Supreme Court Opinions

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, First Amendment, Majority, William Rehnquist

Massachusetts v. Oakes

Anthony Kennedy, Byron White, First Amendment, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE KENNEDY join.

This case involves an overbreadth challenge to a Massachusetts criminal statute generally prohibiting adults from posing or exhibiting nude minors for purposes of visual representation or reproduction in any book, magazine, pamphlet, motion picture, photograph, or picture.

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The statute at issue in this case, Mass.Gen.Laws § 272:29A (1986), was enacted in 1982. [ Footnote 1 ] It provides as follows:

Whoever with knowledge that a person is a child under eighteen years of age, or whoever while in possession of such facts that he should have reason to know that such person is a child under eighteen years of age, hires, coerces, solicits or entices, employs, procures, uses, causes, encourages, or knowingly permits such child to pose or be exhibited in a state of nudity or to participate or engage in any live performance or in any act that depicts, describes or represents sexual conduct for purpose of visual representation or reproduction in any book, magazine, pamphlet, motion picture film, photograph, or picture shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years, or by a fine of not less than ten thousand dollars nor more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both such a fine and imprisonment. It shall be a defense in any prosecution pursuant to this section that such visual

Criminal Procedure, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

McFarland v. Scott

Criminal Procedure, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that 21 U. s. C. § 848 entitles capital defendants pursuing federal habeas corpus relief to a properly trained attorney. I also agree that this right includes legal assistance in preparing a habeas petition. Thus, the Court correctly holds that a defendant need not file a habeas petition to invoke the right to counsel. Ante, at 856-857. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that 28 U. s. C. § 2251 allows a district court to stay an execution pending counsel’s prepara tion of an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ante, at 857-858.

As the Court explains, § 848(q) must be read to apply prior to the filing of a habeas petition. It is almost meaningless to provide a lawyer to pursue claims on federal habeas if the lawyer is not available to help prepare the petition. First, the habeas petition, unlike a complaint, must allege the factual underpinning of the petitioner’s claims. See Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c) (“The petition… shall specify all the grounds for relief which are available to the petitioner… and shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified”). Furthermore, district courts are authorized to summarily dismiss petitions which appear on their face to be meritless. See Habeas Corpus Rule 4. And our carefully crafted doctrines of waiver and abuse of the writ make it especially

Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

McKaskle v. Wiggins

Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), this Court recognized a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense. The Court also held that a trial court may appoint “standby counsel” to assist the pro se defendant in his defense. Today we must decide what role standby counsel who is present at trial over the defendant’s objection may play consistent with the protection of the defendant’s Faretta rights.

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Carl Edwin Wiggins was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as a recidivist. His conviction was set aside because of a defective indictment. When Wiggins was retried, he was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Standby counsel were appointed to assist Wiggins at both trials. Wiggins now challenges counsel’s participation in his second trial.

Prior to the first trial, a hearing was held on Wiggins’ motion to proceed pro se. The court granted the motion, Record 4a, but simultaneously appointed two attorneys to act as standby counsel. Wiggins initially objected to their presence. Id. at 11a. Shortly thereafter, however, counsel asked Wiggins how they should conduct themselves at trial, and Wiggins expressly requested that they bring appropriate objections directly to the attention of the court, without first consulting him. Id. at 37a. After the trial, newly appointed counsel discovered that the original indictment was defective, and a new trial was granted.

On April

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

McKune v. Lile

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

The Court today is divided on the question of what standard to apply when evaluating compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting. I write separately because, although I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is broader than the “atypical and significant hardship” standard we have adopted for evaluating due process claims in prisons, see post, at 58-60 (dissenting opinion) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976)), I do not believe that the alterations in respondent’s prison conditions as a result of his failure to participate in the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) were so great as to constitute compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. I therefore agree with the plurality that the decision below should be reversed.

The text of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person’s refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. Not all pressure necessarily “compel[s]” incriminating statements.

For instance, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 455 (1966), we found that an environment of police custodial interrogation was coercive enough to require prophylactic warnings only after observing that such an environment exerts a “heavy toll on individual liberty.” But we have not required Miranda warnings

Dissent, Due Process, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist

Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams

Dissent, Due Process, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

Today, the Court departs significantly from its prior decisions and holds that, before the State conducts any proceeding that will affect the legally protected property interests of any party, the State must provide notice to that party by means certain to ensure actual notice as long as the party’s identity and location are “reasonably ascertainable.” Ante at 462 U. S. 800. Applying this novel and unjustified principle to the present case, the Court decides that the mortgagee involved deserved more than the notice by publication and posting that were provided. I dissent because the Court’s approach is unwarranted both as a general rule and as the rule of this case.

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In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 339 U. S. 314 (1950), the Court established that

[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.

