Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
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JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to clarify the extent of copyright protection available to telephone directory white pages.
I
Rural Telephone Service Company is a certified public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. It is subject to a state regulation that requires all telephone companies operating in Kansas to issue annually an updated telephone directory. Accordingly, as a condition of its monopoly franchise, Rural publishes a typical telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow pages. The white pages list in alphabetical order the names of Rural’s subscribers, together with their towns and telephone numbers. The yellow pages list Rural’s business subscribers alphabetically by category, and feature classified advertisements of various sizes. Rural distributes its directory free of charge to its subscribers, but earns revenue by selling yellow pages advertisements.
Feist Publications, Inc., is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories. Unlike a typical directory, which covers only a particular calling area, Feist’s area-wide directories cover a much larger geographical range, reducing the need to call directory assistance or consult multiple directories. The Feist directory that is the subject of this litigation covers 11 different telephone service areas in 15 counties and contains 46,878 white pages listings -compared to Rural’s approximately
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
These consolidated cases require us to consider the constitutionality of a state sales tax that excludes or exempts certain segments of the media, but not others.
I
Arkansas’ Gross Receipts Act imposes a 4% tax on receipts from the sale of all tangible personal property and specified services. Ark.Code Ann. §§ 26-52-301, 26-52-302 (1987 and Supp.1989). The Act exempts from the tax certain sales of goods and services. § 26-52-401 (Supp.1989). Counties within Arkansas impose a 1% tax on all goods and services subject to taxation under the Gross Receipts Act, §§ 26-74-307, 26-74-222 (1987 and Supp.1989), and cities may impose a further 1/2 or 1% tax on these items, § 26-75-307 (1987).
The Gross Receipts Act expressly exempts receipts from subscription and over-the-counter newspaper sales and subscription magazine sales. See §§ 26-52-401(4), (14) (Supp.1989); Revenue Policy Statement 1988-1 (Mar. 10, 1988), reprinted in CCH Ark.Tax Rep. 1169-415. Before 1987, the Act did not list among those services subject to the sales tax either cable television [ Footnote 1 ] or scrambled satellite broadcast television services to home dish-antennae owners. [ Footnote 2 ] See § 26-52-301 (1987). In 1987, Arkansas adopted Act 188, which amended the Gross Receipts Act to impose the sales tax on cable television. 1987 Ark.Gen.Acts, No. 188, § 1.
Daniel L. Medlock, a cable television subscriber, Community Communications Co., a cable television
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), this Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest. This case requires us to define what is “prompt” under Gerstein.
I
This is a class action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the manner in which the County of Riverside, California (County), provides probable cause determinations to persons arrested without a warrant. At issue is the County’s policy of combining probable cause determinations with its arraignment procedures. Under County policy, which tracks closely the provisions of Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 825 (West 1985), arraignments must be conducted without unnecessary delay and, in any event, within two days of arrest. This two-day requirement excludes from computation weekends and holidays. Thus, an individual arrested without a warrant late in the week may, in some cases, be held for as long as five days before receiving a probable cause determination. Over the Thanksgiving holiday, a 7-day delay is possible.
The parties dispute whether the combined probable cause/arraignment procedure is available to all warrantless arrestees. Testimony by Riverside County District Attorney Grover Trask suggests that individuals arrested without warrants for felonies do not receive a probable cause determination until the preliminary hearing, which
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners were convicted of manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture “Euphoria,” a drug temporarily designated as a schedule I controlled substance pursuant to § 201(h) of the Controlled Substances Act, 98 Stat. 2071, 21 U.S.C. § 811(h). We consider whether § 201(h) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General and whether the Attorney General’s subdelegation to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was authorized by statute.
I
In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (Act), 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The Act establishes five categories or “schedules” of controlled substances, the manufacture, possession, and distribution of which the Act regulates or prohibits. Violations involving schedule I substances carry the most severe penalties, as these substances are believed to pose the most serious threat to public safety. Relevant here, § 201(a) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to add or remove substances, or to move a substance from one schedule to another. § 201(a), 21 U.S.C. § 811(a).
