Opinions
Opinions
Supreme Court
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1981 to 2006. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the court.
Post Retirement Opinions
After her retirement from the Supreme Court, Sandra Day O'Connor continued to hear cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a designated judge.
Arizona Appellate Court Opinions
Sandra Day O'Connor served as a judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals from 1980 to 1981. This page lists the opinions she wrote during her time on the state bench.
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JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with much of what the Court has written. But the Court has deliberately declined to come to grips with the crucial threshold issue in this case: is inadequate notice a legitimate defense to a subpoena enforcement action brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission)? If it is not, the Court’s concern that a meaningful notice requirement would impede the EEOC’s investigations is wholly unfounded. The Court clearly suggests it is inclined to answer the question in the negative, see ante at 466 U. S. 65 -66, 466 U. S. 75 -77, but then proceeds on the assumption that the question has not been properly presented or briefed. I believe the question is before us and should be addressed.
While respondent Shell Oil Co. (Shell) has maintained throughout that a subpoena may not be enforced if the notice filed in connection with the investigation was unlawful, the EEOC has not conceded the point. In connection with the statement cited by the Court ante at 466 U. S. 66, n. 17, the EEOC conceded that questions concerning the adequacy of the notice may be raised at the enforcement proceeding. But I find no clear concession here or in the EEOC’s briefs that, if notice is inadequate, a district court should then quash the EEOC’s subpoena. To the contrary, the entire thrust of the EEOC’s position is that investigation should
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this litigation is whether an air carrier’s declared liability limit of $9.07 per pound of cargo is inconsistent with the “Warsaw Convention” [ Footnote 1 ] (Convention), an international air carriage treaty that the United States has ratified. As a threshold matter we must determine whether the 1978 repeal of legislation setting an “official” price of gold in the United States renders the Convention’s gold-based liability limit unenforceable in this country. We conclude that the 1978 legislation was not intended to affect the enforceability of the Convention in the United States, and that a $9.07-per-pound liability limit is not inconsistent with the Convention.
I
In 1974, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) informed international air carriers doing business in the United States that the minimum acceptable carrier liability limit for lost cargo would thenceforth be $9.07 per pound. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), has complied with the CAB order since that time. On March 23, 1979, Franklin Mint Corp. (Franklin Mint) delivered four packages of numismatic materials with a total weight of 714 pounds to TWA for transportation from Philadelphia to London. Franklin Mint made no special declaration of value at the time of delivery. [ Footnote 2 ] The packages were subsequently lost. Franklin Mint brought suit in United States District Court to recover damages in the amount of $250,000. The parties stipulated
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. Unlike the Court, however, I conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear respondent Lydon’s habeas petition at this stage in the ongoing state court proceeding.
The Court suggests that federal habeas jurisdiction exists whenever (i) a state defendant is subject to minimal legal restraints on his freedom and (ii) the defendant has exhausted state avenues of relief with respect to the particular federal claim brought to the habeas court. Then, recognizing that its unadorned test might greatly expand federal habeas jurisdiction, the Court, ante at 466 U. S. 302, emphasizes “the unique nature of the double jeopardy right.” In my view, the Court first unnecessarily expands the holding in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U. S. 345 (1973), and then limits the damage by restricting its exhaustion analysis to double jeopardy claims. I would prefer to search for a more principled understanding of the statutory term “custody.”
Under Massachusetts law, as I read it, Lydon is no longer in custody “pursuant” to the judgment entered at his first trial. Lydon has invoked his right to a second trial and appeared at the second proceeding. Under Massachusetts law, therefore, the results of the first trial -together with any incidental “custody” imposed in consequence of that trial -have already been eliminated. The restraints on Lydon’s freedom now derive not from
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the proper standards for judging a criminal defendant’s contention that the Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because counsel’s assistance at the trial or sentencing was ineffective.
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A
During a 10-day period in September, 1976, respondent planned and committed three groups of crimes, which included three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnaping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, respondent surrendered to police and voluntarily gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third of the criminal episodes. The State of Florida indicted respondent for kidnaping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him.
