Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
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JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
Petition circulation undoubtedly has a significant political speech component. When an initiative petition circulator approaches a person and asks that person to sign the petition, the circulator is engaging in “interactive communication concerning political change.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U. S. 414, 422 (1988). It was the imposition of a direct and substantial burden on this one-on-one communication that concerned us in Meyer v. Grant. To address this concern, we held in that case that regulations directly burdening the one-on-one, communicative aspect of petition circulation are subject to strict scrutiny. Id., at 420.
Not all circulation-related regulations target this aspect of petition circulation, however. Some regulations govern the electoral process by directing the manner in which an initiative proposal qualifies for placement on the ballot. These latter regulations may indirectly burden speech but are a step removed from the communicative aspect of petitioning and are necessary to maintain an orderly electoral process. Accordingly, these regulations should be subject to a less exacting standard of review.
In this respect, regulating petition circulation is similar to regulating candidate elections. Regulations that govern a candidate election invariably burden to some degree one’s right to vote and one’s right to associate for political purposes. Such restrictions
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act or Voting Rights Act), 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973et seq.,des
* Deborah J. La Fetra filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. ignated States and political subdivisions are required to obtain federal preclearance before giving effect to changes in their voting laws. See § 1973c. Here, the State of California (California or State), which is not subject to the Act’s preclearance requirements, has passed legislation altering the scheme for electing judges in Monterey County, California (Monterey County or County), a “covered” jurisdiction required to preclear its voting changes. In this appeal, we review the conclusion of a three-judge District Court that Monterey County need not seek approval of these changes before giving them effect. The District Court reasoned, specifically, that California is not subject to the preclearance requirement and that Monterey County merely implemented a California law without exercising any independent discretion. We hold that the Act’s preclearance requirements apply to measures mandated by a noncovered State to the extent that these measures will effect a voting change in a covered county. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the District Court.
I
The instant appeal marks the second occasion on which this Court has addressed issues arising in the course of litigation over the method for electing
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-B.
The Census Bureau (Bureau) has announced a plan to use two forms of statistical sampling in the 2000 Decennial Census to address a chronic and apparently growing problem of “undercounting” certain identifiable groups of individuals. Two sets of plaintiffs filed separate suits challenging the legality and constitutionality of the Bureau’s plan. Convened as three-judge courts, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and the District Court for the District of Columbia each held that the Bureau’s plan for the 2000 census violates the Census Act, 13 U. s. C. § 1 et seq., and both courts permanently enjoined the Bureau’s planned use of statistical sampling to determine the population for purposes of congressional apportionment. 19 F. Supp. 2d 543 (ED Va. 1998); 11 F. Supp. 2d 76 (DC 1998). We noted probable jurisdiction in both cases, 524 U. S. 978 (1998); 525 u. S. 924 (1998), and consolidated the cases for oral argument, 525
rien; for Jerome Gray et al. by Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, and Edward Still.
Donald Dinan filed a brief for the District of Columbia State Democratic Committee urging reversal in No. 98-564.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 98-404 were filed for the State of Wisconsin et al. by James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Peter C. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Mike Fisher, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Calvin R.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JusTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and I write separately to express my views about the meaning of prejudice in this context. When, as here, a district court fails to advise a defendant of his right to appeal, there are two ways in which this error could be said not to have prejudiced the defendant. First, a defendant might not be prejudiced by the error because he already knew about his right to appeal. That is the case here, and the Court properly concludes that under these circumstances, the defendant has not shown that he is entitled to collateral relief.
Second, a defendant might not be prejudiced by the district court’s failure to advise him of his right to appeal because he had no meritorious grounds for appeal in any event. In my opinion, there is no reason why a defendant should have to demonstrate that he had meritorious grounds for an appeal when he is attempting to show that he was harmed by the district court’s error. To require defendants to specify the grounds for their appeal and show that they have some merit would impose a heavy burden on defendants who are often proceeding pro se in an initial 28 U. S. C. § 2255 motion. If the district judge had fulfilled his obligation to advise the defendant of his right to appeal, and the defendant had wanted to appeal, he would have had a lawyer to identify and develop his arguments on appeal. The defendant should not be
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, and with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join as to Part I, dissenting.
