Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist

California v. Superior Court

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue in this case are the limits imposed by federal law upon state court habeas corpus proceedings challenging an extradition warrant.

I

Richard and Judith Smolin were divorced in California in 1978. Sole custody of their two children, Jennifer and Jamie, was awarded to Judith Smolin, subject to reasonable visitation rights for Richard. Until November, 1979, all the parties remained in San Bernardino County, California, and Richard apparently paid his child support and exercised his visitation rights without serious incident. In August, 1979, however, Judith married James Pope, and in November, Mr. Pope’s work required that the family relocate to Oregon. When the Popes moved without informing Richard, the battle over the custody of the minor children began in earnest.

It is unnecessary to recite in detail all that ensued. Richard alleged, and the California courts later found, that the Popes deliberately attempted to defeat Richard’s visitation rights and to preclude him from forming a meaningful relationship with his children in the course of their succeeding relocations from Oregon to Texas to Louisiana. On February 13, 1981, the Popes obtained a decree from a Texas court granting full faith and credit to the original California order awarding sole custody to Judith. Richard was served, but did not appear in the Texas proceeding. Before the Texas decree was issued, however, Richard sought and obtained in California

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

California v. Ramos

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to consider the constitutionality under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of instructing a capital sentencing jury regarding the Governor’s power to commute a sentence of life without possibility of parole. Finding no constitutional defect in the instruction, we reverse the decision of the Supreme Court of California and remand for further proceedings.

I

On the night of June 2, 1979, respondent Marcelino Ramos participated in the robbery of a fast-food restaurant where he was employed as a janitor. As respondent’s codefendant placed a food order, respondent entered the restaurant, went behind the front counter into the work area, ostensibly for the purpose of checking his work schedule, and emerged with a gun. Respondent directed the two employees working that night into the restaurant’s walk-in refrigerator and ordered them to face the back wall. Respondent entered and emerged from the refrigerator several times, inquiring at one point about the keys to the restaurant safe. When he entered for the last time, he instructed the two employees to kneel on the floor of the refrigerator, to remove their hats, and to pray. Respondent struck both on the head and then shot them, wounding one and killing the other.

Respondent was charged with robbery, attempted murder, and first-degree murder. Defense counsel presented no evidence at the guilt phase of respondent’s trial, and the jury returned a verdict

Byron White, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

California v. Grace Brethren Church

Byron White, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The principal question presented by the parties to these appeals is whether certain state and federal statutes violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment [ Footnote 1 ] by requiring religious schools unaffiliated with any church to pay unemployment insurance taxes. We do not reach this substantive question, however, holding instead that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, [ Footnote 2 ] deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to hear these challenges. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below.

I

Last Term, in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U. S. 772 (1981), this Court considered statutory and constitutional challenges to provisions of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Because the present claims involve the same provisions that we interpreted in St. Martin, we recount only briefly the substance and legislative history of the relevant statutes before turning to the facts in the present cases.

A

In FUTA, [ Footnote 3 ] Congress has authorized a cooperative federal-state scheme to provide benefits to unemployed workers. The Act requires employers to pay an excise tax on wages paid to employees in “covered” employment, [ Footnote 4 ] but entitles them to a credit of up to 90% of the federal tax for contributions they have paid into federally approved state unemployment compensation programs. [ Footnote

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

California v. FERC

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns overlapping federal and state regulation of a hydroelectric project located near a California stream. California seeks to ensure that the project’s operators maintain water flowing in the stream sufficient, in the State’s judgment, to protect the stream’s fish. The Federal Government claims the exclusive authority to set the minimum stream flows that the federally licensed power plant must maintain. Each side argues that its position is consistent with the Federal Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. (1982 ed.), and, in particular, with § 27 of that Act. We granted certiorari to resolve these competing claims.

I

The Rock Creek hydroelectric project lies near the confluence of the South Fork American River and one of the river’s tributaries, Rock Creek. Rock Creek runs through federally managed land located within California. The project draws water from Rock Creek to drive its generators and then releases the water near the confluence of the stream and river, slightly less than one mile from where it is drawn. The state and federal requirements at issue govern the “minimum flow rate” of water that must remain in the bypassed section of the stream and that thus remains unavailable to drive the generators.

In 1983, pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA or Act), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a license authorizing the operation of the Rock Creek

Civil Rights, Concurrence

Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa

Civil Rights, Concurrence / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion. In my view, prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the evidentiary rule we developed to shift the burden of persuasion in mixed-motive cases was appropriately applied only where a disparate treatment plaintiff “demonstrated by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role” in an adverse employment decision. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 275 (1989) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). This showing triggered “the deterrent purpose of the statute” and permitted a reasonable factfinder to conclude that “absent further explanation, the employer’s discriminatory motivation ’caused’ the employment decision.” Id., at 265.

As the Court’s opinion explains, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified a new evidentiary rule for mixedmotive cases arising under Title VII. Ante, at 98-10l. I therefore agree with the Court that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury.

Criminal Procedure, Dissent

Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch

Criminal Procedure, Dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.

In an attempt to save their ranch from creditors, the extended Kurth family turned to marijuana farming. “The business expanded to the largest marijuana growing operation in the State of Montana when shut down by law enforcement authorities in October, 1987.” In re Kurth Ranch, 145 B. R. 61, 66 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mont. 1990). The Kurths were convicted and sentenced on various state drug charges.

During the raid on the ranch, authorities found 1,811 ounces of harvested marijuana in the Kurths’ possession. Under Montana law, “[t]here is a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs,” and “each person possessing or storing dangerous drugs is liable for the tax.” Mont. Code Ann. § 15-25-111(1) (1987). In the case of marijuana, the tax is 10 percent of the market value of the drugs or $100 per ounce, whichever is greater. § 15-25-111(2). Pursuant to this law, the Montana Department of Revenue assessed a tax of $181,000 against the Kurths. The Kurths argue, and the courts below agreed, that this tax is a second punishment prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U. S. 222, 229 (1994) (the Clause “‘protects against multiple punishments for the same offense,'” quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969)).

The government may, of course, tax illegal activity. See, e. g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39, 44 (1968). In fact, we have upheld, as within Congress’ taxing authority, a $100 per ounce tax on

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Privacy, William Rehnquist

Department of Justice v. Landano

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Privacy, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Exemption 7(D) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (FOIA), exempts from disclosure agency records “compiled for law enforcement purposes… by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation” if release of those records “could reasonably be expected to disclose” the identity of, or information provided by, a “confidential source.” § 552(b)(7)(D). This case concerns the evidentiary showing that the Government must make to establish that a source is “confidential” within the meaning of Exemption 7(D). We are asked to decide whether the Government is entitled to a presumption that all sources supplying information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or Bureau) in the course of a criminal investigation are confidential sources.

I

Respondent Vincent Landano was convicted in New Jersey state court for murdering Newark, New Jersey, police officer John Snow in the course of a robbery. The crime received considerable media attention. Evidence at trial showed that the robbery had been orchestrated by Victor Forni and a motorcycle gang known as “the Breed.” There was testimony that Landano, though not a Breed member, had been recruited for the job. Landano always has maintained that he did not participate in the robbery and that Forni, not he, killed Officer Snow. He contends that the prosecution withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83

Byron White, Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

Coy v. Iowa

Byron White, Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, concurring.

I agree with the Court that appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated in this case. I write separately only to note my view that those rights are not absolute, but rather may give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests so as to permit the use of certain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from the trauma of courtroom testimony.

Child abuse is a problem of disturbing proportions in today’s society. Just last Term, we recognized that

[c]hild abuse is one of the most difficult problems to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim.

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39, 480 U. S. 60 (1987). Once an instance of abuse is identified and prosecution undertaken, new difficulties arise. Many States have determined that a child victim may suffer trauma from exposure to the harsh atmosphere of the typical courtroom, and have undertaken to shield the child through a variety of ameliorative measures. We deal today with the constitutional ramifications of only one such measure, but we do so against a broader backdrop. Iowa appears to be the only State authorizing the type of screen used in this case. See generally App. to Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 1a-9a (collecting statutes). A full half of the States, however, have authorized the use of oneor twoway closed-circuit television. Statutes sanctioning

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, Federal Taxation, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Commissioner v. Lundy

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, David Souter, Federal Taxation, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we consider the “look-back” period for obtaining a refund of overpaid taxes in the United States Tax Court under 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B), and decide whether the Tax Court can award a refund of taxes paid more than two years prior to the date on which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, when, on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed, the taxpayer had not yet filed a return. We hold that in these circumstances the 2-year look-back period set forth in § 6512(b)(3)(B) applies, and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund.

I

During 1987, respondent Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than the $6,594 the Lundys actually owed in taxes for that year, but the Lundys did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the succeeding 21/2 years. On September 26, 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency, informing him that he owed $7,672 in additional taxes and interest for 1987 and that he was liable for substantial penalties for delinquent filing and negligent underpayment of taxes. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6651(a)(1) and 6653(1).

Lundy and his wife mailed their joint tax return for 1987 to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on December 22, 1990. This return indicated

Clarence Thomas, Concurrence, David Souter, Federal Taxation

Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert

Clarence Thomas, Concurrence, David Souter, Federal Taxation / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment.

Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends.

Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, 522 (1923) (McReynolds, J., concurring). In cases like the one before us today, they can be complete strangers. That our tax laws can at times be in such disarray is a discomforting thought. I can understand why the plurality attempts to extrapolate a generalized estate tax valuation theory from one regulation and then to apply that theory to resolve this case, perhaps with the hope of making sense out of the applicable law. But where the applicability-not to mention the validity-of that theory is far from clear, the temptation to make order out of chaos at any cost should be resisted, especially when the question presented can be resolved-albeit imperfectlyby reference to more directly applicable sources. While JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE BREYER, and I agree on this point, we disagree on the result ultimately dictated by these sources. I therefore write separately to explain why in my view the plurality’s result, though not its reasoning, is correct.

I

When a citizen or resident of the United States dies, the Federal Government imposes a tax on “all [of his] property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated.” 26 U. S. C. §§ 2001(a), 2031(a). Specifically excluded from taxation, however, is certain property devised to the decedent’s spouse or to charity. Such testamenta