JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the Commerce Clause supported Congress' enactment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (PURPA). I disagree, however, with much of the Court's Tenth Amendment analysis. Titles I and III of PURPA conscript state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic army. This result is contrary to the principles of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), antithetical to the values of federalism, and inconsistent with our constitutional history. Accordingly, I dissent from Parts 456 U. S. S. 770|>IV-C of the Court's opinion. [ Footnote 3/1 ]
I
Titles I and III of PURPA require state regulatory agencies to decide whether to adopt a dozen federal standards governing gas and electric utilities. [ Footnote 3/2 ] The statute describes, in some detail, the procedures state authorities must follow when evaluating these standards, [ Footnote 3/3 ] but does not compel the States to adopt the suggested federal standards. 15 U.S.C. § 3203(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV); 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621 (a), 2623(a), 2627(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The latter, deceptively generous feature of PURPA persuades the Court that the statute does not intrude impermissibly into state sovereign functions. The Court's conclusion, however, rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the role that state governments play in our federalist system.
State legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of the national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks to which Congress may assign problems for extended study. Instead, each State is sovereign within its own domain, governing its citizens and providing for their general welfare. While the Constitution and federal statutes define the boundaries of that domain, they do not harness state power for national purposes. The Constitution contemplates "an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States," a system in which both the State and National Governments retain a "separate and independent existence." Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 74 U. S. 725 (1869); Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 74 U. S. 76 (1869).
Adhering to these principles, the Court has recognized that the Tenth Amendment restrains congressional action that would impair "a state's ability to function as a state." Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 455 U. S. 686 (1982); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 842 -852; Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 421 U. S. 547, n. 7 (1975). See also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 435 U. S. 423 -424 (1978) (BURGER, C.J., concurring in judgment). For example, in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, the Court held that Congress could not prescribe the minimum wages and maximum hours of state employees engaged in "traditional governmental functions," id. at 426 U. S. 852, because the power to set those wages and hours is an "attribute of state sovereignty" that is " essential to [a] separate and independent existence.'" Id. at 426 U. S. 845 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, supra, at 74 U. S. 76 ).
Just last Term, this Court identified three separate inquiries underlying the result in National League of Cities. A congressional enactment violates the Tenth Amendment, we observed, if it regulates the " states as States,'" addresses "matters that are indisputably `attribute[s] of state sovereignty,'" and "directly impair[s] [the States'] ability to `structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.'" Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 452 U. S. 287 -288 (1981) (quoting National League of Cities, supra, at 426 U. S. 854, 426 U. S. 845, 426 U. S. 852 ). See also Transportation Union, supra, at 455 U. S. 684. [ Footnote 3/4 ]
Application of these principles to the present case reveals the Tenth Amendment defects in Titles I and III. Plainly those Titles regulate the "States as States." While the statute's ultimate aim may be the regulation of private utility companies, PURPA addresses its commands solely to the States. Instead of requesting private utility companies to adopt lifeline rates, declining block rates, or the other PURPA standards, Congress directed state agencies to appraise the appropriateness of those standards. It is difficult to argue that a statute structuring the regulatory agenda of a state agency is not a regulation of the "State."
I find it equally clear that Titles I and III address "attribute[s] of state sovereignty." Even the Court recognizes that "the power to make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature." Ante at 456 U. S. 761. The power to make decisions and set policy, however, embraces more than the ultimate authority to enact laws; it also includes the power to decide which proposals are most worthy of consideration, the order in which they should be taken up, and the precise form in which they should be debated. PURPA intrudes upon all of these functions. It chooses 12 proposals, forcing their consideration even if the state agency deems other ideas more worthy of immediate attention. In addition, PURPA hinders the agency's ability to schedule consideration of the federal standards. [ Footnote 3/5 ] Finally, PURPA specifies, with exacting detail, the content of the standards that will absorb the agency's time. [ Footnote 3/6 ]
If Congress routinely required the state legislatures to debate bills drafted by congressional committees, it could hardly be questioned that the practice would affect an attribute of state sovereignty. PURPA, which sets the agendas of agencies exercising delegated legislative power in a specific field, has a similarly intrusive effect.