The Court today ignores the plain meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Federal Labor Statute or Statute) and erroneously concludes that when an agency responds to a judicial decision by abandoning its own interpretation of a statute and adopting that of the judicial forum this Court should defer to the agency’s revised position, rather than evaluate whether the revised interpretation renders, in fact, the most plausible reading of the statute. I respectfully dissent.
I
The Federal Labor Statute plainly does not impose a general duty on agencies to bargain midterm. See Social Security Administration v. FLRA, 956 F.2d 1280, 1281 (CA4 1992). Whether the language of a statute is plain or ambiguous is determined “by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997).
Here, the language of the Federal Labor Statute, as well as the specific and broader contexts in which that language is used, demonstrates that the Statute is unambiguous. The Federal Labor Statute specifies a few instances where midterm bargaining is required, see 5 U. S. C. § 7106(b), but it contains no provision that expressly or implicitly imposes a general duty on agencies to bargain during the term of a collective
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, and I agree that the State’s failure to properly raise its challenge to our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence supports a decision not to pass on the merits of this claim. Ante this page. I further note, however, that the State does nothing that would persuade me to reconsider or abandon our well-established body of negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1837, the United States entered into a Treaty with several Bands of Chippewa Indians. Under the terms of this Treaty, the Indians ceded land in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota to the United States, and the United States guar
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Richard M. Frank and Jan S. Stevens, Assistant Attorneys General, and Joel S. Jacobs, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Brent D. Boger and Robin L. Rivett.
Carter G. Phillips, Virginia A. Seitz, and John Bell filed a brief for the National Congress of American Indians et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Douglas Y. Freeman filed a brief for the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance as amicus curiae. anteed to the Indians certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. We must decide whether the Chippewa Indians retain these usufructuary rights today. The State of Minnesota argues that the Indians lost these rights through an Executive Order in 1850, an 1855 Treaty, and the admission of Minnesota into the Union in 1858. After
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner brought suit against the Monroe County Board of Education and other defendants, alleging that her fifthgrade daughter had been the victim of sexual harassment by another student in her class. Among petitioner’s claims was a claim for monetary and injunctive relief under Title IX of
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Sara L. Mandelbaum and Steven R. Shapiro; for the National Education Association et al. by Judith L. Lichtman and Donna R. Lenhoff; for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Martha F. Davis, Julie Goldscheid, Yolanda S. Wu, David S. Ettinger, and Mary-Christine Sungaila; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National School Boards Association et al. by Lisa A. Brown, Jennifer Jacobs, and Julie Underwood; and for Students for Individual Liberty et al. by James A. Moody.
Richard P. Ward and Anita K. Blair filed a brief for the Independent Women’s Forum as amicus curiae. the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. The District Court dismissed petitioner’s Title IX claim on the ground that “student-on-student,” or peer, harassment provides no ground for a private cause of action under the statute. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. We consider
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court. 28 U. s. C. §§ 2254(b)(1), (c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III). In this case, we are asked to decide whether a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for
* Edward M. Chikofsky and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. We conclude that he must.
I
In 1977, respondent Darren Boerckel was tried in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Illinois, for the rape, burglary, and aggravated battery of an 87-year-old woman. The central evidence against him at trial was his written confession to the crimes, a confession admitted over Boerckel’s objection. The jury convicted Boerckel on all three charges, and he was sentenced to serve 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment on the rape charge, and shorter terms on the other two charges, with all sentences to be served concurrently.
Boerckel appealed his convictions to the Appellate Court of Illinois, raising several issues. He argued, among other things, that his confession should have been suppressed because the confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest, because the confession was coerced, and because he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance, Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992) (gang loitering ordinance or ordinance) is unconstitutionally vague. A penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited” or fails to establish guidelines to prevent “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” of the law. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 357 (1983). Of these, “the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is… the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”’ Id., at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 574-575 (1974)). I share JUSTICE THOMAS’ concern about the consequences of gang violence, and I agree that some degree of police discretion is necessary to allow the police “to perform their peacekeeping responsibilities satisfactorily.” Post, at 109 (dissenting opinion). A criminal law, however, must not permit policemen, prosecutors, and juries to conduct “‘a standardless sweep… to pursue their personal predilections.”’ Kolender v. Lawson, supra, at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, supra, at 575).
