Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
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JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides:
“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” This case presents the question whether a federal habeas corpus petition is an “application for State postconviction or other collateral review” within the meaning of this provision.
I
In 1992, several judgments of conviction for robbery were entered against respondent Sherman Walker in the
Leon Friedman and Joshua L. Dratel filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Kent S. Scheidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae. New York state courts. The last of these convictions came in June 1992, when respondent pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree in the New York Supreme Court, Queens County. Respondent was sentenced to 7 to 14 years in prison on this conviction.
Respondent unsuccessfully pursued a number of state remedies in connection with his convictions. It is unnecessary to describe all of these proceedings herein. Respondent’s last conviction was affirmed on June 12, 1995. Respondent was later denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. Respondent also sought a writ of error coram nobis, which the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
The Court holds that a tribe has no power to regulate the activities of state officials enforcing state law on land owned and controlled by the tribe. The majority’s sweeping opinion, without cause, undermines the authority of tribes to “‘make their own laws and be ruled by them.'” Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U. S. 438, 459 (1997) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959)). I write separately because Part II of the Court’s decision is unmoored from our precedents.
I A
Today, the Court finally resolves that Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 (1981), governs a tribe’s civil jurisdiction over nonmembers regardless of land ownership. Ante, at 358-360. This is done with little fanfare, but the holding is significant because we have equivocated on this question in the past.
In Montana, we held that the Tribe in that case could not regulate the hunting and fishing activities of nonmembers on nontriballand located within the geographical boundaries of the reservation. 450 U. S., at 557. We explained that the Tribe’s jurisdiction was limited to two instances-where a consensual relationship exists between the Tribe and nonmembers, or where jurisdiction was necessary to preserve tribal sovereignty-and we concluded that neither instance applied. Id., at 565-567; ante, at 358-360.
Given the facts of Montana, it was not clear whether the status of the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.
I join Parts I and III of JUSTICE SCALIA’S dissenting opinion in this case. I do not join Part II because I believe that, assuming, arguendo, that the Suspension Clause guarantees some minimum extent of habeas review, the right asserted by the alien in this case falls outside the scope of that review for the reasons explained by JUSTICE SCALIA in Part II-B of his dissenting opinion. The question whether the Suspension Clause assures habeas jurisdiction in this particular case properly is resolved on this ground alone, and there is no need to say more.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in the companion case of INS v. St. Cyr, ante, p. 326, I agree with JUSTICE SCALIA’S proposed disposition of the instant case.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In January 1999, the Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§ 21.01-21.07, 22.01-22.09 (2000). Petitioners, a group of cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar manufacturers and retailers, filed suit in Federal District Court claiming that the regulations violate federal law and the United States Constitution. In large measure, the District Court determined that the regulations are valid and enforceable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the regulations are not pre-empted by federal law and do not violate the First Amendment. The first question presented for our review is whether certain cigarette advertising regulations are pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), 79 Stat. 282, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq. The second question presented is whether certain regulations governing the advertising and sale of tobacco products violate the First Amendment.
for the City of Los Angeles et al. by Mark E. Haddad, James M. Harris, Joseph R. Guerra, and James K. Hahn; for the City of New York et al. by Michael D. Hess, Leonard J. Koerner, Elizabeth Susan Natrella, Richard M. Weinberg, and Sandra R. Gutman; for the American Legacy Foundation by A. Stephen Hut, Jr., John Payton, Patrick
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and write separately to explain more fully the circumstances in which a new rule is “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
It is only through the holdings of this Court, as opposed to this Court’s dicta and as opposed to the decisions of any other court, that a new rule is “made retroactive… by the Supreme Court” within the meaning of § 2244(b)(2)(A). See ante, at 663; cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000). The clearest instance, of course, in which we can be said to have “made” a new rule retroactive is where we expressly have held the new rule to be retroactive in a case on collateral review and applied the rule to that case. But, as the Court recognizes, a single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. Ante, at 666. This Court instead may “ma[k]e” a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. Ibid. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by JusTICE BREYER, post, at 672-673 (dissenting opinion), if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstan
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but with my understanding of how the issues discussed in Part II-B of the opinion must be considered on remand.
Part II-B of the Court’s opinion addresses the circumstance, present in this case, where a takings claimant has acquired title to the regulated property after the enactment of the regulation at issue. As the Court holds, the Rhode Island Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the sweeping rule that the preacquisition enactment of the use restriction ipso facto defeats any takings claim based on that use restriction. Accordingly, the Court holds that petitioner’s claim under Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978), “is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction.” Ante, at 630.
The more difficult question is what role the temporal relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisition plays in a proper Penn Central analysis. Today’s holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance. Our polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern partial regulatory takings. Under these cases, interference with investmentbacked
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 allows eligible employees to appeal termination and other serious disciplinary actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board. 5 U. S. C. §§ 7512-7513. The Federal Circuit ruled that, when assessing the reasonableness of these actions, the Board may not consider prior disciplinary actions that are pending in collectively bargained grievance proceedings.212 F.3d 1296, 1298 (2000). Because the Board has broad discretion in determining how to review prior disciplinary actions and need not adopt the Federal Circuit’s rule, we now vacate and remand for further proceedings.
I
Respondent Maria Gregory worked for petitioner United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibil
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, by Mark D. Roth and Charles A. Hobbie; for the National Association of Letter Carriers, AFLCIO, by Keith E. Secular; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Edward H. Passman and Paula A. Brantner; and for the National Treasury Employees Union by Gregory O’Duden, Barbara A. Atkin, and Kerry L. Adams. ity for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes, and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-iS. On April 7, 1997, respondent left work early to take her daughter to the doctor, ignoring her supervisor’s instructions to sort the mail for her route
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins, dissenting.
The Court today holds that 25 U. S. C. § 2719(d) (1994 ed.) clearly and unambiguously fails to give Indian Nations (Nations) the exemption from federal wagering excise and related occupational taxes enjoyed by the States. Because I believe § 2719(d) is subject to more than one interpretation, and because “statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit,” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U. S. 759, 766 (1985), I respectfully dissent.
I
I agree with the Court that § 2719(d) incorporates an error in drafting. I disagree, however, that the section’s reference to chapter 35 is necessarily that error.
As originally proposed in the Senate, the bill that became the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) would have applied all gambling and wagering-related sections of the Internal Revenue Code to the Nations in the same manner as the States:”Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, concerning the taxation and the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to gambling or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations conducted pursuant to this Act the same as they apply to State operations.” S. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1987).
The Senate Indian Affairs Committee altered the language of this bill in two contradictory ways. It restricted the applicable Code sections to those relating to the “reporting and withholding of taxes
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), a physical impairment that “substantially limits one or more… major life activities” is a “disability.” 42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994 ed.). Respondent, claiming to be disabled because of her carpal tunnel syndrome and other related impairments, sued petitioner, her former employer, for failing to provide her with a reasonable accommodation as required by the ADA. See § 12112(b)(5)(A). The District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner, finding that respondent’s impairments did not substantially limit any of her major life activities. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the impairments substantially limited respondent in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, and therefore granting partial summary judgment to respondent on the issue of whether she was disabled under the ADA. We conclude that the Court of Appeals did not apply the proper standard in making this determination because it analyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask whether respondent’s impairments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.
I
Respondent began working at petitioner’s automobile manufacturing plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, in August 1990. She was soon placed on an engine fabrication
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In federal court, petitioners asserted state law claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Maryland et al. by J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Andrew Baida, Solicitor General, Robert H. Kono, Acting Attorney General of Guam, and Dan Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Randolph Beales of Virginia; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley. § 1367 (1994 ed.), against respondent university, an arm of the State of Minnesota. Those claims were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and petitioners refiled them in state court past the period of limitations. The supplemental
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA or Act), 29 U. S. C. § 2601 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), clearly precludes the Secretary of Labor from adopting a rule requiring an employer to give an em ployee notice that leave is FMLA qualifying before the leave may be counted against the employer’s 12-week obligation. Because I believe the Secretary is justified in requiring such individualized notice and because I think that nothing in the Act constrains the Secretary’s ability to secure compliance with that requirement by refusing to count the leave against the employer’s statutory obligation, I respectfully dissent.
I
I begin with the question the Court set aside, see ante, at 88, whether the Secretary was justified in requiring individualized notice at all. The FMLA gives the Secretary the notice and comment rulemaking authority to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out” the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 2654 (1994 ed.). In light of this explicit congressional delegation of rulemaking authority, we must uphold the Secretary’s regulations unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984).
The Secretary has reasonably determined that individualized notice is necessary to implement the FMLA’s provisions. According to
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, concurring in the judgment.
The Court today holds that there is no need in this case to defer to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s regulation because the agency’s position is the one it “would adopt even if there were no formal rule and [the Court] were interpreting the statute from scratch.” Ante, at 114. I do not agree that the EEOC has adopted the most natural interpretation of Title VII’s provisions regarding the filing with the EEOC of charges of discrimination. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (1994 ed.). But, because the statute is at least somewhat ambiguous, I would defer to the agency’s interpretation. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-844 (1984); EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107, 125 (1988) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[D]eference [to the EEOC] is particularly appropriate on this type of technical issue of agency procedure”). I think the regulation, 29 CFR § 1601.12(b) (1997), should be sustained on this alternative basis.
Title VII requires “charges” of discrimination to “be in writing under oath or affirmation.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(b). It also requires “charge[s]” to “be filed within one hundred and eighty [or in some circumstances three hundred] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” § 2000e-5(e)(1). The most natural reading of these provisions is that the first is intended
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join as to Part II, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), 18 U. S. C. § 2251 et seq., proscribes the “knowin[gJ” reproduction, distribution, sale, reception, or possession of images that fall under the statute’s definition of child pornography, § 2252A(a). Possession is punishable by up to 5 years in prison for a first offense, § 2252A(b), and all other transgressions are punishable by up to 15 years in prison for a first offense, § 2252A(a). The CPP A defines child pornography to include “any visual depiction… of sexually explicit conduct” where “such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” § 2256(8)(B) (emphasis added), or “such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” § 2256(8)(D) (emphasis added). The statute defines “sexually explicit conduct” as “actual or simulated… sexual intercourse… ;… bestiality;… masturbation;… sadistic or masochistic abuse; or… lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.” § 2256(2).
The CPPA provides for two affirmative defenses. First, a defendant is not liable for possession if the defendant possesses less than three proscribed images and
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises the question whether a tenant by the entirety possesses “property” or “rights to property” to which a federal tax lien may attach. 26 U. S. C. § 6321. Relying on the state law fiction that a tenant by the entirety has no separate interest in entireties property, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that such property is exempt from the tax lien. We conclude that, despite the fiction, each tenant possesses individual rights in the estate sufficient to constitute “property” or “rights to property” for the purposes of the lien, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
In 1988, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $482,446 in unpaid income tax liabilities against Don Craft, the husband of respondent Sandra L. Craft, for failure to file federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1986. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a, 72a. When he failed to pay, a federal tax lien attached to “all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to” him. 26 U. S. C. § 6321.
At the time the lien attached, respondent and her husband owned a piece of real property in Grand Rapids, Michigan, as tenants by the entirety. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a. After notice of the lien was filed, they jointly executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the husband’s interest in the property to respondent for one dollar. Ibid. When respondent attempted to sell the property
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I agree with portions of the opinion of the Court, but I find problematic the Court’s test for determining whether the fact that a job reassignment violates a seniority system makes the reassignment an unreasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Although a seniority system plays an important role in the workplace, for the reasons I explain below, I would prefer to say that the effect of a seniority system on the reasonableness of a reassignment as an accommodation for purposes of the ADA depends on whether the seniority system is legally enforceable. “Were it possible for me to adhere to [this belief] in my vote, and for the Court at the same time to [adopt a majority rule],” I would do so. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring in result). “The Court, however, is divided in opinion,” ibid., and if each Member voted consistently with his or her beliefs, we would not agree on a resolution of the question presented in this case. Yet “[s]talemate should not prevail,” ibid., particularly in a case in which we are merely interpreting a statute. Accordingly, in order that the Court may adopt a rule, and because I believe the Court’s rule will often lead to the same outcome as the one I would have adopted, I join the Court’s opinion despite my concerns. Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 655-656 (1998) (STEVENS, J.,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 127(a) of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA or Act), 111 Stat. 2328, 21 U. S. C. § 353a, exempts “compounded drugs” from the Food and Drug Administration’s standard drug approval requirements as long as the providers of those drugs abide by several restrictions, including that they refrain from advertising or promoting particular compounded drugs. Respondents, a group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs, sought to enjoin enforcement of the subsections of the Act dealing with advertising and solicitation, arguing that those provisions violate the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. The District Court agreed with respondents and granted their motion for summary judgment, holding that the provisions do not meet the test for acceptable government regulation of commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson Gas&Elec. Corp.v.Public Servo Comm’n of N.Y.,447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980). The court invalidated the relevant provisions, severing them from the rest of § 127(a).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing that the provisions regarding advertisement and promotion are unconstitutional but finding them not to be severable from the rest of § 127(a). Petitioners challenged only the Court of Appeals’ constitutional holding in their petition for certiorari, and respondents did not file a cross-petition. We therefore address
JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JusTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join.
Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.70(C) (1983), as amended, prohibits “the establishment or maintenance of more than one adult entertainment business in the same building, structure or portion thereof.” Respondents, two adult establishments that each operated an adult bookstore and an adult video arcade in the same building, filed a suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V), alleging that § 12.70(C) violates the First Amendment and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents, finding that the city of Los Angeles’ prohibition was a content-based regulation of speech that failed strict scrutiny. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. It held that, even if § 12.70(C) were a contentneutral regulation, the city failed to demonstrate that the
barna, Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Mike McGrath of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Herbert D. Soll of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Mike
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the plurality that even if obscenity on the Internet is defined in terms of local community standards, respondents have not shown that the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) is overbroad solely on the basis of the variation in the standards of different communities. See ante, at 577579. Like JUSTICE BREYER, however, see post, at 589 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), I write separately to express my views on the constitutionality and desirability of adopting a national standard for obscenity for regulation of the Internet.
The plurality’s opinion argues that, even under local community standards, the variation between the most and least restrictive communities is not so great with respect to the narrow category of speech covered by COPA as to, alone, render the statute substantially overbroad. See ante, at 577-579. I agree, given respondents’ failure to provide examples of materials that lack literary, artistic, political, and scientific value for minors, which would nonetheless result in variation among communities judging the other elements of the test. Respondents’ examples of material for which com munity standards would vary include such things as the appropriateness of sex education and the desirability of adoption by same-sex couples. Brief for Respondents 43. Material addressing the latter topic, however, seems highly unlikely to be seen to appeal to the prurient
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a nonnamed member of a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), sought to appeal the approval of a settlement over objections he stated at the fairness hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that he lacked the power to bring such an appeal because he was not a named class representative and because he had not successfully moved to intervene in the litigation. We now reverse.
I
Petitioner Robert Devlin, a retired worker represented by the Transportation Communications International Union (Union), participates in a defined benefits pension plan (Plan) administered by the Union. In 1991, on the recommendation of the Plan’s trustees, the Plan was amended to add a cost of living adjustment (COLA) for retired and active employees. As it turned out, however, the Plan was not able to support such a large benefits increase. To address this problem, the Plan’s new trustees sought to freeze the COLA. Because they were concerned about incurring Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) liability by eliminating the COLA for retired workers, see 29 U. S. C. § 1054(g)(1) (1994 ed.) (providing that accrued benefits “may not be decreased by an amendment of the plan”), the trustees froze the COLA only as to active employees. Because the Plan still lacked sufficient funds, the new trustees obtained an equitable decree from the United States District Court for the District of
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE KENNEDY join as to all but Part I, and with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins as to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Part II-A of the Court’s opinion because I agree that Title VII suits based on discrete discriminatory acts are time barred when the plaintiff fails to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the 180or 300-day time period designated in the statute. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). I dissent from the remainder of the Court’s opinion, however, because I believe a similar restriction applies to all types of Title VII suits, including those based on a claim that a plaintiff has been subjected to a hostile work environment.
I
The Court today holds that, for discrete discriminatory acts, § 2000e-5(e)(1) serves as a form of statute oflimitations, barring recovery for actions that take place outside the charge-filing period. The Court acknowledges, however, that this limitations period may be adjusted by equitable doctrines. See ante, at 114, n. 7; see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393 (1982) (“We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”). Like the Court, I see no need to resolve fully the application of the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
The Court today is divided on the question of what standard to apply when evaluating compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting. I write separately because, although I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that the Fifth Amendment compulsion standard is broader than the “atypical and significant hardship” standard we have adopted for evaluating due process claims in prisons, see post, at 58-60 (dissenting opinion) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976)), I do not believe that the alterations in respondent’s prison conditions as a result of his failure to participate in the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) were so great as to constitute compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. I therefore agree with the plurality that the decision below should be reversed.
The text of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person’s refusal to incriminate himself or herself-it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. Not all pressure necessarily “compel[s]” incriminating statements.
For instance, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 455 (1966), we found that an environment of police custodial interrogation was coercive enough to require prophylactic warnings only after observing that such an environment exerts a “heavy toll on individual liberty.” But we have not required Miranda warnings
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In the year 2000 census, the Census Bureau used the statistical technique known as “hot-deck imputation” to calculate the state population totals that were used to apportion congressional Representatives. While I agree with the Court’s general description of the imputation process, its conclusion that the appellants have standing to challenge its use, and its conclusion that we otherwise have jurisdiction to consider that challenge, I would find that the Bureau’s use of imputation constituted a form of sampling and thus was prohibited by § 195 of the Census Act, 13 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. Therefore, while I concur in Parts I and II of the majority’s opinion, I respectfully dissent from Part III and have no occasion to decide whether the Constitution prohibits imputation, which the majority addresses in Part 11.
I
To conduct the year 2000 census, the Census Bureau (Bureau) first created a master address file that attempted to list every residential housing unit in the United States. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Admin., Census 2000 Operational Plan VI (Dec. 2000) (hereinafter Census 2000 Operational Plan). The Bureau then conducted a survey of every address on that list, primarily through the use of mail-back questionnaires. See id., at IX.A to IX.E; ante, at 457. As relevant here, these questionnaires requested the name of each person living at a given address. See Census 2000 Operational Plan
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner sued respondent unions, claiming that their lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities violated federallabor law and antitrust law. After petitioner lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board decided petitioner had violated federal labor law by prosecuting an unsuccessful suit with a retaliatory motive. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because we find the Board
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. by Stanley R. Strauss, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. Conrad, and Joshua A. Ulman; and for the Society for Human Resource Management et al. by Mark A. Carter and Daniel V. Yager. lacked authority to assess liability using this standard, we reverse and remand.
I
Petitioner, an industrial general contractor, received a contract to modernize a California steel mill near the beginning of 1987. 246 F.3d 619, 621 (CA6 2001). According to petitioner, various unions attempted to delay the project because petitioner’s employees were nonunion. Ibid. That September, petitioner and the mill operator filed suit against those unions in the District Court for the Northern District of California. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. The suit was based on the following basic allegations: First, the unions had lobbied for adoption and enforcement of an emissions standard, despite having no real concern the project would harm the environment.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
Petitioner bases his statutory argument that brandishing must be interpreted as an offense element on Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227 (1999). He bases his constitutional argument that regardless of how the statute is interpreted, brandishing must be charged in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000). As I dissented in Jones and Apprendi and still believe both were wrongly decided, I find it easy to reject petitioner’s arguments. Even assuming the validity of Jones and Apprendi, however, I agree that petitioner’s arguments that brandishing must be charged in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt are unavailing. I therefore join JUSTICE KENNEDY’S opinion in its entirety.