Dissent, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting.

I join Part I of JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S dissent. In my view, the Court should vacate and remand this case for consideration of the various threshold problems, statutory and regulatory, that may moot the constitutional question urged upon us by the parties. “It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint… that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. c., 467 U. S. 138, 157 (1984). That “fundamental rule” suffices to dispose of the case before us, whatever the proper answer to the decidedly hypothetical issue addressed by the Court. I therefore refrain from addressing it myself. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 223-225 (1991) (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting).

Civil Rights, Concurrence

Zobel v. Williams

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

The Court strikes Alaska’s distribution scheme, purporting to rely solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The phrase “right to travel” appears only fleetingly in the Court’s analysis, dismissed with an observation that “right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis.” Ante at 457 U. S. 60, n. 6. The Court’s reluctance to rely explicitly on a right to travel is odd, because its holding depends on the assumption that Alaska’s desire “to reward citizens for past contributions… is not a legitimate state purpose.” Ante at 457 U. S. 63. Nothing in the Equal Protection Clause itself, however, declares this objective illegitimate. Instead, as a full reading of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), reveals, the Court has rejected this objective only when its implementation would abridge an interest in interstate travel or migration.

I respectfully suggest, therefore, that the Court misdirects its criticism when it labels Alaska’s objective illegitimate. A desire to compensate citizens for their prior contributions is neither inherently invidious nor irrational. Under some circumstances, the objective may be wholly reasonable. [ Footnote 3/1 ] Even a generalized desire to reward citizens for past endurance, particularly in a State where years of hardship only recently have produced prosperity, is not

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue presented in this case is whether a resolution banning all “First Amendment activities” at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) violates the First Amendment.

I

On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners (Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides, in pertinent part:

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity; * * * *” BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effective date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or entity seeks to engage in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy of the Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to the uses permitted within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that, if any individual or entity engages in First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litigation against such individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commissioners….

App. 4a-5a.

Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc., is a nonprofit religious

Antonin Scalia, Due Process, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Hodel v. Irving

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether the original version of the “escheat” provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub.L. 97-459, Tit. II, 96 Stat. 2519, effected a “taking” of appellees’ decedents’ property without just compensation.

I

Towards the end of the 19th century, Congress enacted a series of land Acts which divided the communal reservations of Indian tribes into individual allotments for Indians and unallotted lands for non-Indian settlement. This legislation seems to have been in part animated by a desire to force Indians to abandon their nomadic ways in order to “speed the Indians’ assimilation into American society,” Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 465 U. S. 466 (1984), and in part a result of pressure to free new lands for further white settlement. Ibid. Two years after the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, Congress adopted a specific statute authorizing the division of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation into separate reservations and the allotment of specific tracts of reservation land to individual Indians, conditioned on the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Sioux. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. Under the Act, each male Sioux head of household took 320 acres of land, and most other individuals 160 acres. 25 Stat. 890. In order to protect the allottees from the improvident disposition of their lands to white settlers, the Sioux

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, ante p. 481 U. S. 41, the Court held that state common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., are preempted by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a). The question presented by this litigation is whether these state common law claims are not only preempted by ERISA, but also displaced by ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), [ Footnote 1 ] to the extent that complaints filed in state courts purporting to plead such state common law causes of action are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

I

General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in Michigan, has set up an employee benefit plan subject to the provisions of ERISA for its salaried employees. The plan pays benefits to salaried employees disabled by sickness or accident, and is insured by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan).

General Motors employed Michigan resident Arthur Taylor as a salaried employee from 1959-1980. In 1961, Taylor was involved in a job-related automobile accident, and sustained a back injury. Taylor filed a workers’ compensation claim for this injury, and he eventually returned to work. In May, 1980, while embroiled in a divorce

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, William Rehnquist

O’Connor v. Ortega

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE POWELL join.

This suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 presents two issues concerning the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees. First, we must determine whether the respondent, a public employee, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets at his place of work. Second, we must address the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard for a search conducted by a public employer in areas in which a public employee is found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

I

Dr. Magno Ortega, a physician and psychiatrist, held the position of Chief of Professional Education at Napa State Hospital (Hospital) for 17 years, until his dismissal from that position in 1981. As Chief of Professional Education, Dr. Ortega had primary responsibility for training young physicians in psychiatric residency programs.

