Civil Rights, Dissent

Wilson v. Garcia

Civil Rights, Dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.

Citing “practical considerations,” the Court today decides to jettison a rule of venerable application and adopt instead one “simple, broad characterization of all § 1983 claims.” Ante at 471 U. S. 272. Characterization of § 1983 claims is, I agree, a matter of federal law. But I see no justification, given our longstanding interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Congress’ awareness of it, for abandoning the rule that courts must identify and apply the statute of limitations of the state claim most closely analogous to the particular § 1983 claim. In declaring that all § 1983 claims, regardless of differences in their essential characteristics, shall be considered most closely analogous to one narrow class of tort, the Court, though purporting to conform to the letter of § 1988, abandons the policies § 1988 embodies. I respectfully dissent.

I

The rule that a federal court adjudicating rights under § 1983 will adopt the state statute of limitations of the most closely analogous state law claim traces its lineage to M’Cluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270 (1830), Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610 (1895), and O’Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U. S. 318 (1914). These opinions held that, where “Congress… could have, by specific provision, prescribed a limitation, but no specific provision [was] adduced,” O’Sullivan v. Felix, supra,at233 U. S. 322, “Congress… intended to subject such action to the general laws of the State applicable to actions of a similar nature”

Criminal Procedure, Majority

Williams v. Taylor

Criminal Procedure, Majority / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court as to Part II (except as to the footnote), concluding that § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant relief to a state prisoner with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court: The habeas writ may issue only if the state-court adjudication (1) “was contrary to,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of… ” clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Pp.402-413.

(a) Because Williams filed his petition in 1997, his case is not governed by the pre-1996 version of the federal habeas statute, but by the statute as amended by AEDPA. Accordingly, for Williams to obtain federal habeas relief, he must first demonstrate that his case satisfies the condition set by § 2254(d)(1). That provision modifies the previously settled rule of independent federal review of state prisoners’ habeas petitions in order to curb delays, to prevent “retrials” on federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law. In light of the cardinal principle of statutory construction that courts must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, this Court must give independent meaning to both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1). Given the commonly understood definitions of “contrary” as “diametrically different,” “opposite in character or nature,” or “mutually

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Whitley v. Albers

Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Lewis Powell, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide what standard governs a prison inmate’s claim that prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by shooting him during the course of their attempt to quell a prison riot.

I

At the time he was injured, respondent Gerald Albers was confined in cellblock “A” of the Oregon State Penitentiary. Cellblock “A” consists of two tiers of barred cells housing some 200 inmates. The two tiers are connected by a stairway that offers the only practical way to move from one tier to another.

At about 8:30 on the evening of June 27, 1980, several inmates were found intoxicated at the prison annex. Prison guards attempted to move the intoxicated prisoners, some of whom resisted, to the penitentiary’s isolation and segregation facility. This incident could be seen from the cell windows in cellblock “A,” and some of the onlookers became agitated because they thought that the guards were using unnecessary force. Acting on instructions from their superiors, Officers Kemper and Fitts, who were on duty in cellblock “A,” ordered the prisoners to return to their cells. The order was not obeyed. Several inmates confronted the two officers, who were standing in the open area of the lower tier. One inmate, Richard Klenk, jumped from the second tier and assaulted Officer Kemper. Kemper escaped, but Officer Fitts was taken hostage. Klenk and other inmates then began breaking furniture and milling about.

Upon

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist

Whitfield v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases present the question whether conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1956(h), requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. We hold that it does not.

I
In March 1999, a federal grand jury returned a 20-count indictment against petitioners and five codefendants. As relevant here, Count II of the indictment charged petitioners with conspiracy to launder money, in violation of §1956(h). The indictment described, in general terms, the “manner and means” used to accomplish the objects of the money laundering conspiracy, but it did not charge the defendants with the commission of any overt act in furtherance thereof.

