Justice Stevens and Justice OÂ’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles I and II.*
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, contains a series of amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U. S. C. A. §431 et seq. (main ed. and Supp. 2003), the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. §315, and other portions of the United States Code, 18 U. S. C. A. §607 (Supp. 2003), 36 U. S. C. A. §§510–511, that are challenged in these cases.[ Footnote 1 ] In this opinion we discuss Titles I and II of BCRA. The opinion of the Court delivered by The Chief Justice, post, p. ___, discusses Titles III and IV, and the opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Breyer, post , p. ___, discusses Title V.
I
More than a century ago the “sober-minded Elihu Root” advocated legislation that would prohibit political contributions by corporations in order to prevent “ ‘the great aggregations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly,’ ” to elect legislators who would “ ‘vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests as against those of the public.’ ” United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567 , 571 (1957) (quoting E. Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (R. Bacon & J. Scott eds. 1916)). In Root’s opinion, such legislation would “ ‘strik[e] at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this country in our political institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government.’ ” 352 U. S., at 571. The Congress of the United States has repeatedly enacted legislation endorsing Root’s judgment.
BCRA is the most recent federal enactment designed “to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign contributions.” Id., at 572. As Justice Frankfurter explained in his opinion for the Court in Automobile Workers , the first such enactment responded to President Theodore Roosevelt’s call for legislation forbidding all contributions by corporations “ ‘to any political committee or for any political purpose.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1906)). In his annual message to Congress in December 1905, President Roosevelt stated that “ ‘directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money’ ” for political purposes, and he recommended that “ ‘a prohibition’ ” on corporate political contributions “ ‘would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.’ ” 352 U. S., at 352. The resulting 1907 statute completely banned corporate contributions of “money … in connection with” any federal election. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. Congress soon amended the statute to require the public disclosure of certain contributions and expenditures and to place “maximum limits on the amounts that congressional candidates could spend in seeking nomination and election.” Automobile Workers, supra , at 575–576.
In 1925 Congress extended the prohibition of “contributions” “to include ‘anything of value,’ and made acceptance of a corporate contribution as well as the giving of such a contribution a crime.” Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197 , 209 (1982) (citing Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, §§301, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074). During the debates preceding that amendment, a leading Senator characterized “ ‘the apparent hold on political parties which business interests and certain organizations seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign contributions’ ” as “ ‘one of the great political evils of the time.’ ” Automobile Workers, supra , at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507–9508 (1924)). We upheld the amended statute against a constitutional challenge, observing that “[t]he power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress.” Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 , 547 (1934).
Congress’ historical concern with the “political potentialities of wealth” and their “untoward consequences for the democratic process,” Automobile Workers , supra , at 577–578, has long reached beyond corporate money. During and shortly after World War II, Congress reacted to the “enormous financial outlays” made by some unions in connection with national elections. 352 U. S., at 579. Congress first restricted union contributions in the Hatch Act, 18 U. S. C. §610,[ Footnote 2 ] and it later prohibited “union contributions in connection with federal elections … altogether.” National Right to Work, supra , at 209 (citing War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, §9, 57 Stat. 167). Congress subsequently extended that prohibition to cover unions’ election-related expenditures as well as contributions, and it broadened the coverage of federal campaigns to include both primary and general elections. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136. See Automobile Workers, supra , at 578–584. During the consideration of those measures, legislators repeatedly voiced their concerns regarding the pernicious influence of large campaign contributions. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3428, 3522 (1947); H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. Rep. No. 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1947); H. R. Rep. No. 2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945). As we noted in a unanimous opinion recalling this history, Congress’ “careful legislative adjustment of the federal election laws, in a ‘cautious advance, step by step,’ to account for the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable deference.” National Right to Work, 352 U. S., at 209 (citations omitted).
In early 1972 Congress continued its steady improvement of the national election laws by enacting FECA, 86 Stat. 3. As first enacted, that statute required disclosure of all contributions exceeding $100 and of expenditures by candidates and political committees that spent more than $1,000 per year. Id. , at 11–19. It also prohibited contributions made in the name of another person, id., at 19, and by Government contractors, id., at 10. The law ratified the earlier prohibition on the use of corporate and union general treasury funds for political contributions and expenditures, but it expressly permitted corporations and unions to establish and administer separate segregated funds (commonly known as political action committees, or PACs) for election-related contributions and expenditures. Id ., at 12–13.[ Footnote 3 ] See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385 , 409–410 (1972).
