JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1972, Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V) (hereinafter LHWCA or Act). Before 1972, LHWCA coverage extended only to injuries sustained on the actual "navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)." 44 Stat. (part 2) 1426. As part of its 1972 Amendments of the Act, Congress expanded the "navigable waters" situs to include certain adjoining land areas, § 3(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). At the same time, Congress added a status requirement that employees covered by the Act must be "engaged in maritime employment" within the meaning of § 2(3) of the Act. [ Footnote 1 ] We granted certiorari in this case, 455 U.S. 937 (1982), to consider whether a marine construction worker, who was injured while performing his job upon actual navigable waters, [ Footnote 2 ] and who would have been covered by the Act before 1972, is "engaged in maritime employment," and thus covered by the amended Act. [ Footnote 3 ] We hold that the worker is "engaged in maritime employment" for purposes of coverage under the amended LHWCA. Accordingly, we reverse the decision below.
I
The facts are not in dispute. Respondent Perini North River Associates (Perini) contracted to build the foundation of a sewage treatment plant that extends approximately 700 feet over the Hudson River between 136th and 145th Streets in Manhattan. The project required that Perini place large, hollow circular pipes called caissons in the river, down to embedded rock, fill the caissons with concrete, connect the caissons together above the water with concrete beams, and place precast concrete slabs on the beams. The caissons were delivered by rail to the shore, where they were loaded onto supply barges and towed across the river to await unloading and installation.
The injured worker, Raymond Churchill, was an employee of Perini in charge of all work performed on a cargo barge used to unload caissons and other materials from the supply barges and to set caissons in position for insertion into the embedded rock. Churchill was on the deck of the cargo barge giving directions to a crane operator engaged in unloading a caisson from a supply barge when a line used to keep the caissons in position snapped and struck Churchill. He sustained injuries to his head, leg, and thumb. [ Footnote 4 ]
Churchill filed a claim for compensation under the LHWCA. Perini denied that Churchill was covered by the Act, and, after a formal hearing pursuant to § 19 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), an Administrative Law Judge determined that Churchill was not "engaged in maritime employment" under § 2(3) of the Act because his job lacked "some relationship to navigation and commerce on navigable waters." App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. Churchill and the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (Director), appealed to the Benefits Review Board, pursuant to § 21(b)(3) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). The Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's denial of coverage on the theory that marine construction workers involved in building facilities not ultimately used in navigation or commerce upon navigable waters are not engaged in "maritime employment." 12 BRBS 929, 933 (1980). [ Footnote 5 ] One Board Member dissented, arguing that
all injuries sustained in the course of employment by employees over 'navigable waters,' as that term was defined prior to the 1972 Amendments, are covered under the [amended] Act.
Id. at 935. [ Footnote 6 ]
Churchill then sought review of the Board's decision in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, under § 21(c) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). [ Footnote 7 ] The Director participated as respondent, and filed a brief in support of Churchill's position. The Second Circuit denied Churchill's petition, relying on its decision in Fusco v. Perini North River Associates, 622 F.2d 1111 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). According to the Second Circuit, Churchill was not in "maritime employment," because his employment lacked a " significant relationship to navigation or to commerce on navigable waters.'" Churchill v. Perini North River Associates, 652 F.2d 255, 256, n. 1 (1981). The Director now seeks review of the Second Circuit denial of Churchill's petition. The Director agrees with the position taken by the dissenting member of the Benefits Review Board: the LHWCA does not require that an employee show that his employment possesses a "significant relationship to navigation or to commerce," where, as here, the employee is injured while working upon the actual navigable waters in the course of his employment, and would have been covered under the pre-1972 LHWCA. [ Footnote 8 ]
II
Before we consider whether Churchill is covered by the Act, we must address Perini's threshold contention that the Director does not have standing to seek review of the decision below. According to Perini, the Director's only interest in this case is in furthering a different interpretation of the Act than the one rendered by the Administrative Law Judge, the Benefits Review Board, and the Court of Appeals. [ Footnote 9 ]
Perini's claim ignores the procedural posture in which this case comes before the Court. That posture makes it unnecessary for us to consider whether the Director, as the agency official "responsible for the administration and enforcement" of the Act, [ Footnote 10 ] has standing as an aggrieved party to seek review of the decision below. [ Footnote 11 ] The Director is not alone in arguing that Churchill is covered under the LHWCA. Churchill, the injured employee, is before the Court as well. He has filed a brief in support of the Director's request for a writ of certiorari, and a brief addressing the merits of his claim, in which he presents the same arguments presented by the Director. But, for some reason that is not entirely clear, Churchill has not elected to seek review as a petitioner, and by virtue of the Rules of this Court, he is considered a party respondent. [ Footnote 12 ] It is in this procedural context that Perini's challenge to Art. III standing must be considered. Perini concedes that the Director was a proper party respondent before the Court of Appeals in this litigation. [ Footnote 13 ] As party respondent below, the Director is entitled under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) to petition for a writ of certiorari. Although the Director has statutory authority to seek review in this Court, he may not have Art. III standing to argue the merits of Churchill's claim, because the Director's presence does not guarantee the existence of a justiciable controversy with respect to the merits of Churchill's coverage under the LHWCA. However, the Director's petition makes Churchill an automatic respondent under our Rule 19.6, and, in that capacity, Churchill "may seek reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on any ground urged in that court." O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U. S. 773, 447 U. S. 783 -784, n. 14 (1980). The Director's petition, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), brings Churchill before this Court, and there is no doubt that Churchill, as the injured employee, has a sufficient interest in this question to give him standing to urge our consideration of the merits of the Second Circuit decision.
