Supreme Court Opinions

David Souter, Dissent, John Paul Stevens, Privacy

Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton

David Souter, Dissent, John Paul Stevens, Privacy / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting.

The population of our Nation’s public schools, grades 7 through 12, numbers around 18 million. See U. S. Dept. of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 58 (1994) (Table 43). By the reasoning of today’s decision, the millions of these students who participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming majority of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect they use drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bodily search.

In justifying this result, the Court dispenses with a requirement of individualized suspicion on considered policy grounds. First, it explains that precisely because every student athlete is being tested, there is no concern that school officials might act arbitrarily in choosing whom to test. Second, a broad-based search regime, the Court reasons, dilutes the accusatory nature of the search. In making these policy arguments, of course, the Court sidesteps powerful, countervailing privacy concerns. Blanket searches, because they can involve “thousands or millions” of searches, “pos[e] a greater threat to liberty” than do suspicion-based ones, which “affec[t] one person at a time,” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 365 (1987) (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting). Searches based on individualized suspicion also afford potential targets considerable control over whether they will, in fact, be searched because a person can avoid

Concurrence, Economic Activity

Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer

Concurrence, Economic Activity / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with what I understand to be the two basic points made in the Court’s opinion. First, I agree that the language of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U. S. C. App. § 1300 et seq., and our decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U. S. 585 (1991), preclude a holding that the increased cost of litigating in a distant forum, without more, can lessen liability within the meaning of COGSA § 3(8). Ante, at 534-536. Second, I agree that, because the District Court has retained jurisdiction over this case while the arbitration proceeds, any claim of lessening of liability that might arise out of the arbitrators’ interpretation of the bill of lading’s choice-of-Iaw clause, or out of their application of COGSA, is premature. Ante, at 539-541. Those two points suffice to affirm the decision below.

Because the Court’s opinion appears to do more, however, I concur only in the judgment. Foreign arbitration clauses of the kind presented here do not divest domestic courts of jurisdiction, unlike true foreign forum selection clauses such as that considered in lndussa Corp. v. S. S. Ranborg, 377 F. 2d 200 (CA2 1967) (en banc). That difference is an important one-it is, after all, what leads the Court to dismiss much of petitioner’s argument as premature-and we need not decide today whether lndussa, insofar as it relied on considerations other than the increased cost of litigating in a distant forum, retains any vitality

Civil Rights, Concurrence

US Airways Inc. v. Barnett

Civil Rights, Concurrence / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

I agree with portions of the opinion of the Court, but I find problematic the Court’s test for determining whether the fact that a job reassignment violates a seniority system makes the reassignment an unreasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Although a seniority system plays an important role in the workplace, for the reasons I explain below, I would prefer to say that the effect of a seniority system on the reasonableness of a reassignment as an accommodation for purposes of the ADA depends on whether the seniority system is legally enforceable. “Were it possible for me to adhere to [this belief] in my vote, and for the Court at the same time to [adopt a majority rule],” I would do so. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring in result). “The Court, however, is divided in opinion,” ibid., and if each Member voted consistently with his or her beliefs, we would not agree on a resolution of the question presented in this case. Yet “[s]talemate should not prevail,” ibid., particularly in a case in which we are merely interpreting a statute. Accordingly, in order that the Court may adopt a rule, and because I believe the Court’s rule will often lead to the same outcome as the one I would have adopted, I join the Court’s opinion despite my concerns. Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 655-656 (1998) (STEVENS, J.,

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 388 U. S. 19 (1967). In short, the right to compulsory process is essential to a fair trial. Today’s decision, I fear, may not protect adequately the interests of the prosecution and the defense in a fair trial, and may encourage litigation over whether the defendant has made a “plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense.” Ante at 458 U. S. 873. A preferable approach would be to accommodate both the Government’s interest in prompt deportation of illegal aliens and the defendant’s need to interview alien witnesses in order to decide which of them can provide material evidence for the defense. Through a suitable standard, imposed on the federal courts under our supervisory powers, a practical accommodation can be reached without any increase in litigation.

I

One cannot discount the importance of the Federal Government’s role in the regulation of immigration. [ Footnote 2/1 ] As the Court points out, Congress and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the agency authorized to make such policy decisions, have decided that prompt deportation

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

United States v. Treasury Employees

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

Although I agree that aspects of the honoraria ban run afoul of the First Amendment, I write separately for two reasons. First, I wish to emphasize my understanding of how our precedents, beginning with Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563 (1968), and culminating in its most recent application, Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 661 (1994), direct the Court’s conclusion. Second, I write to express my disagreement with the Court’s remedy, which in my view paints with too broad a brush.

I

The time-tested Pickering balance, most recently applied in Waters, provides the governing framework for analysis of all manner of restrictions on speech by the government as employer. Under Pickering, the Court must balance “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” 391 U. S., at 568. In contrast to some of our prior decisions, this case presents no threshold question whether the speech is of public, or merely private, concern. Respondents challenge the ban as it applies to off-hour speech bearing no nexus to Government employment-speech that by definition does not relate to “internal office affairs” or the employee’s status as an employee. Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 149 (1983).

