Dissent, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist

Woolworth Co. v. Taxation Dept

Dissent, Economic Activity, Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

The $39.9 million in dividend income at issue in this case was earned by four foreign subsidiaries of F. W. Woolworth Co.: F. W. Woolworth GmbH (Germany), F. W. Woolworth, Ltd. (Canada), F. W. Woolworth, S. A. de C. V. Mexico (Mexico), and F. W. Woolworth Co., Ltd. (England). F. W. Woolworth Co. wholly owned its German, Canadian, and Mexican subsidiaries, and had a 52.7% interest in its English subsidiary. During the tax year in question, the subsidiaries apparently operated somewhat autonomously in their respective markets, but “mail, telephone, and teletype communication between the upper echelons of management of the parent and the subsidiaries” was ” frequent.'” Ante at 458 U. S. 368 (footnote omitted) (quoting App. to Juris.Statement 34a). Moreover,

[d]ecisions about major financial decisions, such as the amount of dividends to be paid by the subsidiaries and the creation of substantial debt, had to be approved by the parent,

and “Woolworth’s published financial statements, such as its annual reports, were prepared on a consolidated basis.” Ante at 458 U. S. 368 -39 (citations and footnotes omitted).

These controlled subsidiaries, operating in geographically diverse markets in the same line of business as F. W. Woolworth itself, were simply not “unrelated,” [ Footnote 2/1 ] “discrete business enterprise[s],” [ Footnote 2/2 ] “hav[ing] nothing to do with the activities” [ Footnote 2/3

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure

Woodford v. Garceau

Concurrence, Criminal Procedure / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

The Court today holds that the post-Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) version of 28

IJU8TICE O’CONNOR contends that we may have misapplied our test because a filing labeled “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues” placed the merits of respondent’s claims before the District Court before AEDPA’s effective date. Post, at 211 (opinion concurring in judgment). That is simply not so. Respondent’s “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues” plainly stated that “[b]ased on a preliminary review of case materials, counsel believes the following federal constitutional issues exist in this case and are among the issues that may be raised on [Garceau’s] behalf in a petition for habeas corpus.” App. to Brief in Opposition 227 (emphasis added). The clear import of this language is that the filing itself did not seek any relief on the merits or place the merits of respondent’s claims before the District Court for decision. Rather, the document simply alerted the District Court as to some of the possible claims that might be raised by respondent in the future. Indeed, the habeas corpus application respondent eventually filed contained numerous issues that were not mentioned in the “Specification of Non-Frivolous Issues.” U. S. C. § 2254 applies to respondent Robert Garceau’s habeas corpus application because Garceau did not file his application until after AEDPA’s effective date. I agree with that holding. I concur only in

Concurrence, First Amendment

Witters v. Svcs. for the Blind

Concurrence, First Amendment / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I and III of the Court’s opinion, and concur in the judgment. I also agree with the Court that both the purpose and effect of Washington’s program of aid to handicapped students are secular. As JUSTICE POWELL’s separate opinion persuasively argues, the Court’s opinion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), makes clear that

state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, because any aid to religion results from the private decisions of beneficiaries.

Ante at 474 U. S. 490 -491 (POWELL, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). The aid to religion at issue here is the result of petitioner’s private choice. No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 465 U. S. 690 (1984) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring).

Criminal Procedure, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, William Rehnquist

Withrow v. Williams

Criminal Procedure, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Today the Court permits the federal courts to overturn on habeas the conviction of a double murderer, not on the basis of an inexorable constitutional or statutory command, but because it believes the result desirable from the standpoint of equity and judicial administration. Because the principles that inform our habeas jurisprudence-finality, federalism, and fairness-counsel decisively against the result the Court reaches, I respectfully dissent from this holding.

I

The Court does not sit today in direct review of a statecourt judgment of conviction. Rather, respondent seeks relief by collaterally attacking his conviction through the writ of habeas corpus. While petitions for the writ of habeas corpus are now commonplace-over 12,000 were filed in 1990, compared to 127 in 1941-their current ubiquity ought not detract from the writ’s historic importance. See L. Mecham, Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 191 (1991) (1990 figures); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 446, n. 2 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (1941 figures). “The Great Writ” can be traced through the common law to well before the founding of this Nation; its role as a “prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints” is beyond question. Fay, 372 U. S., at 401-402. As Justice Harlan explained:”Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is today, as

Concurrence, Economic Activity

Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley Jr. Co

Concurrence, Economic Activity / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in Parts I and II, and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. I do not agree, however, that the replacement of stale gum served an independent business function. The replacement of stale gum by the sales representatives was part of ensuring the product was available to the public in a form that may be purchased. Making sure that one’s product is available and properly displayed serves no independent business function apart from requesting purchases; one cannot offer a product for sale if it is not available. I agree, however, that the storage of gum in the State and the use of agency stock checks were not ancillary to solicitation and were not de minimis. On that basis, I would hold that Wrigley’s income is subject to taxation by Wisconsin.

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Rel. Comm’n

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12), does not prohibit a State from disqualifying unemployment compensation claimants who leave their jobs because of pregnancy, when the State imposes the same disqualification on all claimants who leave their jobs for a reason not causally connected to their work or their employer. 688 S.W.2d 344 (1985). We granted certiorari, 475 U. S. 1118 (1986), because the court’s decision conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1150 (1983), on a question of practical significance in the administration of state unemployment compensation laws.

