Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

Thornton v. United States

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

Justice O’Connor, concurring in part.
I join all but footnote 4 of the Court’s opinion. Although the opinion is a logical extension of the holding of New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), I write separately to express my dissatisfaction with the state of the law in this area. As Justice Scalia forcefully argues, post, p. 2-5 (opinion concurring in judgment), lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). That erosion is a direct consequence of Belton ’s shaky foundation. While the approach Justice Scalia proposes appears to be built on firmer ground, I am reluctant to adopt it in the context of a case in which neither the Government nor the petitioner has had a chance to speak to its merit.

Civil Rights, Concurrence, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Thornburg v. Gingles

Civil Rights, Concurrence, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.

In this case, we are called upon to construe § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. Amended § 2 is intended to codify the “results” test employed in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and to reject the “intent” test propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). S.Rep. No. 97-417, pp. 27-28 (1982) (hereinafter S.Rep.). Whereas Bolden required members of a racial minority who alleged impairment of their voting strength to prove that the challenged electoral system was created or maintained with a discriminatory purpose and led to discriminatory results, under the results test, “plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose.” S.Rep. at 28. At the same time, however, § 2 unequivocally disclaims the creation of a right to proportional representation. This disclaimer was essential to the compromise that resulted in passage of the amendment. See id. at 193-194 (additional views of Sen. Dole).

In construing this compromise legislation, we must make every effort to be faithful to the balance Congress struck. This is not an easy task. We know that Congress intended to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2, but we also know that Congress did not intend to create a right to proportional representa

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

Thompson v. Oklahoma

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

The plurality and dissent agree on two fundamental propositions: that there is some age below which a juvenile’s crimes can never be constitutionally punished by death, and that our precedents require us to locate this age in light of the ” evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'” See ante at 487 U. S. 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 356 U. S. 101 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.)); ante at 487 U. S. 827 -829; post at 487 U. S. 864 -865, 487 U. S. 872. See also e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 481 U. S. 300 (1987). I accept both principles. The disagreements between the plurality and the dissent rest on their different evaluations of the evidence available to us about the relevant social consensus. Although I believe that a national consensus forbidding the execution of any person for a crime committed before the age of 16 very likely does exist, I am reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of constitutional law without better evidence than we now possess. Because I conclude that the sentence in this case can and should be set aside on narrower grounds than those adopted by the plurality, and because the grounds on which I rest should allow us to face the more general question when better evidence is available, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.

I

Both the plurality and the dissent look initially to the decisions of American legislatures for signs of a national

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Attorneys, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Texas St. Teach. Ass’n v. Garland ISD

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Attorneys, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We must decide today the proper standard for determining whether a party has “prevailed” in an action brought under certain civil rights statutes such that the party is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This is an issue which has divided the Courts of Appeals both before and after our decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983). The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits require that a party succeed on the “central issue” in the litigation and achieve the “primary relief sought” to be eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988. See, e.g., Simien v. San Antonio, 809 F.2d 255, 258 (CA5 1987); Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1149 (CA11 1985) (en banc). Most of the other Federal Courts of Appeals have applied a less demanding standard, requiring only that a party succeed on a significant issue and receive some of the relief sought in the lawsuit to qualify for a fee award. See, e.g., Gingras v. Lloyd, 740 F.2d 210, 212 (CA2 1984); Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F.2d 99, 102 (CA7 1985); Fast v. School Dist. of Ladue, 728 F.2d 1030, 1032-1033 (CA8 1984) (en banc); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F.2d 1124, 1125 (CA9 1983); Nephew v. Aurora, 766 F.2d 1464, 1466 (CA10 1985). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the “central issue” test, and concluded that petitioners here were

Anthony Kennedy, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Tennard v. Dretke

Anthony Kennedy, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I), we held that the Texas capital sentencing scheme provided a constitutionally inadequate vehicle for jurors to consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse the petitioner had presented. The petitioner in this case argues that the same scheme was inadequate for jurors to give effect to his evidence of low intelligence. The Texas courts rejected his claim, and a Federal District Court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that ‘reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,’ Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), and therefore hold that a certificate of appealability should have issued.

I

Petitioner Robert Tennard was convicted by a jury of capital murder in October 1986. The evidence presented at trial indicated that Tennard and two accomplices killed two of his neighbors and robbed their house. Tennard himself stabbed one of the victims to death, and one of the accomplices killed the other victim with a hatchet.

