Supreme Court Opinions

Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan

Bearden v. Georgia

Civil Rights, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from revoking an indigent defendant’s probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution. Its resolution involves a delicate balance between the acceptability, and indeed wisdom, of considering all relevant factors when determining an appropriate sentence for an individual and the impermissibility of imprisoning a defendant solely because of his lack of financial resources. We conclude that the trial court erred in automatically revoking probation because petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Georgia Court of Appeals upholding the revocation of probation, and remand for a new sentencing determination.

I

In September, 1980, petitioner was indicted for the felonies of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. He pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on October 8, 1980. Pursuant to the Georgia First Offender’s Act, Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2727 et seq. (current version at § 42-8-60 et seq. (Supp.1982)), the trial court did not enter a judgment of guilt, but deferred further proceedings and sentenced petitioner to three years on probation for the burglary charge and a concurrent one year on probation for the theft charge. As a condition of probation, the trial court

Dissent, Federalism

Block v. Board of School Lands

Dissent, Federalism / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, dissenting.

I agree with the Court that the sole remedy available to North Dakota is an action under the Quiet Title Act. Having concluded that Congress has permitted such suits, though, I would not reject the usual rule that statutes of limitation do not bar a sovereign, a rule that is especially appropriate in the context of these cases. Consequently, I dissent.

Since the Quiet Title Act is the sole relief available to North Dakota, we confront the question whether Congress intended the statute of limitations to bar actions by States. The Court resolves the question by invocation of the principle that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed. See ante at 461 U. S. 287. [ Footnote 2/1 ] The question is not that simple.

Although it is indeed true that the Court construes waivers of sovereign immunity strictly, that principle of statutory construction is no more than an aid in the task of determining congressional intent. In a close case, it may help the Court choose between two equally plausible constructions. It cannot, however, grant the Court authority to narrow judicially the waiver that Congress intended. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 444 U. S. 118 (1979); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 350 U. S. 69 (1955). The mere observation that a statute waives sovereign immunity, then, cannot resolve questions of construction. The Court still must consider all indicia of congressional intent. Considering all the evidence,

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist

Beecham v. United States

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Criminal Procedure, David Souter, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Today we construe three provisions of the federal firearms statutes:”It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted… [of] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year… [to possess] any firearm…. ” 18 U. S. C. § 922(g).”What constitutes a conviction… shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” § 921(a)(20) (the choice-oflaw clause).”Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction…. ” Ibid. (the exemption clause).

The question before us is which jurisdiction’s law is to be considered in determining whether a felon “has had civil rights restored” for a prior federal conviction. I

Each of the petitioners was convicted of violating § 922(g).

Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court in North Carolina, Jones in Federal District Court in West Virginia. Beecham’s relevant prior conviction was a 1979 federal conviction in Tennessee, for violating is U. S. C. § 922(h). App. 11. Jones’ prior convictions were two West Virginia state convictions, for breaking and entering and for forgery, and one 1971 federal conviction in Ohio for interstate transportation of a stolen automobile. Id., at 19-20.

Jones had gotten his civil rights restored by West Virginia, so his two West Virginia state convictions were not considered.

Civil Rights, Dissent, John Paul Stevens, William Rehnquist

Atty. Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez

Civil Rights, Dissent, John Paul Stevens, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

The Court today holds unconstitutional the preference in public employment opportunities New York offers to resident wartime veterans who resided in New York when they entered military service. Because I believe that New York’s veterans’ preference scheme is not constitutionally offensive under the Equal Protection Clause, does not penalize some free-floating “right to migrate,” and does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, of the Constitution, I dissent.

I

The plurality’s constitutional analysis runs generally as follows: because the classification imposed by New York’s limited, one-time veterans’ civil service preference “penalizes” appellees’ constitutional “right to migrate,” the preference program must be subjected to heightened scrutiny, which it does not survive because it is insufficiently narrowly tailored to serve its asserted purposes. On the strength of this reasoning, the plurality concludes that the preference program violates both appellees’ constitutional “right to migrate” and their right to equal protection of the law, see ante at 476 U. S. 911, although it does not make clear how much of its analysis is necessary or sufficient to find a violation of the “right to migrate” independently of an Equal Protection Clause violation.

In pursuing this new dual analysis, the plurality simply rejects the equal protection approach the Court has previously

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, Majority, William Rehnquist

Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Civil Rights, Clarence Thomas, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Jill Brown brought a claim for damages against petitioner Bryan County under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. She alleged that a county police officer used

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of New York by Paul A. Crotty, Leonard J. Koerner, and John Hogrogian; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda, James I. Crowley, and Donald B. Ayer; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp.

Ogden N. Lewis, James D. Liss, Vincent T. Chang, Michele S. Warman, and Martha Davis filed a brief for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. excessive force in arresting her, and that the county itself was liable for her injuries based on its sheriff’s hiring and training decisions. She prevailed on her claims against the county following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment against the county on the basis of the hiring claim alone. 67 F.3d 1174 (1995). We granted certiorari. We conclude that the Court of Appeals’ decision cannot be squared with our recognition that, in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to impose liability on a municipality unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658,

Antonin Scalia, Dissent, Due Process, William Rehnquist

Board of Pardons v. Allen

Antonin Scalia, Dissent, Due Process, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA join, dissenting.

