First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan

Bowen v. Roy

First Amendment, Partial concurrence, partial dissent, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I and II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion, and I would vacate only a portion of the injunction issued by the District Court.

I

I believe that appellees cannot pursue their free exercise claim based solely on the actions of the Government with respect to the use of a Social Security number already in its possession, or with respect to any other identification number the Government may wish to assign and use in connection with its administration of its welfare assistance program. Accordingly, I join Parts 476 U. S. S. 699|>II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion, and I would vacate that portion of the District Court’s judgment that enjoins the Government from using or disseminating the Social Security number already assigned to Little Bird of the Snow.

In all, eight Members of the Court believe that the District Court’s injunction was overbroad in preventing the Government from using information already in its possession. See ante at 476 U. S. 699 -701 (opinion of BURGER, C.J., joined by POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ.); ante at 476 U. S. 716 -717 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result); ante at 476 U. S. 713 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part); supra, this page.

A logical next step on the facts of this case is to consider whether the case is moot. Only two Members of the Court believe that the case is, or may be, moot. See ante at 476 U. S.

Concurrence, First Amendment

Bowen v. Kendrick

Concurrence, First Amendment / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

This case raises somewhat unusual questions involving a facially valid statute that appears to have been administered in a way that led to violations of the Establishment Clause. I agree with the Court’s resolution of those questions, and I join its opinion. I write separately, however, to explain why I do not believe that the Court’s approach reflects any tolerance for the kind of improper administration that seems to have occurred in the Government program at issue here.

The dissent says, and I fully agree, that “[p]ublic funds may not be used to advance the religious message.” Post at 487 U. S. 642. As the Court notes, “there is no dispute that the record contains evidence of specific incidents of impermissible behavior by AFLA grantees.” Ante at 487 U. S. 620. Because the District Court employed an analytical framework that did not require a detailed discussion of the voluminous record, the extent of this impermissible behavior and the degree to which it is attributable to poor administration by the Executive Branch is somewhat less clear. In this circumstance, two points deserve to be emphasized. First, any use of public funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment Clause. Second, extensive violations -if they can be proved in this case -will be highly relevant in shaping an appropriate remedy that ends such abuses. For that reason, appellees may yet prevail on remand, and I do not believe that the Court’s approach entails

Civil Rights, Dissent

Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass’n

Civil Rights, Dissent / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.

I fully agree with JUSTICE WHITE’s conclusion that the only question properly before us is whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Secretary has no power under 29 U.S.C. § 794 to regulate medical treatment decisions concerning handicapped newborn infants. I also agree that application of established principles of statutory construction and of the appropriate standard for judicial review of agency action leads inescapably to the conclusion that the Secretary has the authority to regulate in this area. Because, however, I see no need at this juncture to address the details of the regulations or to assess whether they are sufficiently rational to survive review under 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), I join only parts 476 U. S. 476 U. S. 476 U. S. and 476 U. S.

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

We must decide today what limits the operation of the federal patent system places on the States’ ability to offer substantial protection to utilitarian and design ideas which the patent laws leave otherwise unprotected. In Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678 (1985), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that a California law prohibiting the use of the “direct molding process” to duplicate unpatented articles posed no threat to the policies behind the federal patent laws. In this case, the Florida Supreme Court came to a contrary conclusion. It struck down a Florida statute which prohibits the use of the direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls, finding that the protection offered by the Florida law conflicted with the balance struck by Congress in the federal patent statute between the encouragement of invention and free competition in unpatented ideas. See 515 So.2d 220 (1987). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 486 U.S. 1004 (1988), and we now affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.

I

In September, 1976, petitioner Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito), a Florida corporation, developed a hull design for a fiberglass recreational boat which it marketed under the trade name Bonito Boat Model 5VBR. App. 5. Designing the boat hull required substantial effort on the part of Bonito. A set of engineering drawings was prepared, from which a hardwood model was created. The hardwood

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Clark v. Jeter

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under Pennsylvania law, an illegitimate child must prove paternity before seeking support from his or her father, and a suit to establish paternity ordinarily must be brought within six years of an illegitimate child’s birth. By contrast, a legitimate child may seek support from his or her parents at any time. We granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of this legislative scheme.

I

On September 22, 1983, petitioner Cherlyn Clark filed a support complaint in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on behalf of her minor daughter, Tiffany, who was born out of wedlock on June 11, 1973. Clark named respondent Gene Jeter as Tiffany’s father. The court ordered blood tests, which showed a 99.3% probability that Jeter is Tiffany’s father.

Jeter moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was barred by the 6-year statute of limitations for paternity actions. * In her response, Clark contended that this statute is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the alternative, she argued that the statute was tolled by fraudulent and misleading actions of the welfare department, or by threats and assaults by Jeter.

The trial court upheld the statute of limitations on the authority of Astemborski v. Susmarski, 499 Pa. 99, 451 A.2d 1012 (1982), vacated, 462 U.S. 1127 (1983), reinstated on remand, 502 Pa. 409, 466 A.2d 1018 (1983). The Pennsylvania Supreme

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Majority, William Rehnquist

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik

Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Civil Rights, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE SCALIA join.

This case calls upon us to define the proper legal standard for determining when isolated decisions by municipal officials or employees may expose the municipality itself to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I

The principal facts are not in dispute. Respondent James H. Praprotnik is an architect who began working for petitioner city of St. Louis in 1968. For several years, respondent consistently received favorable evaluations of his job performance, uncommonly quick promotions, and significant increases in salary. By 1980, he was serving in a management-level city planning position at petitioner’s Community Development Agency (CDA).

The Director of CDA, Donald Spaid, had instituted a requirement that the agency’s professional employees, including architects, obtain advance approval before taking on private clients. Respondent and other CDA employees objected to the requirement. In April, 1980, respondent was suspended for 15 days by CDA’s Director of Urban Design, Charles Kindleberger, for having accepted outside employment without prior approval. Respondent appealed to the city’s Civil Service Commission, a body charged with reviewing employee grievances. Finding the penalty too harsh, the Commission reversed the suspension, awarded respondent backpay, and directed that he be reprimanded for having failed to secure a clear understandi

Byron White, Civil Rights, Dissent, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist

City of Springfield v. Kibbe

Byron White, Civil Rights, Dissent, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.

We granted certiorari in this case to resolve whether a city can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for providing inadequate police training, and, if so, what standard should govern the imposition of such liability. 475 U.S. 1064 (1986). In my view, the question is properly before the Court, and I would decide it on the merits.

I

On the evening of September 28, 1981, the Springfield Police Department received a telephone call reporting that someone had called an apartment’s occupants and threatened to come after them with a knife. Later calls reported that an individual identified as Clinton Thurston had broken the apartment door and assaulted a woman staying at the apartment. When officers arrived at the scene, they discovered that Thurston had abducted the woman and driven away in his car. A short while later, Thurston’s vehicle was spotted by an officer driving an unmarked police car. When Thurston stopped at an intersection, the officer walked up to Thurston’s vehicle and identified himself as a police officer, but Thurston drove away.

The officer gave chase, and soon was joined by other members of the Springfield Police Department. Two officers set up a roadblock to stop Thurston, but he drove past the obstacle without stopping. As he did so, one of the officers fired at the tires of Thurston’s vehicle; later a nick was found in the left rear wheel. At a second roadblock,

Dissent, Harry Blackmun, Judicial Power, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan

Carden v. Arkoma Assocs

Dissent, Harry Blackmun, Judicial Power, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan / By

Justice O’CONNOR, with whom Justice BRENNAN, Justice MARSHALL, and Justice BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

The only potentially nondiverse party in this case is a limited partner. All other parties, including the general partners and the limited partnership itself, assuming it is a citizen, are diverse. Thus, the Court has before it a single question -whether the citizenship of a limited partner must be counted for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The Court first addresses whether the limited partnership is a “citizen.” I do not consider that issue, because even if we were to hold that a limited partnership is a citizen, we are still required to consider which, if any, of the other citizens before the Court as members of Arkoma Associates are real parties to the controversy, i.e., which parties have control over the subject of and litigation over the controversy. See Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16 How. 314, 57 U. S. 328, (1854). Application of that test leads me to conclude that limited partners are not real parties to the controversy and, therefore, should not be counted for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

I

The Court asserts that “[w]e have long since decided” to leave to Congress the issue of the proper treatment of unincorporated associations for diversity purposes, because the issue of which business association

is entitled to be considered a citizen’ for diversity purposes, and which of their members’ citizenship is to be consulted, are questions more readily

Concurrence, David Souter, First Amendment, Stephen Breyer

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette

Concurrence, David Souter, First Amendment, Stephen Breyer / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court’s opinion and concur in the judgment. Despite the messages of bigotry and racism that may be conveyed along with religious connotations by the display of a Ku Klux Klan cross, see ante, at 771 (THOMAS, J., concurring), at bottom this case must be understood as it has been presented to us-as a case about private religious expression and whether the State’s relationship to it violates the Establishment Clause. In my view, “the endorsement test asks the right question about governmental practices challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, including challenged practices involving the display of religious symbols,” County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 628 (1989) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), even where a neutral state policy toward private religious speech in a public forum is at issue. Accordingly, I see no necessity to carve out, as the plurality opinion would today, an exception to the endorsement test for the public forum context.

For the reasons given by JUSTICE SOUTER, whose opinion I also join, I conclude on the facts of this case that there is “no realistic danger that the community would think that the [State] was endorsing religion or any particular creed,” Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508

Concurrence, Due Process

California v. Trombetta

Concurrence, Due Process / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.

Rules concerning preservation of evidence are generally matters of state, not federal constitutional, law. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348, 393 U. S. 352 -353 (1969). The failure to preserve breath samples does not render a prosecution fundamentally unfair, and thus cannot render breath analysis tests inadmissible as evidence against the accused. Id. at 393 U. S. 356. Similarly, the failure to employ alternative methods of testing blood alcohol concentrations is of no due process concern, both because persons are presumed to know their rights under the law and because the existence of tests not used in no way affects the fundamental fairness of the convictions actually obtained. I understand the Court to state no more than these well-settled propositions. Accordingly, I join both its opinion and judgment.