The ordinance at issue provides:”Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. * Section 803(d)(3) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA or Act), 110 Stat. 1321-72, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(d)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. III), t places limits on the fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits. We are asked to decide how this section applies to cases that were pending when the PLRA became effective on April 26, 1996. We conclude that § 803(d)(3) limits attorney’s fees with respect to post judgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA’s effective date but it does not so limit fees for post judgment monitoring performed before the effective date.
I
The fee disputes before us arose out of two class action lawsuits challenging the conditions of confinement in the Michigan prison system. The first case, which we will call Glover, began in 1977 when a now-certified class of female prisoners filed suit under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Glover plaintiffs alleged that the defendant prison officials had violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them access to vocational and educational opportunities that were available to male prisoners. They also claimed that the defendants had denied them their right of access to the courts. After a bench trial, the District Court found “[s]ignificant discrimination against the female prison population”
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), 105 Stat. 1071, punitive damages are available in claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000eet seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.Punitive damages are limited, however, to cases in which the em
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey L. Needle and Mark S. Mandell; for the National Employment Lawyers Association et al. by Janice Goodman, Paula A. Brantner, and Peter S. Rukin; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W Whitehead and Steven H. Aden.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams and Ann Elizabeth Reesman; for the National Retail Federation by Robert P. Joy; for the Society for Human Resource Management by D. Gregory Valenza and Roger S. Kaplan; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Michael J. Connolly, David A. Lawrence, Clifford J. Scharman, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D. Kamenar.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Timothy B. Dyk, Daniel H. Bromberg, John B. Kennedy, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by James M. Finberg, Daniel F.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), dismissed petitioner Vaughn L. Murphy from his job as a UPS mechanic because of his high blood pressure. Petitioner filed suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.,in Federal District Court. The District Court granted summary judgment to respondent, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly considered petitioner in his medicated state when it held that petitioner’s impairment does
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Massachusetts et al. by Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Catherine C. Ziehl, Assistant Attorney General, Darrell V. McGraw, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Mary C. Buchmelter, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Bill Lockyer of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, and Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico; for the American Diabetes Association by Michael A. Greene; for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Gary Phelan and Paul A. Brantner; and for Senator Harkin et al. by Arlene B. Mayerson.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Trucking
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. § 12101et seq.,prohibits certain employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their disabilities. See § 12112(a). Petitioners challenge the dismissal of their ADA action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed. In reaching that result, we hold that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment, including, in this instance, eyeglasses and contact lenses. In addition, we hold that petitioners failed to allege properly that respondent “regarded” them as having a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
I
Petitioners’ amended complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we accept the allegations contained in their complaint as true for purposes of this case. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U. S. 315, 327 (1991).
Petitioners are twin sisters, both of whom have severe myopia. Each petitioner’s uncorrected visual acuity is 20/ 200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye, but “[w]ith the use of corrective lenses, each… has vision that is 20/20 or better.” App. 23. Consequently, without corrective lenses, each “effectively cannot see to conduct
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621et seq.(1994 ed. and Supp. III), makes it unlawful for an employer, including a State, “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual… because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). In these cases, three sets of plaintiffs filed suit under the Act, seeking money damages for their state employers’ alleged discrimination on the basis of age. In each case, the state employer moved to dismiss the suit on the basis of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The District Court in one case granted the motion to dismiss, while in each of the remaining cases the District Court denied the motion. Appeals in the three cases were consolidated before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. In these cases, we are asked to consider whether the ADEA contains a clear
Foley, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitor, and Matthew J. Lampke, Assistant Solicitor, Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we must decide the proper framework for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal without respondent’s consent.