When adding a substance to a schedule, the Attorney General must follow specified procedures. First, the Attorney General must request a scientific and medical evaluation from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), together with a recommendation as to whether the substance should be controlled. A substance cannot be scheduled if the Secretary recommends
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Because Nolan Lucas failed to give statutorily required notice of his intention to present evidence of an alleged rape victim’s past sexual conduct, a Michigan trial court refused to let him present the evidence at trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, adopting a per se rule that preclusion of evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual relationship with a criminal defendant violates the Sixth Amendment. We consider the propriety of this per se rule.
I
Like most States, Michigan has a “rape-shield” statute designed to protect victims of rape from being exposed at trial to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning their past sexual behavior. See Mich. Comp.Laws § 750.520j (1979). * This statute prohibits a criminal defendant from introducing at trial evidence of an alleged rape victim’s past sexual conduct, subject to two exceptions. One of the exceptions is relevant here. It permits a defendant to introduce evidence of his own past sexual conduct with the victim, provided that he follows certain procedures. Specifically, a defendant who plans to present such evidence must file a written motion and an offer of proof “within 10 days” after he is arraigned. The trial court may hold “an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible” – i.e., whether the evidence is material and not more prejudicial than probative.
Lucas was charged with two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The State maintained
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.
[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 485 U. S. 575 (1988). JUSTICE BLACKMUN has explained well why this longstanding canon of statutory construction applies in this case, and I join 500 U. S. 500 U. S. which constitute the Secretary’s interpretation of § 1008 of the Public Health Service Act, 84 Stat. 1508, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6, “raise serious constitutional problems”: the regulations place content-based restrictions on the speech of Title X fund recipients, restrictions directed precisely at speech concerning one of “the most divisive and contentious issues that our Nation has faced in recent years.” Ante at 500 U. S. 215.
One may well conclude, as JUSTICE BLACKMUN does in 500 U. S. that the regulations are unconstitutional for this reason. I do not join Part II of the dissent, however, for the same reason that I do not join 500 U. S. in which JUSTICE BLACKMUN concludes that the regulations are unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The canon of construction that JUSTICE BLACKMUN correctly applies here is grounded in large part upon our time-honored practice of not reaching constitutional questions unnecessarily. See DeBartolo, supra, at 485 U.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that we review for clear error the trial court’s finding as to discriminatory intent, and agree with its analysis of this issue. I agree also that the finding of no discriminatory intent was not clearly erroneous in this case. I write separately because I believe that the plurality opinion goes farther than it needs to in assessing the constitutionality of the prosecutor’s asserted justification for his peremptory strikes.
Upon resolution of the factfinding questions, this case is straightforward. Hernandez asserts an equal protection violation under the rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). In order to demonstrate such a violation, Hernandez must prove that the prosecutor intentionally discriminated against Hispanic jurors on the basis of their race. The trial court found that the prosecutor did not have such intent, and that determination is not clearly erroneous. Hernandez has failed to meet his burden.
An unwavering line of cases from this Court holds that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires state action motivated by discriminatory intent; the disproportionate effects of state action are not sufficient to establish such a violation. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 426 U. S. 239 (1976), we explained that
our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminato
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
No one doubts that Dawud Majid Mu’Min’s brutal murder of Gladys Nopwasky attracted extensive media coverage. For days on end, the case made headlines because it involved a macabre act of senseless violence and because it added fuel to an already heated political controversy about the wisdom of inmate work-release programs. But the question we decide today is not whether the jurors who ultimately convicted Mu’Min had previously read or heard anything about the case; everyone agrees that eight of them had. Nor is the question whether jurors who read that Mu’Min had confessed to the murder should have been disqualified as a matter of law. See post at 500 U. S. 441 -442, 500 U. S. 444. This claim is squarely foreclosed by Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984), where we upheld a trial court’s decision to seat jurors who had read about the case notwithstanding that the defendant’s written confessions, which were not admissible at trial, were widely reported in the press. See id. 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 1029 ; id. at 467 U. S. 1047 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The only question before us is whether the trial court erred by crediting the assurances of eight jurors that they could put aside what they had read or heard and render a fair verdict based on the evidence.
The dissent insists that the trial judge could not have assessed realistically the jurors’ credibility without first identifying the information to which each individual juror had been exposed.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.
