Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

New York v. Class

Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we must decide whether, in order to observe a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible from outside an automobile, a police officer may reach into the passenger compartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring the VIN after its driver has been stopped for a traffic violation and has exited the car. We hold that, in these circumstances, the police officer’s action does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

I

On the afternoon of May 11, 1981, New York City police officers Lawrence Meyer and William McNamee observed respondent Benigno Class driving above the speed limit in a car with a cracked windshield. Both driving with a cracked windshield and speeding are traffic violations under New York law. See N.Y.Veh. & Traf.Law §§ 375(22), 1180(d) (McKinney 1970). Respondent followed the officers’ ensuing directive to pull over. Respondent then emerged from his car and approached Officer Meyer. Officer McNamee went directly to respondent’s vehicle. Respondent provided Officer Meyer with a registration certificate and proof of insurance, but stated that he had no driver’s license.

Meanwhile, Officer McNamee opened the door of respondent’s car to look for the VIN, which is located on the left doorjamb in automobiles manufactured before 1969. When the officer did not find the VIN on the doorjamb, he reached into the interior of respondent’s car to move some papers obscuring the area of the dashboard where the

Byron White, Economic Activity, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Thomas v. Union Carbide

Byron White, Economic Activity, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires the Court to revisit the data-consideration provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq., which was considered last Term in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 (1984). Monsanto examined whether FIFRA’s data-consideration provision effects an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In this case, we address whether Article III of the Constitution prohibits Congress from selecting binding arbitration with only limited judicial review as the mechanism for resolving disputes among participants in FIFRA’s pesticide registration scheme. We conclude it does not, and reverse the judgment below.

I

The Court’s opinion in Monsanto details the development of FIFRA from the licensing and labeling statute enacted in 1947 to the comprehensive regulatory statute of the present. This case, like Monsanto, concerns the most recent amendment to FIFRA, the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 819 (1978 Act), which sought to correct problems created by the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 973 (1972 Act), itself a major revision of prior law. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., supra, at 467 U. S. 991 -992.

A

As a precondition for registration of a pesticide, manufacturers must submit research data to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning the product’s health, safety, and environmenta

Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller

Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Last Term, in Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259 (1984), the Court unanimously held that pretrial orders disqualifying counsel in criminal cases are not subject to immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that § 1291 confers jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of orders disqualifying counsel in a civil case. 237 U.S.App.D.C. 333, 737 F.2d 1038 (1984). Because we conclude that orders disqualifying counsel in a civil case are not collateral orders subject to immediate appeal, we reverse.

I

Respondent Anne Koller (hereafter respondent) was born without normal arms or legs in a District of Columbia hospital in 1979. She filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that petitioner Richardson-Merrell, Inc., is liable for her birth defects. The complaint alleged that respondent’s mother, Cynthia Koller, had taken the antinausea drug Bendectin during the early stages of her pregnancy, and that the drug had caused Anne Koller’s injuries. Petitioner is the manufacturer of Bendectin.

Respondent was initially represented by Cohen & Kokus, a Miami law firm, and by local counsel in Washington. As discovery progressed into 1981, however, a Los Angeles law firm, Butler, Jefferson, Dan & Allis, took the lead in trial preparation. James G. Butler entered an appearance pro hac vice for respondent on January 26, 1981;

Byron White, Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Black v. Romano

Byron White, Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally requires a sentencing court to indicate that it has considered alternatives to incarceration before revoking probation. After a hearing, a state judge found that respondent had violated his probation conditions by committing a felony shortly after his original prison sentences were suspended. The judge revoked probation and ordered respondent to begin serving the previously imposed sentences. Nearly six years later, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that respondent had been denied due process because the record of the revocation hearing did not expressly indicate that the state judge had considered alternatives to imprisonment. The District Court granted a writ of habeas corpus and ordered respondent unconditionally released from custody. 567 F.Supp. 882 (1983). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 735 F.2d 319 (1984). We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 1033 (1984), and we now reverse.

I

On November 15, 1976, respondent Nicholas Romano pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of Laclede County, State of Missouri, to two counts of transferring and selling a controlled substance. The charges resulted from Romano’s attempt to trade 26 pounds of marihuana, which he had harvested, refined, and packaged, for what he thought was opium. App. 15, 27-28, 40. After the Missouri Department of Probation and

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

United States v. Hensley

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case, 467 U.S. 1203 (1984), to determine whether police officers may stop and briefly detain a person who is the subject of a “wanted flyer” while they attempt to find out whether an arrest warrant has been issued. We conclude that such stops are consistent with the Fourth Amendment under appropriate circumstances.

I

On December 4, 1981, two armed men robbed a tavern in the Cincinnati suburb of St. Bernard, Ohio. Six days later, a St. Bernard police officer, Kenneth Davis, interviewed an informant who passed along information that respondent Thomas Hensley had driven the getaway car during the armed robbery. Officer Davis obtained a written statement from the informant and immediately issued a “wanted flyer” to other police departments in the Cincinnati metropolitan area.