Finally, PURPA directly impairs the States' ability to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Utility regulation is a traditional function of state government, [ Footnote 3/7 ] and the regulatory commission is the most integral part of that function. By taxing the limited resources of these commissions, and decreasing their ability to address local regulatory ills, PURPA directly impairs the power of state utility commissions to discharge their traditional functions efficiently and effectively. [ Footnote 3/8 ]
The Court sidesteps this analysis, suggesting that the States may escape PURPA simply by ceasing regulation of public utilities. Even the Court recognizes that this choice "may be a difficult one," ante at 456 U. S. 766, and that "it may be unlikely that the States will or easily can abandon regulation of public utilities to avoid PURPA's requirements." Ante at 456 U. S. 767. In fact, the Court's "choice" is an absurdity, for if its analysis is sound, the Constitution no longer limits federal regulation of state governments. Under the Court's analysis, for example, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), would have been wrongly decided, because the States could have avoided the Fair Labor Standards Act by "choosing" to fire all employees subject to that Act and to close those branches of state government. [ Footnote 3/9 ] Similarly, Congress could dictate the agendas and meeting places of state legislatures, because unwilling States would remain free to abolish their legislative bodies. [ Footnote 3/10 ] I do not agree that this dismemberment of state government is the correct solution to a Tenth Amendment challenge.
The choice put to the States by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 447, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV), the federal statute upheld in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981), and discussed by the Court, ante at 456 U. S. 764 -765, 456 U. S. 768, n. 30, is quite different from the decision PURPA mandates. The Surface Mining Act invites the States to submit proposed surface mining regulations to the Secretary of the Interior. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). If the Secretary approves a state regulatory program, then the State enforces that program. If a State chooses not to submit a program, the Secretary develops and implements a program for that State. § 1254. Even States in the latter category, however, may supplement the Secretary's program with consistent state laws. [ Footnote 3/11 ] The Surface Mining Act does not force States to choose between performing tasks set by Congress and abandoning all mining or land use regulation. That statute is "a program of cooperative federalism," Hodel, supra, at 452 U. S. 289, because it allows the States to choose either to work with Congress in pursuit of federal surface mining goals or to devote their legislative resources to other mining and land use problems. By contrast, there is nothing "cooperative" about a federal program that compels state agencies either to function as bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government or to abandon regulation of an entire field traditionally reserved to state authority. [ Footnote 3/12 ] Yet this is the "choice" the Court today forces upon the States.
The Court defends its novel decision to permit federal conscription of state legislative power by citing three cases upholding statutes that, "in effect, directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions." Ante at 456 U. S. 762. Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), is the most suggestive of these decisions. [ Footnote 3/13 ] In Testa, the Court held that state trial courts may not refuse to hear a federal claim if "th[e] same type of claim arising under [state] law would be enforced by that State's courts." Id. at 330 U. S. 394. A facile reading of Testa might suggest that state legislatures must also entertain congressionally sponsored business, as long as the federal duties are similar to existing state obligations. Application of Testa to legislative power, however, vastly expands the scope of that decision. Because trial courts of general jurisdiction do not choose the cases that they hear, the requirement that they evenhandedly adjudicate state and federal claims falling within their jurisdiction does not infringe any sovereign authority to set an agenda. [ Footnote 3/14 ] As explained above, however, the power to choose subjects for legislation is a fundamental attribute of legislative power, and interference with this power unavoidably undermines state sovereignty. Accordingly, the existence of a congressional authority to "enlist… the [state] judiciary… to further federal ends," ante at 456 U. S. 762, does not imply an equivalent power to impress state legislative bodies into federal service:
The Court, finally, reasons that, because Congress could have preempted the entire field of intrastate utility regulation, the Constitution should not forbid PURPA's "less intrusive scheme." Ante at 456 U. S. 765, and n. 29. [ Footnote 3/15 ] The Court's evaluation of intrusiveness, however, is simply irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. The Constitution permits Congress to govern only through certain channels. If the Tenth Amendment principles articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981), foreclose PURPA's approach, it is no answer to argue that Congress could have reached the same destination by a different route. This Court's task is to enforce constitutional limits on congressional power, not to decide whether alternative courses would better serve state and federal interests. [ Footnote 3/16 ] I do not believe, moreover, that Titles I and III of PURPA are less intrusive than preemption. [ Footnote 3/17 ] When Congress preempts a field, it precludes only state legislation that conflicts with the national approach. The States usually retain the power to complement congressional legislation, either by regulating details unsupervised by Congress or by imposing requirements that go beyond the national threshold. [ Footnote 3/18 ] Most importantly, after Congress preempts a field, the States may simply devote their resources elsewhere. This country does not lack for problems demanding legislative attention. PURPA, however, drains the inventive energy of state governmental bodies by requiring them to weigh its detailed standards, enter written findings, and defend their determinations in state court. While engaged in these congressionally mandated tasks, state utility commissions are less able to pursue local proposals for conserving gas and electric power. The States might well prefer that Congress simply impose the standards described in PURPA; this, at least, would leave them free to exercise their power in other areas.