The Court concludes that the action of a private attorney exercising a peremptory challenge is attributable to the government, and therefore may compose a constitutional violation. This conclusion is based on little more than that the challenge occurs in the course of a trial. Not everything that happens in a courtroom is state action. A trial, particularly a civil trial, is, by design, largely a stage on which private parties may act; it is a forum through which they can resolve their disputes in a peaceful and ordered manner. The government erects the platform; it does not thereby become responsible for all that occurs upon it. As much as we would like to eliminate completely from the courtroom the specter of racial discrimination, the Constitution does not sweep that broadly. Because I believe that a peremptory strike by a private litigant is fundamentally a matter of private choice, and not state action, I dissent.
I
In order to establish a constitutional violation, Edmonson must first demonstrate that Leesville’s use of a peremptory challenge can fairly be attributed to the government. Unfortunately, our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency. Perhaps this is because the state action determination is so closely tied to the “framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present.” See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
A party that prevails against the United States in a civil action is entitled, in certain circumstances, to an award of attorney’s fees, court costs, and other expenses. Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Among other requirements, the prevailing party must submit to the court an application for fees and expenses “within thirty days of final judgment in the action.” § 2412(d)(1)(B). This case requires us to decide whether an administrative decision rendered following a remand from the District Court is a “final judgment” within the meaning of EAJA.
I
In May, 1982, petitioner Zakhar Melkonyan filed an application for disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program established by Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that petitioner was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. In June, 1984, petitioner timely filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California seeking judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), which incorporates the review provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On May 30, 1984, shortly before filing the complaint, petitioner filed a second application for SSI disability benefits accompanied by new evidence of disability. In August, 1984, petitioner’s second application was
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Article V, § 26 of the Missouri Constitution provides that “[a]ll judges other than municipal judges shall retire at the age of seventy years.” We consider whether this mandatory retirement provision violates the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and whether it comports with the federal constitutional prescription of equal protection of the laws.
I
Petitioners are Missouri state judges. Judge Ellis Gregory, Jr., is an associate circuit judge for the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit. Judge Anthony P. Nugent, Jr., is a judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. Both are subject to the § 26 mandatory retirement provision. Petitioners were appointed to office by the Governor of Missouri, pursuant to the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan, Mo.Const., Art. V, §§ 25(a)-25(g). Each has, since his appointment, been retained in office by means of a retention election in which the judge ran unopposed, subject only to a “yes or no” vote. See Mo. Const., Art. V, § 25(c)(1).
Petitioners and two other state judges filed suit against John D. Ashcroft, the Governor of Missouri, in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, challenging the validity of the mandatory retirement provision. The judges alleged that the provision violated both the ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, dissenting.
I agree that predictability and judicial economy counsel the adoption of a uniform federal statute of limitations for actions brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE KENNEDY, however, I believe we should adopt the “1 year from discovery rule,” but not the 3-year period of repose. I write separately only to express my disagreement with the Court’s decision in 501 U. S. In holding that respondent’s suit is time-barred under a limitations period that did not exist before today, the Court departs drastically from our established practice and inflicts an injustice on the respondents. The Court declines to explain its unprecedented decision, or even to acknowledge its unusual character.
Respondents, plaintiffs below, filed this action in Federal District Court in 1986. Everyone agrees that, at that time, their claims were governed by the state statute of limitations for the most analogous state cause of action. This was mandated by a solid wall of binding Ninth Circuit authority dating back more than 30 years. [ Footnote 3/1 ] See ante at 501 U. S. 353. The case proceeded in the District Court and the Court of Appeals for almost four years. During that time, the law never changed; the governing limitations period remained the analogous state statute of limitations. [ Footnote 3/2 ] Notwithstanding respondents’ entirely proper reliance on this limitations period, the Court now holds that
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have held that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to approach individuals at random in airport lobbies and other public places to ask them questions and to request consent to search their luggage, so long as a reasonable person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate. This case requires us to determine whether the same rule applies to police encounters that take place on a bus.
I
Drug interdiction efforts have led to the use of police surveillance at airports, train stations, and bus depots. Law enforcement officers stationed at such locations routinely approach individuals, either randomly or because they suspect in some vague way that the individuals may be engaged in criminal activity, and ask them potentially incriminating questions. Broward County has adopted such a program. County Sheriff’s Department officers routinely board buses at scheduled stops and ask passengers for permission to search their luggage.