Counsel actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery. He cut his efforts short, however, and he experienced a sense of hopelessness about the case, when he learned that, against his specific advice, respondent had also confessed to the first two murders. By the date set for trial, respondent was subject to indictment for three counts of first-degree murder and multiple counts of robbery, kidnaping for ransom, breaking and entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery. Respondent waived his right to a jury trial, again acting against counsel’s advice, and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder charges.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, Circuit Justice.
The petitioner in No. 83-1747 is the Superintendent of the Chillicothe Correctional Institute at Chillicothe, Ohio. The respondent is an Ohio prisoner in petitioner’s custody. Respondent applied to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court granted the writ, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Rose v. Engle, 722 F. 2d 1277 (1983). Petitioner challenges that decision in No. 83-1747.
Respondent, who is entitled to a new trial under the Court of Appeals’ ruling, has been ordered released on May 21, 1984, pending retrial. Petitioner seeks a stay of the Court of Appeals’ judgment until this Court completes its consideration of his petition. In deciding whether to grant the requested stay, I am obliged to determine whether four Justices are likely to vote to grant certiorari, to balance the “stay equities,” and to gauge the likely outcome of this Court’s consideration of the case on the merits. See Gregory-Portland Independent School District v. United States, 448 U. S. 1342 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers). I conclude that the stay should be granted.
Respondent was convicted of murder in 1979. At the trial, the prosecutor introduced certain statements that respondent made, after he had invoked his right to silence and to the presence of an attorney, in response to a police officer’s renewed questioning. Petitioner concedes that these
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the State of Arizona from sentencing respondent to death after the life sentence he had initially received was set aside on appeal. We agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona that Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), squarely controls the disposition of this case. Under the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause adopted in that decision, imposition of the death penalty on respondent would be unconstitutional.
I
An Arizona jury convicted respondent of armed robbery and first degree murder. The trial judge, with no jury, then conducted a separate sentencing hearing to determine, according to the statutory scheme for considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703 (Supp.1983-1984), whether death was the appropriate sentence for the murder conviction. Petitioner, relying entirely on the evidence presented at trial, argued that three statutory aggravating circumstances were present. Respondent, presenting only one witness, countered that no aggravating circumstances were present, but that several mitigating circumstances were. One of the principal points of contention concerned the scope of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703(F)(5) (Supp.1983-1984), which defines as an aggravating circumstance the murder’s commission “as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.”
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” These cases present the question whether the Public Use Clause of that Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the State of Hawaii from taking, with just compensation, title in real property from lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State. We conclude that it does not.
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A
The Hawaiian Islands were originally settled by Polynesian immigrants from the western Pacific. These settlers developed an economy around a feudal land tenure system in which one island high chief, the ali’i nui, controlled the land and assigned it for development to certain subchiefs. The subchiefs would then reassign the land to other lower ranking chiefs, who would administer the land and govern the farmers and other tenants working it. All land was held at the will of the ali’i nui and eventually had to be returned to his trust. There was no private ownership of land. See generally Brief for Office of Hawaiian Affairs as Amicus Curiae 3-5.
Beginning in the early 1800’s, Hawaiian leaders and American settlers repeatedly attempted to divide the lands of the kingdom among the crown, the chiefs, and the common people. These efforts proved largely unsuccessful, however,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether ultimate consumers of dairy products may obtain judicial review of milk market orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (Act), ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. We conclude that consumers may not obtain judicial review of such orders.
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A
In the early 1900’s, dairy farmers engaged in intense competition in the production of fluid milk products. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 396 U. S. 172 -176 (1969). To bring this destabilizing competition under control, the 1937 Act authorizes the Secretary to issue milk market orders setting the minimum prices that handlers (those who process dairy products) must pay to producers (dairy farmers) for their milk products. 7 U.S.C. § 608c. The “essential purpose [of this milk market order scheme is] to raise producer prices,” S.Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1935), and thereby to ensure that the benefits and burdens of the milk market are fairly and proportionately shared by all dairy farmers. See Nebba v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 291 U. S. 517 -518 (1934).
Under the scheme established by Congress, the Secretary must conduct an appropriate rulemaking proceeding before issuing a milk market order. The public must be notified of these proceedings and provided an opportunity for public hearing and comment. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(3).