Federal preemption is less intrusive than PURPA's approach for a second reason. Local citizens hold their utility commissions accountable for the choices they make. Citizens, moreover, understand that legislative authority usually includes the power to decide which ideas to debate, as well as which policies to adopt. Congressional compulsion of state agencies, unlike preemption, blurs the lines of political accountability, and leaves citizens feeling that their representatives are no longer responsive to local needs. [ Footnote 3/19 ]
The foregoing remarks suggest that, far from approving a minimally intrusive form of federal regulation, the Court's decision undermines the most valuable aspects of our federalism. Courts and commentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas. [ Footnote 3/20 ] This state innovation is no judicial myth. When Wyoming became a State in 1890, it was the only State permitting women to vote. [ Footnote 3/21 ] That novel idea did not bear national fruit for another 30 years. [ Footnote 3/22 ] Wisconsin pioneered unemployment insurance, [ Footnote 3/23 ] while Massachusetts initiated minimum wage laws for women and minors. [ Footnote 3/24 ] After decades of academic debate, state experimentation finally provided an opportunity to observe no-fault automobile insurance in operation. [ Footnote 3/25 ] Even in the field of environmental protection, an area subject to heavy federal regulation, the States have supplemented national standards with innovative and far-reaching statutes. [ Footnote 3/26 ] Utility regulation itself is a field marked by valuable state invention. [ Footnote 3/27 ] PURPA, which commands state agencies to spend their time evaluating federally proposed standards and defending their decisions to adopt or reject those standards, will retard this creative experimentation.
In addition to promoting experimentation, federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative government. Alexis de Tocqueville understood well that participation in local government is a cornerstone of American democracy:
It is incontestably true that the love and the habits of republican government in the United States were engendered in the townships and in the provincial assemblies. [I]t is this same republican spirit, it is these manners and customs of a free people, which are engendered and nurtured in the different States, to be afterwards applied to the country at large.
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 181 (H. Reeve trans.1961). [ Footnote 3/28 ] Citizens, however, cannot learn the lessons of self-government if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals formulated by a faraway national legislature. If we want to preserve the ability of citizens to learn democratic processes through participation in local government, citizens must retain the power to govern, not merely administer, their local problems.
Finally, our federal system provides a salutary check on governmental power. As Justice Harlan once explained, our ancestors "were suspicious of every form of all-powerful central authority." Harlan, supra, n. 16, at 944. To curb this evil, they both allocated governmental power between state and national authorities and divided the national power among three branches of government. Unless we zealously protect these distinctions, we risk upsetting the balance of power that buttresses our basic liberties. In analyzing this brake on governmental power, Justice Harlan noted that
[t]he diffusion of power between federal and state authority… takes on added significance as the size of the federal bureaucracy continues to grow.
Ibid. [ Footnote 3/29 ] Today, the Court disregards this warning and permits Congress to kidnap state utility commissions into the national regulatory family. Whatever the merits of our national energy legislation, I am not ready to surrender this state legislative power to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
II
As explained above, the Court's decision to uphold Titles I and III violates the principles of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), and threatens the values promoted by our federal system. The Court's result, moreover, is at odds with our constitutional history, which demonstrates that the Framers consciously rejected a system in which the National Legislature would employ state legislative power to achieve national ends.
The principal defect of the Articles of Confederation, 18th-century writers agreed, was that the new National Government lacked the power to compel individual action. Instead, the central government had to rely upon the cooperation of state legislatures to achieve national goals. Thus, Alexander Hamilton explained that
[t]he great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation for states or governments, in their corporate or collective capacities and as contradistinguished from the individuals of whom they consist.
The Federalist No. 15, p. 93 (J. Cooke ed.1961) (emphasis omitted). He pointed out, for example, that the National Government had "an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money," but "no authority to raise either by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America." Ibid.