In this case, two officers discovered cocaine when they searched a suitcase belonging to Terrance Bostick. The underlying facts of the search are in dispute, but the Florida Supreme Court, whose decision we review here, stated explicitly the factual premise for its decision:
‘Two officers, complete with badges, insignia and one of them holding a recognizable zipper pouch, containing a pistol, boarded a bus bound from Miami to Atlanta during a stopover in Fort Lauderdale. Eyeing
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, dissenting.
The Court extends application of the new rule announced in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984), retroactively to all parties, without consideration of the analysis described in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971). JUSTICE SOUTER bases this determination on “principles of equality and stare decisis. ” Ante at 501 U. S. 540. To my mind, both of these factors lead to precisely the opposite result.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE SCALIA concur in the judgment of the Court, but would abrogate completely the Chevron Oil inquiry and hold that all decisions must be applied retroactively in all cases. I explained last Term that such a rule ignores well-settled precedent in which this Court has refused repeatedly to apply new rules retroactively in civil cases. See American Trucking Assns. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 496 U. S. 188 -200 (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.). There is no need to repeat that discussion here. I reiterate, however, that precisely because this Court has “the power to say what the law is,’ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 177 (1803),” ante at 501 U. S. 549 (SCALIA, J., concurring), when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it. If the Court decides, in the context of a civil case or controversy, to change the law, it must make the subsequent determination whether the new law or the old is to apply to conduct occurring before the law-changing
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a case about federalism. It concerns the respect that federal courts owe the States and the States’ procedural rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal habeas corpus.
I
A Buchanan County, Virginia, jury convicted Roger Keith Coleman of rape and capital murder and fixed the sentence at death for the murder. The trial court imposed the death sentence, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983). This Court denied certiorari. 465 U. S. 1109 (1984).
Coleman then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Buchanan County, raising numerous federal constitutional claims that he had not raised on direct appeal. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the Circuit Court ruled against Coleman on all claims. App. 3-19. The court entered its final judgment on September 4, 1986.
Coleman filed his notice of appeal with the Circuit Court on October 7, 1986, 33 days after the entry of final judgment. Coleman subsequently filed a petition for appeal in the Virginia Supreme Court. The Commonwealth of Virginia, as appellant, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The sole ground for dismissal urged in the motion was that Coleman’s notice of appeal had been filed late. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:9(a) provides that no appeal shall be allowed unless a notice of appeal is filed with the trial court
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I agree with much of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion. In particular, I agree that a State may regulate speech by lawyers representing clients in pending cases more readily than it may regulate the press. Lawyers are officers of the court, and, as such, may legitimately be subject to ethical precepts that keep them from engaging in what otherwise might be constitutionally protected speech. See In re Sawyer, 360 U. S. 622, 360 U. S. 646 -647 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring in result). This does not mean, of course, that lawyers forfeit their First Amendment rights, only that a less demanding standard applies. I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard articulated in Rule 177 passes constitutional muster. Accordingly, I join Parts I and II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion.
For the reasons set out in 501 U. S. however, I believe that Nevada’s Rule is void for vagueness. Section (3) of Rule 177 is a “safe harbor” provision. It states that, “notwithstanding” the prohibitory language located elsewhere in the Rule, “a lawyer involved in the investigation or litigation may state without elaboration… [t]he general nature of the claim or defense.” Gentile made a conscious effort to stay within the boundaries of this “safe harbor.” In his brief press conference, Gentile gave only a rough sketch of the defense that he intended to present at trial – i.e., that Detective Scholl, not Grady Sanders, stole the cocaine
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, concurring.
In my view, a State may legitimately determine that victim impact evidence is relevant to a capital sentencing proceeding. A State may decide that the jury, before determining whether a convicted murderer should receive the death penalty, should know the full extent of the harm caused by the crime, including its impact on the victim’s family and community. A State may decide also that the jury should see “a quick glimpse of the life petitioner chose to extinguish,” Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, 486 U. S. 397 (1988) (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting), to remind the jury that the person whose life was taken was a unique human being.
Given that victim impact evidence is potentially relevant, nothing in the Eighth Amendment commands that States treat it differently than other kinds of relevant evidence.