I

In August, 1980, after having been employed by the J. C. Penney Company for approximately three years, petitioner requested a leave of absence on account of her pregnancy. Pursuant to its established policy, the J. C. Penney Company granted petitioner a “leave without guarantee of reinstatement,” meaning that petitioner would be rehired only if a position was available when petitioner was ready to return to work. Petitioner’s child was born on November 5, 1980. On December 1, 1980, when petitioner notified J. C. Penney that she wished to return to work, she was told that there were no positions open.

Petitioner then filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The claim was denied by the Division of Employment

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Wilton v. Seven Falls Co

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Judicial Power, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case asks whether the discretionary standard set forth inBrillhartv.Excess Ins. Co. of America,316 U. S. 491(1942), or the “exceptional circumstances” test developed inColorado River Water Conservation Dist.v.United States,424 U. S. 800(1976), andMoses H. Cone Memorial Hospitalv.Mercury Constr. Corp.,460 U. S. 1(1983), governs a district court’s decision to stay a declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state court proceedings, and under what standard of review a court of appeals should evaluate the district court’s decision to do so.

I

In early 1992, a dispute between respondents (the Hill Group) and other parties over the ownership and operation of oil and gas properties in Winkler County, Texas, appeared likely to culminate in litigation. The Hill Group asked petitioners (London Underwriters) 1 to provide them with coverage under several commercial liability insurance policies. London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group in a letter dated July 31, 1992. In September 1992, after a 3-week trial, a Winkler County jury entered a verdict in excess of $100 million against the Hill Group on various state law claims.

The Hill Group gave London Underwriters notice of the verdict in late November 1992. On December 9, 1992, Lon

* Laura A. Foggan, Daniel E. Troy, and Thomas W Brunner filed a brief for the Insurance Environmental Litigation Association as amicus curiae urging reversal.

Edwar

Civil Rights, Dissent

Wilson v. Garcia

Civil Rights, Dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.

Citing “practical considerations,” the Court today decides to jettison a rule of venerable application and adopt instead one “simple, broad characterization of all § 1983 claims.” Ante at 471 U. S. 272. Characterization of § 1983 claims is, I agree, a matter of federal law. But I see no justification, given our longstanding interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Congress’ awareness of it, for abandoning the rule that courts must identify and apply the statute of limitations of the state claim most closely analogous to the particular § 1983 claim. In declaring that all § 1983 claims, regardless of differences in their essential characteristics, shall be considered most closely analogous to one narrow class of tort, the Court, though purporting to conform to the letter of § 1988, abandons the policies § 1988 embodies. I respectfully dissent.

I

The rule that a federal court adjudicating rights under § 1983 will adopt the state statute of limitations of the most closely analogous state law claim traces its lineage to M’Cluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 (1830), Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610 (1895), and O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318 (1914). These opinions held that, where “Congress… could have, by specific provision, prescribed a limitation, but no specific provision [was] adduced,” O’Sullivan v. Felix, supra,at233 U. S. 322, “Congress… intended to subject such action to the general laws of the State applicable to actions of a similar nature”

Criminal Procedure, Majority

Williams v. Taylor

Criminal Procedure, Majority / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court as to Part II (except as to the footnote), concluding that § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant relief to a state prisoner with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court: The habeas writ may issue only if the state-court adjudication (1) “was contrary to,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of… ” clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Pp.402-413.

(a) Because Williams filed his petition in 1997, his case is not governed by the pre-1996 version of the federal habeas statute, but by the statute as amended by AEDPA. Accordingly, for Williams to obtain federal habeas relief, he must first demonstrate that his case satisfies the condition set by § 2254(d)(1). That provision modifies the previously settled rule of independent federal review of state prisoners’ habeas petitions in order to curb delays, to prevent “retrials” on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law. In light of the cardinal principle of statutory construction that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, this Court must give independent meaning to both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1). Given the commonly understood definitions of “contrary” as “diametrically different,” “opposite in character or nature,” or “mutually

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Whitley v. Albers

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide what standard governs a prison inmate’s claim that prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by shooting him during the course of their attempt to quell a prison riot.

I

At the time he was injured, respondent Gerald Albers was confined in cellblock “A” of the Oregon State Penitentiary. Cellblock “A” consists of two tiers of barred cells housing some 200 inmates. The two tiers are connected by a stairway that offers the only practical way to move from one tier to another.

At about 8:30 on the evening of June 27, 1980, several inmates were found intoxicated at the prison annex. Prison guards attempted to move the intoxicated prisoners, some of whom resisted, to the penitentiary’s isolation and segregation facility. This incident could be seen from the cell windows in cellblock “A,” and some of the onlookers became agitated because they thought that the guards were using unnecessary force. Acting on instructions from their superiors, Officers Kemper and Fitts, who were on duty in cellblock “A,” ordered the prisoners to return to their cells. The order was not obeyed. Several inmates confronted the two officers, who were standing in the open area of the lower tier. One inmate, Richard Klenk, jumped from the second tier and assaulted Officer Kemper. Kemper escaped, but Officer Fitts was taken hostage. Klenk and other inmates then began breaking furniture and milling about.

Upon