As the 1972 presidential elections made clear, however, FECA’s passage did not deter unseemly fundraising and campaign practices. Evidence of those practices persuaded Congress to enact the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263. Reviewing a constitutional challenge to the amendments, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit described them as “by far the most comprehensive … reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President and members of Congress.” Buckley v. Valeo , 519 F. 2d 821, 831 (1975) (en banc) (per curiam) .
The 1974 amendments closed the loophole that had allowed candidates to use an unlimited number of political committees for fundraising purposes and thereby to circumvent the limits on individual committees’ receipts and disbursements. They also limited individual political contributions to any single candidate to $1,000 per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; imposed ceilings on spending by candidates and political parties for national conventions; required reporting and public disclosure of contributions and expenditures exceeding certain limits; and established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the legislation. Id ., at 831–834 .The Court of Appeals upheld the 1974 amendments almost in their entirety.[Footnote 4] It concluded that the clear and compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process provided a sufficient basis for sustaining the substantive provisions of the Act.Id., at 841. The court’s opinion relied heavily on findings that large contributions facilitated access to public officials[Footnote 5] and described methods of evading the contribution limits that had enabled contributors of massive sums to avoid disclosure.Id., at 837–841.[Footnote 6]
The Court of Appeals upheld the provisions establishing contribution and expenditure limitations on the theory that they should be viewed as regulations of conduct rather than speech. Id. , at 840–841 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 , 376–377 (1968)). This Court, however, concluded that each set of limitations raised serious—though different—concerns under the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 , 14–23 (1976) (per curiam) . We treated the limitations on candidate and individual expenditures as direct restraints on speech, but we observed that the contribution limitations, in contrast, imposed only “a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” Id. , at 20–21. Considering the “deeply disturbing examples” of corruption related to candidate contributions discussed in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, we determined that limiting contributions served an interest in protecting “the integrity of our system of representative democracy.” Id. , at 26–27. In the end, the Act’s primary purpose—“to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions”—provided “a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.” Id., at 26.
We prefaced our analysis of the $1,000 limitation on expenditures by observing that it broadly encompassed every expenditure “ ‘relative to a clearly identified candidate.’ ” Id. , at 39 (quoting 18 U. S. C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)). To avoid vagueness concerns we construed that phrase to apply only to “communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” 424 U. S., at 42– 44. We concluded, however, that as so narrowed, the provision would not provide effective protection against the dangers of quid pro quo arrangements, because persons and groups could eschew expenditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate while remaining “free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views.” Id. , at 45. We also rejected the argument that the expenditure limits were necessary to prevent attempts to circumvent the Act’s contribution limits, because FECA already treated expenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate as contributions, and we were not persuaded that independent expenditures posed the same risk of real or apparent corruption as coordinated expenditures. Id. , at 46–47. We therefore held that Congress’ interest in preventing real or apparent corruption was inadequate to justify the heavy burdens on the freedoms of expression and association that the expenditure limits imposed.
We upheld all of the disclosure and reporting requirements in the Act that were challenged on appeal to this Court after finding that they vindicated three important interests: providing the electorate with relevant information about the candidates and their supporters; deterring actual corruption and discouraging the use of money for improper purposes; and facilitating enforcement of the prohibitions in the Act. Id. , at 66–68. In order to avoid an overbreadth problem, however, we placed the same narrowing construction on the term “expenditure” in the disclosure context that we had adopted in the context of the expenditure limitations. Thus, we construed the reporting requirement for persons making expenditures of more than $100 in a year “to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Id. , at 80 (footnote omitted).
Our opinion in Buckley addressed issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by individuals, since none of the parties challenged the prohibition on contributions by corporations and labor unions. We noted, however, that the statute authorized the use of corporate and union resources to form and administer segregated funds that could be used for political purposes. Id. , at 28–29, n. 31; see also n. 3, supra .
Three important developments in the years after our decision in Buckley persuaded Congress that further legislation was necessary to regulate the role that corporations, unions, and wealthy contributors play in the electoral process. As a preface to our discussion of the specific provisions of BCRA, we comment briefly on the increased importance of “soft money,” the proliferation of “issue ads,” and the disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign practices related to the 1996 federal elections.