The Eighth Amendment stands as a shield against those practices and punishments which are either inherently cruel or which so offend the moral consensus of this society as to be deemed ‘cruel and unusual.’
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U. S. 805, 490 U. S. 821 (1989) (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting). Certainly there is no strong societal consensus that a jury may not take into account the loss suffered by a victim’s family or that a murder victim must remain a faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Just the opposite is true. Most States have enacted legislation enabling judges and juries
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989), we held that state officials “acting in their official capacities” are outside the class of “persons” subject to liability
* Richard Ruda filed a brief for the National Association of Counties et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Andrew J. Pincus, John A. Powell, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Robert M. Weinberg, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold; for Kenneth W. Fultz by Cletus P. Lyman; and for Nancy Haberstroh by Stephen R. Kaplan. OCTOBER TERM, 1991 Syllabus HAFER v. MELO ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No.90-681. Argued October 15, 1991-Decided November 5,1991 Mter petitioner Hafer, the newly elected auditor general of Pennsylvania, discharged respondents from their jobs in her office, they sued her for, inter alia, monetary damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court dismissed the latter claims under Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 71, in which the Court held that state officials “acting in their official capacities” are outside the class of “persons” subject to liability under § 1983. In reversing this ruling, the Court of Appeals found that respondents sought damages from Hafer in her personal capacity
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the evidence of battered child syndrome was relevant. The State had to prove that Mark McGuire intended to kill his daughter, and the evidence that Tori was a battered child was probative of causation and intent. I therefore join Part I of the Court’s opinion.
I do not join Part II of the opinion because I think there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the prior acts instruction. The trial court instructed the jury that evidence of Tori’s prior injuries had been admitted to show that McGuire had committed offenses similar to that for which he was on trial, and that, if the jury found a “clear connection” between the prior offenses and the charged offense, “it may be logically concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the crime charged in this case.” App.41. In my view, the instruction encouraged the jury to assume that McGuire had inflicted the prior injuries and then directed the jury to conclude that the prior abuser was the murderer. Because the instruction may have relieved the State of its burden of proving the identity of Tori’s murderer beyond a reasonable doubt, I would hold that the instruction was error and remand to the Court of Appeals for a determination of whether that error was harmless.
The fact that a 6-month-old child was repeatedly beaten in the course of her short life is so horrifying
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. New York’s “Son of Sam” law requires that an accused or convicted criminal’s income from works describing his crime be deposited in an escrow account. These funds are then made available to the victims of the crime and the criminal’s other creditors. We consider whether this statute is consistent with the First Amendment.
I A
In the summer of 1977, New York was terrorized by a serial killer popularly known as the Son of Sam. The hunt for the Son of Sam received considerable publicity, and by the time David Berkowitz was identified as the killer and apprehended, the rights to his story were worth a substantial amount. Berkowitz’s chance to profit from his notoriety while his victims and their families remained uncompensated did not escape the notice of New York’s Legislature. The State quickly enacted the statute at issue, N. Y. Exec. Law § 632-a (McKinney 1982 and Supp. 1991).
The statute was intended to “ensure that monies received by the criminal under such circumstances shall first be made available to recompense the victims of that crime for their loss and suffering.” Assembly Bill Memorandum Re: A 9019, July 22, 1977, reprinted in Legislative Bill Jacket, 1977 N. Y. Laws, ch. 823. As the author of the statute explained:
It is abhorrent to one’s sense of justice and decency that an individual… can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once he is captured-while five people are dead, [and] other people
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner RafehRafie Ardestani prevailed in an administrative deportation proceeding brought by respondent Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). She sought attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U. S. C. § 504 and 28 U. S. C. § 2412, which provides that prevailing parties in certain adversarial proceedings may recover attorney’s fees from the Government. We now consider whether the EAJA authorizes the award of attorney’s fees and costs for administrative deportation proceedings before the INS. We conclude that it does not.
I
Ardestani is an Iranian woman of the Bahai faith who entered the United States as a visitor in December 1982. She remained in this country lawfully until the end of May 1984 and then sought asylum. The United States Department of State informed the INS that Ardestani’s fear of persecution upon return to Iran was well founded. In February 1986, however, the INS denied Ardestani’s asylum application on the ground that, before entering the United States, she had reached a “safe haven” in Luxembourg and had established residence there. Ardestani advised the INS that she had been in Luxembourg only three days en route to the United States, that she had stayed in a hotel, and that she had never applied for residency in that country. Nonetheless, the following month, the INS issued an order to show cause why she should not be deported.