At trial, the Government presented evidence that petitioners were members of the executive board of an entity known as Greater Ministries International Church (GMIC). GMIC operated a “gifting” program that took in more than $400 million between 1996 and 1999. Under that program, petitioners and others induced unwary investors to give money to GMIC with promises that investors would receive double their money back within a year and a half. Petitioners marketed the program throughout the country, claiming that GMIC would generate returns on investors’ “gifts” through overseas investments in gold and diamond mining, commodities, and offshore banks. Investors were told that GMIC would use some of the profits for philanthropic purposes. Most of these claims were false. GMIC made none of the promised investments, had no assets, and gave virtually nothing to charity. Many participants in GMIC’s program received little or no return on their money, and their investments indeed largely turned out to be “gifts” to GMIC representatives. Petitioners together allegedly received more than $1.2 million in commissions on the money they solicited.

At the close of the evidence, petitioners asked the District Court to instruct the jury that the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the co-conspirators had committed an overt act in furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy. The court denied that request, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the money laundering conspiracy charge.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed petitioners’ convictions, holding, in relevant part, that the jury instructions approved by the District Court were proper because §1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act. 349 F. 3d 1320, 1324 (2003). The Court of Appeals noted that some of its sister Circuits had taken the opposite position. Id., at 1323 (citing United States v. Wilson, 249 F. 3d 366, 379 (CA5 2001); United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F. 3d 756, 762 (CA8 1998)). It concluded, however, that those decisions were erroneously based on case law interpreting the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. §371, which, unlike §1956(h), expressly includes an overt-act requirement. 349 F. 3d, at 1323. The Eleventh Circuit instead relied upon United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10 (1994), where we held that the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U. S. C. §846, does not require proof of an overt act. Because the language of 18 U. S. C. §1956(h) and 21 U. S. C. §846 is “nearly identical,” the Eleventh Circuit found itself compelled to follow the reasoning of Shabani in holding that §1956(h), too, requires no proof of an overt act. 349 F. 3d, at 1323–1324. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the question presented, 542 U. S. ___ (2004), and we now affirm the decision below.

II
Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. §§1956 and 1957 (2000 ed. and Supp. II) as part of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207–18. Section 1956 penalizes the knowing and intentional transportation or transfer of monetary proceeds from specified unlawful activities, while §1957 addresses transactions involving criminally derived property exceeding $10,000 in value. As originally enacted, neither section included a conspiracy provision. Accordingly, the Government relied on the general conspiracy statute, 18 U. S. C. §371, to prosecute conspiracies to commit the offenses set forth in §§1956 and 1957. In 1992, however, Congress enacted the money laundering conspiracy provision at issue in these cases, now codified at 18 U. S. C. §1956(h). See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. 102–550, §1530, 106 Stat. 4066. Section 1956(h) provides: “Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in [§1956] or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”

In Shabani, we addressed whether the nearly identical language of the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U. S. C. §846, requires proof of an overt act. See ibid. (“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy”). We held that it does not, relying principally upon our earlier decisions in Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913), and Singer v. United States, 323 U. S. 338 (1945). See Shabani, supra, at 13–14. In each of those cases, the Court held that, where Congress had omitted from the relevant conspiracy provision any language expressly requiring an overt act, the Court would not read such a requirement into the statute. See Singer, supra, at 340 (Selective Training and Service Act of 1940); Nash, supra, at 378 (Sherman Act).

As we explained in Shabani, these decisions “follow the settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 307–308 (1992). We have consistently held that the common law understanding of conspiracy ‘does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability.’ ” 513 U. S., at 13–14 (quoting Nash, supra, at 378). In concluding that the drug conspiracy statute in Shabani did not require proof of an overt act, we found instructive the distinction between that statute and the general conspiracy statute, §371 , which supersedes the common law rule by expressly including an overt-act requirement. 513 U. S., at 14. See 18 U. S. C. §371 (“If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both” (emphasis added)).