The Constitution cured this defect by permitting direct contact between the National Government and the individual citizen, a change repeatedly acknowledged by the delegates assembled in Philadelphia. George Mason, for example, declared:
Under the existing Confederacy, Congress represent[s] the States, not the people of the States: their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals. The case will be changed in the new plan of Government.
The speeches and writings of the Framers suggest why they adopted this means of strengthening the National Government. Mason, for example, told the Convention that, because "punishment could not [in the nature of things be executed on] the States collectively," he advocated a National Government that would "directly operate on individuals." 1 Farrand 34. Hamilton predicted that a National Government forced to work through the States would "degenerate into a military despotism" because it would have to maintain a "large army, continually on foot" to enforce its will against the States. The Federalist No. 16, p. 101 (J. Cooke ed.1961). See also id. at 102; The Federalist No. 15, supra, at 95-96.
Thus, the Framers concluded that government by one sovereign through the agency of a second cannot be satisfactory. At one extreme, as under the Articles of Confederation, such a system is simply ineffective. At the other, it requires a degree of military force incompatible with stable government and civil liberty. [ Footnote 3/30 ] For this reason, the Framers concluded that "the execution of the laws of the national government… should not require the intervention of the State Legislatures," The Federalist No. 16, supra, at 103, and abandoned the Articles of Confederation in favor of direct national legislation.
At the same time that the members of the Constitutional Convention fashioned this principle, they rejected two proposals that would have given the National Legislature power to supervise directly state governments. The first proposal would have authorized Congress "to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof." 1 Farrand 21. The delegates never even voted on this suggestion. James Madison moved to postpone it, stating that,
the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively, and not individually.
Id. at 54. Several other delegates echoed his concerns, [ Footnote 3/31 ] and Madison ultimately reported that "[t]he practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies [has] been exploded on all hands." 2 id. at 9.
The second proposal received more favorable consideration. Virginia's Governor Randolph suggested that Congress should have the power "to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union." 1 id. at 21. On May 31, 1787, the Committee of the Whole approved this proposal without debate. Id. at 61. A week later, Pinckney moved to extend the congressional negative to all state laws "which [Congress] should judge to be improper." Id. at 164. Numerous delegates criticized this attempt to give Congress unbounded control over state lawmaking. Hugh Williamson, for example, thought "the State Legislatures ought to possess independent powers in cases purely local," id. at 171, while Elbridge Gerry thought Pinckney's idea might "enslave the States." Id. at 165. After much debate, the Convention rejected Pinckney's suggestion.
Late in July, the delegates reversed their approval of even Randolph's more moderate congressional veto. Several delegates now concluded that the negative would be "terrible to the States," "unnecessary," and "improper." 2 id. at 27. [ Footnote 3/32 ] Omission of the negative, however, left the new system without an effective means of adjusting conflicting state and national laws. To remedy this defect, the delegates adopted the Supremacy Clause, providing that the Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land," and that "the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." Art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the Framers substituted judicial review of state laws for congressional control of state legislatures.
While this history demonstrates the Framers' commitment to a strong central government, the means that they adopted to achieve that end are as instructive as the end itself. [ Footnote 3/33 ] Under the Articles of Confederation, the National Legislature operated through the States. The Framers could have fortified the central government, while still maintaining the same system, if they had increased Congress' power to demand obedience from state legislatures. In time, this scheme might have relegated the States to mere departments of the National Government, a status the Court appears to endorse today. The Framers, however, eschewed this course, choosing instead to allow Congress to pass laws directly affecting individuals, and rejecting proposals that would have given Congress military or legislative power over state governments. In this way, the Framers established independent state and national sovereigns. The National Government received the power to enact its own laws and to enforce those laws over conflicting state legislation. The States retained the power to govern as sovereigns in fields that Congress cannot or will not preempt. [ Footnote 3/34 ] This product of the Constitutional Convention, I believe, is fundamentally inconsistent with a system in which either Congress or a state legislature harnesses the legislative powers of the other sovereign. [ Footnote 3/35 ]
III
During his last Term of service on this Court, Justice Black eloquently explained that our notions of federalism subordinate neither national nor state interests:
The concept does not mean blind deference to 'states' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 401 U. S. 44 (1971). In this case, I firmly believe that a proper "sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments" requires invalidation of Titles I and III of PURPA insofar as they apply to state regulatory authorities. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to uphold those portions of the statute.