The constitutional dimension of standing theory requires, at the very least, that there be an "actual injury redressable by the court." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 426 U. S. 39 (1976). This requirement is meant
to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action,
as well as to assure "an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact." Valley Forge Christian College v. American United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 454 U. S. 472 (1982). The presence of Churchill as a party respondent arguing for his coverage under the Act assures that an admittedly justiciable controversy is now before the Court.
III
The question of Churchill's coverage is an issue of statutory construction and legislative intent. For reasons that we explain below, there is no doubt that Churchill, as a marine construction worker injured upon actual navigable waters in the course of his employment upon those waters, would have been covered by the LHWCA before Congress amended it in 1972. In deciding whether Congress intended to restrict the scope of coverage by adding the 2(3) status requirement, we must consider the scope of coverage under the pre-1972 Act and our cases construing the relevant portions of that Act. We must then focus on the legislative history and purposes of the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA to determine their effect on preexisting coverage.
A
Beginning with our decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917), we held that there were certain circumstances in which States could not, consistently with Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, provide compensation to injured maritime workers. [ Footnote 14 ] If the employment of an injured worker was determined to have no "direct relation" to navigation or commerce, and "the application of local law [would not] materially affect" the uniformity of maritime law, then the employment would be characterized as "maritime but local," and the State could provide a compensation remedy. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 257 U. S. 477 (1922). See also Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 257 U. S. 242 (1921). If the employment could not be characterized as "maritime but local," then the injured employee would be left without a compensation remedy.
After several unsuccessful attempts to permit state compensation remedies to apply to injured maritime workers whose employment was not local, [ Footnote 15 ] Congress passed the LHWCA in 1927, 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424. Under the original statutory scheme, a worker had to satisfy five primary conditions in order to be covered under the Act. First, the worker had to satisfy the "negative" definition of "employee" contained in § 2(3) of the 1927 Act in that he could not be a "master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net." Id. at 1425. [ Footnote 16 ] Second, the worker had to suffer an "injury" defined by § 2(2) as "accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment…." Ibid. Third, the worker had to be employed by a statutory "employer," defined by § 2(4) as
an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock).
Ibid. [ Footnote 17 ] Fourth, the worker had to meet a "situs" requirement contained in § 3(a) of the Act that limited coverage to workers whose "disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)." Id. at 1426. Fifth, § 3(a) precluded federal compensation unless "recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law." Ibid.
Federal compensation under the LHWCA did not initially extend to all maritime employees injured on the navigable waters in the course of their employment. As mentioned, § 3(a) of the 1927 Act permitted federal compensation only if compensation "may not validly be provided by State law." Ibid. This language was interpreted to exclude from LHWCA coverage those employees whose employment was "maritime but local." See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). Application of the "maritime but local" doctrine required case-by-case determinations, and a worker was often required to make a perilous jurisdictional "guess" as to which of two mutually exclusive compensation schemes was applicable to cover his injury. Employers faced uncertainty as to whether their contributions to a state insurance fund would be sufficient to protect them from liability.
In Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249 (1942), this Court recognized that, despite its many cases involving the "maritime but local" doctrine, it had "been unable to give any guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of state power in advance of litigation…." Id. at 317 U. S. 253. Employees and employers alike were thrust on "[t]he horns of [a] jurisdictional dilemma." Id. at 317 U. S. 255. [ Footnote 18 ] Davis involved an employee who was injured while dismantling a bridge from a standing position on a barge. We upheld the application of the state compensation law in Davis not because the employee was engaged in "maritime but local" employment, but because we viewed the case as in a "twilight zone" of concurrent jurisdiction where LHWCA coverage was available and where the applicability of state law was difficult to determine. We held that doubt concerning the applicability of state compensation Acts was to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the state remedy. Relying in part on Davis, the Court in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U. S. 114 (1962), created further overlap between federal and state coverage for injured maritime workers. In Calbeck, we held that the LHWCA was
designed to ensure that a compensation remedy existed for all injuries sustained by employees [of statutory employers] on navigable waters, and to avoid uncertainty as to the source, state or federal, of that remedy.
Id. at 370 U. S. 124. Our examination in Calbeck of the "complete legislative history" of the 1927 LHWCA revealed that Congress did not intend to incorporate the "maritime but local" doctrine in the Act. Id. at 370 U. S. 120.
Congress used the phrase 'if recovery… may not validly be provided by State law' in a sense consistent with the delineation of coverage as reaching injuries occurring on navigable waters.
Id. at 370 U. S. 126. [ Footnote 19 ]
Before 1972, there was little litigation concerning whether an employee was "in maritime employment" for purposes of being the employee of a statutory employer:
Workers who are not seamen but who nevertheless suffer injury on navigable waters are, no doubt (or so the courts have been willing to assume), engaged in 'maritime employment.'
G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 428 (2d ed.1975) (Gilmore & Black). One case in which we did discuss the maritime employment requirement was Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U. S. 244 (1941). In Parker, the injured worker, hired as a janitor, was drowned while riding in one of his employer's motorboats keeping lookout for hidden objects under the water. When the employee's beneficiary sought LHWCA compensation, the employer argued that the employment was " so local in character'" that the State could validly have provided a remedy, and the § 3(a) language ("if recovery… may not validly be provided by State law") precluded federal relief. Id. at 314 U. S. 246. A unanimous Court rejected the employer's argument, and held that the employee was engaged in maritime employment, and that LHWCA coverage extended to an employee injured on the navigable waters in the course of his employment, without any further inquiry whether the injured worker's employment had a direct relation to navigation or commerce. [ Footnote 20 ] In abolishing the "jurisdictional dilemma" created by the "maritime but local" doctrine, Calbeck relied heavily on Parker, see 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 127 -128.
It becomes clear from this discussion that the 1927 Act, as interpreted by Parker, Davis, and Calbeck, provided coverage to those employees of statutory "employers," injured while working upon navigable waters in the course of their employment. Indeed, the consistent interpretation given to the LHWCA before 1972 by the Director, the Deputy Commissioners, the courts, and the commentators was that (except for those workers specifically excepted in the statute), any worker injured upon navigable waters in the course of employment was "covered… without any inquiry into what he was doing (or supposed to be doing) at the time of his injury." Gilmore & Black, at 429-430. [ Footnote 21 ] As a marine construction worker required to work upon navigable waters, and injured while performing his duties on navigable waters, there can be no doubt that Churchill would have been covered under the 1927 LHWCA.
B
In its "first significant effort to reform the 1927 Act and the judicial gloss that had been attached to it," Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249, 432 U. S. 261 (1977). The purposes of the 1972 Amendments were to raise the amount of compensation available under the LHWCA, to extend coverage of the Act to include certain contiguous land areas, to eliminate the longshoremen's strict liability seaworthiness remedy against shipowners, to eliminate shipowner's claims for indemnification from stevedores, and to promulgate certain administrative reforms. See S.Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 1 (1972) (hereinafter S.Rep.); H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441 (1972) (hereinafter H.R.Rep.).
For purposes of the present inquiry, the important changes effected by the 1972 Amendments concerned the definition of "employee" in § 2(3), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), and the description of coverage in § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). These amended sections provide:
The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.
§ 2(3), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3).
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)….