Shabani distilled the governing rule for conspiracy statutes as follows: “ ‘ Nash and Singer give Congress a formulary: by choosing a text modeled on §371, it gets an overt-act requirement; by choosing a text modeled on the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §1 [which, like 21 U. S. C. §846, omits any express overt-act requirement], it dispenses with such a requirement.’ ” 513 U. S., at 14 (quoting United States v. Sassi, 966 F. 2d 283, 284 (CA7 1992)). This rule dictates the outcome in the instant cases as well: Because the text of §1956(h) does not expressly make the commission of an overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the Government need not prove an overt act to obtain a conviction.

III
Petitioners argue that the rule that governed Shabani is inapplicable here, because §1956(h) does not establish a new conspiracy offense; rather, they say, it merely increases the penalty for conviction of a money laundering conspiracy under §371. In other words, as we understand their argument, petitioners contend that the Government must continue to prosecute money laundering conspiracies under §371, but that §1956(h) now provides enhanced penalties for conviction. Since §371 contains an overt act requirement, the argument goes, the Government must prove an overt act in prosecutions ostensibly brought under §1956(h). This reading of §1956(h) is untenable for two principal reasons. First, petitioners concede—as they must—that §1956(h)’s text is sufficient to establish an offense. Indeed, its language is nearly identical to the drug conspiracy statute at issue in Shabani, which indisputably created an offense. Second, petitioners apparently read §1956(h) to supply an enhanced penalty for violation of §371 in cases where the object of the conspiracy is to violate the substantive money laundering offenses in §§1956(a) and 1957. But the text of §1956(h) fails to provide any cross-reference to §371. Mere use of the word “conspires” surely is not enough to establish the necessary link between these two separate statutes. In short, if Congress had intended to create the scheme petitioners envision, it would have done so in clearer terms.

Petitioners seek support for their construction of §1956(h) in the provision’s legislative history. They contend that this history contains no indication that Congress meant to create a new offense or to eliminate the pre-existing overt-act requirement for money laundering conspiracy prosecutions that hitherto had been brought under §371. They say that the history instead shows that §1956(h) was intended only to raise the penalty for money laundering conspiracy from the 5-year maximum sentence under §371 to the greater maximums available for substantive money laundering offenses under §§1956(a) and 1957. Petitioners also point out that, when Congress enacted §1956(h), it did so under the title “ Penalty for Money Laundering Conspiracies,” 106 Stat., at 4066 (emphasis added). Had Congress wanted to enact an “offense” provision, they argue, it would have titled it accordingly.

Because the meaning of §1956(h)’s text is plain and unambiguous, we need not accept petitioners’ invitation to consider the legislative history. But even were we to do so, we would reach the same conclusion. It is undisputed that Congress intended §1956(h) to increase the penalties for money laundering conspiracies. The provision’s text makes clear that Congress did so precisely by establishing a new offense. Given the clarity of the text, mere silence in the legislative history cannot justify reading an overt-act requirement, or a cross-reference to §371, into §1956(h). See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 496–497 (1997) (refusing to read a materiality element into the statute at issue based on silence in the legislative history); Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 592 (1980) (“[I]t would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a statute”). Nor do we find it significant that Congress chose to label §1956(h) a “penalty” rather than an “offense” provision. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (“ ‘[t]he title of a statute … cannot limit the plain meaning of the text’ ”); Castillo v. United States, 530 U. S. 120, 125 (2000) (although “[t]he title of the entirety of §924 is ‘Penalties’ … at least some portion of §924 … creates, not penalty enhancements, but entirely new crimes”).

Petitioners’ legislative history argument is particularly inapt here, we might add, because Congress is presumed to have knowledge of the governing rule described in Shabani. While Shabani was decided two years after §1956(h) was enacted, the rule it articulated was established decades earlier in Nash and Singer. These decisions establish a “formulary” that provides clear and predictable guidance to Congress. As the Government points out, Congress has included an express overt-act requirement in at least 22 other current conspiracy statutes, clearly demonstrating that it knows how to impose such a requirement when it wishes to do so. See Brief for United States 11, and n. 5 (citing statutes). Where Congress has chosen not to do so, we will not override that choice based on vague and ambiguous signals from legislative history.

