Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan

Director OWCP v. Perini North River Assocs

Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V) (hereinafter LHWCA or Act). Before 1972, LHWCA coverage extended only to injuries sustained on the actual “navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock).” 44 Stat. (part 2) 1426. As part of its 1972 Amendments of the Act, Congress expanded the “navigable waters” situs to include certain adjoining land areas, § 3(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). At the same time, Congress added a status requirement that employees covered by the Act must be “engaged in maritime employment” within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Act. [ Footnote 1 ] We granted certiorari in this case, 455 U.S. 937 (1982), to consider whether a marine construction worker, who was injured while performing his job upon actual navigable waters, [ Footnote 2 ] and who would have been covered by the Act before 1972, is “engaged in maritime employment,” and thus covered by the amended Act. [ Footnote 3 ] We hold that the worker is “engaged in maritime employment” for purposes of coverage under the amended LHWCA. Accordingly, we reverse the decision below.

I

The facts are not in dispute. Respondent Perini North River Associates (Perini) contracted to build the foundation of a sewage treatment plant that extends approximately 700 feet over the Hudson River between 136th and 145th Streets

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Economic Activity, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Director Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Economic Activity, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In adjudicating benefits claims under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 83 Stat. 792, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., the Department of Labor applies what it calls the “true doubt” rule. This rule essentially shifts the burden of persuasion to the party opposing the benefits claim-when the evidence is evenly balanced, the benefits claimant wins. This litigation presents the question whether the rule is consistent with § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof.” 5 U. S. C. § 556(d).

I

We review two separate decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In one, Andrew Ondecko applied for disability benefits under the BLBA after working as a coal miner for 31 years. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Ondecko had pneumoconiosis (or black lung disease), that he was totally disabled by the disease, and that the disease resulted from coal mine employment. In resolving the first two issues, the ALJ relied on the true doubt rule. In resolving the third, she relied on the rebuttable presumption that a miner with pneumoconiosis who worked in the mines for at least 10 years developed the disease be

tBriefs of amici curiae urging affirmance

Concurrence, Judicial Power, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Diamond v. Charles

Concurrence, Judicial Power, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join the Court’s judgment and Part I of its opinion, and I agree with much of the Court’s discussion of.why Dr. Diamond’s asserted interests in defending the Illinois Abortion Law do not satisfy the Art. III standing requirement. I write separately, however, because I do not agree with the Court’s reasons for rejecting Dr. Diamond’s contention that Illinois’ presence as an appellee ensures that a justiciable controversy is before us. In my view, Dr. Diamond was not a proper intervenor in the Court of Appeals, and therefore Illinois is not before this Court in any capacity, because Diamond was not authorized to bring this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).

The Court assumes that Diamond could properly bring an appeal under § 1254(2), and therefore that Illinois is present in this Court as an appellee under this Court’s Rule 10.4. The Court then asserts that Illinois is not “the functional equivalent of an appellant” by virtue of its status as a party under Rule 10.4. Ante at 476 U. S. 62 -63. On this basis, the Court concludes that Illinois’ “failure to invoke our jurisdiction leaves the Court without a case’ or `controversy’ between appellees and the State of Illinois,” ante at 476 U. S. 63 -64, even if Illinois’ interests are actually adverse to appellees’ interests. I believe this analysis is needlessly inconsistent with this Court’s opinion in Director,

David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Devlin v. Scardelletti

David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a nonnamed member of a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), sought to appeal the approval of a settlement over objections he stated at the fairness hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that he lacked the power to bring such an appeal because he was not a named class representative and because he had not successfully moved to intervene in the litigation. We now reverse.

I

Petitioner Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union (Union), participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, on the recommendation of the Plan’s trustees, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living adjustment (COLA) for retired and active employees. As it turned out, however, the Plan was not able to support such a large benefits increase. To address this problem, the Plan’s new trustees sought to freeze the COLA. Because they were concerned about incurring Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) liability by eliminating the COLA for retired workers, see 29 U. S. C. § 1054(g)(1) (1994 ed.) (providing that accrued benefits “may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan”), the trustees froze the COLA only as to active employees. Because the Plan still lacked sufficient funds, the new trustees obtained an equitable decree from the United States District Court for the District of

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

Fort Wayne Books Inc. v. Indiana

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Because I believe that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the petition in Sappenfield v. Indiana, No. 87-614, I dissent from the Court’s disposition of that case. I concur in the Court’s disposition of Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, No. 87-470, which presents, among others, the same question as presented in Sappenfield.

Petitioners Sappenfield and his bookstore corporations, Fantasy One, Inc., and Fantasy Two, Inc., have yet to be tried or convicted on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) counts brought against them by the State of Indiana. Petitioners’ motion to dismiss the RICO counts and the State’s subsequent appeal were, therefore, interlocutory. Except in limited circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction only to review final judgments rendered by the highest court of the State in which decision may be had. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975). As we observed in Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U. S. 619, 451 U. S. 620 (1981) (per curiam), a case involving violations of Ohio’s obscenity statute, “[a]pplied in the context of a criminal prosecution, finality is normally defined by the imposition of the sentence.” Neither a finding of guilt nor imposition of sentence has yet occurred in Sappenfield. As in Flynt, were we to assume jurisdiction over Sappenfield, there would be some

probability of piecemeal review with respect to federal issues [because]

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Forrester v. White

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*

This case requires us to decide whether a state court judge has absolute immunity from a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his decision to dismiss a subordinate court employee. The employee, who had been a probation officer, alleged that she was demoted and discharged on account of her sex, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that the judge’s decisions were not judicial acts for which he should be held absolutely immune.

I

Respondent Howard Lee White served as Circuit Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois and Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court in Jersey County. Under Illinois law, Judge White had the authority to hire adult probation officers, who were removable in his discretion. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, 204-1 (1979). In addition, as designee of the Chief Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Judge White had the authority to appoint juvenile probation officers to serve at his pleasure. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 37, 706-5 (1979).

In April, 1977, Judge White hired petitioner Cynthia A. Forrester as an adult and juvenile probation officer. Forrester prepared presentence reports for Judge White in adult offender cases, and recommendations for disposition and placement in juvenile cases. She also supervised persons on probation and recommended revocation when necessary. In July, 1979, Judge White appointed Forrester as Project Supervisor of the Jersey

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

Ford v. Wainwright

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part.

I am in full agreement with JUSTICE REHNQUIST’s conclusion that the Eighth Amendment does not create a substantive right not to be executed while insane. Accordingly, I do not join the Court’s reasoning or opinion. Because, however, the conclusion is for me inescapable that Florida positive law has created a protected liberty interest in avoiding execution while incompetent, and because Florida does not provide even those minimal procedural protections required by due process in this area, I would vacate the judgment and remand to the Court of Appeals with directions that the case be returned to the Florida system so that a hearing can be held in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. I cannot agree, however, that the federal courts should have any role whatever in the substantive determination of a defendant’s competency to be executed.

As we explained in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 459 U. S. 466, (1983),

[l]iberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources -the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.

See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 427 U. S. 223 -227 (1976). With JUSTICE REHNQUIST, I agree that the Due Process Clause does not independently create a protected interest in avoiding the execution of a death sentence during incompetency. See also Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9 (1960).

Dissent, Federalism, William Rehnquist

Felder v. Casey

Dissent, Federalism, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.

A state statute cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’ with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation.

Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584, 436 U. S. 593 (1978). Disregarding this self-evident principle, the Court today holds that Wisconsin’s notice of claim statute is preempted by federal law as to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed in state court. This holding is not supported by the statute whose preemptive force it purports to invoke, or by our precedents. Relying only on its own intuitions about “the goals of the federal civil rights laws,” ante at 487 U. S. 138, the Court fashions a new theory of preemption that unnecessarily and improperly suspends a perfectly valid state statute. This Court has said that “unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws.” Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U. S. 495, 485 U. S. 501 (1988). Today’s exercise departs not only from that unquestionable proposition, but even from the much more obvious principle that unexpressed approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws.

Wisconsin’s notice of claim statute, which imposes a limited exhaustion of remedies requirement on those with claims against municipal governments and their officials, serves at least two important purposes apart from providing municipal defendants with a special affirmative defense in litigation. First, the statute helps ensure

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, David Souter, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist

Feist Pubs. Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co. Inc

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, David Souter, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to clarify the extent of copyright protection available to telephone directory white pages.

I

Rural Telephone Service Company is a certified public utility that provides telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas. It is subject to a state regulation that requires all telephone companies operating in Kansas to issue annually an updated telephone directory. Accordingly, as a condition of its monopoly franchise, Rural publishes a typical telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow pages. The white pages list in alphabetical order the names of Rural’s subscribers, together with their towns and telephone numbers. The yellow pages list Rural’s business subscribers alphabetically by category, and feature classified advertisements of various sizes. Rural distributes its directory free of charge to its subscribers, but earns revenue by selling yellow pages advertisements.

Feist Publications, Inc., is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories. Unlike a typical directory, which covers only a particular calling area, Feist’s area-wide directories cover a much larger geographical range, reducing the need to call directory assistance or consult multiple directories. The Feist directory that is the subject of this litigation covers 11 different telephone service areas in 15 counties and contains 46,878 white pages listings -compared to Rural’s approximately

Byron White, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Brennan

FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp

Byron White, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to consider whether a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note is insured as a “deposit” under the federal deposit insurance program. We hold that, in light of the longstanding interpretation of petitioner Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that such a letter does not create a deposit and, in light of the fact that such a letter does not entrust any noncontingent assets to the bank, a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note does not give rise to an insured deposit.

I

Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was, at the time of the relevant transactions, a customer of respondent Philadelphia Gear Corporation (Philadelphia Gear). On Orion’s application, the Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Penn Square) issued a letter of credit for the benefit of Philadelphia Gear in the amount of $145,200. The letter of credit provided that a draft drawn upon the letter of credit would be honored by Penn Square only if accompanied by Philadelphia Gear’s “signed statement that [it had] invoiced Orion Manufacturing Corporation and that said invoices have remained unpaid for at least fifteen (15) days.” App. 25. Because the letter of credit was intended to provide payment to the seller only if the buyer of the invoiced goods failed to make payment, the letter of credit was what is commonly referred to as a “standby” or “guaranty” letter of credit. See, e.g., 12 CFR § 337.2(a),