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this original action, the State of Colorado seeks an equitable apportionment of the waters of the Vermejo River, an interstate river fully appropriated by users in the State of New Mexico. A Special Master, appointed by this Court, initially recommended that Colorado be permitted a diversion of 4,000 acre-feet per year. Last Term, we remanded for additional factual findings on five specific issues. 459 U. S. 459 U.S. 176 (1982). The case is before us again on New Mexico’s exceptions to these additional findings. We now conclude that Colorado has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that a diversion should be permitted. Accordingly, we sustain New Mexico’s exceptions and dismiss the case.
I
The facts of this litigation were set forth in detail in our opinion last Term, see id. at 459 U. S. 178 -183, and we need recount them here only briefly. The Vermejo River is a small, nonnavigable stream, originating in the snow belt of the Rocky Mountains. The river flows southeasterly into New Mexico for roughly 55 miles before feeding into the Canadian River. Though it begins in Colorado, the major portion of the Vermejo River is located in New Mexico. Its waters historically have been used exclusively by farm and industrial users in that State.
In 1975, however, a Colorado corporation, Colorado Fuel and Iron Steel Corp. (C. F. & I.), proposed to divert water from the Vermejo River for industrial and other uses in
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
This case presents the question whether the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) may nullify a motor carrier tariff at any time after it has become effective. Such nullification renders the carrier liable to shippers for the amount by which the rejected rate exceeds the last rate the carrier has lawfully filed. The Court quite correctly reasons that 49 U.S.C. § 10762(e) does not authorize the Commission to reject effective tariffs. See ante at 467 U. S. 361 -364. Reading § 10762(e) to authorize such action would indeed give the Commission an “unbridled discretion” that Congress did not intend it to have. See ante at 467 U. S. 363. However, after having correctly rejected § 10762(e) as a basis for the proposed rejection power, the Court then mysteriously concludes that the power is within the Commission’s “discretionary power” to ensure that shippers adhere strictly to their approved rate bureau agreements. Ante at 467 U. S. 367. I frankly do not understand how this alternative “discretionary power” rationale better reins in the Commission’s discretion. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
The Court starts with the proposition that the enumeration of certain Commission powers in the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., does not necessarily exclude others not expressly listed. See ante at 467 U. S. 364 -365. I have no quarrel with that proposition. Like
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
Rules concerning preservation of evidence are generally matters of state, not federal constitutional, law. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348, 393 U. S. 352 -353 (1969). The failure to preserve breath samples does not render a prosecution fundamentally unfair, and thus cannot render breath analysis tests inadmissible as evidence against the accused. Id. at 393 U. S. 356. Similarly, the failure to employ alternative methods of testing blood alcohol concentrations is of no due process concern, both because persons are presumed to know their rights under the law and because the existence of tests not used in no way affects the fundamental fairness of the convictions actually obtained. I understand the Court to state no more than these well-settled propositions. Accordingly, I join both its opinion and judgment.
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
The various views presented in the opinions in these cases reflect the unusual procedural posture of the cases and the difficulties inherent in allocating the burdens of recession and fiscal austerity. I concur in the Court’s treatment of these difficult issues, and write separately to reflect my understanding of what the Court holds today.
I
To appreciate the Court’s disposition of the mootness issue, it is necessary to place these cases in their complete procedural perspective. The parties agree that the District Court and the Court of Appeals were presented with a “case or controversy” in every sense contemplated by Art. III of the Constitution. Respondents, as trial plaintiffs, initiated the dispute, asking the District Court preliminarily to enjoin the City from reducing the percentage of minority employees in various job classifications within the Fire Department. Petitioners actively opposed that motion, arguing that respondents had waived any right to such relief in the consent decree itself and, in any event, that the reductions in force were bona fide applications of the city-wide seniority system. When the District Court held against them, petitioners followed the usual course of obeying the injunction and prosecuting an appeal. They were, however, unsuccessful on that appeal.
