Anthony Kennedy, Concurrence, Criminal Procedure, William Rehnquist

Simmons v. South Carolina

Anthony Kennedy, Concurrence, Criminal Procedure, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, concurring in the judgment.

“Capital sentencing proceedings must of course satisfy the dictates of the Due Process Clause,” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 746 (1990), and one of the hallmarks of due process in our adversary system is the defendant’s ability to meet the State’s case against him. Cf. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690 (1986). In capital cases, we have held that the defendant’s future dangerousness is a consideration on which the State may rely in seeking the death penalty. See California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 1002-1003 (1983). But “[w]here the prosecution specifically relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in asking for the death penalty,… the elemental due process requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to death ‘on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain’ [requires that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to introduce evidence on this point].” Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 5, n. 1 (1986), quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also 476 U. S., at 9-10 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).

In this case, petitioner physically and sexually assaulted three elderly women-one of them his own grandmotherbefore killing a fourth. At the capital sentencing proceed

*Compare ante, at 162, n. 4 (refraining from addressing Simmons’ Eighth Amendment claim), with ante, at 173-174 (SOUTER,

Antonin Scalia, Dissent, Economic Activity, William Rehnquist

Sheridan v. United States

Antonin Scalia, Dissent, Economic Activity, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.

Petitioners seek to recover money damages under a section of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that authorizes claims against the Government for personal injuries

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). That section is subject to an exception for any claim “arising out of” an assault or battery. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Despite the unqualified language of this exception, the Court today holds that it does not protect the Government from liability for a battery committed by a Government employee who acted outside the scope of his employment if other Government employees had a duty to prevent the battery.

If we were to construe the words according to their ordinary meaning, we would say that a claim “arises out of” a battery in any case in which the battery is essential to the claim. Thus when the Court construed another exception to the FTCA for claims “arising in respect of… the detention of any goods” by customs or law enforcement officials, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), we equated “arising in respect of” with “arising out of,” and decided that the phrase includes “all injuries associated in any way with the detention’ of goods.” See Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, 465 U. S. 854 (1984). A parallel construction of the exception at issue here leads to the conclusion that

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist

Turner v. Safley

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of regulations promulgated by the Missouri Division of Corrections relating to inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate correspondence. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying a strict scrutiny analysis, concluded that the regulations violate respondents’ constitutional rights. We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules. Applying that standard, we uphold the validity of the correspondence regulation, but we conclude that the marriage restriction cannot be sustained.

I

Respondents brought this class action for injunctive relief and damages in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The regulations challenged in the complaint were in effect at all prisons within the jurisdiction of the Missouri Division of Corrections. This litigation focused, however, on practices at the Renz Correctional Institution (Renz), located in Cedar City, Missouri. The Renz prison population includes both male and female prisoners of varying security levels. Most of the female prisoners at Renz are classified as medium or maximum security inmates, while most of the male prisoners are classified as minimum security offenders. Renz is used on occasion to provide protective custody for inmates from other prisons in the Missouri system. The facility originally was built as a minimum

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Dissent, First Amendment, Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Dissent, First Amendment, Ruth Bader Ginsburg / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, dissenting.

In sustaining the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act), Pub. L. 102-385, §§4-5, 106 Stat. 1460, against a First Amendment challenge by cable system operators and cable programmers, the Court errs in two crucial respects. First, the Court disregards one of the principal defenses of the statute urged by appellees on remand: that it serves a substantial interest in preserving “diverse,” “quality” programming that is “responsive” to the needs of the local community. The course of this litigation on remand and the proffered defense strongly reinforce my view that the Court adopted the wrong analytic framework in the prior phase of this case. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 643-651 (1994) (Turner); id., at 675-680 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Second, the Court misapplies the “intermediate scrutiny” framework it adopts. Although we owe deference to Congress’ predictive judgments and its evaluation of complex economic questions, we have an independent duty to identify with care the Government interests supporting the scheme, to inquire into the reasonableness of congressional findings regarding its necessity, and to examine the fit between its goals and its consequences. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 770-771 (1993); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.

Civil Rights, David Souter, Dissent, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS

Civil Rights, David Souter, Dissent, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

In a long line of cases spanning nearly three decades, this Court has applied heightened scrutiny to legislative classifications based on sex. The Court today confronts another statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their sex. While the Court invokes heightened scrutiny, the manner in which it explains and applies this standard is a stranger to our precedents. Because the Immigration and N aturalization Service (INS) has not shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for the sex-based classification embodied in 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a)(4)-i. e., because it has failed to establish at least that the classification substantially relates to the achievement of important governmental objectives-I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

Sex-based statutes, even when accurately reflecting the way most men or women behave, deny individuals opportunity. Such generalizations must be viewed not in isolation, but in the context of our Nation’s “‘long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.'” J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 136 (1994) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion)). Sex-based generalizations both reflect and reinforce “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.” Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 725 (1982).

For these reasons, a party who seeks

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky. Inc. v. Williams

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), a physical impairment that “substantially limits one or more… major life activities” is a “disability.” 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994 ed.). Respondent, claiming to be disabled because of her carpal tunnel syndrome and other related impairments, sued petitioner, her former employer, for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the ADA. See § 12112(b)(5)(A). The District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner, finding that respondent’s impairments did not substantially limit any of her major life activities. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the impairments substantially limited respondent in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, and therefore granting partial summary judgment to respondent on the issue of whether she was disabled under the ADA. We conclude that the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper standard in making this determination because it analyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondent’s impairments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.

I

Respondent began working at petitioner’s automobile manufacturing plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, in August 1990. She was soon placed on an engine fabrication

Civil Rights, Concurrence

Town of Newton v. Rumery

Civil Rights, Concurrence / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join in Parts I, II, III-A, IV, and V of the Court’s opinion. More particularly, I join the Court in disapproving the Court of Appeals’ broad holding that a criminal defendant’s promise not to sue local governments and officials for constitutional violations arising out of his arrest and prosecution, given in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to dismiss pending criminal charges, is void as against public policy under all circumstances. I agree with the Court that a case-by-case approach appropriately balances the important interests on both sides of the question of the enforceability of these agreements, and that, on the facts of this particular case, Bernard Rumery’s covenant not to sue is enforceable. I write separately, however, in order to set out the factors that lead me to conclude that this covenant should be enforced, and to emphasize that it is the burden of those relying upon such covenants to establish that the agreement is neither involuntary nor the product of an abuse of the criminal process.

As the Court shows, ante at 480 U. S. 395 -396, 480 U. S. 398, there are substantial policy reasons for permitting release-dismissal bargains to be struck in appropriate cases. Certainly some § 1983 litigation is meritless, and the inconvenience and distraction of public officials caused by such suits is not inconsiderable. Moreover, particular release-dismissal agreements may serve bona fide criminal

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist

Tison v. Arizona

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether the petitioners’ participation in the events leading up to and following the murder of four members of a family makes the sentences of death imposed by the Arizona courts constitutionally permissible, although neither petitioner specifically intended to kill the victims and neither inflicted the fatal gunshot wounds. We hold that the Arizona Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard in making the findings required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), and, therefore, vacate the judgments below and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I

Gary Tison was sentenced to life imprisonment as the result of a prison escape during the course of which he had killed a guard. After he had been in prison a number of years, Gary Tison’s wife, their three sons Donald, Ricky, and Raymond, Gary’s brother Joseph, and other relatives made plans to help Gary Tison escape again. See State v. Dorothy Tison, Cr. No. 108352 (Super.Ct.Maricopa County 1981). The Tison family assembled a large arsenal of weapons for this purpose. Plans for escape were discussed with Gary Tison, who insisted that his cellmate, Randy Greenawalt, also a convicted murderer, be included in the prison break. The following facts are largely evidenced by petitioners’ detailed confessions given as part of a plea bargain according to the terms of which the State agreed not to seek the death sentence.

Anthony Kennedy, Dissent, Judicial Power, William Rehnquist

Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown

Anthony Kennedy, Dissent, Judicial Power, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join, dissenting.

We granted certiorari to consider one specific question:

“Whether a federal court may refuse to enforce a prior federal class action judgment, properly certified under Rule 23, on grounds that absent class members have a constitutional due process right to opt out of any class action which asserts monetary claims on their behalf.” Pet. for Cert. i. The Court decides not to answer this question based on its speculation about a nonconstitutional ground for decision that is neither presented on this record nor available to these parties. From that decision I respectfully dissent.

Respondents are members of a class that reached a final settlement with petitioners in an antitrust action styled MDL No. 633. In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Services Antitrust Litigation, 1986-1 Trade Cases’ 67,149, p. 62,921 (ED Pa. 1986), aff’d, 815 F.2d 695 (CA3 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 909 (1988). Respondents subsequently brought this action against petitioners, asserting some of the same claims. The District Court held that respondents had been adequately represented in the MDL No. 633 action, and granted summary judgment for petitioners because, given the identity of parties and claims, the MDL No. 633 settlement was res judicata. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-28a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 982 F.2d 386 (1992). The court agreed that respondents had been adequately represented

Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Tibbs v. Florida

Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause [ Footnote 1 ] bars retrial after a state appellate court sets aside a conviction on the ground that the verdict was against “the weight of the evidence.” After examining the policies supporting the Double Jeopardy Clause, we hold that a reversal based on the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the evidence permits the State to initiate a new prosecution.

I

In 1974, Florida indicted petitioner Delbert Tibbs for the first-degree murder of Terry Milroy, the felony murder of Milroy, and the rape of Cynthia Nadeau. Nadeau, the State’s chief trial witness, testified that she and Milroy were hitchhiking from St. Petersburg to Marathon, Fla., on February 3, 1974. A man in a green truck picked them up near Fort Myers and, after driving a short way, turned off the highway into a field. He asked Milroy to help him siphon gas from some farm machinery, and Milroy agreed. W hen Nadeau stepped out of the truck a few minutes later, she discovered the driver holding a gun on Milroy. The driver told Milroy that he wished to have sex with Nadeau, and ordered her to strip. After forcing Nadeau to engage in sodomy, the driver agreed that Milroy could leave. As Milroy started to walk away, however, the assailant shot him in the shoulder. When Milroy fell to the ground, pleading for his life, the gunman walked over and taunted, “Does it hurt, boy? You in pain? Does it hurt,