§ 3(a), as set forth in 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). [ Footnote 22 ]
The 1972 Amendments thus changed what had been essentially only a 'situs' test of eligibility for compensation to one looking to both the 'situs' of the injury and the 'status' of the injured.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., supra, at 432 U. S. 264 -265. In expanding the covered situs in § 3(a), Congress also removed the requirement, present in § 3(a) of the 1927 Act, that federal compensation would be available only if recovery "may not validly be provided by State law." The definition of "injury" remained the same, [ Footnote 23 ] and the definition of "employer" was changed to reflect the new definition of "employee" in § 2(3). [ Footnote 24 ]
The Director and Churchill claim that, when Congress added the status requirement in § 3(a), providing that a covered employee must be "engaged in maritime employment," it intended to restrict or define the scope of the increased coverage provided by the expanded situs provision in § 3(a), but that Congress had no intention to exclude from coverage workers, like Churchill, who were injured upon actual navigable waters, i.e., navigable waters as previously defined, in the course of their employment upon those waters.
According to Perini, Congress intended to overrule legislatively this Court's decision in Calbeck, and the status requirement was added to ensure that both the landward coverage and seaward coverage would depend on the nature of the employee's duties at the time he was injured. Perini's theory, adopted by the court below, is that all coverage under the amended LHWCA requires employment having a "significant relationship to navigation or to commerce on navigable waters." [ Footnote 25 ] Perini argues further that Churchill cannot meet the status test because he was injured while working on the construction of a foundation for a sewage treatment plant -an activity not typically associated with navigation or commerce on navigable waters.
We agree with the Director and Churchill. We are unable to find any congressional intent to withdraw coverage of the LHWCA from those workers injured on navigable waters in the course of their employment, and who would have been covered by the Act before 1972. As we have long held,
[t]his Act must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.
Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328, 346 U. S. 333 (1953). See also Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U. S. 408, 284 U. S. 414 (1932); Northeast Marine Terminal Co., 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 268.
It is necessary to consider the context in which the 1972 Amendments were passed, especially as that context relates directly to the coverage changes that were effected. Despite the fact that Calbeck extended protection of the LHWCA to all employees injured upon navigable waters in the course of their employment, LHWCA coverage still stopped at the water's edge -a line of demarcation established by Jensen. In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U. S. 212 (1969), we held that the LHWCA did not extend to longshoremen whose injuries occurred on the pier attached to the land. We recognized that there was much to be said for the uniform treatment of longshoremen irrespective of whether they were performing their duties upon the navigable waters (in which case they would be covered under Calbeck ), or whether they were performing those same duties on a pier. We concluded, however, that, although Congress could exercise its authority to cover land-based maritime activity, "[t]he invitation to move that [ Jensen ] line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this Court." 396 U.S. at 396 U. S. 224. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U. S. 202, 404 U. S. 216 (1971).
"Congress responded with the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972." P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U. S. 69, 444 U. S. 73 (1979). The 1972 Amendments were enacted after Committees in both the House and Senate prepared full Reports that summarized the general purposes of the legislation and contained an analysis of the changes proposed for each section. See S.Rep., supra; H.R.Rep., supra. These legislative Reports indicate clearly that Congress intended to " extend coverage to protect additional workers." S.Rep. at 1 (emphasis added). [ Footnote 26 ] Although the legislative history surrounding the addition of the status requirement is not as clear as that concerning the reasons for the extended situs, it is clear that,
with the definition of 'navigable waters' expanded by the 1972 Amendments to include such a large geographical area, it became necessary to describe affirmatively the class of workers Congress desired to compensate.
Northeast Marine Terminal Co., supra, at 432 U. S. 264. This necessity gave rise to the status requirement:
The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity.