Respondents now claim that the cases have become moot on certiorari to this Court. The recession is over, the employees who were laid off or demoted have been
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court held unconstitutional, because inherently compelled, the admission of statements derived from in-custody questioning not preceded by an explanation of the privilege against self-incrimination and the consequences of forgoing it. Today, the Court concludes that overriding considerations of public safety justify the admission of evidence -oral statements and a gun -secured without the benefit of such warnings. Ante at 467 U. S. 657 -658. In so holding, the Court acknowledges that it is departing from prior precedent, see ante at 467 U. S. 653, and that it is “lessen[ing] the desirable clarity of [the Miranda ] rule,” ante at 467 U. S. 658. Were the Court writing from a clean slate, I could agree with its holding. But Miranda is now the law and, in my view, the Court has not provided sufficient justification for departing from it or for blurring its now clear strictures. Accordingly, I would require suppression of the initial statement taken from respondent in this case. On the other hand, nothing in Miranda or the privilege itself requires exclusion of nontestimonial evidence derived from informal custodial interrogation, and I therefore agree with the Court that admission of the gun in evidence is proper. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
I
Prior to Miranda, the privilege against self-incrimination had not been applied to an accused’s statements secured during
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are two public defenders working in the State of Oregon. Petitioner Bruce Tower, the Douglas County Public Defender, represented respondent Billy Irl Glover at one of Glover’s state trials on robbery charges, at which Glover was convicted. Petitioner Gary Babcock, the Oregon State Public Defender, represented Glover in Glover’s unsuccessful state court appeal from this and at least one other conviction.
In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Glover alleges that petitioners conspired with various state officials, including the trial and appellate court judges and the former Attorney General of Oregon, to secure Glover’s conviction. Glover seeks neither reversal of his conviction nor compensatory damages, but asks instead for $5 million in punitive damages to be awarded against each petitioner. App. 5, 9. We conclude that public defenders are not immune from liability in actions brought by a criminal defendant against state public defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state officials to deprive the § 1983 plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.
I
Glover was arrested on February 1, 1976, in Del Norte County, Cal. Pet. for Cert. in Glover v. Dolan, O.T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. 3. The State of California extradited Glover to Benton County, Ore., on December 6, 1976. [ Footnote 1 ] Upon arriving in Oregon, Glover immediately filed for habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, seeking, apparently,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
At issue in this case are several questions arising from the application of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) to an employer’s treatment of its undocumented alien employees. We first determine whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) may properly find that an employer engages in an unfair labor practice by reporting to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) certain employees known to be undocumented aliens in retaliation for their engaging in union activity, thereby causing their immediate departure from the United States. We then address the validity of the Board’s remedial order as modified by the Court of Appeals.
I
Petitioners are two small leather processing firms located in Chicago that, for purposes of the Act, constitute a single integrated employer. In July, 1976, a union organization drive was begun. Eight employees signed cards authorizing the Chicago Leather Workers Union, Local 431, Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (Union), to act as their collective bargaining representative. Of the 11 employees then employed by petitioners, most were Mexican nationals present illegally in the United States without visas or immigration papers authorizing them to work. The Union ultimately prevailed in a Board election conducted on December 10, 1976.
Two hours after the election, petitioners’ president, John Surak, addressed a group of employees, including
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join all of the Court’s opinion except for Part 467 U. S. ante at 467 U. S. 1013, that “EPA’s consideration or disclosure of data submitted by Monsanto to the agency prior to October 22, 1972,… does not effect a taking.” In my view, public disclosure of pre-1972 data would effect a taking. As to consideration of this information within EPA in connection with other license applications not submitted by Monsanto, I believe we should remand to the District Court for further factual findings concerning Monsanto’s expectations regarding interagency uses of trade secret infol mation prior to 1972.
It is important to distinguish at the outset public disclosure of trade secrets from use of those secrets entirely within EPA. Internal use may undermine Monsanto’s competitive position within the United States, but it leaves Monsanto’s position in foreign markets undisturbed. As the Court notes, ante at 467 U. S. 1007, n. 11, the likely impact on foreign market position is one that Monsanto would weigh when deciding whether to submit trade secrets to EPA. Thus, a submission of trade secrets to EPA that implicitly consented to further use of the information within the agency is not necessarily the same as one that implicitly consented to public disclosure.