The flyer twice stated that Hensley was wanted for investigation of an aggravated robbery. It described both Hensley and the date and location of the alleged robbery, and asked other departments to pick up and hold Hensley for the St. Bernard police in the event he were located. The flyer also warned other departments to use caution and to consider Hensley armed and dangerous.

The St. Bernard Police Department’s “wanted flyer” was received by teletype in the headquarters of the Covington Police Department on December 10, 1981. Covington is a Kentucky suburb of Cincinnati that is approximately five miles from St. Bernard.

Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Tower v. Glover

Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners are two public defenders working in the State of Oregon. Petitioner Bruce Tower, the Douglas County Public Defender, represented respondent Billy Irl Glover at one of Glover’s state trials on robbery charges, at which Glover was convicted. Petitioner Gary Babcock, the Oregon State Public Defender, represented Glover in Glover’s unsuccessful state court appeal from this and at least one other conviction.

In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Glover alleges that petitioners conspired with various state officials, including the trial and appellate court judges and the former Attorney General of Oregon, to secure Glover’s conviction. Glover seeks neither reversal of his conviction nor compensatory damages, but asks instead for $5 million in punitive damages to be awarded against each petitioner. App. 5, 9. We conclude that public defenders are not immune from liability in actions brought by a criminal defendant against state public defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state officials to deprive the § 1983 plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.

I

Glover was arrested on February 1, 1976, in Del Norte County, Cal. Pet. for Cert. in Glover v. Dolan, O.T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. 3. The State of California extradited Glover to Benton County, Ore., on December 6, 1976. [ Footnote 1 ] Upon arriving in Oregon, Glover immediately filed for habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, seeking, apparently,

Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Sure-Tan Inc. v. NLRB

Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue in this case are several questions arising from the application of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) to an employer’s treatment of its undocumented alien employees. We first determine whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) may properly find that an employer engages in an unfair labor practice by reporting to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) certain employees known to be undocumented aliens in retaliation for their engaging in union activity, thereby causing their immediate departure from the United States. We then address the validity of the Board’s remedial order as modified by the Court of Appeals.

I

Petitioners are two small leather processing firms located in Chicago that, for purposes of the Act, constitute a single integrated employer. In July, 1976, a union organization drive was begun. Eight employees signed cards authorizing the Chicago Leather Workers Union, Local 431, Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (Union), to act as their collective bargaining representative. Of the 11 employees then employed by petitioners, most were Mexican nationals present illegally in the United States without visas or immigration papers authorizing them to work. The Union ultimately prevailed in a Board election conducted on December 10, 1976.

Two hours after the election, petitioners’ president, John Surak, addressed a group of employees, including

Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Minn. Bd. Commun. for Colleges v. Knight

Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The State of Minnesota authorizes its public employees to bargain collectively over terms and conditions of employment. It also requires public employers to engage in official exchanges of views with their professional employees on policy questions relating to employment but outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. If professional employees forming an appropriate bargaining unit have selected an exclusive representative for mandatory bargaining, their employer may exchange views on nonmandatory subjects only with the exclusive representative. The question presented in these cases is whether this restriction on participation in the nonmandatory subject exchange process violates the constitutional rights of professional employees within the bargaining unit who are not members of the exclusive representative and who may disagree with its views. We hold that it does not.

I

A

In 1971, the Minnesota Legislature adopted the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn.Stat. § 179.61 et seq. (1982), to establish “orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and their employees….” § 179.61. The public employers covered by the law are, broadly speaking, the State and its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. § 179.63. In its amended form, as in its original form, PELRA provides for the division of public employees into appropriate bargaining units and establishes a procedure, based

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Michigan v. Long

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police officer the right “to neutralize the threat of physical harm,” id. at 392 U. S. 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent David Long was convicted for possession of marihuana found by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the automobile that he was driving. The police searched the passenger compartment because they had reason to believe that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. We hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We also examine Long’s argument that the decision below rests upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we decide in favor of our jurisdiction.

I

Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. [ Footnote 1 ] The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch.

Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Bell v. New Jersey

Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider both the rights of the Federal Government when a State misuses funds advanced as part of a federal grant-in-aid program under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the manner in which the Government may assert those rights. We hold that the Federal Government may recover misused funds, that the Department of Education may determine administratively the amount of the debt, and that the State may seek judicial review of the agency’s determination.

I

The respondents, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, received grants from the Federal Government under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub.L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V). Title I created a program designed to improve the educational opportunities available to disadvantaged children. § 102, 20 U.S.C. § 2702 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Local educational agencies obtain federal grants through state educational agencies, which in turn obtain grants from the Department of Education [ Footnote 1 ] upon providing assurances to the Secretary that the local educational agencies will spend the funds only on qualifying programs. § 182(a), 20 U.S.C. § 2832(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). [ Footnote 2 ] In auditing New Jersey for the period September 1, 1970, through August, 1973, and Pennsylvania for the period July 1, 1967, through June 30, 1973, to ensure compliance with ESEA and