Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
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JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting.
The population of our Nation’s public schools, grades 7 through 12, numbers around 18 million. See U. S. Dept. of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 58 (1994) (Table 43). By the reasoning of today’s decision, the millions of these students who participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming majority of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect they use drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bodily search.
In justifying this result, the Court dispenses with a requirement of individualized suspicion on considered policy grounds. First, it explains that precisely because every student athlete is being tested, there is no concern that school officials might act arbitrarily in choosing whom to test. Second, a broad-based search regime, the Court reasons, dilutes the accusatory nature of the search. In making these policy arguments, of course, the Court sidesteps powerful, countervailing privacy concerns. Blanket searches, because they can involve “thousands or millions” of searches, “pos[e] a greater threat to liberty” than do suspicion-based ones, which “affec[t] one person at a time,” Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 365 (1987) (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting). Searches based on individualized suspicion also afford potential targets considerable control over whether they will, in fact, be searched because a person can avoid
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court’s opinion and concur in the judgment. Despite the messages of bigotry and racism that may be conveyed along with religious connotations by the display of a Ku Klux Klan cross, see ante, at 771 (THOMAS, J., concurring), at bottom this case must be understood as it has been presented to us-as a case about private religious expression and whether the State’s relationship to it violates the Establishment Clause. In my view, “the endorsement test asks the right question about governmental practices challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, including challenged practices involving the display of religious symbols,” County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 628 (1989) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), even where a neutral state policy toward private religious speech in a public forum is at issue. Accordingly, I see no necessity to carve out, as the plurality opinion would today, an exception to the endorsement test for the public forum context.
For the reasons given by JUSTICE SOUTER, whose opinion I also join, I conclude on the facts of this case that there is “no realistic danger that the community would think that the [State] was endorsing religion or any particular creed,” Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
“We have time and again held that the government generally may not treat people differently based on the God or gods they worship, or do not worship.” Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687, 714 (1994) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). This insistence on government neutrality toward religion explains why we have held that schools may not discriminate against religious groups by denying them equal access to facilities that the schools make available to all. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). Withholding access would leave an impermissible perception that religious activities are disfavored: “[T]he message is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion.” Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion). “The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion.” Kiryas Joel, supra, at 717 (O’CONNOR, J.). Neutrality, in both form and effect, is one hallmark of the Establishment Clause.
As JUSTICE SOUTER demonstrates, however, post, at 868872 (dissenting opinion), there exists another axiom in the history and precedent
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. We held inShawv.Reno,509 U. S. 630(1993), that a plaintiff may state a claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that a State “adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race,
tBriefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the Congressional Black Caucus by A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., and Pamela S. Karlan; for the National Bar Association et al. by Koteles Alexander and Brian J. Murphy; and for Bernadine St. Cyr et al. by Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, Charles Stephen Ralston, Jacqueline A. Berrien, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, J. Gerald Hebert, and Robert B. McDuff
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Anthony T. Caso and Deborah J. La Fetra; for the South Carolina Senate et al. by Mark A. Packman and Benjamin E. Griffith; and for Ruth O. Shaw et al. by Robinson O. Everett and Clifford Dougherty.
William H. Mellor III filed a brief for the Institute for Justice as amicus curiae. and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.” Id., at 658. Appellees Ray Hays, Edward Adams, Susan Shaw Singleton, and Gary Stokley claim that the State of Louisiana’s congressiona
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I understand the threshold standard the Court adoptsthat “the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles… to racial considerations,” ante, at 916-to be a demanding one. To invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices. Those practices provide a crucial frame of reference and therefore constitute a significant governing principle in cases of this kind. The standard would be no different if a legislature had drawn the boundaries to favor some other ethnic group; certainly the standard does not treat efforts to create majority-minority districts less favorably than similar efforts on behalf of other groups. Indeed, the driving force behind the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to end legal discrimination against blacks.