We emphasized that notice is constitutionally adequate when “the practicalities and peculiarities of the case… are reasonably met,” id. at 339 U. S. 314 -315. See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 352 U. S. 115 (1956); Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U. S. 208, 371 U. S. 211 -212 (1962); Greene v. Lindsey, 456

Dissent, Economic Activity, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

Dissent, Economic Activity, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

This case presents a simple question: is it legitimate for a State to use its taxing power to promote a domestic insurance industry and to encourage capital investment within its borders? In a holding that can only be characterized as astonishing, the Court determines that these purposes are illegitimate. This holding is unsupported by precedent and subtly distorts the constitutional balance, threatening the freedom of both state and federal legislative bodies to fashion appropriate classifications in economic legislation. Because I disagree with both the Court’s method of analysis and its conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

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Alabama’s legislature has chosen to impose a higher tax on out-of-state insurance companies and insurance companies incorporated in Alabama that do not maintain their principal place of business or invest assets within the State. Ala.Code § 27-4-4 et seq. (1975). This tax seeks to promote both a domestic insurance industry and capital investment in Alabama. App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, joined by many other out-of-state insurers, alleges that this discrimination violates its rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that a State shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Appellants rely on the Equal Protection Clause because,

Anthony Kennedy, Concurrence, Due Process

Michael H. v. Gerald D

Anthony Kennedy, Concurrence, Due Process / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, concurring in part.

I concur in all but footnote 6 of JUSTICE SCALIA’s opinion This footnote sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). On occasion, the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be “the most specific level” available. Ante at 491 U. S. 127 -128, n. 6. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 94 (1987); cf. United States v. Stanley, 483 U. S. 669, 709 (1987) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 367 U. S. 542, 367 U. S. 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist

Miles v. Apex Marine Corp

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide whether the parent of a seaman who died from injuries incurred aboard respondents’ vessel may recover under general maritime law for loss of society, and whether a claim for the seaman’s lost future earnings survives his death.

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Ludwick Torregano was a seaman aboard the vessel M/V Archon. On the evening of July 18, 1984, Clifford Melrose, a fellow crew member, stabbed Torregano repeatedly, killing him. At the time, the ship was docked in the harbor of Vancouver, Washington.

Mercedel Miles, Torregano’s mother and administratrix of his estate, sued Apex Marine Corporation and Westchester Marine Shipping Company, the vessel’s operators, Archon Marine Company, the charterer, and Aeron Marine Company, the Archon’s owner (collectively Apex), in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Miles alleged negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, for failure to prevent the assault on her son, and breach of the warranty of seaworthiness under general maritime law for hiring a crew member unfit to serve. She sought compensation for loss of support and services and loss of society resulting from the death of her son, punitive damages, and compensation to the estate for Torregano’s pain and suffering prior to his death and for his lost future income.

At trial, the District Court granted Apex’s motion to strike the claim for punitive damages, ruled that the estate could not recover Torregano’s

Anthony Kennedy, Civil Rights, Concurrence

Miller v. Albright

Anthony Kennedy, Civil Rights, Concurrence / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, concurring in the judgment.

This Court has long applied a presumption against thirdparty standing as a prudential limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Federal courts, we have held, “must hesitate before resolving a controversy, even one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 113 (1976); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975). Contrary to this prudential rule, the principal opinion recognizes that petitioner has standing to raise an equal protection challenge to 8 U. S. C. § 1409. The statute, however, accords differential treatment to fathers and mothers, not to sons and daughters. Thus, O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment

although petitioner is clearly injured by the fact that she has been denied citizenship, the discriminatory impact of the provision falls on petitioner’s father, Charlie Miller, who is no longer a party to this suit. Consequently, I do not believe that we should consider petitioner’s gender discrimination claim.

The principal opinion recognizes that petitioner’s claim turns on “the proposition that her citizen father should have the same right to transmit citizenship as would a citizen mother” and resolves to “evaluate the alleged discrimination against [petitioner’s father] as well as its impact on [petitioner].” Ante, at 433. But even when “the very same allegedly

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan

Miller v. Fenton

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), state court findings of fact “shall be presumed to be correct” in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless one of eight enumerated exceptions applies. [ Footnote 1 ] The question presented is whether the voluntariness of a confession is an issue of fact entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption.

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On the morning of August 13, 1973, a stranger approached the rural New Jersey home of 17-year-old Deborah Margolin and told her that a heifer was lose at the foot of her driveway. She set out alone to investigate and never returned. Later that day, her mutilated body was found in a nearby stream.

The victim’s brothers were able to provide a description of the stranger’s car and clothing. Based on this information, officers of the New Jersey State Police tentatively identified petitioner and, later that evening, found him at his place of employment. Petitioner responded to the officers’ preliminary inquiries and agreed to return to the police barracks for further questioning. Approximately two hours later, Detective Charles Boyce led petitioner to an interrogation room and informed him of his Miranda rights. Petitioner inquired about the scope of his privilege to remain silent, and then executed a written waiver, the validity of which is not at issue.

A 58-minute-long interrogation session ensued. During the course of the interview, Detective Boyce told petitioner that Ms. Margolin had just died. That statement,