O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired):

Appellant Hashmel Turner claims that the Council for the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia, violated his First Amendment rights when it implemented a policy beginning in 2005 requiring that legislative prayers be nondenominational. Because the prayers at issue here are government speech, we hold that Fredericksburg’s prayer policy does not violate Turner’s Free Speech and Free Exercise rights. Likewise, the requirement that the prayers be nondenominational does not violate the Establishment Clause.

I.

The Council of the City of Fredericksburg, Virginia (“the Council”) begins every meeting with a Call to Order, which consists of an opening prayer offered by one of the Council’s elected members followed by the Pledge of Allegiance. Only Council members are allowed to offer the opening prayer, and the Council members rotate the Call to Order duty. Until 2005, members of the Council were allowed to offer denominational prayers.

Turner was first elected to the Council in 2002. He is an ordained minister and a part-time pastor of the First Baptist Church of Love. Turner’s religious beliefs require him to close his prayers in the name of Jesus Christ. Turner’s prayers on behalf of the Council reflected this practice.

In 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union threatened to file a lawsuit if the Council’s practice of opening with sectarian prayers continued. The City Attorney examined the relevant case law and concluded that the safest course

SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired).

Appellant claims the introduction into evidence of phone calls between him and Kenneth Durgin, an inmate in a correctional facility, violated the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. Because Durgin consented to monitoring of his calls, we affirm the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress.

I.

Appellant Christopher Conley first came to the government’s attention during an investigation into a drug trafficking ring. Kenneth Durgin, who was serving time in the Maine Correctional Center (“MCC”), was also suspected of involvement in that ring. Witnesses identified appellant as a potential member of the organization. But when he was called before a grand jury and interviewed by government agents, he denied his involvement with the group, his alias of “White Boy,” and any relationship with Durgin.

Another arm of the investigation focused on inmate Durgin. Agent Paul McNeil informed Peter Herring, the correctional investigator responsible for investigating alleged crimes at MCC, that he suspected Durgin was involved in ongoing drug trafficking operations while he was incarcerated. He requested permission to record and listen to Durgin’s phone conversations. Permission was granted, and Herring transferred recordings of Durgin’s calls to McNeil.

Unfortunately for appellant, the phone conversations were all too illuminating. During those calls, Durgin spoke with appellant. Appellant bragged that the government

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.):

Section 7407 of Title 26 of the United States Code permits the United States to seek, and a district court to issue, an injunction prohibiting tax preparers from engaging in certain deceptive or fraudulent practices. 26 U.S.C. § 7407. The district court may specifically enjoin a tax preparer from engaging in a variety of deceptive practices, including misrepresenting his eligibility to practice before the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). § 7407(b)(1)(A)-(D), (b)(2). If the district court finds that the tax preparer has continuously engaged in offensive conduct, and that an injunction specifically prohibiting such conduct would not be effective at preventing further abuses, “the court may enjoin such person from acting as a tax return preparer” altogether. § 7407(b)(2).

In this case, the Government brought a suit against Abelardo Ernest Cruz and four co-defendants seeking to enjoin them from operating as tax return preparers. The complaint alleged that the defendants engaged in a fraudulent tax preparation scheme in which they would intentionally overstate deductions and credits on their clients’ tax returns in an effort to reduce their clients’ tax liabilities and increase their refunds. It further alleged that the defendants made various misrepresentations regarding their eligibility to practice before the IRS.

The District Court found that the defendants had engaged in deceptive practices in preparing tax returns and issued an injunction

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired):

Melvin Gary appeals the district court’s decision to allow the government to introduce evidence obtained from a search of his home pursuant to a warrant. He claims the affidavit underlying that warrant failed to establish probable cause on its face, and that the warrant was void because the affidavit excluded material information. Because the warrant was issued in good faith and the information excluded was not material, we affirm the district court.

I.

Late on the evening of March 25, 2005, Officer Graves of the Richmond Police Department investigated a tip from an unnamed informant. The informant had suggested that an individual named “Melvin” was selling illegal narcotics from 601 Northside Avenue. Graves visited the address in question and noticed that there were several green trash cans in the alley behind the home. Two of those trash cans were directly behind number 601. One can was spray-painted with the number “601”; adjacent to it was a second trash can, which was unmarked.

Graves removed several large, black trash bags from both cans. All the bags he removed were tied in a similar fashion. Graves did not document which bag came from which can. Inside the trash bags, Officer Graves found two plastic bags containing a white powder residue, which he believed to be heroin, squares of foil and plastic bags with the corners removed (materials often used in packaging narcotics), a document addressed to “Tammy Sauls” at 601 Northside

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Associate Justice O’CONNOR wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Judge GREGORY joined.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired):

Defendant-appellant Paul Guild sexually assaulted two boys entrusted to his care by their respective parents on his promise that he would tutor them and arrange for their participation in music lessons and team sports. He presents a host of challenges to his conviction and sentence. We find none meritorious and consequently affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Guild served as a Regional Supervisory Executive Officer for the U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) stationed in Kiev, Ukraine. When one of his colleagues was transferred from Kiev to the United States, Guild agreed to take in her fourteen-year-old son, Nathan, so that Nathan could complete orthodontic treatments. Guild agreed to arrange for music lessons, team sports, and summer jobs for Nathan, and also to tutor Nathan in math and English. When another member of the Kiev diplomatic community learned of these planned activities, he asked if his fifteen-year-old stepson, Ousmane, could participate as well, and Guild agreed.

One night when Ousmane was sleeping over, Guild called the two boys to his room, where he was seated with a towel over his lap, otherwise naked. Guild told the boys that he had been spanked as a child, made each take off his pants and underwear,

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.).

