Civil Rights, Concurrence

Johnson v. De Grandy

Civil Rights, Concurrence / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

The critical issue in these cases is whether § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. s. C. § 1973, requires courts to “maximize” the number of districts in which minority voters may elect their candidates of choice. The District Court, applying the maximization principle, operated “on the apparent assumption that what could have been done to create additional Hispanic supermajority districts should have been done.” Ante, at 1009. The Court today makes clear that the District Court was in error, and that the Voting Rights Act does not require maximization. Ante, at 1017 (“Failure to maximize cannot be the measure of § 2”); ante, at 1022 (the District Court improperly “equated dilution with failure to maximize the number of reasonably compact majorityminority districts”).

But today’s opinion does more than reject the maximization principle. The opinion’s central teaching is that proportionality-defined as the relationship between the number of majority-minority voting districts and the minority group’s share of the relevant population-is always relevant evidence in determining vote dilution, but is never itself dispositive. Lack of proportionality is probative evidence of vote dilution. “[A]ny theory of vote dilution must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting strength that makes some reference to the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 84 (1986) (O’CONNOR,

Concurrence, Judicial Power

Jerome B. Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co

Concurrence, Judicial Power / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

I concur in the Court’s judgment and opinion. The Court properly holds that, when a court is faced with a case involving multiple tortfeasors, some of whom may not be maritime actors, if one of the putative tortfeasors was engaged in traditional maritime activity alleged to have proximately caused the incident, then the supposedly wrongful activity “involves” traditional maritime activity. The possible involvement of other, nonmaritime parties does not affect the jurisdictional inquiry as to the maritime party. Ante, at 541. I do not, however, understand the Court’s opinion to suggest that, having found admiralty jurisdiction over a particular claim against a particular party, a court must then exercise admiralty jurisdiction over all the claims and parties involved in the case. Rather, the court should engage in the usual supplemental jurisdiction and impleader inquiries. See 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1988 ed., Supp. V); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 14; see also ante, at 531. I find nothing in the Court’s opinion to the contrary.

Concurrence, Economic Activity, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde

Concurrence, Economic Activity, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.

East Jefferson Hospital, a public hospital governed by petitioners, requires patients to use the anesthesiological services provided by Roux & Associates, as they are the only doctors authorized to administer anesthesia to patients in the hospital. The Court of Appeals found that this arrangement was a tie-in illegal under the Sherman Act. 686 F.2d 286 (CA5 1982). I concur in the Court’s decision to reverse, but write separately to explain why I believe the hospital-Roux contract, whether treated as effecting a tie between services provided to patients or as an exclusive dealing arrangement between the hospital and certain anesthesiologists, is properly analyzed under the rule of reason.

I

Tying is a form of marketing in which a seller insists on selling two distinct products or services as a package. A supermarket that will sell flour to consumers only if they will also buy sugar is engaged in tying. Flour is referred to as the tying product, sugar as the tied product. In this case, the allegation is that East Jefferson Hospital has unlawfully tied the sale of general hospital services and operating room facilities (the tying service) to the sale of anesthesiologists’ services (the tied services). The Court has on occasion applied a per se rule of illegality in actions alleging tying in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. International Salt Co. v. United

Dissent, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Jefferson Cty. Pharm. Ass’n v. Abbott Labs

Dissent, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

The issue that confronts the Court is one of statutory construction: whether the Robinson-Patman Act covers purchases of commodities by state and local governments for resale in competition with private retailers. [ Footnote 2/1 ] The Court’s task, therefore, is to discern the intent of the 1936 Congress which enacted the Robinson-Patman Act. I do not agree with the majority that this issue can be resolved by reference to cases under the Sherman Act or other statutes, or by reliance on the broad remedial purposes of the antitrust laws generally. The 1936 Congress simply did not focus on this issue. The business and legal communities have assumed for the past four decades that such purchases are not covered. For these reasons, as explained more fully below, I respectfully dissent.

I

A

The majority relies extensively on the interpretation this Court has given to the term “person” under the Sherman Act and other statutes as a guide to whether the terms “person” and “purchasers,” as used in § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act (Act), 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13, include state and local governmental entities. See ante at 460 U. S. 155 -156. In my view, such reliance is misplaced. The question of the Robinson-Patman Act’s treatment of governmental purchases requires an independent examination of the legislative history of that Act to ascertain

Civil Rights, Concurrence

J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B

Civil Rights, Concurrence / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

I agree with the Court that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from excluding a person from jury service on account of that person’s gender. Ante, at 135137. The State’s proffered justifications for its genderbased peremptory challenges are far from the” ‘exceedingly persuasive'” showing required to sustain a gender-based

the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.” Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 220 (1946). classification. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724 (1982); ante, at 137-140. I therefore join the Court’s opinion in this case. But today’s important blow against gender discrimination is not costless. I write separately to discuss some of these costs, and to express my belief that today’s holding should be limited to the government’s use of gender-based peremptory strikes.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), itself was a significant intrusion into the jury selection process. Batson minihearings are now routine in state and federal trial courts, and Batson appeals have proliferated as well. Demographics indicate that today’s holding may have an even greater impact than did Batson itself. In further constitutionalizing jury selection procedures, the Court increases the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshowwill become part of the main event.

For this same

Anthony Kennedy, Dissent, Federalism, William Rehnquist

James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia

Anthony Kennedy, Dissent, Federalism, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, dissenting.

The Court extends application of the new rule announced in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984), retroactively to all parties, without consideration of the analysis described in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971). JUSTICE SOUTER bases this determination on “principles of equality and stare decisis. ” Ante at 501 U. S. 540. To my mind, both of these factors lead to precisely the opposite result.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE SCALIA concur in the judgment of the Court, but would abrogate completely the Chevron Oil inquiry and hold that all decisions must be applied retroactively in all cases. I explained last Term that such a rule ignores well-settled precedent in which this Court has refused repeatedly to apply new rules retroactively in civil cases. See American Trucking Assns. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 496 U. S. 188 -200 (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.). There is no need to repeat that discussion here. I reiterate, however, that precisely because this Court has “the power to say what the law is,’ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 177 (1803),” ante at 501 U. S. 549 (SCALIA, J., concurring), when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it. If the Court decides, in the context of a civil case or controversy, to change the law, it must make the subsequent determination whether the new law or the old is to apply to conduct occurring before the law-changing

Concurrence, Unions

Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Longshoremen

Concurrence, Unions / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

Based on the legislative history of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and our previous cases interpreting it, e.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (1938), the Court correctly concludes that this case involves a labor dispute within the meaning of § 4 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104. The Court also correctly determines that, under Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), no injunction may issue pending arbitration because the underlying political dispute is not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement. Unless the Court is willing to overrule Buffalo Forge, the conclusion reached by the Court in this case is inescapable. Therefore, I concur in the judgment.

Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

INS v. Phinpathya

Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In § 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 66 Stat. 214, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), Congress provided that the Attorney General, in his discretion, may suspend deportation and adjust the status of an otherwise deportable alien who (1) “has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years”; (2) “is a person of good moral character”; and (3) is “a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child….” In this case, we must decide the meaning of § 244(a)(1)’s “continuous physical presence” requirement.

I

Respondent, a native and citizen of Thailand, first entered the United States as a nonimmigrant student in October, 1969. Respondent’s husband, also a native and citizen of Thailand, entered the country in August, 1968. Respondent and her husband were authorized to remain in the United States until July, 1971. However, when their visas expired, they chose to stay without securing permission from the immigration authorities.

In January, 1977, petitioner, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), [ Footnote 1 ] commenced deportation proceedings against respondent and her husband pursuant to § 241(a)(2) of the Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Respondent and her husband conceded deportability and applied for suspension pursuant to § 244(a)(1). 8 U.S.C.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, David Souter, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, David Souter, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*

This case presents the question whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., preempts a state common law claim that an employee was unlawfully discharged to prevent his attainment of benefits under a plan covered by ERISA.

I

Petitioner Ingersoll-Rand employed respondent Perry McClendon as a salesman and distributor of construction equipment. In 1981, after McClendon had worked for the company for nine years and eight months, the company fired him, citing a company-wide reduction in force. McClendon sued the company in Texas state court, alleging that his pension would have vested in another four months and that a principal reason for his termination was the company’s desire to avoid making contributions to his pension fund. McClendon did not realize that, pursuant to applicable regulations, see 29 CFR § 2530.200b-4 (1990) (break-in-service regulation), he had already been credited with sufficient service to vest his pension under the plan’s 10-year requirement. McClendon sought compensatory and punitive damages under various tort and contract theories; he did not assert any cause of action under ERISA. After a period of discovery, the company moved for, and obtained, summary judgment on all claims. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that McClendon’s employment was terminable at will. 757 S.W.2d 816 (1988).

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Texas

Anthony Kennedy, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Indianapolis v. Edmond

Anthony Kennedy, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444 (1990), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976), we held that brief, suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purposes of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants were constitutional. We now consider the constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics.

I

In August 1998, the city of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints on Indianapolis roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. The city conducted six such roadblocks between August and November that year, stopping

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Kansas et al. by Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General of Kansas, Stephen R. McAllister, State Solicitor, Jared S. Maag, Assistant Attorney General, and John M. Bailey, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Mark Pryor of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Karen M. Freeman-Wilson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Michael C. Moore of Mississippi, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Jan Graham of Utah, and Mark L. Earley of Virginia; for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda and