JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondents' husbands were killed when petitioner Air Logistic's helicopter, in which the decedents were traveling, crashed into the high seas. The issue presented is whether the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq., provides the exclusive remedy by which respondents may recover against petitioner for the wrongful death of their husbands, or whether they may also recover the measure of damages provided by the Louisiana wrongful death statute, La.Civ.Code Ann., Art. 2315 (West Supp.1986), applying either of its own force or as surrogate federal law under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 67 Stat. 462, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.
I
The husbands of respondents Corrine Taylor and Beth Tallentire worked on drilling platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, off the coast of Louisiana. On August 6, 1980, respondents' husbands were killed while being transported in a helicopter owned and operated by petitioner Air Logistics (hereafter petitioner), a Division of Offshore Logistics, Inc., from a drilling platform to Houma, Louisiana. The crash occurred approximately 35 miles off the coast of Louisiana, well over the 3-mile limit that separates Louisiana's territorial waters from the high seas for purposes of DOHSA.
Respondents each filed wrongful death suits in United States District Court, raising claims under DOHSA, OCSLA, and the law of Louisiana. These actions were later consolidated in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Upon petitioner's pretrial motion for partial summary judgment, the District Court ruled that DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy for death on the high seas, and it therefore dismissed respondents' claims based upon the Louisiana wrongful death statute. Petitioner admitted liability, and the trial was limited to the question of damages. Because DOHSA limits recovery to "fair and just compensation for… pecuniary loss," the District Court's awards to respondents did not include damages for nonpecuniary losses. 46 U.S.C. § 762.
Respondents appealed the District Court's dismissal of their OCSLA and state law wrongful death claims, contending that they were entitled to nonpecuniary damages under the Louisiana wrongful death statute. See La.Civ.Code Ann., Art. 2315(B) (West Supp.1986) (permitting recovery for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages, "includ[ing] loss of consortium, service, and society"). They argued that the Louisiana statute applied to this helicopter crash on the high seas, either of its own force by virtue of the saving provision in § 7 of DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. § 767, or as adopted federal law through OCSLA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of benefits recoverable under Louisiana law, with one judge specially concurring and another judge dissenting. See 754 F.2d 1274 (1985).
The Court of Appeals first observed that, even if OCSLA did apply to this action, OCSLA adopts state law as surrogate federal law only "[t]o the extent [the state laws] are… not inconsistent with… other Federal laws." 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). Because the precedent of the Fifth Circuit held that DOHSA applies to a helicopter crash on the high seas, the court concluded that Louisiana law could not be applied through OCSLA, as the Louisiana wrongful death scheme was inconsistent with DOHSA. Accordingly, the court turned to the question whether state law could apply of its own force by virtue of § 7 of DOHSA, which provides:
The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter. Nor shall this chapter apply to the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any State, or to any navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone.
46 U.S.C. § 767.
After examining the legislative history of § 7, the Court of Appeals concluded that that section was intended to preserve the applicability of state wrongful death statutes on the high seas. It further held that Louisiana had legislative jurisdiction to extend its wrongful death statute to remedy deaths on the high seas, and that Louisiana, in fact, intended its statute to have that effect. In reaching its result, the court acknowledged that the disunity that its decision would create was "profoundly unsettling," 754 F.2d at 1284, but ultimately concluded that "[o]ur desire for a uniform, consistent, scheme of maritime death remedies cannot justify a refusal to follow" the perceived legislative will. Id. at 1288.
Judge Jolly filed a special concurrence, observing that, although the court's result was compelled by § 7, it would create
significant problems in the field of maritime law because it defies reason, runs contrary to principles of the general precedent in the field, and creates all sorts of internal inconsistencies in the prosecution of cases dealing with death on the high seas.
Id. at 1289. Judge Garza dissented, arguing that § 7 was intended to preserve state wrongful death actions only in territorial waters, and echoing the view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the application of state law to wrongful death actions arising on the high seas would be " as damaging to uniformity in wrongful death actions as it is illogical.'" Ibid. (quoting Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (CA9 1983)).