Notes
1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 133 (M. Farrand ed.1911) (hereinafter Farrand) (abbreviations expanded in this and subsequent quotations). Hamilton subsequently explained to the people of New York that the Constitution marked the "difference between a league and a government," because it "extend[ed] the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens, -the only proper objects of government." The Federalist No. 15, supra, at 95. Similarly, Charles Pinckney told the South Carolina House of Representatives that
the necessity of having a government which should at once operate upon the people, and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by every delegation present;… however they may have differed with respect to the quantum of power, no objection was made to the system itself.
4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Convention 256 (2d ed. 1863).
[ Footnote 3/1 ]
I concur in the Court's decision to uphold Title II, § 210, of PURPA against appellees' facial attack. As the Court explains, part of that section permits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to exempt cogeneration and small power production facilities from otherwise applicable state and federal laws. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). This exemption authority does not violate the Tenth Amendment, for it merely preempts state control of private conduct, rather than regulating the "States as States." See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 452 U. S. 287 -293 (1981).
Section 210's requirement that the States "implement" rules promulgated by the Secretary of Energy, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), is more disturbing. Appellants, however, have interpreted this statutory obligation to include "an undertaking to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising under [§ 210], or any other action reasonably designed to implement [that section]." 18 CFR § 292.401(a) (1981). It appears, therefore, that state regulatory authorities may satisfy § 210's implementation requirement simply by adjudicating private disputes arising under that section. As the Court points out, ante at 456 U. S. 760 -761, the Mississippi Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over similar state disputes, and it is settled that a State may not exercise its judicial power in a manner that discriminates between analogous federal and state causes of action. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947). Under these circumstances, but without foreclosing the possibility that particular applications of § 210's implementation provision might uncover hidden constitutional defects, I would not sustain appellees' facial attack on the provision.
Section 210 also authorizes FERC, electric utilities, cogenerators, and small power producers to "enforce" the above implementation provision against state utility commissions. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As applied, it is conceivable that this enforcement provision would raise troubling federalism issues. Once again, however, I decline to accept appellees' facial challenge to the provision, preferring to consider the constitutionality of this provision in the setting of a concrete controversy.
[ Footnote 3/2 ]
The statute imposes the same requirements upon nonregulated utilities. In this respect, it regulates purely private conduct, and does not violate the Tenth Amendment. Throughout this dissent, I consider only the constitutionality of Titles I and III as applied to state regulatory authorities. I would allow the District Court, on remand, to decide whether the constitutionally defective aspects of Titles I and III are severable from the unobjectionable portions.
[ Footnote 3/3 ]
See ante at 456 U. S. 748 -749. The Court overlooks several of PURPA's procedural mandates. For example, with respect to six of the standards, the state agency must publish a written determination, including findings, even if it decides to adopt the federal standard. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). In addition, PURPA guarantees certain rights to discover information, § 2631(b); requires the State to provide transcripts, at the cost of reproduction, to parties to ratemaking proceedings or other "regulatory proceeding[s] relating to [electric utility] rates or rate design," § 2632(c); and, under some circumstances, mandates compensation for reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and other costs to consumers who contribute substantially to the adoption of a Title I standard, §§ 2632 (a), (b). These requirements, as well as the ones described by the Court, may impose special burdens on state administrative agencies. I do not weigh the constitutionality of these individual procedural requirements, however, because I would invalidate the entire regimen that Titles I and III impose on state regulatory authorities.
[ Footnote 3/4 ]
In both Hodel and United Transportation Union, we further noted that, even when these three requirements are met, "the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 452 U. S. 288, n. 29; Transportation Union, 455 U.S. at 455 U. S. 684, n. 9. Neither of those cases involved such an exception to National League of Cities, and the Court has not yet explored the circumstances that might justify such an exception.
[ Footnote 3/5 ]
As the Court recognizes, ante at 456 U. S. 748, PURPA permits "[a]ny person" to bring an action in state court to enforce the agency's obligation to consider the federal standards. 15 U.S.C. § 3207(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV); 16 U.S.C. § 2633(c)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The Secretary of Energy, moreover, may intervene in any ongoing ratemaking proceeding to require consideration of PURPA's standards. 15 U.S.C. § 3205(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV); 16 U.S.C. §§ 2631(a), 2622(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Title I grants affected utilities and consumers the same right of intervention. 16 U.S.C. § 2631(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Because of these rights of intervention and enforcement, state agencies lack even the