Soft Money
Under FECA, “contributions” must be made with funds that are subject to the Act’s disclosure requirements and source and amount limitations. Such funds are known as “federal” or “hard” money. FECA defines the term “contribution,” however, to include only the gift or advance of anything of value “made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federaloffice.” 2 U. S. C. §431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Donations made solely for the purpose of influencing state or local elections are therefore unaffected by FECA’s requirements and prohibitions. As a result, prior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations and unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum permissible contributions to federal candidates, to contribute “nonfederal money”—also known as “soft money”—to political parties for activities intended to influence state or local elections.
Shortly after Buckley was decided, questions arose concerning the treatment of contributions intended to influence both federal and state elections. Although a literal reading of FECA’s definition of “contribution” would have required such activities to be funded with hard money, the FEC ruled that political parties could fund mixed-purpose activities—including get-out-the-vote drives and generic party advertising—in part with soft money.[ Footnote 7 ] In 1995 the FEC concluded that the parties could also use soft money to defray the costs of “legislative advocacy media advertisements,” even if the ads mentioned the name of a federal candidate, so long as they did not expressly advocate the candidate’s election or defeat. FEC Advisory Op. 1995–25.
As the permissible uses of soft money expanded, the amount of soft money raised and spent by the national political parties increased exponentially. Of the two major parties’ total spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6 million) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million) in 2000.[ Footnote 8 ] The national parties transferred large amounts of their soft money to the state parties, which were allowed to use a larger percentage of soft money to finance mixed-purpose activities under FEC rules.[ Footnote 9 ] In the year 2000, for example, the national parties diverted $280 million—more than half of their soft money—to state parties.
Many contributions of soft money were dramatically larger than the contributions of hard money permitted by FECA. For example, in 1996 the top five corporate soft-money donors gave, in total, more than $9 million in nonfederal funds to the two national party committees.[ Footnote 10 ] In the most recent election cycle the political parties raised almost $300 million—60% of their total soft-money fundraising—from just 800 donors, each of which contributed a minimum of $120,000.[ Footnote 11 ] Moreover, the largest corporate donors often made substantial contributions to both parties.[ Footnote 12 ] Such practices corroborate evidence indicating that many corporate contributions were motivated by a desire for access to candidates and a fear of being placed at a disadvantage in the legislative process relative to other contributors, rather than by ideological support for the candidates and parties.[ Footnote 13 ]
Not only were such soft-money contributions often designed to gain access to federal candidates, but they were in many cases solicited by the candidates themselves. Candidates often directed potential donors to party committees and tax-exempt organizations that could legally accept soft money. For example, a federal legislator running for reelection solicited soft money from a supporter by advising him that even though he had already “contributed the legal maximum” to the campaign committee, he could still make an additional contribution to a joint program supporting federal, state, and local candidates of his party.[ Footnote 14 ] Such solicitations were not uncommon.[ Footnote 15 ]
The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft money thus enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECAÂ’s limitations on the source and amount of contributions in connection with federal elections.
Issue Advertising
In Buckleywe construed FECA’s disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as its expenditure limitations, “to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” 424 U. S., at 80 (footnote omitted). As a result of that strict reading of the statute, the use or omission of “magic words” such as “Elect John Smith” or “Vote Against Jane Doe” marked a bright statutory line separating “express advocacy” from “issue advocacy.” Seeid., at 44, n. 52. Express advocacy was subject to FECA’s limitations and could be financed only using hard money. The political parties, in other words, could not use soft money to sponsor ads that used any magic words, and corporations and unions could not fund such ads out of their general treasuries. So-called issue ads, on the other hand, not only could be financed with soft money, but could be aired without disclosing the identity of, or any other information about, their sponsors.