Because the Fifth Circuit's decision creates the potential for disunity in the administration of wrongful death remedies for causes of action arising from accidents on the high seas, and is in conflict with the prevailing view in other courts that DOHSA preempts state law wrongful death statutes in the area of its operation, we granted certiorari. 474 U.S. 816 (1985). We now hold that neither OCSLA nor DOHSA requires or permits the application of Louisiana law in this case, and accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
II
The tortuous development of the law of wrongful death in the maritime context illustrates the truth of Justice Cardozo's observation that "[d]eath is a composer of strife by the general law of the sea as it was for many centuries by the common law of the land." Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U. S. 367, 287 U. S. 371 (1932). In The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886), this Court held that, in the absence of an applicable state or federal statute, general federal maritime law did not afford a wrongful death cause of action to the survivors of individuals killed on the high seas, or waters navigable from the sea. It reasoned that, because the common law did not recognize a civil action for injury which resulted in death on the land, no different rule should apply with respect to maritime deaths. Unable to tolerate this archaism, some courts began to allow recovery for deaths within state territorial waters if an applicable state statute permitted such recovery. See, e.g., The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 103-108 (SDNY 1893) (state wrongful death statute may validly be applied to "maritime affairs within the state limits"), aff'd, 61 F. 364, 367-368 (CA2 1894) (application of state wrongful death statute to accident in state territorial waters valid "in the absence of any regulation of the subject by congress"). See also Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522 (1873).
In an attempt to alleviate the harshness of the rule of The Harrisburg, this Court also recognized in The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 (1907), that state wrongful death statutes could, in some limited circumstances, be applied to fatal accidents occurring on the high seas. In The Hamilton, the Court held that, where the statutes of the United States enabled the owner of a vessel to transfer its liability to a fund and to claim the exclusive jurisdiction of admiralty, and where that fund was being distributed, a Delaware citizen's claim under Delaware law against another citizen of Delaware for wrongful death on the high seas would be recognized in admiralty. The Court noted that,
[i]n such circumstances, all claims to which the admiralty does not deny existence must be recognized, whether admiralty liens or not.
207 U. S. @ at 406.
The Hamilton has sometimes been understood to endorse a broader application of state law on the high seas than its holding suggested. Some courts came to rely on dicta in The Hamilton for the "questionable" proposition that, if a state wrongful death statute was intended to extend to torts occurring on the high seas, then an action between citizens of that State for a wrongful death on the high seas could lie in admiralty. Day, Maritime Wrongful Death and Survival Recovery: The Need for Legislative Reform, 64 Colum.L.Rev. 648, 650 (1964). See also Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F.Supp. 85, 88 (ND Cal.1954); Comment, 51 Calif.L.Rev. 389 (1963) ("Because the constitutionality of the application of a state wrongful death statute to occurrences on the high seas was doubtful, the cases [recognizing such an application] had to rest on farfetched theories"); Putnam, The Remedy for Death at Sea, 22 Case & Com. 125, 126-127 (1915). There was continued doubt, in spite of The Hamilton's dicta, as to the States' competence to provide wrongful death relief for causes of action arising on the high seas. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375, 398 U. S. 393, n. 10 (1970) ("The general understanding was that the statutes of the coastal States, which provided remedies for deaths within territorial waters, did not apply beyond state boundaries"); H.R.Rep. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 4 (1920) (accompanying DOHSA) ("there is no right of action for death under" maritime law; "the right to affirmative action [outside of limitation of liability actions] in the admiralty against ship or owner has never been sustained by the Supreme Court").
Even where The Hamilton was understood to sanction a state remedy for the high seas,
probably because most state death statutes were not meant to have application to the high seas, [the] possibility [of recovery under state law for deaths on the high seas] did little to fill the vacuum
left by The Harrisburg. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, supra, at 398 U. S. 393, n. 10. Moreover, those state wrongful death statutes that were held to apply to the high seas had limited effectiveness, because, under the dicta in The Hamilton,
[l]egislative jurisdiction to impose a liability for a wrongful act at sea beyond the boundaries of the state had to rest upon one of two theories: either (1) that the vessel upon which the wrongful act occurred was constructively part of the territory of the state; or (2) that the wrongdoer was a vessel or citizen of the state subject to its jurisdiction even when beyond its territorial limits. Neither theory sufficed for every situation.
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, supra, at 88. Such conflict of laws problems arose out of collisions between vessels incorporated in different States and between American-flag vessels and those flying the flag of a foreign jurisdiction that, in one celebrated case, the perplexed court simply denied recovery entirely. See, e.g., The Middlesex, 253 F. 142 (Mass.1916) (where collision on high seas was between two American vessels whose owners resided or were incorporated in different States, recovery could not be had under any of the potentially applicable state statutes). See also Day, supra, at 650-651, and n. 13; Robinson, Wrongful Death in Admiralty and the Conflict of Laws, 36 Colum.L.Rev. 406 (1936). In sum, for all practical purposes, from the date of The Harrisburg until the passage of DOHSA in 1920, "there was no remedy for death on the high seas caused by breach of one of the duties imposed by federal maritime law." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. at 398 U. S. 393.
It was in this atmosphere that Congress considered legislation designed to provide a uniform and effective wrongful death remedy for survivors of persons killed on the high seas. See id. at 398 U. S. 398, 401; Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, supra, at 88-90. In 1920, Congress enacted DOHSA, in which it finally repudiated the rule of The Harrisburg for maritime deaths occurring beyond state territorial waters by providing for a federal maritime remedy for wrongful deaths more than three miles from shore. [ Footnote 1 ] DOHSA limits the class of beneficiaries to the decedent's "wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative," 46 U.S.C. § 761, establishes a 3-year statute of limitations period, § 763a, allows a suit filed by the victim to continue as a wrongful death action if the victim dies of his injuries while suit is pending, § 765, provides that contributory negligence will not bar recovery, § 766, and declares that
recovery… shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought….
§ 762.
As this Court explained in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 436 U. S. 621 -622 (1978):
In the half century between 1920 and 1970, deaths on the high seas gave rise to federal suits under DOHSA, while those in territorial waters were largely governed by state wrongful death statutes, [the primary exception being survivor's suits for wrongful death under the Jones Act, which gives a remedy no matter where the wrong takes place.] DOHSA brought a measure of uniformity and predictability to the law on the high seas, but in territorial waters, where The Harrisburg made state law the only source of a wrongful death remedy, the continuing impact of that decision produced uncertainty and incongruity. The reasoning of The Harrisburg,which was dubious at best in 1886, became less and less satisfactory as the years passed. In 1970, therefore, the Court overruledThe Harrisburg. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, the Court held that a federal remedy for wrongful death does exist under general maritime law. The case concerned a death in Florida's territorial waters. The defendant argued that Congress, by limiting DOHSA to the high seas, had evidenced an intent to preclude federal judicial remedies in territorial waters. The Court concluded, however, that the reason Congress confined DOHSA to the high seas was to prevent the Act from abrogating, by its own force, the state remedies then available in state waters. Id. at 400.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Subsequently, the Court confronted some of the various subsidiary questions concerning the Moragne federal death remedy in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U. S. 573 (1974), in which it was held that awards in a Moragne -based suit could include compensation for loss of support and services, for funeral expenses, and for loss of society, but not for mental anguish. Finally, in Higginbotham, the Court ruled that the nonpecuniary loss standard provided by DOHSA controlled on the high seas, and could not be supplemented by the measure of damages recognized in Gaudet for Moragne causes of action. In so doing, the Court concluded:
We realize that, because Congress has never enacted a comprehensive maritime code, admiralty courts have often been called upon to supplement maritime statutes. The Death on the High Seas Act, however, announces Congress' considered judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries, the limitations period, contributory negligence, survival, and damages…. The Act does not address every issue of wrongful death law,… but when it does speak directly to a question, the courts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless.
436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 625.
With this background, we now proceed to the question at hand: whether the DOHSA measure of recovery may be supplemented by the remedies provided by state law, through either OCSLA or § 7 of DOHSA.
III
As explained above, DOHSA is intended to provide a maritime remedy for deaths stemming from wrongful acts or omissions "occurring on the high seas." 46 U.S.C. § 761. OCSLA, by contrast, provides an essentially nonmaritime remedy, and controls only on "the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures" erected thereon. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). By its terms, OCSLA must be "construed in such a manner that the character of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf as high seas… shall not be affected." § 1332(2). Within the area covered by OCSLA, federal law controls, but the law of the adjacent State is adopted as surrogate federal law to the extent that it is not inconsistent with applicable federal laws or regulations. § 1333(a)(2)(A).
The intent behind OCSLA was to treat the artificial structures covered by the Act as upland islands or as federal enclaves within a landlocked State, and not as vessels, for purposes of defining the applicable law, because maritime law was deemed inapposite to these fixed structures. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U. S. 352, 395 U. S. 361 -366 (1969). This Court endorsed the congressional assumption that admiralty law generally would not apply to the lands and structures covered by OCSLA in Rodrigue, noting that accidents on the artificial islands covered by OCSLA "had no more connection with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents on piers." Id. at 395 U. S. 360. See also Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U. S. 414, 470 U. S. 422 (1985). Thus, in Rodrigue, the Court held that an admiralty action under DOHSA does not apply to accidents "actually occurring" on these artificial islands, and that DOHSA therefore does not preclude the application of state law as adopted federal law through OCSLA to wrongful death actions arising from accidents on offshore platforms. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., supra, at 453 U. S. 366.
Respondents argue that, because the decedents were platform workers being transported from work to the mainland, OCSLA, not DOHSA, governs their cause of action. They contend that, in Rodrigue and Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U. S. 473 (1981), the Court recognized the applicability of state law through OCSLA to accidents that resulted in deaths or injuries not on platforms, but on boats in the waters immediately adjacent to the platforms. This, they state, evidences the Court's assumption that OCSLA applies to traditionally maritime locales on the high seas, beyond the confines of the platform, when the decedent is a platform worker. In support of their apparent assumption that it is the decedent's status as a platform worker that controls, they note that it was the
special relationship between the men working on these artificial islands and the adjacent shore to which they commute to visit their families
that moved Congress to treat drilling platforms as upland federal enclaves, rather than vessels. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 365.
We cannot accept respondents' attempt to rewrite OCSLA. The extension of OCSLA far beyond its intended locale to the accident in this case simply cannot be reconciled with either the narrowly circumscribed area defined by the statute or the statutory prescription that the Act not be construed to affect the high seas which cover the Continental Shelf. Nor can the extension of OCSLA to this case be reconciled with the operative assumption underlying the statute: that admiralty jurisdiction generally should not be extended to accidents in areas covered by OCSLA. See, e.g., id. at 395 U. S. 361. Here, admiralty jurisdiction is expressly provided under DOHSA because the accidental deaths occurred beyond a marine league from shore. See 46 U.S.C. § 761. Even without this statutory provision, admiralty jurisdiction is appropriately invoked here under traditional principles, because the accident occurred on the high seas and in furtherance of an activity bearing a significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U. S. 249 (1972). Although the decedents were killed while riding in a helicopter, and not a more traditional maritime conveyance, that helicopter was engaged in a function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels: the ferrying of passengers from an "island," albeit an artificial one, to the shore. Id. at 409 U. S. 271, and n. 20.
The character of the decedents as platform workers who have a special relationship with the shore community simply has no special relevance to the resolution of the question of the application of OCSLA to this case. Neither of the cases cited by respondents supports their position. Rodrigue and Gulf Offshore did not endorse the proposition that it is the decedent's status or his special relationship with the shore that required the application of OCSLA, regardless of the location of the accident. Indeed, no question was even raised in Gulf Offshore regarding whether OCSLA applied to an accident aboard a vessel adjacent to the platform. Moreover, the facts of these cases make clear that OCSLA was presumed applicable not because of the status of the decedents, but because of the proximity of the workers' accidents to the platforms and the fact that the fatalities were intimately connected with the decedents' work on the platforms.
We do not interpret § 4 of OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1333, to require or permit us to extend the coverage of the statute to the platform workers in this case who were killed miles away from the platform and on the high seas simply because they were platform workers. Congress determined that the general scope of OCSLA's coverage, like the operation of DOHSA's remedies, would be determined principally by locale, not by the status of the individual injured or killed. [ Footnote 2 ] See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) ("To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations.. the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State… are hereby declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon"); 46 U.S.C. § 761 (DOHSA's coverage extends to the death of any "person… caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a maritime league from the shore of any State…"). Cf. Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, supra (discussing status and situs requirements of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as applied to platform workers making claims against their employers); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297 (1983); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (recovery under Jones Act confined to "seaman"). Because the fatalities underlying this suit did not arise from an accident in the area covered by OCSLA, but rather occurred on the high seas, DOHSA plainly was intended to control.
In the circumstances presented, then, the conclusion is inescapable that the remedies afforded by DOHSA, not OCSLA, govern this action. Thus, respondents may secure the nonpecuniary damages made available by Louisiana's wrongful death statute only if it is found that DOHSA preserves, or does not preempt, state remedies on the high seas.
IV
Respondents argue that the first sentence of § 7 of DOHSA was intended to ensure the applicability of state wrongful death statutes to deaths on the high seas. We conclude that that provision will not bear respondents' reading when evaluated in light of the language of the Act as a whole, the legislative history of § 7, the congressional purposes underlying the Act, and the importance of uniformity of admiralty law. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 350 U. S. 285 (1956) (" I n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy'") (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 49 U. S. 122 (1849)). These references persuade us that the first sentence of § 7 was intended only to serve as a jurisdictional saving clause, ensuring that state courts enjoyed the right to entertain causes of action and provide wrongful death remedies both for accidents arising on territorial waters and, under DOHSA, for accidents occurring more than one marine league from shore.