We conclude by addressing two arguments raised by petitioners relating to the text and structure of §1956 as a whole. First, petitioners note that Congress placed each of the three substantive money laundering offenses in §1956 under subsection (a). Had the drafters intended §1956(h) to create a new offense, petitioners contend, they would have placed it with the other offenses in subsection (a) instead of in its own separate subsection. We fail to see why that should be so. The three offenses placed in subsection (a) share a common feature: All are substantive money-laundering crimes. We find nothing remarkable in Congress’ decision to place a qualitatively different conspiracy offense provision in a separate subsection.

Petitioners’ second textual argument is based on §1956(i) (2000 ed., Supp. II), a venue provision added to the statute in 2001. See USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. 107–56, §1004, 115 Stat. 392. Section 1956(i)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. II) provides that “[a] prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy offense under [§1956 or §1957] may be brought in the district where venue would lie for the completed offense under [§1956(i)(1)], or in any other district where an act in furtherance of the attempt or conspiracy took place.” Petitioners contend that, by setting venue in the district where an overt act took place, Congress confirmed what (petitioners say) was the majority view of the Courts of Appeals at the time of §1956(i)’s enactment: that proof of an overt act was required under §1956(h). Moreover, petitioners argue, setting venue where an overt act took place makes little sense if such an act is not an element of the offense.

This argument fails for several reasons. As a preliminary matter, petitioners assume that §1956(i) is the sole provision setting venue in money laundering conspiracy prosecutions. Although we need not definitively construe that provision here, we note that its language appears permissive rather than exclusive—§1956(i) says a conspiracy prosecution “ may be brought” in a district meeting the specified criteria. (Emphasis added.) This suggests that the provision serves to supplement, rather than supplant, the default venue rule: “Unless a statute or these rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense was committed.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 18. For a conspiracy prosecution under the common law rule, the district in which the unlawful agreement was reached would satisfy this default venue rule. See Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S. 62, 76 (1905).

But even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that §1956(i) is an exclusive venue provision, petitioners’ argument still fails. The provision authorizes two alternative venues for money laundering conspiracy prosecutions: (1) the district in which venue would lie if the completed substantive money laundering offense had been accomplished, or (2) any district in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed. The first venue option clearly does not require that any overt act have been committed, and the Government therefore need not allege or prove such an act for venue to be properly established under this portion of §1956(i). As to the second venue option, this Court has long held that venue is proper in any district in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed, even where an overt act is not a required element of the conspiracy offense. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 252 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 402–404 (1927). In light of this longstanding rule, §1956(i)(2)’s authorization of venue in a district where an overt act took place cannot be taken to indicate that Congress deemed such an act necessary for conviction under §1956(h). Instead, Congress appears merely to have confirmed the availability of this alternative venue option in money laundering conspiracy cases.

* * *

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1956(h), does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Interstate Relations, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

Kansas v. Colorado

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Interstate Relations, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the Court’s disposition of this case as to Colorado’s first and fourth exceptions to the Special Master’s Third Report, concerning the award and determination of damages. I therefore join Parts I, IV, and V of the Court’s opinion. I do not concur in Parts II and III of the Court’s opinion because I believe that the award of prejudgment interest to Kansas, coming over half a century after the Arkansas River Compact’s (hereinafter Compact) negotiation and approval, is clearly improper under our precedents.

We are dealing with an interstate compact apportioning the flow of a river between two States. A compact is a contract. It represents a bargained-for exchange between its signatories and “remains a legal document that must be construed and applied in accordance with its terms.” Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U. S. 124, 128 (1987); see also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U. S. 275, 285 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“A Compact is, after all, a contract”). It is a fundamental tenet of contract law that parties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with reference to principles of law existing at the time the contract was made. See, e. g., Norfolk & Western R. Co. v.

be required.” Third Report 63. Because the circumstances in Kansas involved short-short run situations, and because such short-short run situations generally involve higher

Concurrence, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist

South Carolina v. Regan

Concurrence, Judicial Power, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.