While the distinction between “issue” and express advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in important respects. Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates, even though the so-called issue ads eschewed the use of magic words.[ Footnote 16 ] Little difference existed, for example, between an ad that urged viewers to “vote against Jane Doe” and one that condemned Jane Doe’s record on a particular issue before exhorting viewers to “call Jane Doe and tell her what you think.”[ Footnote 17 ] Indeed, campaign professionals testified that the most effective campaign ads, like the most effective commercials for products such as Coca-Cola, should, and did, avoid the use of the magic words.[ Footnote 18 ] Moreover, the conclusion that such ads were specifically intended to affect election results was confirmed by the fact that almost all of them aired in the 60 days immediately preceding a federal election.[ Footnote 19 ] Corporations and unions spent hundreds of millions of dollars of their general funds to pay for these ads,[ Footnote 20 ] and those expenditures, like soft-money donations to the political parties, were unregulated under FECA. Indeed, the ads were attractive to organizations and candidates precisely because they were beyond FECA’s reach, enabling candidates and their parties to work closely with friendly interest groups to sponsor so-called issue ads when the candidates themselves were running out of money.[ Footnote 21 ]
Because FECA’s disclosure requirements did not apply to so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used misleading names to conceal their identity. “Citizens for Better Medicare,” for instance, was not a grassroots organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for an association of drug manufacturers.[ Footnote 22 ] And “Republicans for Clean Air,” which ran ads in the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, was actually an organization consisting of just two individuals—brothers who together spent $25 million on ads supporting their favored candidate.[ Footnote 23 ]
While the public may not have been fully informed about the sponsorship of so-called issue ads, the record indicates that candidates and officeholders often were. A former Senator confirmed that candidates and officials knew who their friends were and “sometimes suggest[ed] that corporations or individuals make donations to interest groups that run ‘issue ads.’ ”[ Footnote 24 ] As with soft-money contributions, political parties and candidates used the availability of so-called issue ads to circumvent FECA’s limitations, asking donors who contributed their permitted quota of hard money to give money to nonprofit corporations to spend on “issue” advocacy.[ Footnote 25 ]
Senate Committee Investigation
In 1998 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs issued a six-volume report summarizing the results of an extensive investigation into the campaign practices in the 1996 federal elections. The report gave particular attention to the effect of soft money on the American political system, including elected officialsÂ’ practice of granting special access in return for political contributions.
The committee’s principal findings relating to Democratic Party fundraising were set forth in the majority’s report, while the minority report primarily described Republican practices. The two reports reached consensus, however, on certain central propositions. They agreed that the “soft money loophole” had led to a “meltdown” of the campaign finance system that had been intended “to keep corporate, union and large individual contributions from influencing the electoral process.”[ Footnote 26 ] One Senator stated that “the hearings provided overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal rubble.”[ Footnote 27 ]
The report was critical of both parties’ methods of raising soft money, as well as their use of those funds. It concluded that both parties promised and provided special access to candidates and senior Government officials in exchange for large soft-money contributions. The Committee majority described the White House coffees that rewarded major donors with access to President Clinton,[ Footnote 28 ] and the courtesies extended to an international businessman named Roger Tamraz, who candidly acknowledged that his donations of about $300,000 to the DNC and to state parties were motivated by his interest in gaining the Federal Government’s support for an oil-line project in the Caucasus.[ Footnote 29 ] The minority described the promotional materials used by the RNC’s two principal donor programs, “Team 100” and the “Republican Eagles,” which promised “special access to high-ranking Republican elected officials, including governors, senators, and representatives.”[ Footnote 30 ]One fundraising letter recited that the chairman of the RNC had personally escorted a donor on appointments that “ ‘turned out to be very significant in legislation affecting public utility holding companies’ ” and made the donor “ ‘a hero in his industry.’ ”[Footnote 31]
In 1996 both parties began to use large amounts of soft money to pay for issue advertising designed to influence federal elections. The Committee found such ads highly problematic for two reasons. Since they accomplished the same purposes as express advocacy (which could lawfully be funded only with hard money), the ads enabled unions, corporations, and wealthy contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was intended to provide. Moreover, though ostensibly independent of the candidates, the ads were often actually coordinated with, and controlled by, the campaigns.[ Footnote 32 ] The ads thus provided a means for evading FECAÂ’s candidate contribution limits.
