. Under English common law, the English Crown held sovereign title to all lands underlying navigable waters. Because title to such land was important to the sovereign’s ability to control navigation, fishing, and other commercial activity on rivers and lakes, ownership of this land was considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.
Title to such land was therefore vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 152 U. S. 11 -14 (1894). When the 13 Colonies became independent from Great Britain, they claimed title to the lands under navigable waters within their boundaries as the sovereign successors to the English Crown. Id. at 152 U. S. 15. Because all subsequently admitted States enter the Union on an “equal footing” with the original 13 States, they too hold title to the land under navigable waters within their boundaries upon entry into the Union. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845).
In Pollard’s Lessee, this Court announced the principle that the United States held the lands under navigable waters in the Territories “in trust” for the future States
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents two questions regarding the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements between brokerage firms and their customers. the first is whether a claim brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), must be sent to arbitration in accordance with the terms of an arbitration agreement. The second is whether a claim brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S. C. § 1961 et seq., must be arbitrated in accordance with the terms of such an agreement.
I
Between 1980 and 1982, respondents Eugene and Julia McMahon, individually and as trustees for various pension and profit-sharing plans, were customers of petitioner Shearson/American Express Inc. (Shearson), a brokerage firm registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission). Two customer agreements signed by Julia McMahon provided for arbitration of any controversy relating to the accounts the McMahons maintained with Shearson. The arbitration provision provided in relevant part as follows:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of Directors
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring.
The Court is, I believe, entirely correct to find that the “step two” regulation is not facially inconsistent with the Social Security Act’s definition of disability. Title 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1982 ed. and Supp. III) provides:
[A]n individual… shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.
Step two, on its face, requires only that the claimant show that he or she suffers from
an impairment or combination of impairments… [that] significantly limit[s]… physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
20 CFR § 404.1521(a) (1986). “Basic work activities,” the regulation says, include
walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling[,]… seeing, hearing, and speaking,… [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions[,]… [u]se of judgment[,]… [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work situations[,]… [d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.
§404.1521(b)(1)-(6). I do not see how a claimant unable to show a significant limitation in any of these areas can possibly meet the statutory definition of disability. For the reasons