The first sentence of § 7 of DOHSA, as originally drafted, provided that
the provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this act as to causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any State.
See 59 Cong.Rec. 4482 (1920). During the House debate, Representative Mann proposed an amendment deleting the words "as to causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any state." Although at first blush the language of the amended § 7 seems to support respondents' position, a closer comparison of the language of § 7, both before and after its amendment, with the language of § 4 of the Act belies respondents' facial argument.
The only other amendment made to the bill as originally submitted was the addition of § 4, which provides:
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of the United States without abatement in respect to the amount for which recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.
46 U.S.C. § 764. Section 4 indicates that, when Congress wanted to preserve the right to recover under the law of another sovereign for whatever measure of damages that law might provide, regardless of any inconsistency with the measure of damages provided by DOHSA, it did so expressly. We are reluctant to read the much more ambiguous language of § 7, which states only that state law "remedies" or "rights of action" would not be "affected" and which makes no provision for reconciling potentially conflicting state and federal measures of recovery, to have the same substantive effect as the explicit command of § 4. Normal principles of statutory construction require that we give effect to the subtleties of language that Congress chose to employ, particularly where, as here, Congress isolated only these sections for special consideration by way of amendment while it was considering DOHSA.
The language of § 7 bears a marked similarity to the "saving to suitors" clause that allows litigants to bring in personam maritime actions in state courts. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 76 ("saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it"); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1948 and 1949 amendments to original saving clause) ("saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled"). See also Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U. S. 556, 346 U. S. 560, n. 12 (1954) (1948 and 1949 amendments effected no substantive change). The "saving to suitors" clause leaves state courts competent to adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings in personam, and means that
a state, 'having concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents as it sees fit,' so long as it does not attempt to [give in rem remedies or] make changes in the 'substantive maritime law.'
Id. at 560-561 (quoting Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 264 U. S. 124 (1924)). Stated another way, the "saving to suitors" clause allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime causes of action, but, in such cases, the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called "reverse Erie " doctrine, which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal maritime standards. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan.L.Rev. 1, 34 (1963) (referring to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938)). See also Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 317 U. S. 246 (1942); Stevens, Erie RR. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 246 (1950).
Thus, a natural reading of § 7 is that a state statute providing a wrongful death right of action traditionally unavailable at common law would not be "affected" by DOHSA in the sense of being rendered an incompetent means of invoking state jurisdiction, but the state statute's substantive provisions would not, by virtue of the saving provision, "extend as a conduct-governing enactment on the high seas" if in conflict with DOHSA's provisions. Safir v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 241 F.Supp. 501, 508 (EDNY 1965) (interpreting § 7). The legislative history of § 7, as originally proposed and as amended, supports this construction of the section's language.
The Maritime Law Association (MLA), an organization of experts in admiralty law and a prime force in the movement for a federal wrongful death remedy, drafted the bill that was enacted as DOHSA. The MLA envisioned § 7 to be a jurisdictional saving clause which completed the statutory scheme by ensuring continued concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over wrongful death claims arising from accidents on territorial waters. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts § 1316(b), pp. 236-237 (1969) (hereinafter ALI Study). See also Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31 Yale L.J. 115, 123 (1921). Although congressional proponents viewed § 7 as a product of perhaps overabundant caution, the MLA, an expert body of maritime lawyers, had reason to fear that, absent a saving clause specifically recognizing the continued viability of this type of action, state wrongful death remedies on territorial waters might be deemed beyond the competency of state courts. In 1917, this Court handed down Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, a landmark in admiralty law. In that case, the Court held that the remedy a state workmen's compensation statute
attempts to give is of a character wholly unknown to the common law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any court, and is not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
where the rights and liabilities of the parties are clearly matters within admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 244 U. S. 218. The felt necessity for a DOHSA saving clause, then, may be traced to the fact that wrongful death statutes, like workmen's compensation schemes, were not "common law remedies," see The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. at 119 U. S. 213, and thus may not have been deemed "saved to suitors" under the Judiciary Act of 1789, as construed in Jensen.
Although not intended to function as a substantive law saving clause, § 7 incidentally ensured that state courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction could, as under the "saving to suitors" clause, apply such state remedie