First Amendment, John Paul Stevens, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, William Rehnquist

Brown v. Socialist Workers Comm

First Amendment, John Paul Stevens, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the judgment that the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has sufficiently demonstrated a reasonable probability that disclosure of contributors will subject those persons to threats, harassment, or reprisals, and thus, under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), the State of Ohio cannot constitutionally compel the disclosure. Further, I agree that the broad concerns of Buckley apply to the required disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures. But, as I view the record presented here, the SWP has failed to carry its burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of recipients of expenditures will subject the recipients themselves or the SWP to threats, harassment, or reprisals. Moreover, the strong public interest in fair and honest elections outweighs any damage done to the associational rights of the party and its members by application of the State’s expenditure disclosure law.

I

Buckley upheld the validity of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which requires the disclosure of names of both contributors to a campaign and recipients of expenditures from the campaign. Buckley recognized three major governmental interests in disclosure requirements: deterrence of corruption; enhancement of voters’ knowledge about a candidate’s possible allegiances and interests; and provision of the data and means necessary to detect

Federalism, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Brown v. Dept. of Law & Pub. Safety

Federalism, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1976, the citizens of New Jersey amended their State Constitution to permit the legislative authorization of casino gambling within the municipality of Atlantic City. [ Footnote 1 ] Determined to prevent the infiltration of organized crime into its nascent casino industry and to assure public trust in the industry’s integrity, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Casino Control Act (Act), N.J.Stat.Ann. § 5:12-1 et seq. (West Supp.1983-1984), which provides for the comprehensive regulation of casino gambling, including the regulation of unions representing industry employees. Sections 86 and 93 of the Act specifically impose certain qualification criteria on officials of labor organizations representing casino industry employees. Those labor organizations with officials found not to meet these standards may be prohibited from receiving dues from casino industry employees and prohibited from administering pension and welfare funds. The principal question presented by these cases is whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., precludes New Jersey from imposing these criteria on those whom casino industry employees may select as officials of their bargaining representatives. We hold that it does not.

I

A

The advent of casino gambling in New Jersey was heralded with great expectations for the economic revitalization of the Atlantic City region, but with equally great fears for the

Concurrence, First Amendment, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades Inc

Concurrence, First Amendment, Warren Burger, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring.

Only days after the State of Washington adopted the moral nuisance law at issue here, appellees launched a constitutional attack in Federal District Court. Although the statute has never been enforced or authoritatively interpreted by a state court, appellees allege that it applies to constitutionally protected expression and is facially invalid. Because I believe that the federal courts should have abstained and allowed the Washington courts an opportunity to construe the state law in the first instance, I think the proper disposition of these cases would be to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals on that ground. The Court, however, rejects that course and reaches the merits of the controversy. I join the opinion of the Court because I agree that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the statute invalid on its face.

Although federal courts generally have a duty to adjudicate federal questions properly before them, this Court has long recognized that concerns for comity and federalism may require federal courts to abstain from deciding federal constitutional issues that are entwined with the interpretation of state law. In Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941), the Court held that where uncertain questions of state law must be resolved before a federal constitutional question can be decided, federal courts should abstain until a state court has addressed the state questions.

Criminal Procedure, Dissent

Brecht v. Abrahamson

Criminal Procedure, Dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.

I have no dispute with the Court’s observation that “collateral review is different from direct review.” Ante, at 633. Just as the federal courts may decline to adjudicate certain issues of federal law on habeas because of prudential concerns, see Withrow v. Williams, post, at 686; post, at 699-700 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), so too may they resolve specific claims on habeas using different and more lenient standards than those applicable on direct review, see, e. g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 299-310 (1989) (habeas claims adjudicated under the law prevailing at time conviction became final and not on the basis of intervening changes of law). But decisions concerning the Great Writ “warrant restraint,” Withrow, post, at 700 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), for we ought not take lightly alteration of that “‘fundamental safeguard against unlawful custody,'” post, at 697-698 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 449 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).

In my view, restraint should control our decision today.

The issue before us is not whether we should remove from the cognizance of the federal courts on habeas a discrete prophylactic rule unrelated to the truthfinding function of trial, as was the case in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), and more recently in Withrow v. Williams, post, p. 680. Rather, we are asked to alter a standard that not only finds application in virtually every

Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Bread Political Action Comm’n v. FEC

Byron White, First Amendment, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 310(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 88 Stat. 1285, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), lists three categories of plaintiffs who may challenge the constitutional validity of FECA in specially expedited suits: (1) the Federal Election Commission (FEC), (2) “the national committee of any political party,” and (3) “any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President.” In this case, we address a question we expressly reserved in California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 453 U. S. 187, n. 6 (1981): whether a party not belonging to one of the three categories listed in § 437h(a) may nonetheless invoke its procedures.

I

The appellants are two trade associations and three political action committees (PAC’s): the National Restaurant Association and its associated PAC, the Restauranteurs Political Action Committee, the National Lumber and Building Material Dealers Association and its associated PAC, the Lumber Dealers Political Action Committee, and the Bread Political Action Committee, the PAC associated with the American Bakers Association. In order to challenge the validity of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(D), which has the effect of limiting the extent to which trade associations and their PAC’s may solicit funds for political purposes, [ Footnote 1 ] the appellants filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking

Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

Branch v. Smith

Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion because I agree that the Mississippi Chancery Court’s redistricting plan lacks preclearance. I join Part II-C because it is consistent with our decisions holding that federal courts should not rule on a constitutional challenge to a nonprecleared voting change when the change is not yet capable of implementation. See, e. g., Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975) (per curiam); see also ante, p. 282 (KENNEDY, J., concurring). I cannot join Part III or Part IV; however, because I disagree with the Court that 2 U. S. C. § 2c is a command to the States and I disagree with the plurality regarding the proper statutory construction of § 2a(c)(5).

I

First, I agree with the plurality’s somewhat reluctant conclusion that § 2c does not impliedly repeal § 2a(c)(5). Here, it is quite easy to read §§ 2c and 2a(c) together. A natural statutory reading of § 2a(c) gives force to both §§ 2c and 2a(c): Section 2a(c) applies “[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof.” Section 2c applies after a State has “redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof.”

As both the plurality and JUSTICE STEVENS recognize, an implied repeal can exist only if the “provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict” or if “the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute.” Posadas

Civil Rights, Partial concurrence, partial dissent

Bragdon v. Abbott

Civil Rights, Partial concurrence, partial dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that respondent’s claim of disability should be evaluated on an individualized basis and that she has not proved that her asymptomatic HIV status substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. In my view, the act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part of the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the representative major life activities of all persons-“caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working”-listed in regulations relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 CFR § 41.31(b)(2) (1997). Based on that conclusion, there is no need to address whether other aspects of intimate or family relationships not raised in this case could constitute major life activities; nor is there reason to consider whether HIV status would impose a substantiallimitation on one’s ability to reproduce if reproduction were a major life activity.

I join in Part II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which concludes that the Court of Appeals failed to properly determine whether respondent’s condition posed a direct threat. Accordingly, I agree that a remand is necessary on that issue.

Civil Rights, Concurrence, John Paul Stevens

Bowen v. Yuckert

Civil Rights, Concurrence, John Paul Stevens / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring.

The Court is, I believe, entirely correct to find that the “step two” regulation is not facially inconsistent with the Social Security Act’s definition of disability. Title 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1982 ed. and Supp. III) provides:

[A]n individual… shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.

Step two, on its face, requires only that the claimant show that he or she suffers from

an impairment or combination of impairments… [that] significantly limit[s]… physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.

20 CFR § 404.1521(a) (1986). “Basic work activities,” the regulation says, include

walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling[,]… seeing, hearing, and speaking,… [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions[,]… [u]se of judgment[,]… [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work situations[,]… [d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting.

§404.1521(b)(1)-(6). I do not see how a claimant unable to show a significant limitation in any of these areas can possibly meet the statutory definition of disability. For the reasons

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan

Bowen v. Roy

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I and II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion, and I would vacate only a portion of the injunction issued by the District Court.

I

I believe that appellees cannot pursue their free exercise claim based solely on the actions of the Government with respect to the use of a Social Security number already in its possession, or with respect to any other identification number the Government may wish to assign and use in connection with its administration of its welfare assistance program. Accordingly, I join Parts 476 U. S. S. 699|>II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion, and I would vacate that portion of the District Court’s judgment that enjoins the Government from using or disseminating the Social Security number already assigned to Little Bird of the Snow.

In all, eight Members of the Court believe that the District Court’s injunction was overbroad in preventing the Government from using information already in its possession. See ante at 476 U. S. 699 -701 (opinion of BURGER, C.J., joined by POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ.); ante at 476 U. S. 716 -717 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result); ante at 476 U. S. 713 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part); supra, this page.

A logical next step on the facts of this case is to consider whether the case is moot. Only two Members of the Court believe that the case is, or may be, moot. See ante at 476 U. S.

Concurrence, First Amendment

Bowen v. Kendrick

Concurrence, First Amendment / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

This case raises somewhat unusual questions involving a facially valid statute that appears to have been administered in a way that led to violations of the Establishment Clause. I agree with the Court’s resolution of those questions, and I join its opinion. I write separately, however, to explain why I do not believe that the Court’s approach reflects any tolerance for the kind of improper administration that seems to have occurred in the Government program at issue here.

The dissent says, and I fully agree, that “[p]ublic funds may not be used to advance the religious message.” Post at 487 U. S. 642. As the Court notes, “there is no dispute that the record contains evidence of specific incidents of impermissible behavior by AFLA grantees.” Ante at 487 U. S. 620. Because the District Court employed an analytical framework that did not require a detailed discussion of the voluminous record, the extent of this impermissible behavior and the degree to which it is attributable to poor administration by the Executive Branch is somewhat less clear. In this circumstance, two points deserve to be emphasized. First, any use of public funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment Clause. Second, extensive violations -if they can be proved in this case -will be highly relevant in shaping an appropriate remedy that ends such abuses. For that reason, appellees may yet prevail on remand, and I do not believe that the Court’s approach entails