I
The State of California charged respondent, Lucio FloresOrtega, with one count of murder, two counts of assault, and a personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement allegation. In October 1993, respondent appeared in Superior Court with his court-appointed public defender, Nancy Kops, and a Spanish language interpreter, and pleaded guilty to seconddegree murder. The plea was entered pursuant to a California rule permitting a defendant both to deny committing a crime and to admit that there is sufficient evidence to convict him. See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P. 2d 409 (1970). In exchange for the guilty plea, the state prosecutor moved to strike the allegation of personal use of a deadly weapon and to dismiss both assault charges. On November 10, 1993,
* Kent S. Scheidegger and Christine M. Murphy filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Lawrence S. Lustberg, Kevin McNulty, and Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging affirmance. respondent was sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison. After pronouncing sentence, the trial judge informed respondent, “You may file an appeal within 60 days from today’s date
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves one of the most troubling public health problems facing our Nation today: the thousands of premature deaths that occur each year because of tobacco use. In 1996, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), after having expressly disavowed any such authority since its inception, asserted jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44619-45318. The FDA concluded that nicotine is a “drug” within the meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or Act), 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 301et seq.,and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are “combination products” that deliver nicotine to the body. 61 Fed. Reg. 44397 (1996). Pursuant to this authority, it promulgated regulations intended to reduce tobacco consumption among children and adolescents.Id.,at 4461544618. The agency believed that, because most tobacco consumers begin their use before reaching the age of 18, curbing tobacco use by minors could substantially reduce the prevalence of addiction in future generations and thus the incidence of tobacco-related death and disease.Id.,at 44398-44399.
Regardless of how serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to address, however, it may not exercise its authority “in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.” ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U. S. 495, 517 (1988). And although agencies are generally entitled to deference
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that the case is not moot. A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.County of Los Angelesv.Davis,440 U. S. 625Syllabus, 631. Simply closing Kandyland is not sufficient to moot the case because Pap’s is still incorporated under Pennsylvania
law, and could again decide to operate a nude dancing establishment in Erie. Moreover, Pap’s failed, despite its obligation to the Court, to mention the potential mootness issue in its brief in opposition, which was filed after Kandyland was closed and the property sold. See Board of License Comm’rs of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U. S. 238, 240. In any event, this is not a run of the mill voluntary cessation case. Here it is the plaintiff who, having prevailed below, seeks to have the case declared moot. And it is the defendant city that seeks to invoke the federal judicial power to obtain this Court’s review of the decision. Cf. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 617-618. The city has an ongoing injury because it is barred from enforcing the ordinance’s public nudity provisions. If the ordinance is found constitutional, then Erie can enforce it, and the availability of such relief is sufficient to prevent the case from being moot. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13. And Pap’s still has a concrete stake in the case’s outcome because,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an action for damages against a railroad due to its alleged failure to maintain adequate warning devices at a grade crossing in western Tennessee. After her husband was killed in a crossing accident, respondent brought suit against petitioner, the operator of the train involved in the collision. Respondent claimed that the warning signs posted at the crossing, which had been installed using federal funds, were insufficient to warn motorists of the danger posed by passing trains. The specific issue we must decide is whether the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 971, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 20101et seq.,in conjunction with the Federal Highway Administration’s regulation addressing the adequacy of warning devices installed with federal funds, pre-empts state tort actions such as respondent’s. We hold that it does.
I A
In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) “to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.” 49 U. S. C. § 20101. The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation the authority to “prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety,” § 20103(a), and directs the Secretary to “maintain a coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem,” § 20134(a). The FRSA also contains an express pre-emption provision, which states:
Laws, regulations,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court as to Part II (except as to the footnote), concluding that § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant relief to a state prisoner with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court: The habeas writ may issue only if the state-court adjudication (1) “was contrary to,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of… ” clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Pp.402-413.