Application of the Court’s standard does not throw into doubt the vast majority of the Nation’s 435 congressional districts, where presumably the States have drawn the boundaries in accordance with their customary districting principles. That is so even though race may well have been
929
Georgia Congressional Districts (1992)
930
People Per Square Mile D Oto 10
D 10to 100
1,000 to 10,000
• 10,000 to 100,000
100,000 to 1,000,000
Population Density Map
11th Congressional District of Georgia
APPENDIX B
931
considered in the redistricting process. See Shaw v. Reno,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
My agreement with the Court is founded on two understandings. First, the challenged regulation is limited to significant habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals. Second, even setting aside difficult questions of scienter, the regulation’s application is limited by ordinary principles of proximate causation, which introduce notions of foreseeability. These limitations, in my view, call into question Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (CA9 1988) (Palila II), and with it, many of the applications derided by the dissent. Because there is no need to strike a regulation on a facial challenge out of concern that it is susceptible of erroneous application, however, and because there are many habitat-related circumstances in which the regulation might validly apply, I join the opinion of the Court.
In my view, the regulation is limited by its terms to actions that actually kill or injure individual animals. JusTICE SCALIA disagrees, arguing that the harm regulation “encompasses injury inflicted, not only upon individual animals, but upon populations of the protected species.” Post, at 716. At one level, I could not reasonably quarrel with this observation; death to an individual animal always reduces the size of the population in which it lives, and in that sense, “injures” that population. But by its insight, the dissent means
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.t Petitioner Joseph Libretti pleaded guilty to engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 84 Stat. 1265, 21 U. S. C. § 848 (1988 ed. and Supp. V), and agreed to forfeit numerous items of his property to the Government. We must decide whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) requires the District Court to determine whether a factual basis exists for a stipulated asset forfeiture embodied in a plea agreement, and whether the Federal Rule of Crimi
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Forfeiture Endangers American Rights Foundation by Brenda Grantland; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by David B. Smith and Richard J. Troberman.
tJUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join all but Parts II-B and II-C of this opinion. JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE GINSBURG join only Parts I and II. nal Procedure 31(e) right to a special jury verdict on forfeiture can only be waived following specific advice from the District Court as to the existence and scope of this right and an express, written waiver.
I
In May 1992, Joseph Libretti was charged in a multicount superseding indictment with violations of various federal drug, firearms, and money-laundering laws. Included in the indictment was a count alleging that Libretti engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), in violation of 21 U. s. C. § 848, by operating a cocaine and marijuana distribution organization in Wyoming
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. These consolidated petitions each challenge a conviction under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). In relevant part, that section imposes a 5-year minimum term of imprisonment upon a person who “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime… uses or carries a firearm.” We are asked to decide whether evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds is alone sufficient to support a conviction for “use” of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1).
I
In May 1989, petitioner Roland Bailey was stopped by police officers after they noticed that his car lacked a front license plate and an inspection sticker. When Bailey failed to produce a driver’s license, the officers ordered him out of the car. As he stepped out, the officers saw Bailey push something between the seat and the front console. A search of the passenger compartment revealed one round of ammunition and 27 plastic bags containing a total of 30 grams of cocaine. After arresting Bailey, the officers searched the trunk of his car where they found, among a number of items, a large amount of cash and a bag containing a loaded 9-mm. pistol.
Bailey was charged on several counts, including using and carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U. s. C. § 924(c)(1). A prosecution expert testified at trial that drug dealers frequently carry a firearm to protect their drugs and money
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider the “look-back” period for obtaining a refund of overpaid taxes in the United States Tax Court under 26 U. S. C. § 6512(b)(3)(B), and decide whether the Tax Court can award a refund of taxes paid more than two years prior to the date on which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed the taxpayer a notice of deficiency, when, on the date the notice of deficiency was mailed, the taxpayer had not yet filed a return. We hold that in these circumstances the 2-year look-back period set forth in § 6512(b)(3)(B) applies, and the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to award a refund.