A jury convicted Raul Jiminez of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. Jiminez challenges the proceedings below on two grounds. First, Jiminez contends that the district court improperly allowed certain evidence to be introduced which was unfairly prejudicial. Second, Jiminez contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in the contested evidentiary rulings and a reasonable jury could have found Jiminez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Using a federal wiretap to intercept phone calls, law enforcement officials learned of a drug shipment that was to be delivered to Norfolk, Nebraska. On the morning of March 3, 2005, a Nebraska State Patrol official informed Trooper Timothy Stopak of suspicions that a shipment of methamphetamine was being transported in a green Plymouth minivan, with the Minnesota license plate number NHB030, traveling north on Highway 81 toward Norfolk, Nebraska. Later that morning, Trooper Stopak saw the green minivan and pulled the vehicle over for speeding.

Trooper Stopak approached the vehicle and asked Jiminez, who was the only occupant of the minivan, for his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. As Jiminez handed over some of the materials, Trooper Stopak observed that Jiminez’s hand was shaking. When

O’CONNOR, Supreme Court Justice (Ret.):

Appellant Jason McGuire fired a single shot from a handgun in the general direction of an airborne police helicopter. Believing he meant to hit the helicopter, a jury convicted McGuire of attempting to “set[ ] fire to, damage[ ], destroy[ ], disable[ ], or wreck[ ] an[ ] aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1). The judge determined that this was a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which imposes a mandatory consecutive sentence on anyone who uses or possesses a firearm in connection with such a crime. McGuire challenges both the jury’s verdict and the judge’s determination. We affirm.

I.

Because McGuire challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the facts are in dispute. Roughly speaking, however, they are as follows:

Inebriated and distraught because of losing his girlfriend and his job, McGuire took his father’s loaded.38–caliber revolver from an unlocked safe and out into the driveway of his home. He called several friends on his cell phone, attempting to vent his distress, but could not find a ready ear. He was contemplating suicide, he says, but he could not bring himself to it. Instead, he fired off several rounds: one into a tree near the driveway, and several down the empty street. Neighbors called the police. McGuire, meanwhile, went back inside. See Dkt. No. 152 at 19–24.

When he came out again, the police had responded.

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret).

Mark Lou Meyer appeals the district court’s revocation of his probation. Because the district court’s factual findings on the two grounds on which it justified revoking Meyer’s probation were not clearly erroneous, we affirm the judgment below.

I.

On January 22, 2004, Mark Lou Meyer was indicted for being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). After Meyer pleaded guilty to this charge, the district court sentenced him to a term of three years’ probation on September 2, 2004. As relevant to this appeal, Meyer’s probation came with two conditions. First, Meyer was prohibited from possessing or using unlawful drugs. Second, Meyer was prohibited from leaving Iowa’s Northern District without first obtaining permission from a probation officer or the court.

While he was on probation, Meyer participated in two distinct methods of drug testing. Under the first method, a probation officer affixed sweat patches to Meyer’s skin to monitor whether he was using illegal drugs. The sweat patch technology at issue here is a relatively novel drug testing device. The sweat patch, which is “marketed by PharmChem, Inc., is composed of an absorbent pad and an outer membrane. After the skin is cleaned with alcohol, the patch is applied to the wearer[ ], and the absorbent pad collects the wearer’s sweat, over a period of a week or more.” United States v. Bentham, 414 F.Supp.2d 472, 473 (S.D.N.Y.2006). “The [wearer]’s

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired).

The government in this case brings an extraordinary appeal: It asks us to reverse a district court ruling barring from evidence recordings of phone calls made between an attorney and his client. These calls were recorded in clear violation of state and federal regulations. But appellee, the attorney, has not raised a Sixth Amendment challenge, and for Fourth Amendment purposes, his client consented to the monitoring of his calls. On these narrow facts, we reverse the determination of the district court that the calls must be excluded.

I.

Scott Holyoke was a prisoner held in pretrial detention at the Barnstable County Jail in Massachusetts. Holyoke was represented by the Federal Defenders, and planned to plead guilty to charges of methamphetamine trafficking. He did not, however, wish to face sentencing with his state convictions on his record, because under the Sentencing Guidelines, the effect of those convictions on his criminal history would result in a longer prison sentence.

For assistance with these state convictions, Holyoke turned to appellee Lawrence Novak in 2005. Novak was a Massachusetts attorney. All of Holyoke’s contact with Novak was conducted through telephone calls made from the County Jail, which randomly records and monitors inmate calls.

Inmates are informed of the monitoring in two ways. First, phones in the jail contain signs which state, “Calls are subject to monitoring and recording.” Second, an automated message

O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired):

This is a case about a wolf named Dutchess. Concerned that the wolf’s presence on residential property posed a risk to the public, a Prince George’s County Animal Control Officer seized Dutchess and left word for her absent owners. Those owners sued the officer and the county for monetary damages, arguing that the seizure violated their civil rights. The district court concluded that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and that the plaintiffs failed adequately to plead a claim against the county. We agree and consequently affirm the court’s judgment.

I

Because plaintiffs-appellants Robert and Courtney Walker’s claims were rejected on summary judgment, we view the factual evidence in the light most favorable to them. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In February 2006, Robert Walker obtained an animal that he believed was a dog. Walker and his wife, Courtney Walker, named the animal Dutchess and had her vaccinated for rabies. The veterinarian who performed the vaccination determined that Dutchess was an Alaskan Malamute, a breed of dog that looks like a husky. He gave the Walkers proof of the vaccination, which identified Dutchess as a dog. The Walkers used this report to obtain a “dog/ferret/cat license” from Prince George’s County.

In July, Robert Walker and his sister, Antonia Payne, had a heated confrontation in front of his home. Walker struck and cracked the windshield