(a) Because Williams filed his petition in 1997, his case is not governed by the pre-1996 version of the federal habeas statute, but by the statute as amended by AEDPA. Accordingly, for Williams to obtain federal habeas relief, he must first demonstrate that his case satisfies the condition set by § 2254(d)(1). That provision modifies the previously settled rule of independent federal review of state prisoners’ habeas petitions in order to curb delays, to prevent “retrials” on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law. In light of the cardinal principle of statutory construction that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, this Court must give independent meaning to both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1). Given the commonly understood definitions of “contrary” as “diametrically different,” “opposite in character or nature,” or “mutually
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to make the following observations concerning the Court’s decision. First, in Part II-A, the Court holds that the Secretary did not exceed his authority under the Taylor Grazing Act by promulgating the new “grazing preference” and “permitted use” rules. I agree with that holding but would place special emphasis on the Court’s third reason for rejecting petitioners’ facial challenge to the regulations. Petitioners have not shown how the new regulations themselves-rather than specific actions the Secretary might take pursuant to those regulations-violate the Taylor Grazing Act’s requirement that “grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged… be adequately safeguarded.” 43 U. S. C. § 315b. It is of particular importance, as the Court notes, ante, at 743, that the Secretary has assured us that the new regulations do not in actual practice “alter the active use/suspended use formula in grazing permits” and that” ‘present suspended use would continue to be recognized and have a priority for additional grazing use within the allotment.'” Brief for Respondents 22 (quoting Bureau of Land Management, Rangeland Reform ’94: Final Environmental Impact Statement 144 (1994)). For these reasons, petitioners’ facial challenge to the regulations must fail. Should a permit holder find, however, that the Secretary’s specific application of the new regulations deviates from the above
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
In most cases, an issue not presented to an administrative decisionmaker cannot be argued for the first time in federal court. On this underlying principle of administrative law, the Court is unanimous. See ante, at 108; post, at 114-115 (BREYER, J., dissenting). In the absence of a specific statute or regulation requiring issue exhaustion, however, such a rule is not always appropriate. The inquiry requires careful examination of “the characteristics of the particular administrative procedure provided.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U. S. 140, 146 (1992). The Court’s opinion provides such an examination, and reaches the correct result. Accordingly, I join Parts I and II -A of the Court’s opinion, as well as its judgment. I write separately because, in my view, the agency’s failure to notify claimants of an issue exhaustion requirement in this context is a sufficient basis for our decision. Requiring issue exhaustion is particularly inappropriate here, where the regulations and procedures of the Social Security Administration (SSA) affirmatively suggest that specific issues need not be raised before the Appeals Council.
Although the SSA’s regulations warn claimants that completely failing to request Appeals Council review will forfeit the right to seek judicial review, see 20 CFR § 404.900(b) (1999), the regulations provide no notice that claimants must also raise specific issues before the Appeals Council to preserve
JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JusTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join.
Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington permits “[a]ny person” to petition a superior court for visitation rights “at any time,” and authorizes that court to grant such visitation rights whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child.” Petitioners Jenifer and Gary Troxel petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their grandchildren, Isabelle and Natalie Troxel. Respondent Tommie Granville, the mother of Isabelle and Natalie, opposed the petition. The case ultimately reached the Washington Supreme Court, which held that § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally interferes with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.
I
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel shared a relationship that ended in June 1991. The two never married, but they had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad’s parents, and thus the paternal grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie. After Tommie and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought his daughters to his parents’ home for weekend visitation. Brad committed suicide in May 1993. Although the Troxels at first continued to see Isabelle and Natalie on a regular basis after their son’s death, Tommie Granville in
and Education Fund et al. by Patricia M. Logue, Ruth E. Harlow, and Beatrice Dohrn; for
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994), a majority of the Court held that “[w]here the State puts the defendant’s future dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury… that he is parole ineligible.” Id., at 178 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); see also id., at 163-164 (plurality opinion). Due process requires that “a defendant not be sentenced to death ‘on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.”’ Id., at 175 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 5, n. 1 (1986)). Accordingly, where the State seeks to demonstrate that the defendant poses a future danger to society, he “should be allowed to bring his parole ineligibility to the jury’s attention” as a means of rebutting the State’s case. 512 U. S., at 177. I have no doubt that Simmons was rightly decided.
In this case, because petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus rather than the vacatur of his sentence on direct appeal, the scope of our review is governed by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III). Accordingly, we may grant relief only if the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the kind and amount of evidence necessary to sustain a jury’s verdict that an employer unlawfully discriminated on the basis of age. Specifically, we must resolve whether a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff’s case consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action. We must also decide whether the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the particular circumstances presented here.
I
In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years old and had spent 40 years in the employ of respondent, Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers. 197 F.3d 688, 690 (CA5 1999). Petitioner worked in a department known as the “Hinge Room,” where he supervised the “regular line.” Ibid. Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, supervised the Hinge Room’s “special line,” and Russell Caldwell, the manager of the Hinge Room and age 45, supervised both petitioner and Oswalt. Ibid. Petitioner’s responsibilities included recording the attendance and hours of those under his supervision, and reviewing a weekly report that listed the hours worked by each employee. 3 Record 38-40.
In the summer of 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the director of manufacturing and the husband of company president Sandra Sanderson,