During the penalty phase of the trial, defense counsel called only one witness’Tennard’s parole officer’who testified that Tennard’s Department of Corrections record from a prior incarceration indicated that he had an IQ of 67. App. 28’29. He testified that the IQ test would have been administered as a matter of course. Ibid.

Criminal Procedure, Dissent, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Taylor v. Alabama

Criminal Procedure, Dissent, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

The Court holds today that Omar Taylor’s detailed confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest, and consequently, should be suppressed. Because I conclude that neither the facts nor the law supports the Court’s analysis, I respectfully dissent.

I

In the course of their investigation of the Moseley robbery, Montgomery police questioned Charles Martin, who was being held on unrelated rape and robbery charges. Martin stated that “he had heard that Omar Taylor was involved in the robbery of Moseley’s Grocery,” Tr. 6, but the police made no attempt to establish either Martin’s credibility as an informant or the reliability of the information he provided. [ Footnote 2/1 ]

Based only on this tip, which did not provide probable cause, Sergeants Alford and Rutland arrested Taylor a little before 3 p.m. on January 4, 1979. At that time, they told him why he was being arrested and advised him of his Miranda rights, but asked him no questions regarding the robbery. Tr. 20, 24. When they arrived at the police station, the officers turned Taylor over to detectives.

After Taylor had been fingerprinted and signed a form acknowledging his Miranda rights, Detective Wilson questioned him for about 15 minutes, Tr. 48, and placed him in a lineup before one of the victims, Mrs. Moseley. Id. at 37-38. At the lineup, which lasted about an hour, id. at 48, Mrs. Moseley was unable to identify the

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist

Tanner v. United States

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners William Conover and Anthony Tanner were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and of committing mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. 772 F.2d 765 (1985). Petitioners argue that the District Court erred in refusing to admit juror testimony at a postverdict hearing on juror intoxication during the trial; and that the conspiracy count of the indictment failed to charge a crime against the United States. We affirm in part and remand.

I

Conover was the procurement manager at Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Seminole), a Florida corporation owned and operated by 11 rural electric distribution cooperatives. Seminole generates and transmits electrical energy to the cooperatives.

In 1979, Seminole borrowed over $1.1 billion from the Federal Financing Bank in order to construct a coal-fired power plant near Palatka, Florida. The loan was guaranteed by the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), a credit agency of the United States Department of Agriculture that assists rural electric organizations by providing loans, guaranteeing loans from other sources, and approving other security arrangements that allow the borrower to obtain financing. REA, A Brief History of the Rural Electrification and Telephone Programs (1985). The loan agreement between Seminole and the REA provided

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Dissent

Swidler & Berlin v. United States

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, Dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

Although the attorney-client privilege ordinarily will survive the death of the client, I do not agree with the Court that it inevitably precludes disclosure of a deceased client’s communications in criminal proceedings. In my view, a criminal defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence or a compelling law enforcement need for information may, where the testimony is not available from other sources, override a client’s posthumous interest in confidentiality.

We have long recognized that “[t]he fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are to rest upon reason-is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.” Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 381 (1933). In light of the heavy burden that they place on the search for truth, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 708-710 (1974), “[e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper circumstances,” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 175 (1979). Consequently, we construe the scope of privileges narrowly. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U. S. 1, 19 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); see also University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U. S. 182, 189 (1990). We are reluctant to recognize a privilege or read an existing one expansively unless to do so will serve a “public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit a State from imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the distribution of religious materials by a religious organization.

I

California’s Sales and Use Tax Law requires retailers to pay a sales tax “[f]or the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail.” Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. § 6051 (West 1987). A “sale” includes any transfer of title or possession of tangible personal property for consideration. Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. § 6006(a) (West Supp.1989).

The use tax, as a complement to the sales tax, reaches out-of-state purchases by residents of the State. It is “imposed on the storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer,” § 6201, at the same rate as the sales tax (6 percent). Although the use tax is imposed on the purchaser, § 6202, it is generally collected by the retailer at the time the sale is made. §§ 6202-6206. Neither the State Constitution nor the State Sales and Use Tax Law exempts religious organizations from the sales and use tax, apart from a limited exemption for the serving of meals by religious organizations, § 6363.5.

During the tax period in question (1974 to 1981), appellant Jimmy Swaggart Ministries was a religious organization incorporated as a Louisiana nonprofit corporation and recognized as such by the Internal Revenue