Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Minn. Bd. Commun. for Colleges v. Knight

Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The State of Minnesota authorizes its public employees to bargain collectively over terms and conditions of employment. It also requires public employers to engage in official exchanges of views with their professional employees on policy questions relating to employment but outside the scope of mandatory bargaining. If professional employees forming an appropriate bargaining unit have selected an exclusive representative for mandatory bargaining, their employer may exchange views on nonmandatory subjects only with the exclusive representative. The question presented in these cases is whether this restriction on participation in the nonmandatory subject exchange process violates the constitutional rights of professional employees within the bargaining unit who are not members of the exclusive representative and who may disagree with its views. We hold that it does not.

I

A

In 1971, the Minnesota Legislature adopted the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn.Stat. § 179.61 et seq. (1982), to establish “orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and their employees….” § 179.61. The public employers covered by the law are, broadly speaking, the State and its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. § 179.63. In its amended form, as in its original form, PELRA provides for the division of public employees into appropriate bargaining units and establishes a procedure, based

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Michigan v. Long

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police officer the right “to neutralize the threat of physical harm,” id. at 392 U. S. 24, when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent David Long was convicted for possession of marihuana found by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the automobile that he was driving. The police searched the passenger compartment because they had reason to believe that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. We hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We also examine Long’s argument that the decision below rests upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we decide in favor of our jurisdiction.

I

Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. [ Footnote 1 ] The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch.

Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Bell v. New Jersey

Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider both the rights of the Federal Government when a State misuses funds advanced as part of a federal grant-in-aid program under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the manner in which the Government may assert those rights. We hold that the Federal Government may recover misused funds, that the Department of Education may determine administratively the amount of the debt, and that the State may seek judicial review of the agency’s determination.

I

The respondents, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, received grants from the Federal Government under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub.L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V). Title I created a program designed to improve the educational opportunities available to disadvantaged children. § 102, 20 U.S.C. § 2702 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Local educational agencies obtain federal grants through state educational agencies, which in turn obtain grants from the Department of Education [ Footnote 1 ] upon providing assurances to the Secretary that the local educational agencies will spend the funds only on qualifying programs. § 182(a), 20 U.S.C. § 2832(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). [ Footnote 2 ] In auditing New Jersey for the period September 1, 1970, through August, 1973, and Pennsylvania for the period July 1, 1967, through June 30, 1973, to ensure compliance with ESEA and

Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan

Kolender v. Lawson

Due Process, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal presents a facial challenge to a criminal statute that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a “credible and reliable” identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a stop under the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). [ Footnote 1 ] We conclude that the statute as it has been construed is unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a “credible and reliable” identification. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court below.

I

Appellee Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately 15 occasions between March, 1975, and January, 1977, pursuant to Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 647(e) (West 1970). [ Footnote 2 ] Lawson was prosecuted only twice, and was convicted once. The second charge was dismissed.

Lawson then brought a civil action in the District Court for the Southern District of California seeking a declaratory judgment that § 647(e) is unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction to restrain enforcement of the statute, and compensatory and punitive damages against the various officers who detained him. The District Court found that § 647(e) was overbroad because “a person who is stopped on less than probable cause cannot be punished for failing to identify

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist

Teague v. Lane

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE KENNEDY join.

In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that the jury venire be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The Court stated, however, that,

in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community, we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition.

Id. at 419 U. S. 538. The principal question presented in this case is whether the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement should now be extended to the petit jury. Because we adopt Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review, we leave the resolution of that question for another day.

I

Petitioner, a black man, was convicted by an all-white Illinois jury of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. During jury selection for petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner’s counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Mesa v. California

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide today whether United States Postal Service employees may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), remove to Federal District Court state criminal prosecutions brought against them for traffic violations committed while on duty.

I

In the summer of 1985, petitioners Kathryn Mesa and Shabbir Ebrahim were employed as mail truck drivers by the United States Postal Service in Santa Clara County, California. In unrelated incidents, the State of California issued criminal complaints against petitioners, charging Mesa with misdemeanor-manslaughter and driving outside a laned roadway after her mail truck collided with and killed a bicyclist, and charging Ebrahim with speeding and failure to yield after his mail truck collided with a police car. Mesa and Ebrahim were arraigned in the San Jose Municipal Court of Santa Clara County on September 16 and October 2, 1985, respectively. The Municipal Court set a pretrial conference in Mesa’s case for November 4, 1985, and set trial for Ebrahim on November 7, 1985.

On September 24 and October 4, 1985, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California filed petitions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California for removal to that court of the criminal complaints brought against Ebrahim and Mesa. The petitions alleged that the complaints should properly be removed to the Federal District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) because

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, Civil Rights, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Timeline, William Rehnquist

City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, Civil Rights, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Timeline, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-B, and IV, an opinion with respect to Part II, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice WHITE join, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A and V, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and Justice KENNEDY join.

In this case, we confront once again the tension between the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal treatment to all citizens, and the use of race-based measures to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination on the opportunities enjoyed by members of minority groups in our society. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980), we held that a congressional program requiring that 10% of certain federal construction grants be awarded to minority contractors did not violate the equal protection principles embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Relying largely on our decision in Fullilove, some lower federal courts have applied a similar standard of review in assessing the constitutionality of state and local minority set-aside provisions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g. South Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846 (CA11), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871, 105 S.Ct. 220, 83 L.Ed.2d 150 (1984); Ohio Contractors Assn. v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (CA6 1983). Since our decision two Terms ago in Wygant

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR, delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and III, concluding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to a subjective or discretionary promotion system. Pp.487 U. S. 985-991,487 U. S. 999-1000.

(a) Each of this Court’s decisions applying disparate impact analysis -under which facially neutral employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to illegal intentional discrimination -involved standardized tests or criteria, such as written aptitude tests or high school diploma requirements, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, and the Court has consistently used disparate treatment theory, in which proof of intent to discriminate is required, to review hiring or promotion decisions that were based on the exercise of personal judgment or the application of subjective criteria, see, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792. Until today, the Court has never addressed the question whether disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment criteria. Pp. 487 U. S. 985 -989.

(b) The reasons supporting the use of disparate impact analysis apply to subjective employment practices. That analysis might effectively be abolished if it were confined to objective, standardized selection practices, since an employer could insulate itself from liability under Griggs and its progeny simply by combining such practices with a subjective

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the propriety of an injunction entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The injunction prohibited specified parties from litigating a certain matter in the Texas state courts. We must determine whether this injunction is permissible under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which generally bars federal courts from granting injunctions to stay proceedings in state courts.

I

In 1977, Leong Chong, a resident of the Republic of Singapore, was accidentally killed in that country while performing repair work on a ship owned by respondent Esso Tankers, Inc., a subsidiary of respondent Exxon Corporation. Petitioner Chick Kam Choo, also a resident of Singapore, is Chong’s widow. * In 1978, she brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, presenting claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. § 761, the general maritime law of the United States, App. 4, and the Texas Wrongful Death Statute, Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 71.001-71.031 (1986).

Respondents moved for summary judgment on the Jones Act and DOHSA claims, arguing that Chong was not a seaman, which rendered the Jones Act inapplicable, and that Chong had not died on the “high seas,” but while the ship was in port, which rendered the DOHSA inapplicable. App. 9-10. Respondents also moved for summary judgment on the claim

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Due Process, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan

Tulsa Prof. Collection Svcs. v. Pope

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Due Process, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves a provision of Oklahoma’s probate laws requiring claims “arising upon a contract” generally to be presented to the executor or executrix of the estate within two months of the publication of a notice advising creditors of the commencement of probate proceedings. Okla.Stat., Tit. 58, § 333 (1981). The question presented is whether this provision of notice solely by publication satisfies the Due Process Clause.

I

Oklahoma’s Probate Code requires creditors to file claims against an estate within a specified time period, and generally bars untimely claims. Ibid. Such “nonclaim statutes” are almost universally included in state probate codes. See Uniform Probate Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); Falender, Notice to Creditors in Estate Proceedings: What Process is Due?, 63 N. C.L.Rev. 659, 667-668 (1985). Giving creditors a limited time in which to file claims against the estate serves the State’s interest in facilitating the administration and expeditious closing of estates. See, e.g., State ex rel. Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital v. Reed, 493 P.2d 815, 818 (Okla.1972). Nonclaim statutes come in two basic forms. Some provide a relatively short time period, generally two to six months, that begins to run after the commencement of probate proceedings. Others call for a longer period, generally one to five years, that runs from the decedent’s death. See Falender, supra, at 664-672. Most States include