Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Michigan v. Long

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police officer the right “to neutralize the threat of physical harm,” id. at 392 U. S. 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent David Long was convicted for possession of marihuana found by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the automobile that he was driving. The police searched the passenger compartment because they had reason to believe that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. We hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We also examine Long’s argument that the decision below rests upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we decide in favor of our jurisdiction.

I

Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. [ Footnote 1 ] The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch.

Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Bell v. New Jersey

Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider both the rights of the Federal Government when a State misuses funds advanced as part of a federal grant-in-aid program under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the manner in which the Government may assert those rights. We hold that the Federal Government may recover misused funds, that the Department of Education may determine administratively the amount of the debt, and that the State may seek judicial review of the agency’s determination.

I

The respondents, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, received grants from the Federal Government under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub.L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V). Title I created a program designed to improve the educational opportunities available to disadvantaged children. § 102, 20 U.S.C. § 2702 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Local educational agencies obtain federal grants through state educational agencies, which in turn obtain grants from the Department of Education [ Footnote 1 ] upon providing assurances to the Secretary that the local educational agencies will spend the funds only on qualifying programs. § 182(a), 20 U.S.C. § 2832(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). [ Footnote 2 ] In auditing New Jersey for the period September 1, 1970, through August, 1973, and Pennsylvania for the period July 1, 1967, through June 30, 1973, to ensure compliance with ESEA and

Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan

Kolender v. Lawson

Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal presents a facial challenge to a criminal statute that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a “credible and reliable” identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a stop under the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). [ Footnote 1 ] We conclude that the statute as it has been construed is unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a “credible and reliable” identification. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court below.

I

Appellee Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately 15 occasions between March, 1975, and January, 1977, pursuant to Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 647(e) (West 1970). [ Footnote 2 ] Lawson was prosecuted only twice, and was convicted once. The second charge was dismissed.

Lawson then brought a civil action in the District Court for the Southern District of California seeking a declaratory judgment that § 647(e) is unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction to restrain enforcement of the statute, and compensatory and punitive damages against the various officers who detained him. The District Court found that § 647(e) was overbroad because “a person who is stopped on less than probable cause cannot be punished for failing to identify

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, David Souter, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist

Simon & Schuster Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, David Souter, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. New York’s “Son of Sam” law requires that an accused or convicted criminal’s income from works describing his crime be deposited in an escrow account. These funds are then made available to the victims of the crime and the criminal’s other creditors. We consider whether this statute is consistent with the First Amendment.

I A

In the summer of 1977, New York was terrorized by a serial killer popularly known as the Son of Sam. The hunt for the Son of Sam received considerable publicity, and by the time David Berkowitz was identified as the killer and apprehended, the rights to his story were worth a substantial amount. Berkowitz’s chance to profit from his notoriety while his victims and their families remained uncompensated did not escape the notice of New York’s Legislature. The State quickly enacted the statute at issue, N. Y. Exec. Law § 632-a (McKinney 1982 and Supp. 1991).

The statute was intended to “ensure that monies received by the criminal under such circumstances shall first be made available to recompense the victims of that crime for their loss and suffering.” Assembly Bill Memorandum Re: A 9019, July 22, 1977, reprinted in Legislative Bill Jacket, 1977 N. Y. Laws, ch. 823. As the author of the statute explained:

It is abhorrent to one’s sense of justice and decency that an individual… can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once he is captured-while five people are dead, [and] other people

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist

Touby v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners were convicted of manufacturing and conspiring to manufacture “Euphoria,” a drug temporarily designated as a schedule I controlled substance pursuant to § 201(h) of the Controlled Substances Act, 98 Stat. 2071, 21 U.S.C. § 811(h). We consider whether § 201(h) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General and whether the Attorney General’s subdelegation to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was authorized by statute.

I

In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (Act), 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The Act establishes five categories or “schedules” of controlled substances, the manufacture, possession, and distribution of which the Act regulates or prohibits. Violations involving schedule I substances carry the most severe penalties, as these substances are believed to pose the most serious threat to public safety. Relevant here, § 201(a) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to add or remove substances, or to move a substance from one schedule to another. § 201(a), 21 U.S.C. § 811(a).

When adding a substance to a schedule, the Attorney General must follow specified procedures. First, the Attorney General must request a scientific and medical evaluation from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), together with a recommendation as to whether the substance should be controlled. A substance cannot be scheduled if the Secretary recommends

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist

Michigan v. Lucas

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Because Nolan Lucas failed to give statutorily required notice of his intention to present evidence of an alleged rape victim’s past sexual conduct, a Michigan trial court refused to let him present the evidence at trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, adopting a per se rule that preclusion of evidence of a rape victim’s prior sexual relationship with a criminal defendant violates the Sixth Amendment. We consider the propriety of this per se rule.

