O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.):

Dr. Ana Alvarez and Nurse Sandra Mateos were employees at St. Jude Rehabilitation Center during its brief time as an operating clinic in 2003. St. Jude was ostensibly an HIV treatment center, but it was established as a front for a massive Medicare scam. The fraud involved falsely diagnosing patients with a condition that would justify treatments of WinRho, an expensive drug reimbursable by Medicare at a rate of about $4,900 per treatment to St. Jude. Because the treatment was medically unnecessary, employees at St. Jude would purchase only a small fraction of the drugs and drug treatments for which they billed Medicare. They would then use a simple saline solution or an extremely diluted dose of WinRho to inject patients, thereby pocketing much of the money that Medicare had paid for the WinRho treatments. All of the patients were HIV-positive Medicare beneficiaries who had been recruited for the purpose of seeking WinRho treatments they did not actually need. The patients were typically paid about $150 per visit in exchange for their knowing participation. During the approximately five-month span in which this scam continued, St. Jude received more than $8 million from Medicare.

For their roles in this operation, Dr. Alvarez and Nurse Mateos were indicted on several counts. Both Alvarez and Mateos were indicted for: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States, to cause the submission of false claims, and to pay health care kickbacks, in

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired).

Under federal law, it is a crime for any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to ship, transport, receive or possess a firearm or ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 125 S.Ct. 1752, 161 L.Ed.2d 651 (2005), the Supreme Court construed the phrase “convict [ions] in any court” in that statute to “encompas[s] only domestic, not foreign, convictions.” Id. at 387, 125 S.Ct. 1752. The question presented is whether appellant’s conviction in a Puerto Rican court for the possession of marijuana is a “foreign” or “domestic” conviction under § 922(g)(1), a question of first impression in the Courts of Appeals. The District Court concluded that it was a domestic conviction within the ambit of the statute’s prohibition. We agree, and accordingly affirm the court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss his indictment.

I.

The material facts are not in dispute. In July 1999, appellant Marco Laboy–Torres was convicted in the Superior Court of Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, for possessing marijuana, and was sentenced to 36 months’ probation. Two years later, he moved to the United States in violation of the terms of his sentence. When he returned to Puerto Rico in 2005, he was rearrested, his probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to serve a three year term of incarceration, with two years’ credit for the probation he had previously served.

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.):

Defendant Charles Lee Gillenwater, II, was charged with two counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications and one count of transmitting threatening communications by United States mail. After determining that Gillenwater was not competent to stand trial, the district court authorized the government to medicate Gillenwater involuntarily to render him competent to face the charges against him. While recognizing the important interests at stake for both the government and Gillenwater, we conclude that the district court did not err in authorizing Gillenwater’s involuntary medication.

I

Gillenwater once worked on the renovation of the Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. Gillenwater believes that he and thousands of others were exposed to asbestos during that renovation. He also believes that the government allowed the exposure to occur and helped the hotel cover it up. And Gillenwater believes that government and hotel officials came after him when he tried to reveal the exposure and cover up.

In November 2011, Gillenwater was charged with two counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and one count of transmitting threatening communications by United States mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c).

In the proceedings that followed, the government claimed that Gillenwater made graphic and disturbing threats against a number of government officials and employees and showed

SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.).

Defendant-Appellant Gerald Fields pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Fields was sentenced to a term of 151 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of his uncontested Guidelines range. Fields now argues that his sentence was unreasonable. He also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred in failing to inquire as to whether Fields admitted or denied a prior felony drug conviction used to enhance his sentence, as required by 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

On June 6, 2007, the Northern Kentucky Drug Strike Force intercepted a United Parcel Service package that was found to contain more than four kilograms of cocaine. The package was delivered to one of Fields’s co-defendants, Alberto Martinez, who was immediately detained by the Strike Force. Martinez cooperated with authorities and arranged to meet Fields at a Red Roof Inn to deliver the package. That evening, Fields and two other individuals arrived at the Red Roof Inn. Fields was identified as the intended recipient of the drugs. Fields had $94,314 in currency with him, and he was arrested by the Strike Force and subsequently indicted. While charges were pending, the government filed a “prior conviction information” on September 7, 2007. The information indicated that Fields had been convicted of felony possession of cocaine in 1999

O’CONNOR, Supreme Court Justice (Ret.):

This case asks us to evaluate the constitutionality of certain aspects of New York’s handgun licensing regime. As we explain, we believe we should not reach that question before certifying a predicate question of state law to the New York Court of Appeals.

I

Appellant Alfred Osterweil applied for a handgun license in May 2008. Following the directions of New York Penal Law § 400.00(3)(a), he applied for a license “in the city or county… where [he] resides.”1 At that time, his house in Summit, New York—part of Schoharie County—was still his primary residence and domicile. While his application was pending, however, Osterweil moved his primary residence to Louisiana, keeping his home in Summit as a part-time vacation residence. He then sent a letter to the Schoharie licensing authorities inquiring whether this move made him ineligible for a license. A46. Shortly thereafter, in July 2008, Osterweil sent another letter suggesting that if his change of domicile foiled his license application, a constitutional problem would result. A52–A53. This second letter came after the United States Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms, and that the core of this right is the right to self-defense in the home.

Osterweil’s application was eventually forwarded to appellee George Bartlett, a judge of the county court

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Justice O’CONNOR wrote the opinion, in which Judge KING and Judge DAVIS joined.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice:

Geraldine Lauture appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to her employer, St. Agnes Hospital, on her race- and national origin-based claims for discrimination, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. She also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to St. Agnes on her state law claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I

Appellant Geraldine Lauture, who is black and was born in Haiti of Haitian parents, was employed by St. Agnes Hospital as a Medical Laboratory Technician. Lauture holds an associate degree in Medical Laboratory Technology and a Certificate of Achievement for completing training in chemistry, hematology, and microbiology. From July 2004 until December 2005, Lauture worked the evening shift in the Microbiology Lab without any direct supervision. In December 2005, Lauture was allowed to switch to the day shift so that she could spend time with her children. On the day shift, Lauture was supervised by Jane Weiger and Margaret Kinch, the Microbiology Lab’s co-Lead Technologists, who had permitted Lauture’s move from the evening shift. Weiger and Kinch