The motion of South Carolina for leave to file a complaint in our original jurisdiction raises three questions. First, the Court must decide whether Congress intended, by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), to bar nontaxpayers like the State of South Carolina from challenging the validity of federal tax statutes in the courts. Second, if the Act generally does bar such nontaxpayer suits, the Court must decide whether Congress intended, and if so whether the Constitution permits it, to bar us from considering South Carolina’s complaint in our original jurisdiction. Third, if Congress either did not intend, or constitutionally is not permitted, to withdraw this case from our original jurisdiction, the Court must decide whether South Carolina’s challenge to the constitutionality of § 103(j)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 103(j)(1) (1982 ed.), as added by § 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub.L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 596, raises issues appropriate for original adjudication.

In answering the first question, the Court reaches the unwarranted conclusion that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act proscribes only those suits in which the complaining party, usually a taxpayer, can challenge the validity of a taxing measure in an alternative forum. The Court holds that suits by nontaxpayers generally are not barred. In my opinion,

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Federalism, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer

United States v. Alaska

Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Federalism, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This original action presents a dispute between the United States and the State of Alaska over the ownership of submerged lands along Alaska’s Arctic Coast. In 1979, with leave of the Court, 442 U. S. 937, the United States filed a bill of complaint setting out a dispute over the right to offer lands in the Beaufort Sea for mineral leasing. Alaska counterclaimed, seeking a decree quieting its title to coastal submerged lands within two federal reservations, the N ational Petroleum Reserve-Alaska and the Arctic National Wildlife Range (now the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge). The Court appointed a Special Master. 444 U. S. 1065 (1980). Between 1980 and 1986, the Special Master oversaw extensive hearings and briefing. Before us now are the report of the Special Master and the exceptions of the parties. We overrule Alaska’s exceptions and sustain that of the United States.

I

Alaska and the United States dispute ownership of lands underlying tidal waters off Alaska’s North Slope. The region is rich in oil, and each sovereign seeks the right to grant

*Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Jan S. Stevens, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Jane Brady of Delaware, Margery

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, Interstate Relations, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist

Nebraska v. Wyoming

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Clarence Thomas, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, Interstate Relations, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this original action we revisit the dispute among Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, and the United States over water rights to the North Platte River. In 1945, this Court entered a decree establishing interstate priorities on the North Platte and apportioning the natural flow of one critical portion of the river during the irrigation season. Nebraska returned to the Court in 1986 seeking an order for enforcement of the decree and injunctive relief. A Special Master, appointed by the Court, has supervised pretrial proceedings and discovery since 1987. Before us now are the Special Master’s recommended dispositions of several summary judgment motions, together with exceptions filed to the Special Master’s reports.

I

The North Platte River rises in northern Colorado and flows through Wyoming into Nebraska, where it joins the South Platte River. The topology of the river and the history of its early development are described at length in the Court’s 1945 opinion. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S.

*Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Basin Electric Power Cooperative by Edward Weinberg, Richmond F. Allan, Michael J. Hinman, and Claire Olson; and for the National Audubon Society et al. by Peter A. A. Berle and Abbe David Lowell. 589, 592-599. In 1934, Nebraska, invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution, brought an action against Wyoming seeking an equitable apportionment of the

Concurrence, First Amendment

McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky

Concurrence, First Amendment / By

Justice O’Connor, concurring.

I join in the Court’s opinion. The First Amendment expresses our Nation’s fundamental commitment to religious liberty by means of two provisions—one protecting the free exercise of religion, the other barring establishment of religion. They were written by the descendents of people who had come to this land precisely so that they could practice their religion freely. Together with the other First Amendment guarantees—of free speech, a free press, and the rights to assemble and petition—the Religion Clauses were designed to safeguard the freedom of conscience and belief that those immigrants had sought. They embody an idea that was once considered radical: Free people are entitled to free and diverse thoughts, which government ought neither to constrain nor to direct.