I

Like most States, Michigan has a “rape-shield” statute designed to protect victims of rape from being exposed at trial to harassing or irrelevant questions concerning their past sexual behavior. See Mich. Comp.Laws § 750.520j (1979). * This statute prohibits a criminal defendant from introducing at trial evidence of an alleged rape victim’s past sexual conduct, subject to two exceptions. One of the exceptions is relevant here. It permits a defendant to introduce evidence of his own past sexual conduct with the victim, provided that he follows certain procedures. Specifically, a defendant who plans to present such evidence must file a written motion and an offer of proof “within 10 days” after he is arraigned. The trial court may hold “an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible” – i.e., whether the evidence is material and not more prejudicial than probative.

Lucas was charged with two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The State maintained

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist

United States v. R. Enterprises

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*

This case requires the Court to decide what standards apply when a party seeks to avoid compliance with a subpoena duces tecum issued in connection with a grand jury investigation.

I

Since 1986, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia has been investigating allegations of interstate transportation of obscene materials. In early 1988, the grand jury issued a series of subpoenas to three companies -Model Magazine Distributors, Inc. (Model), R. Enterprises, Inc., and MFR Court Street Books, Inc. (MFR). Model is a New York distributor of sexually oriented paperback books, magazines, and videotapes. R. Enterprises, which distributes adult materials, and MFR, which sells books, magazines, and videotapes, are also based in New York. All three companies are wholly owned by Martin Rothstein. The grand jury subpoenas sought a variety of corporate books and records and, in Model’s case, copies of 193 videotapes that Model had shipped to retailers in the Eastern District of Virginia. All three companies moved to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the subpoenas called for production of materials irrelevant to the grand jury’s investigation and that the enforcement of the subpoenas would likely infringe their First Amendment rights.

The District Court, after extensive hearings, denied the motions to quash. As to Model, the court found that the subpoenas for business records were sufficiently specific and that

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, Majority, William Rehnquist

Board of Educ. v. Mergens

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C, concluding that petitioners violated the Equal Access Act by denying official recognition to respondents’ proposed club. Pp.496 U. S. 234-247.

(a) The Act provides, among other things, that a “limited open forum” exists whenever a covered school “grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises.” Its equal access obligation is therefore triggered even if such a school allows only one “noncurriculum related” group to meet. Pp. 496 U. S. 234 -237.

(b) Although the Act does not define the crucial phrase “noncurriculum related student group,” that term is best interpreted in the light of the Act’s language, logic, and nondiscriminatory purpose, and Congress’ intent to provide a low threshold for triggering the Act’s requirements, to mean any student group that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the school. A group directly relates to a school’s curriculum if the group’s subject matter is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered course; if that subject matter concerns the body of courses as a whole; or if participation in the group is required for a particular course or results in academic credit. Whether a specific group is “noncurriculum related” will therefore depend on the particular school’s curriculum, a determination that would be subject to factual findings well

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Port Authority v. Feeney

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case calls upon the Court to determine whether the Eleventh Amendment bars respondents’ suits in federal court against an entity created by New York and New Jersey to operate certain transportation and other facilities.

I

In 1921, New York and New Jersey entered a bi-state compact creating the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. 1921 N.J.Laws, c. 151; 1921 N.Y.Laws, c. 154; see N.J.Stat.Ann. § 32:1-1 et seq. (1963); N.Y.Unconsol.Laws § 6401 et seq. (McKinney 1979). In accord with the Constitution’s Compact Clause, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, Congress consented to the compact. 42 Stat. 174 (1921). Through the compact, the States created the Authority to achieve “a better coordination of the terminal, transportation and other facilities of commerce in, about and through the port of New York,” N.J.Stat.Ann. § 32:1-1 (1963); N.Y. Unconsol.Laws § 6401 (McKinney 1979), and lodged in the Authority

full power and authority to purchase, construct, lease and/or operate any terminal or transportation facility.within [the port] district.

N.J. Stat.Ann. § 32:1-7 (1963); N.Y.Unconsol. Laws § 6407 (McKinney 1979). See generally United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1, 431 U. S. 4 -5 (1977); E. Bard, The Port of New York Authority (1942). The Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (PATH), petitioner in these consolidated cases, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Port Authority that operates an interstate railway

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist

Kaiser Alumium v. Bonjorno

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are called upon in these cases to decide the applicable rate of postjudgment interest and the date from which postjudgment interest should be calculated pursuant to the federal postjudgment interest statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982 ed.) (amended).

I

Respondents (Bonjorno) were the sole stockholders of now defunct Columbia Metal Culvert Co., Inc., which was at one time a fabricator of aluminum drainage pipe in Vineland, New Jersey. Bonjorno brought suit against petitioners (Kaiser) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the theory that Kaiser had monopolized the market for aluminum drainage pipe in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States in violation of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1988).

At the first trial, the District Court entered a directed verdict for Kaiser. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury. Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 37 (1978). On August 21, 1979, a second trial resulted in a jury verdict in respondents’ favor in the trebled amount of $5,445,000. The judgment was entered on August 22, 1979. The District Court held that the evidence did not support the jury’s damages award and granted petitioners’ motion for a new trial as to damages only. 518 F.Supp. 102, 109, 119 (ED Pa.1981). A limited retrial