Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Tafflin v. Levitt

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil actions brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.

I

The underlying litigation arises from the failure of Old Court Savings & Loan, Inc. (Old Court), a Maryland savings and loan association, and the attendant collapse of the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corp. (MSSIC), a state-chartered nonprofit corporation created to insure accounts in Maryland savings and loan associations that were not federally insured. See Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1181-1183 (CA4 1988) (reviewing history of Maryland’s savings and loan crisis). Petitioners are nonresidents of Maryland who hold unpaid certificates of deposit issued by Old Court. Respondents are the former officers and directors of Old Court, the former officers and directors of MSSIC, the law firm of Old Court and MSSIC, the accounting firm of Old Court, and the State of Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund Corp., the state-created successor to MSSIC. Petitioners allege various state law causes of action as well as claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., and RICO.

The District Court granted respondents’ motions to dismiss, concluding that petitioners had failed to state a claim under the Exchange Act and that, because

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist

FW/PBS v. City of Dallas

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part II, in which Justice STEVENS and Justice KENNEDY join.

These cases call upon us to decide whether a licensing scheme in a comprehensive city ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses is a prior restraint that fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards as required by Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965). We must also decide whether any petitioner has standing to address the ordinance’s civil disability provisions, whether the city has sufficiently justified its requirement that motels renting rooms for less than 10 hours be covered by the ordinance, and whether the ordinance impermissibly infringes on the right to freedom of association. As this litigation comes to us, no issue is presented with respect to whether the books, videos, materials, or entertainment available through sexually oriented businesses are obscene pornographic materials.

I

On June 18, 1986, the city council of the city of Dallas unanimously adopted an ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses, which was aimed at eradicating the secondary effects of crime and urban blight. The ordinance defines a “sexually oriented business,” as

an adult arcade, adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel, adult motion picture theater, adult theater, escort agency, nude model studio, or sexual encounter center.

Dalla

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Penry v. Lynaugh

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-C.

In this case, we must decide whether petitioner, Johnny Paul Penry, was sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the jury was not instructed that it could consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence in imposing its sentence. We must also decide whether the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits Penry’s execution because he is mentally retarded.

I

On the morning of October 25, 1979, Pamela Carpenter was brutally raped, beaten, and stabbed with a pair of scissors in her home in Livingston, Texas. She died a few hours later in the course of emergency treatment. Before she died, she described her assailant. Her description led two local sheriff’s deputies to suspect Penry, who had recently been released on parole after conviction on another rape charge. Penry subsequently gave two statements confessing to the crime, and was charged with capital murder.

At a competency hearing held before trial, a clinical psychologist, Dr. Jerome Brown, testified that Penry was mentally retarded. As a child, Penry was diagnosed as having organic brain damage, which was probably caused by trauma to the brain at birth. App. 34-35. Penry was tested over the years as having an IQ between 50 and 63, which indicates mild to moderate retardation. [ Footnote 1 ] Id. at 36-38, 55. Dr. Brown’s own testing before the trial indicated that Penry had an IQ of 54. Dr. Brown’s evaluation also revealed

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Majority, William Rehnquist

Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part II, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE KENNEDY join.

The questions before us in these cases are whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides an independent federal cause of action for damages against local governmental entities, and whether that cause of action is broader than the damages remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such that a municipality may be held liable for its employees’ violations of § 1981 under a theory of respondeat superior.

I

Petitioner Norman Jett, a white male, was employed by respondent Dallas Independent School District (DISD) as a teacher, athletic director, and head football coach at South Oak Cliff High School (South Oak) until his reassignment to another DISD school in 1983. Petitioner was hired by the DISD in 1957, was assigned to assistant coaching duties at South Oak in 1962, and was promoted to athletic director and head football coach of South Oak in 1970. During petitioner’s lengthy tenure at South Oak, the racial composition of the school changed from predominantly white to predominantly black. In 1975, the DISD assigned Dr. Fredrick Todd, a black, as principal of South Oak. Petitioner and Todd clashed repeatedly over school policies, and in particular over petitioner’s handling of the school’s football program. These conflicts came to a head following a November

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Coit Indep. Jt. Venture v. FSLIC

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether Congress granted the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), as receiver, the exclusive authority to adjudicate the state law claims asserted against a failed savings and loan association. We hold that Congress did not grant FSLIC such power, and that the creditors of a failed savings and loan association are entitled to de novo consideration of their claims in court. We also hold that creditors are not required to exhaust FSLIC’s current administrative claims procedure before filing suit, because the lack of a clear time limit on FSLIC’s consideration of claims renders the administrative procedure inadequate.

I

From 1983 to 1986, Coit Independence Joint Venture (Coit), a real estate concern, borrowed money from FirstSouth, F.A. a federal savings and loan association. Subsequent disagreements led Coit to file suit against FirstSouth in October, 1986, in the 95th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. In its state court complaint, Coit alleged that it had received two loans of $20 million and $30 million to purchase two parcels of undeveloped land. Coit alleged that FirstSouth had required it to pay a “profit participation” interest in any profits derived from sale of the property as a condition of receiving the loans. Coit asserted that this “profit participation” fee was interest that, when added to the regular accrued interest rate, made the loans usurious

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist

Teague v. Lane

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE KENNEDY join.

In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that the jury venire be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The Court stated, however, that,

in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community, we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition.

Id. at 419 U. S. 538. The principal question presented in this case is whether the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement should now be extended to the petit jury. Because we adopt Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review, we leave the resolution of that question for another day.

I

Petitioner, a black man, was convicted by an all-white Illinois jury of three counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. During jury selection for petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner’s counsel used one of his 10 peremptory challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Mesa v. California

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide today whether United States Postal Service employees may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), remove to Federal District Court state criminal prosecutions brought against them for traffic violations committed while on duty.

I

In the summer of 1985, petitioners Kathryn Mesa and Shabbir Ebrahim were employed as mail truck drivers by the United States Postal Service in Santa Clara County, California. In unrelated incidents, the State of California issued criminal complaints against petitioners, charging Mesa with misdemeanor-manslaughter and driving outside a laned roadway after her mail truck collided with and killed a bicyclist, and charging Ebrahim with speeding and failure to yield after his mail truck collided with a police car. Mesa and Ebrahim were arraigned in the San Jose Municipal Court of Santa Clara County on September 16 and October 2, 1985, respectively. The Municipal Court set a pretrial conference in Mesa’s case for November 4, 1985, and set trial for Ebrahim on November 7, 1985.

On September 24 and October 4, 1985, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California filed petitions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California for removal to that court of the criminal complaints brought against Ebrahim and Mesa. The petitions alleged that the complaints should properly be removed to the Federal District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) because

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, Civil Rights, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Timeline, William Rehnquist

City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, Civil Rights, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Timeline, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-B, and IV, an opinion with respect to Part II, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice WHITE join, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A and V, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and Justice KENNEDY join.

In this case, we confront once again the tension between the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal treatment to all citizens, and the use of race-based measures to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination on the opportunities enjoyed by members of minority groups in our society. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980), we held that a congressional program requiring that 10% of certain federal construction grants be awarded to minority contractors did not violate the equal protection principles embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Relying largely on our decision in Fullilove, some lower federal courts have applied a similar standard of review in assessing the constitutionality of state and local minority set-aside provisions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g. South Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846 (CA11), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871, 105 S.Ct. 220, 83 L.Ed.2d 150 (1984); Ohio Contractors Assn. v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (CA6 1983). Since our decision two Terms ago in Wygant

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR, delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and III, concluding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to a subjective or discretionary promotion system. Pp.487 U. S. 985-991,487 U. S. 999-1000.

(a) Each of this Court’s decisions applying disparate impact analysis -under which facially neutral employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to illegal intentional discrimination -involved standardized tests or criteria, such as written aptitude tests or high school diploma requirements, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, and the Court has consistently used disparate treatment theory, in which proof of intent to discriminate is required, to review hiring or promotion decisions that were based on the exercise of personal judgment or the application of subjective criteria, see, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792. Until today, the Court has never addressed the question whether disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment criteria. Pp. 487 U. S. 985 -989.

(b) The reasons supporting the use of disparate impact analysis apply to subjective employment practices. That analysis might effectively be abolished if it were confined to objective, standardized selection practices, since an employer could insulate itself from liability under Griggs and its progeny simply by combining such practices with a subjective

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist

Schweiker v. Chilicky

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide whether the improper denial of Social Security disability benefits, allegedly resulting from violations of due process by government officials who administered the Federal Social Security program, may give rise to a cause of action for money damages against those officials. We conclude that such a remedy, not having been included in the elaborate remedial scheme devised by Congress, is unavailable.

I

A

Under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), the Federal Government provides disability benefits to individuals who have contributed to the Social Security program and who, because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, are unable to engage in substantial gainful work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). A very similar program for disabled indigents is operated under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), but those provisions are technically not at issue in this case. Title II, which is administered in conjunction with state welfare agencies, provides benefits only while an individual’s statutory disability persists. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 421(a), 423(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). In 1980, Congress noted that existing administrative procedures provided for reexamination of eligibility “only under a limited number of circumstances.” H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 96-944, p. 60 (1980); see also S.Rep. No. 96-408, pp. 60-61 (1979). Congress