Relying on semantics and ignoring altogether the sweeping discretion granted to the Board of Pardons by Montana law, the Court today concludes that respondents had a legitimate expectation of parole sufficient to give rise to an interest protected by procedural due process. Because I conclude that the discretion accorded the Board of Pardons belies any reasonable claim of entitlement to parole, I respectfully dissent.

In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), this Court observed that, to have a protected interest, one

clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.

Id. at 408 U. S. 577. Applying these principles, the Roth Court found that a teacher had no property interest in a renewal of his 1-year contract despite the fact that most teachers hired on a year-to-year basis by the university were rehired. Id. at 408 U. S. 578, n. 16. The Court concluded that the teacher had no legitimate entitlement to continued employment because the discretion of the university officials to renew or not renew such a contract was subject to no “cause” limitations.

The Roth decision teaches that a mere expectation of a benefit -even if that expectation is supported by consistent government practice -is not sufficient to create an interest protected by procedural due

Concurrence, First Amendment

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union

Concurrence, First Amendment / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the plurality that even if obscenity on the Internet is defined in terms of local community standards, respondents have not shown that the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) is overbroad solely on the basis of the variation in the standards of different communities. See ante, at 577579. Like JUSTICE BREYER, however, see post, at 589 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), I write separately to express my views on the constitutionality and desirability of adopting a national standard for obscenity for regulation of the Internet.

The plurality’s opinion argues that, even under local community standards, the variation between the most and least restrictive communities is not so great with respect to the narrow category of speech covered by COPA as to, alone, render the statute substantially overbroad. See ante, at 577-579. I agree, given respondents’ failure to provide examples of materials that lack literary, artistic, political, and scientific value for minors, which would nonetheless result in variation among communities judging the other elements of the test. Respondents’ examples of material for which com munity standards would vary include such things as the appropriateness of sex education and the desirability of adoption by same-sex couples. Brief for Respondents 43. Material addressing the latter topic, however, seems highly unlikely to be seen to appeal to the prurient

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist

Baltimore City DSS v. Bouknight

Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Criminal Procedure, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Majority, William Rehnquist / By

Justice O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this action, we must decide whether a mother, the custodian of a child pursuant to a court order, may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to resist an order of the Juvenile Court to produce the child. We hold that she may not.

I

Petitioner Maurice M. is an abused child. When he was three months old, he was hospitalized with a fractured left femur, and examination revealed several partially healed bone fractures and other indications of severe physical abuse. In the hospital, respondent Bouknight, Maurice’s mother, was observed shaking Maurice, dropping him in his crib despite his spica cast, and otherwise handling him in a manner inconsistent with his recovery and continued health. Hospital personnel notified Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS), petitioner in No. 88-1182, of suspected child abuse. In February, 1987, BCDSS secured a court order removing Maurice from Bouknight’s control and placing him in shelter care. Several months later, the shelter care order was inexplicably modified to return Maurice to Bouknight’s custody temporarily. Following a hearing held shortly thereafter, the Juvenile Court declared Maurice to be a “child in need of assistance,” thus asserting jurisdiction over Maurice and placing him under BCDSS’s continuing oversight. BCDSS agreed that Bouknight could continue as custodian of the child, but only pursuant to extensive conditions set forth in a

Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist

Bennett v. New Jersey

Byron White, Federalism, Harry Blackmun, Majority, Warren Burger, William Brennan, William Rehnquist / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue presented is whether substantive provisions of the 1978 Amendments to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act apply retroactively for determining if Title I funds were misused during the years 1970-1972. This case was previously before the Court, and we then held that the Federal Government may recover misused funds from States that provided assurances that federal grants would be spent only on eligible programs. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773 (1983). We expressly declined, however, to address the retroactive effect of substantive provisions of the 1978 Amendments. Id. at 461 U. S. 781, n. 6, 461 U. S. 782, and n. 7. On remand from our decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the standards of the 1978 Amendments should apply to determine if funds were improperly expended in previous years. State of New Jersey, Dept. of Ed. v. Hufstedler, 724 F.2d 34 (1983). We granted certiorari, 469 U.S. 815 (1984), and we now reverse.

I

Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 241a et seq. (1976 ed.), provided federal grants-in-aid to support compensatory education for disadvantaged children in low-income areas. [ Footnote 1 ] Based on the theory that poverty and low scholastic achievement are closely related, Title I allocated funds to local school districts based on their numbers of impoverished children and the State’s

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Concurrence, Economic Activity

Atherton v. FDIC

Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Concurrence, Economic Activity / By

JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join all of the Court’s opinion, except to the extent that it relies on the notably unhelpful legislative history to 12 U. S. C. § 1821(k). Ante, at 228-230. As the Court cor rectly points out, the most natural reading of the saving clause in § 1821(k) covers both state and federal rights. Ante, at 228. With such plain statutory language in hand, there is no reason to rely on legislative history that is, as the majority recognizes, “not all on one side.” Ante, at 229.