I
During 1987, respondent Robert F. Lundy and his wife had $10,131 in federal income taxes withheld from their wages. This amount was substantially more than the $6,594 the Lundys actually owed in taxes for that year, but the Lundys did not file their 1987 tax return when it was due, nor did they file a return or claim a refund of the overpaid taxes in the succeeding 21/2 years. On September 26, 1990, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue mailed Lundy a notice of deficiency, informing him that he owed $7,672 in additional taxes and interest for 1987 and that he was liable for substantial penalties for delinquent filing and negligent underpayment of taxes. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 6651(a)(1) and 6653(1).
Lundy and his wife mailed their joint tax return for 1987 to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on December 22, 1990. This return indicated
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. We consider whether § 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U. S. C. § 6972, authorizes a private cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the environment. We conclude that it does not.
I
Respondent KFC Western, Inc. (KFC), owns and operates a “Kentucky Fried Chicken” restaurant on a parcel of property in Los Angeles. In 1988, KFC discovered during the course of a construction project that the property was contaminated with petroleum. The County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services ordered KFC to attend to the problem, and KFC spent $211,000 removing and disposing of the oil-tainted soil.
Three years later, KFC brought this suit under the citizen suit provision of RCRA, 90 Stat. 2825, as amended, 42
Massachusetts, and William L. Pardee, John Beling, and Karen McGuire, Assistant Attorneys General, Jeremiah W Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, and James Layton, Joseph P. Bindbeutel, and Douglas E. Nelson, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General of their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Calvin E. Holloway of Guam, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Carla Stolla of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
Today the Court concludes that three categories of workers fall outside the definition of “agricultural laborer” supplied by § 3(f) the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) and § 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA): (1) Holly Farms’ chicken catchers, who labor on a farm manually rounding up, catching, and caging live chickens, (2) forklift operators, who then load the caged chickens onto the bed of a flatbed truck, and (3) live-haul drivers, who drive the loaded trucks to Holly Farms’ processing plants, where the chickens are slaughtered and prepared for market. I concur in the Court’s judgment with respect to the live-haul drivers, since their work is neither performed “by a farmer” nor “on a farm.” But the Court’s conclusion that Holly Farms’ chicken catchers and forklift operators do not perform agricultural work runs contrary to common sense and finds no support in the text of the relevant statute. Because the definition supplied by Congress makes clear that the chicken catchers and forklift operators are agricultural workers exempt from the reach of the NLRA, I respectfully dissent.
The Court devotes the bulk of its opinion to an analysis of the reasonableness of the National Labor Relations Board’s (Board) interpretation of the statute, but gives remarkably short shrift to the statute itself. The Court dismisses
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in the judgment.
Rhode Island prohibits advertisement of the retail price of alcoholic beverages, except at the place of sale. The State’s only asserted justification for this ban is that it promotes temperance by increasing the cost of alcoholic beverages. Brief for Respondent State of Rhode Island 22. I agree with the Court that Rhode Island’s price-advertising ban is invalid. I would resolve this case more narrowly, however, by applying our established Central Hudson test to determine whether this commercial speech regulation survives First Amendment scrutiny.
Under that test, we first determine whether the speech at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading, and whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both these conditions are met, we must decide whether the regulation “directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980).
Given the means by which this regulation purportedly serves the State’s interest, our conclusion is plain: Rhode Island’s regulation fails First Amendment scrutiny.
Both parties agree that the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test are met. Even if we assume, arguendo, that Rhode Island’s regulation also satisfies the requirement that it directly
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider whether an abstention-based remand order is appealable as a final order under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, and whether the abstention doctrine first recognized in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), can be applied in a common-law suit for damages.
I
Petitioner, the Insurance Commissioner for the State of California, was appointed trustee over the assets of the Mission Insurance Company and its affiliates (Mission companies) in 1987, after those companies were ordered into liquidation by a California court. In an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission companies, the Commissioner filed the instant action against respondent Allstate Insurance Company in state court, seeking contract and tort damages for Allstate’s alleged breach of certain reinsurance agreements, as well as a general declaration of Allstate’s obligations under those agreements.
Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V). The Commissioner sought remand to state court, arguing that the District Court should abstain from hearing the case under Burford, supra, because its resolution might interfere with California’s regulation of the Mission insolvency. Specifically, the Commissioner indicated that Allstate would be asserting its right to set off its own contract claims against the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join.
This is the latest in a series of appeals involving racial gerrymandering challenges to state redistricting efforts in the wake of the 1990 census. See Shaw v. Hunt, ante, p. 899 (Shaw II); United States v. Hays, 515 U. S. 737 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I). That census revealed a population increase, largely in urban minority populations, that entitled Texas to three additional congressional seats. In response, and with a view to complying with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973 et seq., the Texas Legislature promulgated a redistricting plan that, among other things, created District 30, a new majority-African-American district in Dallas County; created District 29, a new majority-Hispanic district in and around Houston in Harris County; and reconfigured District 18, which is adjacent to District 29, to make it a majority African-American district. The Department of Justice precleared that plan under VRA § 5 in 1991, and it was used in the 1992 congressional elections.
The plaintiffs, six Texas voters, challenged the plan, alleging that 24 of Texas’ 30 congressional districts constitute racial gerrymanders in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The three-judge United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held Districts
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JusTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
The Montana Supreme Court unanimously held that Mont.
Code Ann. § 45-2-203 (1995) violates due process. I agree. Our cases establish that due process sets an outer limit on the restrictions that may be placed on a defendant’s ability to raise an effective defense to the State’s accusations. Here, to impede the defendant’s ability to throw doubt on the State’s case, Montana has removed from the jury’s consideration a category of evidence relevant to determination of mental state where that mental state is an essential element of the offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because this disallowance eliminates evidence with which the defense might negate an essential element, the State’s burden to prove its case is made correspondingly easier. The justification for this disallowance is the State’s desire to increase the likelihood of conviction of a certain class of defendants who might otherwise be able to prove that they did not satisfy a requisite element of the offense. In my view, the statute’s effect on the criminal proceeding violates due process.
I
This Court’s cases establish that limitations placed on the accused’s ability to present a fair and complete defense can, in some circumstances, be severe enough to violate due process. “The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355, 29 U. S. C. § 791et seq.(Act or Rehabilitation Act), prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the basis of disability “under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency.” 29 U. S. C. § 794(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The question presented in this case is whether Congress has waived the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity against awards of monetary damages for violations of this provision.
I
The United States Merchant Marine Academy is a federal service academy that trains students to serve as commercial merchant marine officers and as commissioned officers in the United States Armed Forces. The Academy is administered by the Maritime Administration, an organization within the Department of Transportation. Petitioner James Griffin Lane entered the Academy as a first-year student in July 1991 after meeting the Academy’s requirements for appointment, including passing a physical examination conducted by the Department of Defense. During his first year at the Academy, however, Lane was diagnosed by a private physician as having diabetes mellitus. Lane reported the diagnosis to the Academy’s Chief Medical Officer. The Academy’s Physical Examination Review Board conducted a hearing in September 1992 to determine Lane’s “medical suitability” to continue at the Academy, following which the Board reported to the Superintendent of the Academy that
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a defendant who is prosecuted in a single proceeding for multiple petty offenses has a constitutional right to a jury trial where the aggregate prison term authorized for the offenses exceeds six months. We are also asked to decide whether a defendant who would otherwise have a constitutional right to a jury trial may be denied that right because the presiding judge has made a pretrial commitment that the aggregate sentence imposed will not exceed six months.
We conclude that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial does not extend to petty offenses, and its scope does not change where a defendant faces a potential aggregate prison term in excess of six months for petty offenses charged. Because we decide that no jury trial right exists where a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses, we do not reach the second question.