It seems quite clear -indeed, the Court scarcely disputes -that public disclosure of trade secrets submitted to the Federal Government before 1972 was neither permitted
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in JUSTICE REHNQUIST’s dissent, I believe the Court should address the double jeopardy question decided by the Court of Appeals. I also agree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST that the Court of Appeals’ ruling should be vacated and the case remanded for further consideration in light of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974). In my view, however, the Court of Appeals’ double jeopardy holding should be vacated simply on the ground that jeopardy does not attach in the first tier of a “two-tier” criminal trial.
Two-tier systems for adjudicating less serious criminal cases such as traffic offenses are extremely common. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, 407 U. S. 112, n. 4 (1972). Indeed, this is our second occasion this Term to review double jeopardy problems arising out of a two-tier trial. See Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U. S. 294 (1984). Mississippi’s two-tier system is fairly typical. A defendant convicted in a Mississippi justice of the peace court has an absolute right to a trial de novo if he chooses to appeal his conviction. See Calhoun v. City of Meridian, 355 F.2d 209, 211 (CA5 1966); Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-1 et seq. (1972). In Mississippi, as in Kentucky,
a defendant can bypass the inferior court simply by pleading guilty and erasing immediately thereafter any consequence that would otherwise follow from tendering the plea.
Colten v. Kentucky, supra, at 407 U. S. 119
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
The question in this case is whether the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) adopted an erroneous interpretation of law when it concluded that commercial paper is not a “security” under, and hence is not subject to the proscriptions of, §§ 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 48 Stat. 184, 189, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 Seventh and 378(a)(1). The area of banking law in which this question arises is as specialized and technical as the financial world it governs, and the relevant statutes are far from clear or easy to interpret. The question is accordingly one on which this Court must give substantial deference to the Board’s construction. Because of the Board’s expertise and experience in this complicated area of law, and because of its extensive responsibility for administering the federal banking laws, the Board’s interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act must be sustained unless it is unreasonable. No. 83-614, Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, post at 468 U. S. 217, and n. 16; Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 401 U. S. 626 -627 (1971); See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 467 U. S. 844 -845 (1984); Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute, 450 U. S. 46, 450 U. S. 56 -58 (1981); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1976, the citizens of New Jersey amended their State Constitution to permit the legislative authorization of casino gambling within the municipality of Atlantic City. [ Footnote 1 ] Determined to prevent the infiltration of organized crime into its nascent casino industry and to assure public trust in the industry’s integrity, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Casino Control Act (Act), N.J.Stat.Ann. § 5:12-1 et seq. (West Supp.1983-1984), which provides for the comprehensive regulation of casino gambling, including the regulation of unions representing industry employees. Sections 86 and 93 of the Act specifically impose certain qualification criteria on officials of labor organizations representing casino industry employees. Those labor organizations with officials found not to meet these standards may be prohibited from receiving dues from casino industry employees and prohibited from administering pension and welfare funds. The principal question presented by these cases is whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., precludes New Jersey from imposing these criteria on those whom casino industry employees may select as officials of their bargaining representatives. We hold that it does not.
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A
The advent of casino gambling in New Jersey was heralded with great expectations for the economic revitalization of the Atlantic City region, but with equally great fears for the
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I and III of the Court’s opinion, which set out the facts and reject the vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the Minnesota statute. With respect to Part II-A of the Court’s opinion, I agree with the Court that the Jaycees cannot claim a right of association deriving from this Court’s cases concerning “marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 424 U. S. 713 (1976). Those cases, “while defying categorical description,” ibid., identify certain zones of privacy in which certain personal relationships or decisions are protected from government interference. Whatever the precise scope of the rights recognized in such cases, they do not encompass associational rights of a 295,000-member organization whose activities are not “private” in any meaningful sense of that term.
I part company with the Court over its First Amendment analysis in Part II-B of its opinion. I agree with the Court that application of the Minnesota law to the Jaycees does not contravene the First Amendment, but I reach that conclusion for reasons distinct from those offered by the Court. I believe the Court has adopted a test that unadvisedly casts doubt on the power of States to pursue the profoundly important goal of ensuring nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our society. At the same time, the Court has adopted an approach
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Parents of black public school children allege in this nationwide class action that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. They assert that the IRS thereby harms them directly and interferes with the ability of their children to receive an education in desegregated public schools. The issue before us is whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. We hold that they do not.
I
The IRS denies tax-exempt status under §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) -and hence eligibility to receive charitable contributions deductible from income taxes under §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2) -to racially discriminatory private schools. Rev.Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum.Bull. 230. [ Footnote 1 ] The IRS policy requires that a school applying for tax-exempt status show that it
admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs.
Ibid. To carry out this policy, the IRS has established guidelines and procedures
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, II, and IV of the Court’s opinion, and agree with substantial portions of Part III as well.
I agree with the Court that the installation of a beeper in a container with the consent of the container s present owner implicates no Fourth Amendment concerns. The subsequent transfer of the container, with the unactivated beeper, to one who is unaware of the beeper’s presence is also unobjectionable. It is when the beeper is activated to track the movements of the container that privacy interests are implicated.
In my view, however, these privacy interests are unusually narrow -narrower than is suggested by the Court in 468 U. S. If the container is moved on the public highways, or in other places where the container’s owner has no reasonable expectation that its movements will not be tracked without his consent, activation of the beeper infringes on no reasonable expectation of privacy. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983). In this situation, the location of the container defeats any expectation that its movements will not be tracked.
In addition, one who lacks ownership of the container itself or the power to move the container at will can have no reasonable expectation that the movements of the container will not be tracked by a beeper within the container, regardless of where the container is moved. In this situation, the absence of an appropriate
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, concurring.
The courts of this country quite properly share the responsibility for protecting the constitutional rights of those imprisoned for the commission of crimes against society. Thus, when a prisoner’s property is wrongfully destroyed, the courts must ensure that the prisoner, no less than any other person, receives just compensation. The Constitution, as well as human decency, requires no less. The issue in these cases, however, does not concern whether a prisoner may recover damages for a malicious deprivation of property. Rather, these cases decide only what is the appropriate source of the constitutional right and the remedy that corresponds with it. I agree with the Court’s treatment of these issues, and therefore join its opinion and judgment today. I write separately to elaborate my understanding of why the complaint in this litigation does not state a ripe constitutional claim.
The complaint alleges three types of harm under the Fourth Amendment: invasion of privacy from the search, temporary deprivation of the right to possession from the seizure, and permanent deprivation of the right to possession as a result of the destruction of the property. The search and seizure allegations can be handled together. They would state a ripe Fourth Amendment claim if, on the basis of the facts alleged, they showed that government officials had acted unreasonably. The Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” determination is generally conducted on a case-by-case
JUSTICE O’CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part V, in which JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined.*
This litigation requires us to decide whether an admission of unlawful presence in this country made subsequently to an allegedly unlawful arrest must be excluded as evidence in a civil deportation hearing. We hold that the exclusionary rule need not be applied in such a proceeding.
I
Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both citizens of Mexico, were summoned to separate deportation proceedings in California and Washington, and both were ordered deported. They challenged the regularity of those proceedings on grounds related to the lawfulness of their respective arrests by officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an agency of the Department of Justice, affirmed the deportation orders.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed Sandoval-Sanchez’ deportation order and vacated and remanded Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation order. 705 F.2d 1059 (1983). It ruled that Sandoval-Sanchez’ admission of his illegal presence in this country was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and that the exclusionary rule applied in a deportation proceeding. Lopez-Mendoza’s deportation order was vacated and his case remanded to
JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins, concurring.
I concur in the Court’s opinion and judgment that, on the facts of this case, the city of Duncanville is justly compensated by the payment of the market value for the sanitary landfill that was condemned by the Government. I write separately to note that I do not read the Court’s opinion to preclude a municipality or other local governmental entity from establishing that payment of market value in a particular case is manifestly unjust and therefore inconsistent with the Just Compensation Clause. See ante at 469 U. S. 29. When a local governmental entity can prove that the market value of its property deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by the Just Compensation Clause and that a substitute facility must be acquired to continue to provide an essential service, limiting compensation to the fair market value in my view would be manifestly unjust. Because the city of Duncanville did not establish that the market value in this case deviated significantly from the indemnity principle, I agree that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.