At the deportation hearing,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, dissenting.
The Court’s decision in this case is an example of the truism that hard cases make bad law. The Court’s understandable reluctance to leave petitioner without a remedy leads it to contort and confuse the clear statement doctrine we have articulated in recent opinions. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
I
The Court invokes stare decisis while at the same time running headlong away from it. In my view, this case is cleanly resolved by applying two recent precedents, Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989), and Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U. S. 468 (1987), not by rehabilitating a decision we have largely repudiated, Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U. S. 184 (1964). In Will, we held that if Congress intends to upset the “‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,'” it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear. Will, supra, at 65 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)). As we determined in that case, a federal statute requiring the States to entertain damages suits against themselves in state courts is precisely the kind of legislation that requires a clear statement, because of the long-established principle that a State cannot normally be sued in its own courts without its consent. Will, supra, at 67.
In Welch, we held that the language of the Jones Act,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure conditions federal appellate jurisdiction on the filing of a timely notice of appeal. In this case, we hold that a document intended to serve as an appellate brief may qualify as the notice of appeal required by Rule 3.
I
While an inmate at the Maryland State Penitentiary, petitioner William Smith filed a pro se action against two prison administrators, seven corrections officers, two state psychologists, and named respondent Dr. Wayne Barry, a private physician. Suing under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, Smith alleged that he suffered from a psychogenic pain disorder and that the defendants’ refusal to provide him with a wheelchair constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Smith further alleged that the officers used excessive force against him, also in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The District Court dismissed Dr. Barry as a defendant on the ground that he did not act under color of state law when treating Smith and therefore was not subject to suit under § 1983. App. 5-6. The case proceeded to trial in 1988, following appointment of counsel. After Smith presented his case in chief, the District Court directed a verdict for the prison administrators and officers on Smith’s wheelchair OCTOBER TERM, 1991 Syllabus SMITH v. BARRY ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 90-7477. Argued December 2, 1991-Decided
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to decide whether the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. We answer that question in the affirmative.
I
At the time of the incident that is the subject of this suit, petitioner Keith Hudson was an inmate at the state penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. Respondents Jack McMillian, Marvin Woods, and Arthur Mezo served as corrections security officers at the Angola facility. During the early morning hours of October 30,1983, Hudson and McMillian argued. Assisted by Woods, McMillian then placed Hudson in handcuffs and shackles, took the prisoner out of his cell, and walked him toward the penitentiary’s “administrative lockdown” area. Hudson testified that, on the way there, McMillian punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach while Woods held the inmate in place and kicked and punched him from behind. He further testified that Mezo, the supervisor on duty, watched the beating but merely told the officers “not to have too much fun.” App. 23. As a result of this episode, Hudson suffered minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip. The blows also loosened Hudson’s teeth and cracked his partial dental plate, rendering it unusable for several months.
Hudson sued the three corrections officers in Federal District Court under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging a violation
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1987, the Michigan Legislature enacted a statute that had the effect of requiring petitioners General Motors Corporation (GM) and Ford Motor Company (Ford) to repay workers’ compensation benefits GM and Ford had withheld in reliance on a 1981 workers’ compensation statute. Petitioners challenge the provision of the statute mandating these retroactive payments on the ground that it violates the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.
I
Since at least 1974, workers’ compensation law in Michigan has been the subject of legislative study and bitter debate. VanderLaan & Studley, Workers’ Compensation Reform: A Case Study of the Legislative Process in Michigan, 14 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 451, 452-454 (1981). “Literally dozens of conflicting legislative proposals” were offered each year, and all were fought to a standstill by competing interest groups. Id., at 453. The legislative logjam was finally broken in 1980, when the Governor and four legislative leaders began a series of negotiations leading to an agreement on reforms.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Citizens Insurance Co. of America et al. by Donald S. Young and Kathleen McCree Lewis; for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., et al. by David A. Strauss, William H. Crabtree, Dwight H. Vincent, J. Walker Henry, and Rachelle G. Silberberg; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Scott