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

United States v. Shabani

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case asks us to consider whether 21 U. S. C. § 846, the drug conspiracy statute, requires the Government to prove that a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. We conclude that it does not.

I

According to the grand jury indictment, Reshat Shabani participated in a narcotics distribution scheme in Anchorage, Alaska, with his girlfriend, her family, and other associates. Shabani was allegedly the supplier of drugs, which he arranged to be smuggled from California. In an undercover operation, federal agents purchased cocaine from distributors involved in the conspiracy.

Shabani was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. He moved to dismiss the indictment because it did not allege the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which act, he argued, was an essential element of the offense. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Hon. H. Russel Holland, denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of evidence, Shabani again raised the issue and asked the court to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act was required for conviction. The District Court noted that Circuit precedent did not require the allegation of an overt act in the indictment but did require proof of such an act at trial in order to state a violation of § 846. Recognizing that such a result was “totally illogical,” App. 29,

Civil Rights, Dissent, Harry Blackmun

United States v. R. L. C

Civil Rights, Dissent, Harry Blackmun / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.

By failing to interpret 18 U. S. C. § 5037(c)(1)(B) in light of the statutory scheme of which it is a part, the Court interprets a “technical amendment” to make sweeping changes to the process and focus of juvenile sentencing. Instead, the Court should honor Congress’ clear intention to leave settled practice in juvenile sentencing undisturbed.

When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it authorized the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission or Commission) to overhaul the discretionary system of adult sentencing. As an important aspect of this overhaul, Guidelines sentencing formalizes sentencing procedures. The Commission explains:”In pre-guidelines practice, factors relevant to sentencing were often determined in an informal fashion. The informality was to some extent explained by the fact that particular offense and offender characteristics rarely had a highly specific or required sentencing consequence. This situation will no longer exist under sentencing guidelines. The court’s resolution of disputed sentencing factors will usually have a measurable effect on the applicable punishment. More formal ity is therefore unavoidable if the sentencing process is to be accurate and fair.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3, comment (Nov. 1991) (USSG).

Another significant change permits an appeal when the Guidelines are incorrectly applied or departed from,

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

United States v. Place

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics. Given the enforcement problems associated with the detection of narcotics trafficking and the minimal intrusion that a properly limited detention would entail, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit such a detention. On the facts of this case, however, we hold that the police conduct exceeded the bounds of a permissible investigative detention of the luggage.

I

Respondent Raymond J. Place’s behavior aroused the suspicions of law enforcement officers as he waited in line at the Miami International Airport to purchase a ticket to New York’s La Guardia Airport. As Place proceeded to the gate for his flight, the agents approached him and requested his airline ticket and some identification. Place complied with the request and consented to a search of the two suitcases he had checked. Because his flight was about to depart, however, the agents decided not to search the luggage.

Prompted by Place’s parting remark that he had recognized that they were police, the agents inspected the address tags on the checked luggage and noted discrepancies in the two street addresses. Further investigation revealed that neither address existed, and that the telephone

Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Dissent, William Rehnquist

United States v. Paradise

Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Dissent, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.

In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 476 U. S. 273 (1986), we concluded that the level of Fourteenth Amendment

scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.

Thus, in evaluating the constitutionality of the District Court order in this case under the Fourteenth Amendment, we must undertake a two-part inquiry. First, we must decide whether the order is “supported by a compelling [governmental] purpose.” Ibid. Second, we must scrutinize the order to ensure that “the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are narrowly tailored.” Ibid.

One cannot read the record in this case without concluding that the Alabama Department of Public Safety had undertaken a course of action that amounted to “pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct.” Ante at 480 U. S. 167. Because the Federal Government has a compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination by the Department, the District Court unquestionably had the authority to fashion a remedy designed to end the Department’s egregious history of discrimination. In doing so, however, the District Court was obligated to fashion a remedy that was narrowly tailored to accomplish this purpose. The plurality today purports to apply strict scrutiny, and concludes that the order in this case was

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun

United States v. Ojeda Rios

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun / By

Justice O’CONNOR, with whom Justice BLACKMUN joins, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion on the understanding that a “satisfactory explanation” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) cannot merely be a reasonable excuse for the delay; it must also reflect the actual reason for the delay. Thus, as the Court today holds, an appellate court’s review of the sufficiency of the Government’s explanation for a delay should be based on the findings made and evidence presented in the district court, rather than on a post hoc explanation given for the first time on appeal. See ante at 495 U. S. 267. With this understanding, I agree with the Court that this case should be remanded for a determination whether the Government’s explanation to the District Court for the delay -not the explanation offered on appeal -meets the “satisfactory explanation” standard.