S.Rep. at 13; H.R.Rep. at 11. This comment indicates that Congress intended the status requirement to define the scope of the extended landward coverage. [ Footnote 27 ]
There is nothing in these comments, or anywhere else in the legislative Reports, to suggest, as Perini claims, that Congress intended the status language to require that an employee injured upon the navigable waters in the course of his employment had to show that his employment possessed a direct (or substantial) relation to navigation or commerce in order to be covered. Congress was concerned with injuries on land, and assumed that injuries occurring on the actual navigable waters were covered, and would remain covered. [ Footnote 28 ] In discussing the added status requirement, the Senate Report states explicitly that the "maritime employment" requirement in § 3(a) was not meant to "exclude other employees traditionally covered." S.Rep. at 16. We may presume "that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law," Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 441 U. S. 696 -697 (1979), and that their use of "employees traditionally covered" was intended to refer to those employees included in the scope of coverage under Parker, Davis, and Calbeck. [ Footnote 29 ]
Other aspects of the statutory scheme support our understanding of the "maritime employment" status requirement. Congress removed from § 3(a) the requirement that, as a prerequisite to federal coverage, there can be no valid recovery under state law. [ Footnote 30 ] As we noted in our discussion in Part 459 U. S. supra, the continued use of the "maritime but local" doctrine occurred after passage of the 1927 Act, because the original coverage section contained this requirement that Congress explicitly deleted in 1972. Surely, if Congress wished to repeal Calbeck and other cases legislatively, it would do so by clear language, and not by removing from the statute the exact phrase that Calbeck found was responsible for continued emphasis on the "maritime but local" doctrine. [ Footnote 31 ]
Congressional intent to adhere to Calbeck is also indicated by the fact that the legislative Reports clearly identified those decisions that Congress wished to overrule by the 1972 Amendments. As mentioned above, the 1972 Amendments had other purposes apart from an expansion of coverage to shoreside areas. Two other purposes involved the elimination of a strict liability unseaworthiness remedy against a vessel owner afforded to longshoremen by Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946), and an indemnity claim against the stevedore by the vessel owner afforded by Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124 (1956). The legislative Reports explicitly identified these decisions as intended to be overruled legislatively by the 1972 Amendments. See S.Rep. at 8-12; H.R.Rep. at 4-8. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that Congress would have intended to return to the "jurisdictional monstrosity" that Calbeck sought to lay to rest without at least some indication of its intent to do so.
In considering the scope of the status test as applied to land-based employees in Northeast Marine Terminal Co., we rejected the "point of rest" theory proposed by the employer, under which landward coverage under the 1972 Amendments would include only the portion of the unloading process that takes place before longshoremen place the cargo onto the dock. We reasoned that the "point of rest" concept is
[a] theory that nowhere appears in the Act, that was never mentioned by Congress during the legislative process, that does not comport with Congress' intent, and that restricts the coverage of a remedial Act designed to extend coverage….
The absence of the concept, "claimed to be so well known in the industry is both conspicuous and telling." 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 278 -279, 432 U. S. 275. In the same sense, the absence of even the slightest congressional allusion to the "maritime but local" doctrine, a concept that plagued maritime compensation law for over 40 years and that would have the effect of restricting coverage in the face of congressional intent not to "exclude other employees traditionally covered," is equally conspicuous and telling.
Finally, we note that our conclusion concerning the continued coverage of employees injured on actual navigable waters in the course of their employment is consistent with, and supported by, our recent decision in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U. S. 715 (1980). In Sun Ship, the issue before the Court was whether extended shoreside coverage under the 1972 Amendments had the effect of displacing concurrent state remedies for landward injuries. After a review of the development of the "maritime but local" doctrine, and review of certain portions of the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments, we concluded that those Amendments were not intended to resurrect the dilemma, created by mutually exclusive spheres of jurisdiction, that Calbeck and Davis eliminated. Our reasoning was based, in part, on the removal by Congress of the language in the 1927 Act that made federal compensation available if recovery could not validly be provided by state law: "[T]he deletion of that language in 1972 -if it indicates anything -may logically only imply acquiescence in Calbec[k]…." 447 U.S. at 447 U. S. 721.
Sun Ship held that, with respect to land-based injuries, "the… extension of federal jurisdiction supplements, rather than supplants, state compensation law." Id. at 447 U. S. 720. If we were to hold that the addition of the status requirement was meant to exclude from coverage some employees injured on the actual navigable waters in the course of their employment, a most peculiar result would follow. Concurrent jurisdiction will exist with respect to the class of employees to whom Congress extended protection in 1972, while employees "traditionally covered" before 1972 would be faced with a hazardous pre Davis choice of two exclusive jurisdictions from which to seek compensation. Such an anomalous result could not have been intended by Congress. We also note that a return to exclusive spheres of jurisdiction for workers injured upon the actual navigable waters would be inconsistent with express congressional desire to extend LHWCA jurisdiction landward in light of the inadequacy of most state compensation systems. See S.Rep. at 12; H.R.Rep. at 10.
In holding that we can find no congressional intent to affect adversely the pre-1972 coverage afforded to workers injured upon the actual navigable waters in the course of their employment, we emphasize that we in no way hold that Congress meant for such employees to receive LHWCA coverage merely by meeting the situs test, and without any regard to the "maritime employment" language. [ Footnote 32 ] We hold only that, when a worker is injured on the actual navigable waters in the course of his employment on those waters, he satisfies the status requirement in § 2(3), and is covered under the LHWCA, providing, of course, that he is the employee of a statutory "employer," and