In July, 1981, Hospital officials, including Dr. Dennis O’Connor, the Executive Director of the Hospital, became concerned about possible improprieties in Dr. Ortega’s management of the residency program. In particular, the Hospital officials were concerned with Dr. Ortega’s acquisition of an Apple II computer for use in the residency program. The officials thought that Dr. Ortega may have misled Dr. O’Connor into believing that the computer had been donated, when in fact the computer had been financed by the possibly coerced

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Western Air Lines v. Bd. of Equalization

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we consider whether the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax, S.D.Codified Laws, ch. 10-29 (1982), violates the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C.App. § 1513(d). We conclude that, because the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax is an “in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes,” 49 U.S.C.App. § 1513(d)(3), the tax does not violate § 1513(d).

I

The federal provision at issue is part of a series of congressional actions dedicated to improving the Nation’s air transportation system. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U. S. 7, 464 U. S. 8 -10 (1983). In 1970, following findings that

substantial expansion and improvement of the airport and airway system is [ sic ] required to meet the demands of interstate commerce, the postal service, and the national defense,

H. R. Conf Rep. No. 91-1074, p. 29 (1970), Congress required the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a plan for the development of public airports, and authorized the Secretary to make grants to States and localities for airport development. Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219. Congress also established an Airport and Airway Trust Fund, maintained by federal aviation taxes, to finance airport development projects. § 208, 84 Stat. 250. Soon afterward, Congress acted to limit state taxation of air transportation. Concluding that state passenger

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court

Justice O’CONNOR, delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I and II-B, concluding that the state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over petitioner would be unreasonable and unfair, in violation of the Due Process Clause. Pp.480 U. S. 113-116.

(a) The burden imposed on petitioner by the exercise of state court jurisdiction would be severe, since petitioner would be required not only to traverse the distance between Japan and California, but also to submit its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign judicial system. Such unique burdens should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of extending personal jurisdiction over national borders. Pp. 480 U. S. 113 -114.

(b) The interests of Cheng Shin and the forum State in the exercise of jurisdiction over petitioner would be slight, and would be insufficient to justify the heavy burdens placed on petitioner. The only surviving question is whether a Japanese corporation should indemnify a Taiwanese corporation on the bases of a sale made in Taiwan and a shipment of goods from Japan to Taiwan. The facts do not demonstrate that it would be more convenient for Cheng Shin to litigate its claim in California, rather than in Taiwan or Japan, while California’s interests are diminished by Cheng Shin’s lack of a California residence and by the fact that the dispute is primarily about indemnity, rather than the safety of consumers. While the possibility of being sued in California might create an additional deterrent

Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Randall v. Loftsgaarden

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether the recovery available to a defrauded tax shelter investor, entitled under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 or § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to rescind the fraudulent transaction or obtain rescissory damages, must be reduced by any tax benefits the investor has received from the tax shelter investment.

I

In 1973, petitioners purchased interests in Alotel Associates (Associates), a limited partnership organized by respondent B. J. Loftsgaarden to build and operate a motel in Rochester, Minnesota. Loftsgaarden was the president and sole shareholder of respondent Alotel, Inc. (Alotel), which, together with Loftsgaarden, was to be a general partner in the venture.

Loftsgaarden marketed this $3.5 million project as a “tax shelter,” which would result in ” significantly greater returns for persons in relatively high income tax brackets.'” Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 173 (CA8 1982) ( Austin I ). As a partnership, Associates would not be taxed as an entity. Rather, its taxable income and losses would pass through to the limited partners, who would then be entitled to claim their individual shares of the partnership’s deductible losses to the extent of their adjusted basis in their partnership interests. 26 U.S.C. § 704(d). Especially attractive from the high-income investor’s perspective was the fact that,

in a real estate investment such as the one contemplated

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Murray v. Carrier

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether a federal habeas petitioner can show cause for a procedural default by establishing that competent defense counsel inadvertently failed to raise the substantive claim of error, rather than deliberately withholding it for tactical reasons.

I

Respondent Clifford Carrier was convicted of rape and abduction by a Virginia jury in 1977. Before trial, respondent’s court-appointed counsel moved for discovery of the victim’s statements to police describing “her assailants, the vehicle the assailants were driving, and the location of where the alleged rape took place.” 2 Record 11. The presiding judge denied the motion by letter to counsel after examining the statements in camera and determining that they contained no exculpatory evidence. Id. at 31. Respondent’s counsel made a second motion to discover the victim’s statements immediately prior to trial, which the trial judge denied for the same reason after conducting his own in camera examination. Tr. 151-152.

After respondent was convicted, his counsel filed a notice of appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court assigning seven errors, of which the fifth was:

Did the trial judge err by not permitting defendant’s counsel to examine the written statements of the victim prior to trial, and during the course of the trial?

2 Record 83. Without consulting respondent, counsel subsequently submitted the required petition for appeal,