Reasonable minds can disagree about how to apply the Religion Clauses in a given case. But the goal of the Clauses is clear: to carry out the Founders’ plan of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society. By enforcing the Clauses, we have kept religion a matter for the individual conscience, not for the prosecutor or bureaucrat. At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar travails, while allowing private religious exercise to flourish. The well-known statement that “[w]e are a religious people,” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313 (1952), has proved true. Americans attend their places of worship more often than do citizens of other developed nations, R. Fowler, A. Hertzke, & L. Olson, Religion and Politics in America 28–29 (2d ed. 1999), and describe religion as playing an especially important role in their lives, Pew Global Attitudes Project, Among Wealthy Nations U. S. Stands Alone in its Embrace of Religion (Dec. 19, 2002). Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?

Our guiding principle has been James Madison’s—that “[t]he Religion … of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man.” Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 2 Writings of James Madison 183, 184 (G. Hunt ed. 1901) (hereinafter Memorial). To that end, we have held that the guarantees of religious freedom protect citizens from religious incursions by the States as well as by the Federal Government. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 16 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). Government may not coerce a person into worshiping against her will, nor prohibit her from worshiping according to it. It may not prefer one religion over another or promote religion over nonbelief. Everson, supra, at 15–16. It may not entangle itself with religion. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970). And government may not, by “endorsing religion or a religious practice,” “mak[e] adherence to religion relevant to a person’s standing in the political community.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

When we enforce these restrictions, we do so for the same reason that guided the Framers—respect for religion’s special role in society. Our Founders conceived of a Republic receptive to voluntary religious expression, and provided for the possibility of judicial intervention when government action threatens or impedes such expression. Voluntary religious belief and expression may be as threatened when government takes the mantle of religion upon itself as when government directly interferes with private religious practices. When the government associates one set of religious beliefs with the state and identifies nonadherents as outsiders, it encroaches upon the individual’s decision about whether and how to worship. In the marketplace of ideas, the government has vast resources and special status. Government religious expression therefore risks crowding out private observance and distorting the natural interplay between competing beliefs. Allowing government to be a potential mouthpiece for competing religious ideas risks the sort of division that might easily spill over into suppression of rival beliefs. Tying secular and religious authority together poses risks to both.

Given the history of this particular display of the Ten Commandments, the Court correctly finds an Establishment Clause violation. See ante, at 19–25. The purpose behind the counties’ display is relevant because it conveys an unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

It is true that many Americans find the Commandments in accord with their personal beliefs. But we do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment. See West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts”). Nor can we accept the theory that Americans who do not accept the Commandments’ validity are outside the First Amendment’s protections. There is no list of approved and disapproved beliefs appended to the First Amendment—and the Amendment’s broad terms (“free exercise,” “establishment,” “religion”) do not admit of such a cramped reading. It is true that the Framers lived at a time when our national religious diversity was neither as robust nor as well recognized as it is now. They may not have foreseen the variety of religions for which this Nation would eventually provide a home. They surely could not have predicted new religions, some of them born in this country. But they did know that line-drawing between religions is an enterprise that, once begun, has no logical stopping point. They worried that “the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects.” Memorial 186. The Religion Clauses, as a result, protect adherents of all religions, as well as those who believe in no religion at all.

***

We owe our First Amendment to a generation with a profound commitment to religion and a profound commitment to religious liberty—visionaries who held their faith “with enough confidence to believe that what should be rendered to God does not need to be decided and collected by Caesar.” Zorach, supra, at 324–325 (Jackson, J., dissenting). In my opinion, the display at issue was an establishment of religion in violation of our Constitution. For the reasons given above, I join in the Court’s opinion.

Dissent, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist

Dissent, First Amendment, John Paul Stevens / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting.

I join Part I of JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S dissent. In my view, the Court should vacate and remand this case for consideration of the various threshold problems, statutory and regulatory, that may moot the constitutional question urged upon us by the parties. “It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint… that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. c., 467 U. S. 138, 157 (1984). That “fundamental rule” suffices to dispose of the case before us, whatever the proper answer to the decidedly hypothetical issue addressed by the Court. I therefore refrain from addressing it myself. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 223-225 (1991) (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting).