Byron White, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Bowsher v. Merck & Co. Inc

Byron White, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue before the Court is the scope of the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to examine the records of a private contractor with whom the Government has entered into fixed-price [ Footnote 1 ] negotiated contracts. We conclude that, under the circumstances presented in this action, the Comptroller General may inspect the contractor’s records of direct costs, but not records of indirect costs.

I

In 1973, Merck & Co., Inc. (Merck), entered into three contracts with the Defense Supply Agency of the Department of Defense and one contract with the Veterans’ Administration for the sale of pharmaceutical products to the Government. All four contracts were negotiated, rather than awarded after formal advertising. [ Footnote 2 ] The pharmaceutical products supplied under each contract were standard commercial products sold by Merck in substantial quantities to the general public. App. 41a. The price term proposed by Merck for each contract was based on the catalog price at which Merck sold the item to the general public or was otherwise determined by adequate competition. Before the award of each of the contracts at the fixed price proposed by Merck, there was no actual negotiation of price, and the Government contracting officers did not request Merck to submit cost data in connection with any of the four contracts.

As required by 10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) and 65 Stat. 700, 41 U.S.C. § 254(c), [ Footnote 3

Byron White, Federal Taxation, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Commissioner

Byron White, Federal Taxation, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

These consolidated cases present the question of the applicability of the tax benefit rule to two corporate tax situations: the repayment to the shareholders of taxes for which they were liable, but that were originally paid by the corporation, and the distribution of expensed assets in a corporate liquidation. We conclude that, unless a nonrecognition provision of the Internal Revenue Code prevents it, the tax benefit rule ordinarily applies to require the inclusion of income when events occur that are fundamentally inconsistent with an earlier deduction. Our examination of the provisions granting the deductions and governing the liquidation in these cases leads us to hold that the rule requires the recognition of income in the case of the liquidation, but not in the case of the tax refund.

I

In No. 81-485, Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, the petitioner, Hillsboro National Bank, is an incorporated bank doing business in Illinois. Until 1970, Illinois imposed a property tax on shares held in incorporated banks. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 120, § 557 (1971). Banks, required to retain earnings sufficient to cover the taxes, § 558, customarily paid the taxes for the shareholders. Under § 164(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 164(e), [ Footnote 1 ] the bank was allowed a deduction for the amount of the tax, but the shareholders were not. In 1970, Illinois amended its Constitution to prohibit ad valorem taxation

Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan

Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm’r

Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*

This case presents the question of a State’s power to impose a special tax on the press and, by enacting exemptions, to limit its effect to only a few newspapers.

I

Since 1967, Minnesota has imposed a sales tax on most sales of goods for a price in excess of a nominal sum. [ Footnote 1 ] Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 32, Art. XIII, § 2, 1967 Minn. Laws 2143, 2179, codified at Minn.Stat. § 297A.02 (1982). In general, the tax applies only to retail sales. Ibid. An exemption for industrial and agricultural users shields from the tax sales of components to be used in the production of goods that will themselves be sold at retail. § 297A.25(1)(h). As part of this general system of taxation and in support of the sales tax, see Minn.Code of Agency Rules, Tax S & U 300 (1979), Minnesota also enacted a tax on the “privilege of using, storing or consuming in Minnesota tangible personal property.” This use tax applies to any nonexempt tangible personal property unless the sales tax was paid on the sales price. Minn.Stat. § 297A.14 (1982). Like the classic use tax, this use tax protects the State’s sales tax by eliminating the residents’ incentive to travel to States with lower sales taxes to buy goods, rather than buying them in Minnesota. §§ 297A.14, 297A.24.

The appellant, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., “Star Tribune,” is the publisher of a morning newspaper and an evening newspaper (until 1982) in Minneapolis. From 1967 until 1971,

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist

United States v. Frady

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a criminal conviction to be overturned on direct appeal for “plain error” in the jury instructions, even if the defendant failed to object to the erroneous instructions before the jury retired, as required by Rule 30. In this case, we are asked to decide whether the same standard of review applies on a collateral challenge to a criminal conviction brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

I

A

Joseph Frady, the respondent, does not dispute that, 19 years ago, he and Richard Gordon killed Thomas Bennett in the front room of the victim’s house in Washington, D.C. Nonetheless, because the resolution of this case depends on what the jury learned about Frady’s crime, we must briefly recount what happened, as told by the witnesses at Frady’s trial and summarized by the Court of Appeals. See Frady v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 348 F.2d 84 (en banc) ( Frady I ), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965).

The events leading up to the killing began at about 4:30 p.m. on March 13, 1963, when two women saw Frady drive slowly by Bennett’s house in an old car. Later, at about 7:00 p.m., Frady, accompanied by Richard Gordon and Gordon’s friend, Elizabeth Ryder, returned to the same block. On this second trip, Ryder overheard Frady say “something about that is the house over there,” at which point Frady and Gordon looked in the direction of the victim’s house.

After reconnoitering Bennett’s

First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan

Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps

First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us once more to

struggl[e]… to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 418 U. S. 325 (1974). In Gertz, the Court held that a private figure who brings a suit for defamation cannot recover without some showing that the media defendant was at fault in publishing the statements at issue. Id. at 418 U. S. 347. Here, we hold that, at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at issue are false.

I

Maurice S. Hepps is the principal stockholder of General Programming, Inc. (GPI), a corporation that franchises a chain of stores -known at the relevant time as “Thrifty” stores -selling beer, soft drinks, and snacks. Mr. Hepps, GPI, and a number of its franchisees are the appellees here. [ Footnote 1 ] Appellant Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., owns the Philadelphia Inquirer (Inquirer). The Inquirer published a series of articles, authored by appellants William Ecenbarger and William Lambert, containing the statements at issue here. The general theme of the five articles, which appeared in the Inquirer between May, 1975, and May, 1976, was that appellees had links to organized crime and used some of those links to influence the State’s governmental processes, both legislative

Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

New York v. Class

Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we must decide whether, in order to observe a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible from outside an automobile, a police officer may reach into the passenger compartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring the VIN after its driver has been stopped for a traffic violation and has exited the car. We hold that, in these circumstances, the police officer’s action does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

I

On the afternoon of May 11, 1981, New York City police officers Lawrence Meyer and William McNamee observed respondent Benigno Class driving above the speed limit in a car with a cracked windshield. Both driving with a cracked windshield and speeding are traffic violations under New York law. See N.Y.Veh. & Traf.Law §§ 375(22), 1180(d) (McKinney 1970). Respondent followed the officers’ ensuing directive to pull over. Respondent then emerged from his car and approached Officer Meyer. Officer McNamee went directly to respondent’s vehicle. Respondent provided Officer Meyer with a registration certificate and proof of insurance, but stated that he had no driver’s license.

Meanwhile, Officer McNamee opened the door of respondent’s car to look for the VIN, which is located on the left doorjamb in automobiles manufactured before 1969. When the officer did not find the VIN on the doorjamb, he reached into the interior of respondent’s car to move some papers obscuring the area of the dashboard where the

Byron White, Economic Activity, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Thomas v. Union Carbide

Byron White, Economic Activity, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires the Court to revisit the data-consideration provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq., which was considered last Term in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984). Monsanto examined whether FIFRA’s data-consideration provision effects an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In this case, we address whether Article III of the Constitution prohibits Congress from selecting binding arbitration with only limited judicial review as the mechanism for resolving disputes among participants in FIFRA’s pesticide registration scheme. We conclude it does not, and reverse the judgment below.

I

The Court’s opinion in Monsanto details the development of FIFRA from the licensing and labeling statute enacted in 1947 to the comprehensive regulatory statute of the present. This case, like Monsanto, concerns the most recent amendment to FIFRA, the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 819 (1978 Act), which sought to correct problems created by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 973 (1972 Act), itself a major revision of prior law. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 467 U. S. 991 -992.

A

As a precondition for registration of a pesticide, manufacturers must submit research data to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the product’s health, safety, and environmenta

Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller

Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Last Term, in Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259 (1984), the Court unanimously held that pretrial orders disqualifying counsel in criminal cases are not subject to immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that § 1291 confers jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of orders disqualifying counsel in a civil case. 237 U.S.App.D.C. 333, 737 F.2d 1038 (1984). Because we conclude that orders disqualifying counsel in a civil case are not collateral orders subject to immediate appeal, we reverse.

I

Respondent Anne Koller (hereafter respondent) was born without normal arms or legs in a District of Columbia hospital in 1979. She filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that petitioner Richardson-Merrell, Inc., is liable for her birth defects. The complaint alleged that respondent’s mother, Cynthia Koller, had taken the antinausea drug Bendectin during the early stages of her pregnancy, and that the drug had caused Anne Koller’s injuries. Petitioner is the manufacturer of Bendectin.

Respondent was initially represented by Cohen & Kokus, a Miami law firm, and by local counsel in Washington. As discovery progressed into 1981, however, a Los Angeles law firm, Butler, Jefferson, Dan & Allis, took the lead in trial preparation. James G. Butler entered an appearance pro hac vice for respondent on January 26, 1981;

Byron White, Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Black v. Romano

Byron White, Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally requires a sentencing court to indicate that it has considered alternatives to incarceration before revoking probation. After a hearing, a state judge found that respondent had violated his probation conditions by committing a felony shortly after his original prison sentences were suspended. The judge revoked probation and ordered respondent to begin serving the previously imposed sentences. Nearly six years later, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that respondent had been denied due process because the record of the revocation hearing did not expressly indicate that the state judge had considered alternatives to imprisonment. The District Court granted a writ of habeas corpus and ordered respondent unconditionally released from custody. 567 F.Supp. 882 (1983). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 735 F.2d 319 (1984). We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 1033 (1984), and we now reverse.

I

On November 15, 1976, respondent Nicholas Romano pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of Laclede County, State of Missouri, to two counts of transferring and selling a controlled substance. The charges resulted from Romano’s attempt to trade 26 pounds of marihuana, which he had harvested, refined, and packaged, for what he thought was opium. App. 15, 27-28, 40. After the Missouri Department of Probation and

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

United States v. Hensley

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case, 467 U.S. 1203 (1984), to determine whether police officers may stop and briefly detain a person who is the subject of a “wanted flyer” while they attempt to find out whether an arrest warrant has been issued. We conclude that such stops are consistent with the Fourth Amendment under appropriate circumstances.

I

On December 4, 1981, two armed men robbed a tavern in the Cincinnati suburb of St. Bernard, Ohio. Six days later, a St. Bernard police officer, Kenneth Davis, interviewed an informant who passed along information that respondent Thomas Hensley had driven the getaway car during the armed robbery. Officer Davis obtained a written statement from the informant and immediately issued a “wanted flyer” to other police departments in the Cincinnati metropolitan area.

The flyer twice stated that Hensley was wanted for investigation of an aggravated robbery. It described both Hensley and the date and location of the alleged robbery, and asked other departments to pick up and hold Hensley for the St. Bernard police in the event he were located. The flyer also warned other departments to use caution and to consider Hensley armed and dangerous.

The St. Bernard Police Department’s “wanted flyer” was received by teletype in the headquarters of the Covington Police Department on December 10, 1981. Covington is a Kentucky suburb of Cincinnati that is approximately five miles from St. Bernard.