The report also emphasized the role of state and local parties. While the FEC’s allocation regime permitted national parties to use soft money to pay for up to 40% of the costs of both generic voter activities and issue advertising, they allowed state and local parties to use larger percentages of soft money for those purposes.[ Footnote 33 ] For that reason, national parties often made substantial transfers of soft money to “state and local political parties for ‘generic voter activities’ that in fact ultimately benefit[ed] federal candidates because the funds for all practical purposes remain[ed] under the control of the national committees.” The report concluded that “[t]he use of such soft money thus allow[ed] more corporate, union treasury, and large contributions from wealthy individuals into the system.”[ Footnote 34 ]
The report discussed potential reforms, including a ban on soft money at the national and state party levels and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty groups.[ Footnote 35 ] The majority expressed the view that a ban on the raising of soft money by national party committees would effectively address the use of union and corporate general treasury funds in the federal political process only if it required that candidate-specific ads be funded with hard money.[ Footnote 36 ] The minority similarly recommended the elimination of soft-money contributions to political parties from individuals, corporations, and unions, as well as “reforms addressing candidate advertisements masquerading as issue ads.”[ Footnote 37 ]
II
In BCRA, Congress enacted many of the committeeÂ’s proposed reforms. BCRAÂ’s central provisions are designed to address CongressÂ’ concerns about the increasing use of soft money and issue advertising to influence federal elections. Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties, officeholders, and candidates. Title II primarily prohibits corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, influencing the outcome of federal elections.
Section 403 of BCRA provides special rules for actions challenging the constitutionality of any of the Act’s provisions. 2 U. S. C. A. §437h note (Supp. 2003). Eleven such actions were filed promptly after the statute went into effect in March 2002. As required by §403, those actions were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and heard by a three-judge court. Section 403 directed the District Court to advance the cases on the docket and to expedite their disposition “to the greatest possible extent.” The court received a voluminous record compiled by the parties and ultimately delivered a decision embodied in a two-judge per curiam opinion and three separate, lengthy opinions, each of which contained extensive commentary on the facts and a careful analysis of the legal issues. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (2003). The three judges reached unanimity on certain issues but differed on many. Their judgment, entered on May 1, 2003, held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld others. 251 F. Supp. 2d 948.
As authorized by §403, all of the losing parties filed direct appeals to this Court within 10 days. 2 U. S. C. A. §437h note. On June 5, 2003, we noted probable jurisdiction and ordered the parties to comply with an expedited briefing schedule and present their oral arguments at a special hearing on September 8, 2003. 539 U. S. ___. To simplify the presentation, we directed the parties challenging provisions of BCRA to proceed first on all issues, whether or not they prevailed on any issue in the District Court. Ibid . Mindful of §403’s instruction that we expedite our disposition of these appeals to the greatest extent possible, we also consider each of the issues in order. Accordingly, we first turn our attention to Title I of BCRA.
III
Title I is Congress’ effort to plug the soft-money loophole. The cornerstone of Title I is new FECA §323(a), which prohibits national party committees and their agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003).[ Footnote 38 ] In short, §323(a) takes national parties out of the soft-money business.
The remaining provisions of new FECA §323 largely reinforce the restrictions in §323(a). New FECA §323(b) prevents the wholesale shift of soft-money influence from national to state party committees by prohibiting state and local party committees from using such funds for activities that affect federal elections. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(b). These “Federal election activit[ies],” defined in new FECA §301(20)(A), are almost identical to the mixed-purpose activities that have long been regulated under the FEC’s pre-BCRA allocation regime. 2 U. S. C. A. §431(20)(A). New FECA §323(d) reinforces these soft-money restrictions by prohibiting political parties from soliciting and donating funds to tax-exempt organizations that engage in electioneering activities. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d). New FECA §323(e) restricts federal candidates and officeholders from receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in connection with federal elections and limits their ability to do so in connection with state and local elections. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e). Finally, new FECA §323(f) prevents circumvention of the restrictions on national, state, and local party committees by prohibiting state and local candidates from raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other public communications that promote or attack federal candidates. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(f).
Plaintiffs mount a facial First Amendment challenge to new FECA §323, as well as challenges based on the Elections Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, principles of federalism, and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. We address these challenges in turn.
A
In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have subjected restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign contributions. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377 , 387–388 (2000); Buckley , 424 U. S., at 19. In these cases we have recognized that contribution limits, unlike limits on expenditures, “entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” Id., at 20; see also, e.g., Beaumont , supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14); Shrink Missouri , supra, at 386–388. In Buckley we said that:
“A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of the contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” 424 U. S., at 21 (footnote omitted).
Because the communicative valu