* David A. Reiser, John Vanderstar, and Jeffrey B. Coopersmith filed a brief for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Christopher Warnock filed a brief for the Jury Trial Group as amicus curiae.
I
Petitioner Ray Lewis was a mail handler for the United States Postal Service. One day, postal inspectors saw him open several pieces of mail and pocket the contents. The next day, the inspectors routed “test”
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Section 360k(a), the pre-emption provision of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), provides that no State may establish or continue in effect “any requirement” “which is different from, or in addition to,” any requirement applicable under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) to the device. As the Court points out, because Congress has expressly provided a pre-emption provision, “we need not go beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the MDA to pre-empt” state law. Ante, at 484. We agree, then, on the task before us: to interpret Congress’ intent by reading the statute in accordance with its terms. This, however, the Court has failed to do.
The cases require us to determine whether the Lohrs’ state common-law claims survive pre-emption under § 360k. I conclude that state common-law damages actions do impose “requirements” and are therefore pre-empted where such requirements would differ from those imposed by the FDCA. The plurality acknowledges that a common-law action might impose a “requirement,” but suggests that such a pre-emption would be “rare indeed.” Ante, at 502. To reach that determination, the opinion-without explicitly relying on Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations and without offering any sound basis for why deference would be warranted-imports the FDA regulations interpreting
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that § 10(a) is constitutional and that § 10(b) is unconstitutional, and I join Parts I, II, III, and V, and the judgment in part. I am not persuaded, however, that the asserted “important differences” between §§ 10(a) and 10(c), ante, at 760, are sufficient to justify striking down § 10(c). I find the features shared by § 10(a), which covers leased access channels, and § 10(c), which covers public access channels, to be more significant than the differences. For that reason, I would find that § 10(c) also withstands constitutional scrutiny.
Both §§ 10(a) and 10(c) serve an important governmental interest: the well-established compelling interest of protecting children from exposure to indecent material. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 639-640 (1968). Cable television, like broadcast television, is a medium that is uniquely accessible to children, see ante, at 744-745, and, of course, children have equally easy access to public access channels as to leased access channels. By permitting a cable operator to prevent transmission of patently offensive sexrelated programming, §§ 10(a) and 10(c) further the interest of protecting children.
Furthermore, both provisions are permissive. Neither presents an outright ban on a category of speech, such as we struck down in Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, supra. Sections 10(a) and
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.â€Â
This case requires us to decide whether, and to what extent, the First Amendment protects independent contractors from the termination of at-will government contracts in retaliation for their exercise of the freedom of speech.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Robin L. Dahlbert, Marjorie Heins, and Steven R. Shapiro; and for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., Anthony C. Epstein, Julie M. Carpenter, Nory Miller, Roger K. Evans, Dara Klassel, and Eve W Paul.
†THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins all but Part II-B-1 of this opinion.
I
Under state law, Wabaunsee County, Kansas (County), is obliged to provide for the disposal of solid waste generated within its borders. In 1981, and, after renegotiation, in 1985, the County contracted with respondent U mbehr for him to be the exclusive hauler of trash for cities in the County at a rate specified in the contract. Each city was free to reject or, on 90 days’ notice, to opt out of, the contract. By its terms, the contract between U mbehr and the County was automatically renewed annually unless either party terminated it by giving notice at least 60 days before the end of the year or a renegotiation was instituted on 90 days’ notice. Pursuant to the contract, U mbehr hauled trash for six of the County’s seven cities from 1985 to 1991 on an exclusive and uninterrupted basis.
During the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents a challenge to an order by a threejudge District Court for the Northern District of California that authorized Monterey County to conduct judicial elections under an election plan that has not received federal approval pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
I
The State of California has 58 counties, one of which is Monterey County (hereinafter County). In 1971, the Attorney General designated the County a covered jurisdiction under § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b(b). 36 Fed. Reg. 5809 (1971); see 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (1995). As a result, the County became subject to the federal preclearance requirements set forth in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c.
*Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Paul C. Saunders, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Brenda Wright, Samuel L. Walters, Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, Steven R. Shapiro, Elaine R. Jones, Norman J. Chachkin, and Jacqueline A. Berrien filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Sharon L. Browne and Deborah J. La Fetra filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Barbara McDowell and Elwood G. Lui filed a brief for the California Judges Association as amicus curiae. Section 5 governs changes in voting procedures, with the purpose of preventing jurisdictions covered by its requirements
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
The Court today announces a rule that misapplies Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and upsets, without explanation, longstanding precedent regarding criminal prosecutions. I do not agree that the Government’s introduction of evidence that reveals the name and basic nature of a defendant’s prior felony conviction in a prosecution brought under 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) “unfairly” prejudices the defendant within the meaning of Rule 403. Nor do I agree with the Court’s newly minted rule that a defendant charged with violating
course, require some jury instruction to explain it (just as it will require some discretion when the indictment is read). A redacted judgment in this case, for example, would presumably have revealed to the jury that Old Chief was previously convicted in federal court and sentenced to more than a year’s imprisonment, but it would not have shown whether his previous conviction was for one of the business offenses that do not count, under § 921(a)(20). Hence, an instruction, with the defendant’s consent, would be necessary to make clear that the redacted judgment was enough to satisfy the status element remaining in the case. The Government might, indeed, propose such a redacted judgment for the trial court to weigh against a defendant’s offer to admit, as indeed the Government might do even if the defendant’s admission had been received into evidence. § 922(g)(1)
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all of the Court’s opinion, except to the extent that it relies on the notably unhelpful legislative history to 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k). Ante, at 228-230. As the Court cor rectly points out, the most natural reading of the saving clause in § 1821(k) covers both state and federal rights. Ante, at 228. With such plain statutory language in hand, there is no reason to rely on legislative history that is, as the majority recognizes, “not all on one side.” Ante, at 229.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 33 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 933, gives the “person entitled to compensation” two avenues of recovery: Such a person may seek to recover damages from the third parties ultimately at fault for any injuries and still recover compensation under the Act from the covered worker’s employer as long as the worker’s employer gives its approval before the person settles with any of the third party tortfeasors. The question we decide today is whether an injured worker’s spouse, who may be eligible to receive death benefits under the Act after the worker dies, is a “person entitled to compensation” when the spouse enters into a settlement agreement with a third party before the worker’s death. We also consider whether the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) is a proper respondent in proceedings before the courts of appeals.
I
Jefferson Yates worked for Ingalls as a shipfitter at its Pascagoula shipyards in Mississippi between 1953 and 1967 and was exposed to asbestos in his workplace during this time. In March 1981, Mr. Yates was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis, chronic bronchitis, and possible malignancy in his lungs. Less than a month later, he filed a claim for disability benefits under § 8 of the LHWCA, 33 U. S. C. § 908, asserting that his present condition resulted from his expo
*Briefs of amici curiae
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. We are asked to decide whether a federal court may direct that a prison sentence under 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) run concurrently with a state-imposed sentence, even though § 924(c)
* Leah J. Prewitt, Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Placido G. Gomez, and Barbara Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. provides that a sentence imposed under that statute “shall [not]… run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” We hold that it may not.
I
Respondents were arrested in a drug sting operation during which two of them pulled guns on undercover police officers. All three were convicted in New Mexico courts on charges arising from the holdup. The state courts sentenced them to prison terms ranging from 13 to 17 years. After they began to serve their state sentences, respondents were convicted in federal court of committing various drug offenses connected to the sting operation, and conspiring to do so, in violation of 21 U. s. C. §§ 841 and 846. They were also convicted of using firearms during and in relation to those drug trafficking crimes, in violation of 18 U. s. C. § 924(c). Respondents received sentences ranging from 120 to 147 months in prison, of which 60 months reflected the mandatory sentence required for their firearms convictions. Pursuant to § 924(c), the District Court ordered that the portion of respondents’ federal sentences attributable to the